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THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS, 1975-1985 



Li nton Wei Is 



VOX LIBRARY 
^GRADUATE SCHOOL' 
CALIFORNIA 03940 



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daaNia asv~ 




THE 

JOHNS HOPKINS 

UNIVERSITY 



THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS, 1975-1985 

by 
Linton Wells II 



Baltimore, Maryland 21218 



, 93*44 



THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS, 1975-1985 



by 
Linton Wells II 



A dissertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins 
University in conformity with the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 

Baltimore, Maryland 
1975 



7Z. 



'^-^ 







Copyright 1975 
Linton Wells II 



11 



ABSTRACT 

Recent changes in military technology, commercial ocean 
uses and the law of the sea are examined in relation to their 
impact on seapower over the next decade. It is concluded that 
technical developments will significantly narrow the alternatives 
available to political decision makers during this period. In 
addition, the foundations of the freedom of the seas are rapidly 
being eroded, there are signs of increasing disorder at sea, and 
the utility of great power naval vessels as instruments of 
diplomacy may decline. 

Elements of Japan's strategic interests and the status of 
the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) as of late 1974 are 
reviewed. Some potential changes in these interests and in 
the constraints on the armed services are outlined. Particular 
attention is given to pressures for and against a wider security 
role in the Western Pacific. Existing evidence suggests more 
continuity than change in Japanese foreign policy over the next 
several years. 

The elements of seapower outlined in Part One then are 
applied to the strategic interests which were noted in Part Two. 
Japan's need for a balance of power at the global, regional and 
local levels is discussed, along with the role of naval forces 



Ill 



in securing such conditions. Some suggestions axe made for 
future MSDF force structures. The concepts of protective, 
acquisitive and suasive commercial seapower are introduced, and 
Japan's potential is examined in each role. Though chances for 
suasion will he limited, maritime activities can offer some 
increase in Japan's resilience to foreign pressures. Her 
marine-related expertise and capital stocks also will he well- 
suited to acquire a wide variety of goods and services and to 
take advantage of new ocean development opportunities. 



To my Parents 
who have given me every opportunity 
and 
The United States Navy 
which has given me this one. 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This paper was begun during a month's visit to Japan 
in January 1973 a^ continued in Baltimore and Tokyo during 1973 
and 1974* A trip to nine countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania 
from May to July 1974 offered many additional insights into 
Japan's image abroad and into coastal state perceptions of sea- 
power. 

A letter of introduction from the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., DSN, to the Chief of the Maritime 
Staff, Admiral Samejima Hiroichi, JMSDF, established many of the 
contacts which made the project possible, i am deeply grateful 
to both leaders for their interest and support. 

It is impossible to personally acknowledge each of those 
who gave their time and assistance for this study. However, 
particular thanks must go to five individuals without whose help 
much less could have been accomplished. Miss Hakai Yoko of the 
United States Information Service, Tokyo, provided introductions, 
translations, source materials and encouragement. Her friendship 
and enthusiasm were among the highlights of this research. 

Mr. Taoka Shunji, defense correspondent for Asahi Shimbun , 
has been an invaluable source of information on a remarkable 
range of subjects extending far beyond Japanese strategic studies. 



VI 



The hospitality which he and his wife Noriko have shown me both 
in Japan and the United States is unforgettable. 

Dr. Tsunoda Jun of the National Diet Library began my 
education in Japanese security problems during my first research 
visit. His perception and experience have been invaluable. 

Vice Admiral Kitamura Kenichi, JMSDF (Ret.), offered basic 
insights and corrected misconceptions from the beginning of the 
project. He also took time from an extremely busy schedule to 
review parts of the manuscript. 

Captain Yamazumi Akira, JT.ISDF, Head of the Foreign Liaison 
section of the Maritime Staff Office, was instrumental in 
arranging many interviews and made available a variety of useful 
services. His cheerfulness and attention to detail overcame 
several periods of discouragement. 

Dr. Robert W. Tucker of the Johns Hopkins University guided 
the overall study, as well as most of my post-graduate education. 
His criticisms have been useful both in style and substance. Dr. 
George Liska posed many of the questions from which the seapower 
section was developed and was second reader for the thesis. Dr. 
Ann L. Hollick of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter- 
national Studies initiated my interest in ocean policy and law of 
the sea issues. 

While in Tokyo, I was attached to the Defense Attache Office 
in the American Embassy. Captain Wilton L. Atkinson, USN, and his 
successor as Naval Attache, Captain Marvin L. Duke, USN, offered 



VI 1 



the support and assistance of their staffs. I am particularly 
grateful to Commander John S. Viccelio, USN, for his comments 
and advice. 

Dr. Abraham M. Halpern of George Washington University's 
Sino-Soviet Institute, Commander Michael MccGwire, RN (Ret.), 
Mr. Odani Kosuke of the Japan Marine Science and Technology 
Center, Commander Seno Sadao, JMSDF, Dr. Kenneth R. Stunkel of 
Monmouth College, Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, JMSDF (Ret.), Captain 
Don Walsh, USN, and Mr. Gerard P. Yoest of the American 
Institute of Merchant Shipping were kind enough to read various 
drafts of the paper and offered important criticisms. 

Particular appreciation also is due to Lieutenant Commander 
James E. Auer, USN; Lieutenant Commander Pukui Shizuo, IJN; Mr. 
Roy A. Mlynarchik, Head of the Press Translation Branch of the 
American Embassy, Tokyo; Dr. Okuhara Toshio of Kokusikan Univer- 
sity; Commander Sekino Hideo, I JIT; Captain Yamaguchi Kaiji, 
JMSDF, of the Maritime Staff College; and Mr. Yamato Kuril tami of 
the Maritime Administration, American Embassy, Tokyo. 

The Southeast Asia trip would not have been possible with- 
out the active support of the Defense and Naval Attaches at the 
American Embassies in Taipei, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, 
Singapore, Jakarta, Canberra and Wellington. In addition to 
giving their own assessments, they arranged contacts, transpor- 
tation and other valuable assistance. 

Words are insufficient to express my gratitude to Mr. 



Vlll 



Takahashi Tsutomu and his wife Takako. During each of my visits 
to Japan they have opened their house to me and have given me 
a greater appreciation of their country than they can ever know. 

My parents, as usual, were my most thorough and construc- 
tive critics. Any stylistic continuity in the paper is mainly 
due to their efforts. Mr. David Wilson's help with the bibli- 
ography also was greatly appreciated. 

Finally, thanks are due to Mrs. Catherine Grover. Despite 
last-minute revisions and indecipherable handwriting, she 
finished typing the smooth draft with time to spare. 



IX 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Eaga 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v 

LIST OF TABLES xiii 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xv 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xvi 

INTRODUCTION 1 

Part I: The Changing Nature of Seapower 
Chapter 

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 5 

One: TECHNOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY NAVAL OPERATIONS ... 10 

The Nature of Military Innovations 10 

Tactical Developments 15 

Anti-Ship Missiles 16 

Aircraft vs Surface Ships 27 

Other Tactical Innovations 31 

Strategic Developments 35 

Submarine vs Anti-Submarine 35 

Sealift and Airlift 40 

Other Strategic Innovations 45 

Environment-Level Developments 46 

Real-Time Ocean Surveillance Systems .... 46 

Command Control Communications 58 

Two: THE CHANGING USES OF THE OCEAN 60 

Merchant Shipping 61 

The GroY,rth of Tankers and Bulk Carriers . . 64 

Containerization 67 

Barges, Barge Carriers and RO/ROs 69 

LNG Carriers and OBOs 71 

Fisheries 71 

Non-Living Marine Resources 74 

Alluvial and Continental Shelf Minerals . . 74 

Offshore Hydrocarbons 75 

Deep Seabed Mining 81 

The Extraction of Materials from Seawater ... 86 

Ocean Engineering Structures 89 

Conclusion 93 



Three: THE UNSETTLED MARINE POLITICAL CLIMATE 95 

The Foundations of Freedom of the Seas .... 95 

The Barbary Corsairs (1500-1830) 97 

The Chinese Pirates M 832-1 869} ...... 99 

The Slave Traders (1807-1890) ...... 102 

Summary 104 

The Current Status of Maritime Politics .... 107 

The Limitations on Global Naval Force ... 107 

Extended Coastal State Claims 110 

The Regime of the Deep Seabed 123 

Shipping 124 

Conclusion 132 

Four: THE OCEAN SETTING 1975-85 134 

Signs of Disorder 135 

The Changing Character of the Oceans .... 135 

Asymmetrical Acceptabilities of Force ... 137 

Current Weapons Technology 139 

Diminished Freedom of the Seas 140 

The Use of Force at Sea 140 



Part II: The Setting of Japan's Seapovrer: 
Purposes, Problems and Prospects 



Five: JAPANESE INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC THINKING 1974 - • 151 

The Physical Security of the Japanese People . 154 

The Setting 154 

Diplomatic Security 159 

Military Security 173 

The Maintenance of Economic Well-Being .... 177 

International Measures 177 

Domestic Measures 187 

Preservation of Political Autonomy/ 

Independence 1 91 

Contributions to the Development of the 

International System 192 

Six: THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MARITIME SELF- 

DEFENSE FORCE AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON ITS 

DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 194 

The Current Status of the MSDF 194 

Domestic Constraints 205 

Constitutional-Political 205 

Bureaucratic 210 



XI 



Economic and Industrial 211 

Manpower 217 

Logistical 218 

International Constraints 219 

Great Power Reactions 219 

Developing Country Reactions 220 

Summary 221 

Seven: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTRAINTS 222 

Domestic Issues 222 

An Uncertain Future 222 

Japanese Militarism 2J1 

The Quest for a Satisfying World Role . . . 236 

External Changes 238 

The People's Republic of China 238 

The Soviet Union 241 

The United States ..... 242 

Other States 244 

Changes and Continuities in Maritime Affairs . 245 

A Twelve-Mile Territorial Sea 246 

200-Mile Economic Zone 248 

Oceanic States and the "World Lake" .... 253 

Summary 255 



Part III: The Sea and Japan's Strategic Interests 

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 258 

Eight: THE MILITARY DIMENSION—FART I: GLOEAL 

AND REGIONAL INTERESTS 259 

The Global Balance 259 

Regional Balances 264 

Options Involving the United States .... 265 
Options Involving Countries Other than 

the U.S., or Multi-Lateral Ties 272 

Other Regional Considerations 280 

Nine: THE MILITARY DIMENSION—PART II: THE 

LOCAL BALANCE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 284 

Patterns of Threats 284 

Direct Threats to the National Territory . . 286 
Direct Threats to the Sea Lines of 

Communications 300 

Mine Warfare 313 



Xll 



Divisive/intimidating Actions 315 

Threats which Promote Revolution 

or Social Unrest 318 

Defense of the Economic Zone 319 

Naval Power as a Bargaining Chip 321 

Summary 322 

Ten: THE NON-MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF JAPANESE 

SEAPOWER 324 

The Scope of Japan's Commercial Ocean 

Interests 325 

Shipping 325 

Shipbuilding 330 

Fisheries 332 

Whaling 338 

Ocean Development 340 

Japan's Organization for Maritime Development . 346 

Non-Military Seapower and Japan's Interests . . 355 

Protective Maritime Ventures 355 

Acquisitive Maritime Ventures 358 

Suasive Measures 36O 



CONCLUSION 363 

APPENDIX OIK: UNITS CONVERSION TABLE 368 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 370 



Xlll 



LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

1-1 Anti-Ship Missiles, Surface and Subsurface 

Launched (SSM) 17 

1-2 Diffusion of Missile Launchers (Estimated) .... 19 

1-3 Air-to-Surface Missiles and Homing Ordnance .... 29 

2-1 Composition of the World Merchant Fleet 61 

2-2 Comparison of the Carrying Capacity of the 
World Merchant Fleet by Basic Ship 

Types 1967-1972 63 

2-3 Leading Offshore Petroleum and Natural 

Gas Producers 78 

2-4 Nodule Metal Production 84 

2-5 Potential Uses of Multi-Purpose Offshore 

Islands and Platforms 90 

2-6 Ocean-Atmosphere Energy Systems 92 

3-1 Hank Order of Seabed Areal Allocations 118 

3-2 Ocean Resource Potentials 119 

3-3 Composition of World Trade 1960-1970 128 

5-1 Japanese Strategic Regions — 1972 

Resources Supply 1 67 

5-2 Japanese Strategic Regions — Trade 168 

5-3 Japanese Strategic Regions — Investments 169 

5-4 Livestock Slaughtered 178 

6-1 The Composition of the Maritime Self- 

Defense Force 194 



XIV 



Table Page 

6-2 Summary of the First to Fourth Defense 

Power Consolidation Programs , 198 

6-3 Some Comparisons of Blue-7/ater Naval Strengths . . 204 

6-4 Company Reasons for Accepting Unprofitable 

Defense Contracts 214 

8-1 Foreign Naval Construction by Japanese 

Shipyards 278 

9-1 Soviet Pacific Amphibious Assets 293 

9-2 A Comparison of Swedish, German and 

Japanese Defense Forces . 298 

9~3 A Comparison of Submarine and ASW Assets 

in the North Atlantic and North Pacific 

in 1974 and 1980 305 

9-4 Japanese Domestic Transportation Shares ...... 314 

10-1 Possible Nodule Metals Production as a 

Percent of 1972 Japanese Demand 357 



XV 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure Page 

2-1 Seabed Mining Activities 76 

2-2 Coastal Regions with Inadequate Fresh 

Water Supplies 88 

5-1 Japan in Asia 156 

5-2 Japan's Exploration Effort (Petroleum) 185 

6-1 Organization of the Liar i time Self- 

Defense Force 196 

6-2 MSDF Bases and Installations 197 

6-3 The Southeast and Southwest Route Zones 202 

7-1 A 200-Mile Japanese Claim Showing 

Disputed Areas 249 

7-2 Disputed Seabed Areas on the East China 

Coast and Yellow Sea Continental Shelf 251 

7-5 Japan's Share of a Partitioned Ocean 254 

8-1 Northwest Pacific Cloud Cover 270 

9-1 Japanese Air Defense Radar Coverage 289 

10-1 Organizational Relationships in Sumitomo 

Lianganese Nodule Mining 349 



XVI 



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 



ADAV/S 

ADIZ 

AEW 

AF 

ARM 

ASDF 

ASM 

ASW 

AWACS 



Action Data Automation Weapons System (U.K.) 

Air Defense Identification Zone 

Airborne Early Warning (Aircraft) 

Air Force 

Anti-Radiation Missile 

Air Self-Defense Force (Japan) 

Air-to-Surface Missile 

Ant i -Submarine Warfare 

Airborne Warning and Control System 



BCAS 

BMEWS 



Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 



C 

CIC 
CLB 
CNSP 
CSE 

CTS 

CVAN 



Command Control Communications 

Combat Information Center 

Continuous Line Bucket System 

Council on National Security Problems (japan) 

Central Studies Establishment (Australia) 

Central Terminal Storage (for Petroleum) 

Attack Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear powered 



DDG 

DDH 

DOLIA 

DPRK 

DPRV 

dwt 



Guided Missile Destroyer 

Helicopter Destroyer 

Deep Ocean Minerals Association 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) 

Democratic People's .Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) 

Deadweight Tons 



ECCM 

ECM 

ECOR 

EEC 

ELINT 

EUSC 

EW 



Electronic Counter-Countermeasures 
Electronic Countermeasures 
Engineering Committee on Ocean Resources 
European Economic Community 
Electronic Intelligence 
Effective U.S. Control Fleet 
Electronic Warfare 



F4 

F4EJ 

F5 

F104 

FAO 
FB 



U.S. Phantom II Fighter-Bomber 

Japanese Variant of U.S. F4 

U.S. Fighter Aircraft primarily built for export 

U.S. "Starfighter" Aircraft 

United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization 

Fighter-Bomber 



XV11 



FBM 

FEER 

FY 

GNP 

GRT 
GSDF 



Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Fax Eastern Economic Review 
Fiscal Year 

Gross National Product 
Gross Registered Tons 
Ground Self -Defense Force 



ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IDR International Defense Review 

IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) 

IJN Imperial Japanese Navy 

ITI International Trade and Industry (see MITl) 

IWC International Whaling Commission 

JAMS TEC Japan Marine Science and Technology Center 

JDA Japan Defense Agency 

JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force 

JOIA Japan Ocean Industries Association 

JSP Japan Socialist Party 

LASH Lighter Aboard Ship 

LCT Landing Craft, Tank 

LCU Landing Craft, Utility 

LDP Liberal Democratic Party (japan) 

LNG Liquified Natural Gas 

LPG Liquified Petroleum Gas 

LRI.EP Long-Range Marine Patrol Aircraft 

LSM Landing Ship, Medium 

LST Landing Ship, Tank 

LSV Landing Ship, Vehicle 

MDIJ Marine Development in Japan 1972 

MDN Mainichi Daily News 

MDP Marine Development Program of Japan, Fiscal Year 1974 

MIG Common designation for aircraft designed by Mikoyan 

of the USSR 

MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry (japan) 

MOBS Mobile Ocean Basing System (U.S. Navy) 

MSA Maritime Safety Agency (Japan) 

MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japan) ; also JMSDF 

MTS Marine Technology Society (U.S.A.) 

NADGE NATO Air Defense Ground Environment 

NKIW Nihon Keizai Shimbun International Weekly 

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty 

NTDS Naval Tactical Data System 

0B0 Oil/Bulk/Ore Carrier 

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 



XVI 11 



OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 

OTH Over-the-Horizon (Radars) 

OTH-B Over-the-Horizon Backseat ter radars 



PFLP 

PIRAZ 

PRC 

PT 

PXL 

RAN 
ROC 
ROK 
RO/RO 

RPV 



Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 

Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone 

People's Republic of China 

Patrol Torpedo Boat 

New Anti-Submarine Patrol Aircraft (japan) 

Royal Australian Navy 
Republic of China ( Taiwan) 
Republic of Korea (s . Korea) 
Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships 
Remotely Piloted Vehicles 



SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

SAM Surface- to- Air Missile 

SAR Search and Rescue 

SDF Self-Defense Force (japan) 

SENIT Syste'me d'Exploitation Navale des Informations 

Tactiques 

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

SLAR Side-Looking Airborne Radar 

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 

SODECO Sumitomo Ocean Development and Engineering Company 



SSM 
SSN 
SSPP 



Surface- to-Surf ace Missile 
Nuclear Powered Submarine 
Solar Sea Power Plant 



ULCC Ultra-Large Crude Carrier 

USA United States Army 

USN United States Navy 

USNI United States Naval Institute (Annapolis) 

USNIP United States Naval Institute Proceedings 

USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey 

VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier 

V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (Aircraft) 

VTOL Vertical Take-off and Landing (Aircraft) 



INTRODUCTION 

This paper will examine Japan 1 s ability to influence other 
states, and to protect herself from their influence, through the 
use of the seas. The scope of these uses, which together com- 
prise a nation's seapower, is broader than usually realized. 

The last few years have seen changes in naval technology 
and marine industries which will have a world-wide impact. In 
some fields, operational capabilities have exceeded the ability 
of governments to regulate them. In others, expansions of 
jurisdiction have outpaced the capacity for both exploitation 
and enforcement. For a few activities entirely new transnational 
institutions have been proposed. 

In any case, politics and technology are inextricably 
entwined in ocean affairs. The reader therefore is asked to be 
patient with what may seem excessive technical detail. An effort 

has been made to include only that which is needed to understand 
the nature of current seapower and the physical constraints 
which have been imposed on the political process. 

The time frame of the study will be roughly ten years. 
With a few exceptions, specific numerical forecasts have been 
avoided. In Japan 1 s case, events since October 1973 have com- 
pletely upset earlier projections of continued exponential 



growth, while the studies that have been done to replace them 
predict everything from economic contraction to a return to pre- 
energy crisis expansion rates. Even for such a specific item as 
the demand for U.S. natural gas tankers, 1985 estimates vary 
between 29 and 84 (and between 29 and 180 for 1990)! Accordingly, 
the analysis has centered on possible reactions to alternative 
situations and on policies which offer the most flexibility under 
a variety of assumptions. 

Part One will review some recent developments in military 
and commercial technology. Issues under negotiation at the Law 
of the Sea Conference also will be summarized to illustrate the 
depth and intensity of marine political problems. Attempts will 
be made to identify elements of continuity as well as change. 

The second part will consider Japan's strategic interests 
and the current status of the Maritime Self -Defense Force as 
points of reference for later chapters. The latter' s employment and 
development is restricted by several domestic and international 
conditions, which will be explored. Some possible evolutions of 
Japan's definition of her national interests and the limits on 
the Self-Defense Forces also will be included. Particular 
attention will be paid to pressures for and against an expanded 
naval role in the Western Pacific. 

Finally, Part Three will look at the relationship between 
seapower and the interests outlined earlier. Two chapters will 
concentrate on military problems and potential. A third will be 



devoted to commercial ocean affairs. 

In general, metric units will be used herein. Many ocean 

* 

issues, however, axe defined in terms of nautical miles. 

Mention of a 370.4 kilometer economic zone or a 22.2 kilometer 
territorial sea, for instance, would be strange even to the most 
metricized delegate at the law of the sea negotiations. In the 
interests of clarity, therefore, the terms most commonly used in 
discussions of a particular point have been retained. A con- 
version table will be found in Appendix One. 



A nautical mile (6080.2 feet) is equal to one 60th of a 
degree of longitude at the equator, or very nearly one minute of 
latitude anywhere. Thus it is a convenient unit of measure on a 
chart. The international nautical mile is defined as 1,852 meters 
(exactly), or 6076.1 feet. 



PART I 



THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEAPOWER 



Chapter One . . 

Chapter Two . . 

Chapter Three . 
Chapter Four 



Introduction 
. . Technology and Contemporary Naval Operations 
. . The Changing Uses of the Seas 
. . The Unsettled Marine Political Climate 
. . The Ocean Setting 1975-1985 



THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEAPOWER 



Introduction 



Two key ideas have been central to classical writings on 

1 

seapower (though they often have been left unstated). The 

first is that the sea is a neutral medium. In Mahan' s words: 

In itself, the sea is a barren tenure; only as 
the great common, the highway of commerce, the seat 
of communication, does it possess unique character 
and value. 2 

This principle has been crucial to the concept of freedom of the 

seas, and with it the free mobility of naval vessels. 

The second, related, point has been that there is a clear 

distinction between the sea and the land: "Man marks the earth 

with ruin — his control stops with the shore" (or at least at 



1 

Some of the major works after Mahan are: Julian S. 

Corbett, Some Principles of Mari time Strategy (Annapolis: U.S. 
Naval Institute, 1 971 ), reprint of 1 91 1 edition: Herbert Rich- 
mond, Statesmen and Seapower (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946); 
Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy , 4th ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1958); A. E. Sokol, Seapower in the 
Nuclear Age (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961); S. W. 
Hoskill, The Strategy of Seapower (London: Collins, 1962); and 
Peter Gretton, Maritime Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965) • 

2 

Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (London: Kennikat 

Press, 1970), p. 52. 

George Gordon Byron, Lord Byron, Childe Harold (London: 
J. M. Dent, 1898), Ch. IV, clxxix, p. 184. 



the three mile limit) . The populations which have been important 
to governments have lived, and largely worked, ashore. With the 
exception of fish, resources and food also have come almost 
exclusively from the land. It follows that many of the great 
power rivalries of history (including the present one) have been 
cast as dichotomies between those which have influenced these 
populations and resources directly on land, and those which have 
used the more subtle tools of navies and maritime commerce. 

These principles, together with the concept that superior 
force is the final arbiter of disputes, have underlain most 
strategies for maritime warfare. The subordination of military 
means to political ends usually has been acknowledged, but such 
interactions have been seen mostly in the choice of the objective. 
Since World War II attention has shifted to more restricted 
arenas — non-nuclear warfare at sea, limited wars, counter- 
insurgency operations, etc. However, once the scope of the 
military activity was defined, it was expected that it would be 
possible to bring forces to bear which were commensurate with 
the potential threat. 

By the late 1960s, however, it was recognized that major 
naval powers, at least those of the West, were operating under 
unfavorable asymmetries in the acceptability of force — 



See B. H. Liddell Hart's criticism of past military 
practices in this regard in "The Objective in War," a lecture 
delivered at the U.S. Naval War College on September 24, 1952. 
Also, Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1973) » passim . 



particularly in the Third World. This spurred a number of 

studies of the uses of naval power in non-combat situations and 

5 
under severe political constraints. Even more recently, 

welcome attention has begun to be paid to the diplomatic 

potential of non-military maritime instruments. The next four 

chapters will concentrate on three factors which may undermine 

7 

the utility of great power naval forces as a political tool. 



5 
Two pioneering works were: L. W. Martin, The Sea in 

Modern Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1967) and James Cable, 

Gunboat Diplomacy (London: IISS, 1971)* See also, John T. Howe, 

Multicrises (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 971 ) ; and Edward Luttwak, 

The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 

1974); other references are listed in the biography. 

c 

See Joseph Kasputys, "The Evolving Role of the Merchant 
Marine as a Determinant of Seapower," Third International Sea- 
power Symposium , U.S. Naval War College, Newport, H.I., 1 973> 
pp. 134-170, and U.S. Naval Institute (USNl), To Use The Sea 
(Annapolis: USNI, 1 974) » Sections I and II. 

7 
Definitions 

(1) Great Power navies. These will be considered to be 
those fleets which can conduct operations on a world-wide scale, 
and which can single-handedly affect the global balance of power. 
At present, only the U.S. andtheSoviet navies qualify for this 
status. In the past, of course, Britain, France, Holland, Spain, 
Portugal, Japan and Germany also have had such fleets. 

(2) Middle Power navies. Despite the difficulties 
attendant to definitions of middle powers, it is somewhat easier 
to speak of middle power navies. They will be defined herein as 
those which seek to exercise command of the seas, for whatever 
purpose, beyond their own coastal waters, but not on a global 
scale. One such group of fleets would be those which operate 
within a well-defined geographic region, such as the Italians in 
the Mediterranean or the Iranians in the Persian Gulf. But 
other middle power navies, such as Australia and Canada, have no 
such finite boundaries, while the Indian Ocean, though it pro- 
vides natural limits for the attention of New Delhi's forces, is 
too large to be the sole province of the present Indian fleet. 
(The mere possession of nuclear weapons, and even submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) is not considered sufficient 



The factors are: (1) The current state of naval technology, 
(2) the growing economic importance of the oceans, and (3) the 
changing marine political climate. The first and third have 
augmented the usable power available to small and middle powers 
at sea. All three, it will be argued, have undercut the 
impartiality of the seas as medium of trade and communication, 
and have begun to blur the distinction between the sea and land 
itself. 

The basic rationale for navies, indeed for all armed 
forces, still lies in answer to the question: "What options do 

Q 

you have if diplomacy fails?" The factors to be discussed do 
not diminish the need for naval forces themselves, but they may 
alter the conditions which govern their use. It must be remem- 
bered, however, that naval force is only one component of sea- 
power. Merchant fleets, geography, population, national produc- 
tivity, etc. all have been a part of the equation in one writing 



to raise a navy to great power status.) 

(3) The editor of Jane ' s Fighting Ships has identified two 
other types of forces: (a) the status-symbol navy — he uses 
Ghana for an example, and (b) the coast defense fleet. (See the 
forward to Jane's , 1 973 — 74 edition, pp. 73 - 78.) An interesting 
statement concerning the latter unit was provided by Rear 
Admiral Walujo Sugito, Indonesian Navy, when he stated that his 
navy would develop: "... the capability in wartime to keep 
the border seas in dispute. [This ability], without fining 
command at sea, could impede the advance movement of the enemy. 
If the enemy is superior, ... we at least would have given the 
land forces enough time to make the necessary preparations • . .' 
Address presented to the Third International Seapower Symposium, 
U.S. Naval War College, October 17, 1973. (Emphasis supplied.) 

I am indebted to Admiral Arleigh Burke for this point. 



9 

or another. The seapower that will be examined herein, however, 

is broader still. The ultimate aim will be to understand what 
leverage Japan or any other maritime nation can exert, and how 
it can insulate itself from the pressures of others, through the 
uses of the oceans — be they economic, military, scientific or 
recreational. 



9 

William Reitzer, in "Mahan on the Use of the Sea," Naval 

War College Review , XXV (May-June, 1973), PP» 73-82, makes the 
useful distinction between seapower (commercial movement) and 
sea force (navy) as subsystems of a nation's total maritime 
power. 



Chapter One 
TECHNOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY NAVAL OPERATIONS 

The Nature of Military Innovations 

Changes in technology can affect military operations on 

1 

three levels — tactical, strategic and environmental. A given 

development may lead from one level to another in any sequence. 
The advent of steam, for instance, first transformed naval tac- 
tics by reducing some of the elements of chance inherent in wind 
and weather. In time, the need for coaling and maintenance led 
to a greater reliance on bases than had been the case in the 
days of sail, thus altering the strategic picture. Most impor- 
tant, however, was the fact that steam eventually helped destroy 
the indivisibility of the seas, which had been the key to 
British power in the 1?th, 18th and early 19th centuries. 



1 
Tactics refers to the conduct of operations for immediate 

and specific objectives, usually when opposing forces are in 

contact. Strategy encompasses a broader scale of both position 

and objectives and generally applies to measures taken prior to 

the joining of forces. Environmental changes are those which 

alter the setting in which warfare as a whole is conducted. 

Bernard Brodie, in Seapower in the Machine Age (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1 941 ) , pp. 90-91 and Chapter XXI, 

makes the distinction between tactical and strategic impacts of 

steam and ordnance developments. 



10 



11 



So long as Britain controlled the waters from the North 
Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar during the age of sail, she con- 
trolled the oceans of the world, at least insofar as other Euro- 
pean Powers were concerned. From the Armada (1588), through the 
Dutch Wars, to La Hogue (1692) and eventually Trafalgar (1805), 
the truly decisive naval battles were fought in European waters. 
There were important peripheral campaigns, to be sure — Suffren 
in the Indian Ocean, De Grasse in the We stern Atlantic — but 
these were not crucial to England's overall supremacy. 

Steam, however, enabled forces to be concentrated rapidly. 
Moreover, it (along with the development of the torpedo and the 

submarine), virtually destroyed the feasibility of the close 

2 

blockade, which the Royal Navy had used for so long to keep the 

fleets of her enemies separated. It also made the effectiveness 
of a force roughly proportional to its proximity to a base, 
whereas sailing ships had been much more independent. The 



2 

A "close" blockade implies a cordon of ships around an 

enemy's harbor to detect his movements immediately, and bring 
him to action should he try to escape. See Arthur J. Marder, 
The Anatomy of British Seapower (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1940), 
for a description of the fiasco attendant to an attempted 
blockade during the Royal Navy's 1897 fleet problem. Legal 
problems associated with blockades by mines, submarines and more 
distant warships arose during both World Wars, without definitive 
resolutions. See C. John Colombos, The International Law of the 
Sea, 5th ed. (New York: David Mckay Company, 1962), Chapter XIX. 
The 1972 mining of Haiphong, supported by Seventh Fleet units in 
the Gulf of Tonkin, was similar to a close blockade, but only 
was possible since the U.S. had control of the air over the area. 

By 1904> the situation was exemplified by Jackie Fisher's 
famous comment that: "Five keys lock up the World! Singapore, 



12 



result was a beginning of a partitioning of the seas, an 
environmental change which has continued to this day. 

Telecommunication developments affected naval operations 
in a reverse order. The first impact was environmental, in that 
the transoceanic cable (1858) destroyed the sailor's monopoly of 
intercontinental communications. Thereafter, it was put to 
strategic use, ordering Dewey to Manila Bay (1898). Finally, 
tactical wireless equipment was installed in most of the major 
navies during the early years of this century. Its first combat 
use came in the Russo-Japanese War and was instrumental in the 
defeat of Admiral Rozhdestvensky at Tsushima (1905)* 



The Cape, Alexandria, Gibraltar and Dover." (Quoted in Marder, 
op . cit ., p. 473) - 

The powers- that-be were not unaware of the implications 
of this technology. In 1828, the First Lord of the Admiralty 
wrote: 

Their Lordships feel it their bounden duty to 
discourage to the utmost of their ability the 
employment of steam vessels, as they consider that 
the introduction of steam is calculated to strike a 
fatal blow at the naval supremacy of the Empire. 

(Quoted in Donald Maclntyre and Basil W. Bathe, Man-Of-War , 
[.New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969], pp. 75"76.) Note that the 
partitioning also coincided with the rise of non-European sea- 
powers. These, in turn, were aided by the rapid development of 
new equipment, which effectively forced the major navies to 
rebuild their fleets every few years. 

5 
Linwood S. Howeth, History of Communications — Electronics 

in the United States Navy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1963). Japanese data from Fukui Shizuo, interview July 

22, 1 974* Although the advent of telecommunications ended the 

seaman's role in international communications, it actually 

heightened the importance of seapower by resolving many of the 

command and control problems which had plagued admirals for 



13 



Aircraft have passed from tactical to strategic roles. In 
the sense that airpower has reduced the constraints of geography, 
it has had an impact on the physical environment as well. How- 
ever, as will be discussed below (p. 40 ) , it is likely to be 
many years, if ever, before the skies will even begin to compare 
with the seas as a conduit of international commerce. 

One of the most dramatic shifts which has affected the 
nature of seapower in this century has been the ability to pro- 
ject power directly from one's own heartland into an enemy's. 
Foreshadowed by World War II 's strategic bombing, the process 
reached its culmination in the late 1950s with the development 
of the ICBM. No longer was seapower, through blockade or 
amphibious operations, the only link for the infliction of 
damage between an island state and a continental one. Naval 
power projection kept pace with advances ashore — first by 
increasing the range of naval gunnery, and then through airpower, 

from British seaplane raids on the North Sea zeppelin bases in 

7 
1914> to carrier-based nuclear weapons in 1949 and on to the 



centuries. Moreover, there are few, if any, recorded instances 
where control of the seas led to the capture of important dis- 
patches, so the loss of the communications monopoly does not 
appear especially significant. 

c 

The fact that these constraints still operate, however, 
was made clear by the need for enroute airfields during the Yom 
Kippur War airlift. These will partly be eliminated by the 
development of a mid-air refueling capability for transport air- 
craft, but only a few of the largest planes will be so equipped. 

n 

See Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers (New York: Doubleday, 



14 



Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) of the 1960s. 
These multiple systems added flexibility and survivability to 
strategic forces, but the advent of intercontinental weaponry 
itself eliminated much of the historic value of the sea as a 
"buffer" between great powers. With it went the ancient justi- 
fication of so many arms races, namely the direct threat posed 
to Britain, and later the United States, by a strong navy in the 
hands of a state with a large standing army. 

Recent developments in military technology also may be 
categorized according to their potential impact. Among those of 
current concern to naval planners are: 

(1) The production of sophisticated ship-launched weapons 
systems such as surface- skimming missiles and their ready 
availability to coastal state navies worldwide. These 
weapons tend to favor the defender of inshore areas or 
restricted bodies of water. 

(2) The increased effectiveness of aircraft against surface 
ships, particularly when equipped with electro-optically 
guided, laser-designated or other homing ordnance. 

(3) The disparity between submarine and anti-submarine 
capabilities. 

(4) Recent advances in strategic airlift. 

(5) The possible deployment of real-time ocean surveillance 
systems. 

(6) Developments in Command Control Communications (C ) • 



1969) for a history of the development of naval sea-based 
aviation and the post-World War II in- fighting to keep the 
carriers in strategic warfare. Also Desmond P. Wilson, Jr., 
"Evolution of the Attack Aircraft Carrier: A Case Study in 
Technology and Strategy," in U.S., Congress, Senate and House 
Armed Services Committees, CYAN- 70 Aircraft Carrier (hereafter 
CVAN-70 Hearings ), 91st Cong., 2ndSess., 1970, pp. 398-608. 



15 



The first two are tactical innovations. The third has 
both tactical and strategic implications. The fourth is 
strategic. Both the fifth and sixth are potentially environ- 
mental. One eventually may strip warship movements of the cloak 
of uncertainty which has been such an important part of past 
naval operations. The other may make decisive victories possible 
while the majority of an enemy's forces are still intact. 

The size and scope of the world's research and development 
budgets point to many other significant changes in the next few 
years. Some of them also will be noted below. The factors to 
be examined in detail, however, are especially important in the 
context of the changing law of the sea and Japan's particular 
situation. 



Tactical Developments 



Any innovation which confines its effects to the realm of 

o 

tactics is destined to be quickly superseded. This is true 

even though such devices often seem to be the most "revolutionary" 

9 
of inventions. Nevertheless, improvements in a particular type 

of weapon and the counter-measures thereto may shift the advantage 



Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the electronic 
warfare (Bff) field, with its array of seekers, counter-measures 
(ECM), and counter-countermeasures (ECCM). See any recent 
edition of Jane ' s Weapon Systems (London: Sampson Low, annual). 

Q 
Brodie, op_. cit . , p. <)] , makes this point with regard to 

the ironclad. 



16 



back and forth between attacker and defender through several 
cycles over many years. This seems to be the present case with 
homing ordnance, both surface and air-launched. 



Anti-Ship Missiles 

In late 1974> there were over twenty types of surface or 
submarine -launched anti-ship missiles (SSM) which had been 
acquired or ordered by over forty navies. These are outlined 

in Table 1-1. Although these weapons were introduced in the 

11 

late 1950s with the Soviet Scrubber, they did not get wide- 
spread attention until they were used to sink the Israeli 

12 

destroyer Eilat off Alexandria in 1967. ' Styx missiles were 

distributed throughout the Warsaw Pact and to selected Third 
Y/orld countries during the 1960s, but Western systems have pro- 
liferated more rapidly in recent years. Table 1-2 illustrates 
their distribution. 



1 

Some sources use the abbreviation ASM (Anti-Ship Missile) 

for these weapons. Herein the letters SSM ( Surface- to-Surf ace 
Missile) will refer to weapons launched from surface ships or 
submarines. ASM (Air- to-Surf ace Missile) will be used for those 
carried by aircraft. Note that some equipment, like the U.S. 
Navy's Harpoon, is capable of airborne, surface or subsurface 
launchings. 

1 1 

Scrubber, Styx, etc. are NATO code names for Soviet SSMs. 

12 

The missiles in Soviet hands always caused concern among 

Western analysts, but the response was mostly to develop counter- 
measures rather than systems of our own. The Eilat sinking 
certainly was the impetus behind the U.S. Harpoon SSM develop- 
ment, but the starting dates for some foreign programs (Sea 
Killer - 1963> Penguin - 1962) indicate that the danger (or the 
potential) was seen abroad somewhat earlier. 



17 



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21 



The implications of this diffusion are important. In fact, 
given any sort of restraint by the maritime states, the missiles 
have the potential to redress the naval balance of power in 
inshore areas and restricted bodies of water. This alteration 
will be in favor of the coastal states at the expense of the 
major naval powers. This requires some explanation. 

The modern surface warship is a highly sophisticated piece 
of machinery. Radars, communications antennas and electronic 
countermeasures domes are easily visible on most ships of 
frigate size or larger. If missiles are added, the complexity 
increases sharply. In order to save topside weight, many 
Western navies have adopted aluminum superstructures, thus 
effectively removing any protection for the transmitters, wave- 
guides, computers and other devices which often are located 
above the main deck. Although the ships are structurally sound, 
and their hulls capable of absorbing considerable damage, the 
vital electronics suit is quite vulnerable, even to schrapnel 
from a near miss. 

This was dramatically illustrated in April 1972, when 
U.S.S. 7/orden was accidently damaged by an American air-launched 
missile which homed in on its radars in the Gulf of Tonkin. The 
offending weapon was a Shrike, whose warhead is considerably 
smaller than those of most of the SSMs novj in service. Never- 
the less, Worden, an $80 million guided missile frigate, was 
virtually incapacitated, lost one man killed and nine injured, 



22 



and had to be towed to the Philippines for repair. 

Published data on the Soviet Styx, one of the oldest SSMs, 
indicate that shipboard warning time, once the missile is 
launched, is at most two minutes. Moreover, many of the later 
designs fly at heights of two or three meters above the water 
(thus earning the name "sea-skimmer"). This profile compli- 
cates the problems of detection and fire control radar solutions 
while more sophisticated homing devices also make electronic 
jamming or deception more difficult. The ideal answer would be 
to destroy the launch-platform prior to firing. This is possible 
in the open sea, where the more sophisticated weapons and sensors 
of the larger ship might be decisive. In confined waters, how- 
ever, such as straits, bays or gulfs, the advantage of surprise 
lies with the patrol boat, unless its opponent is maintaining 
airborne surveillance. It is perhaps worth noting that 43 of 
the 116 straits to be closed by a 12-mile territorial sea 



1 ^ 

^New York Times, April 19, 1972, p. 1. 

The Styx's speed is rated at Mach 1 = 332 meters/second 
(643 knots) at sea level. Maximum listed range is 42 km, giving 
about 2 minutes and 5 seconds of flight time. So far, most com- 
bat launches reportedly have been at less than 20 kilometers. 
This decrease in range does not necessarily mean less warning, 
however, since the launching can be anticipated by ECM tech- 
niques. 

15 

Presumably this imposes some limitations in rough 

weather, but the extent is not clear from published materials. 



23 



AC 

border developing countries. Twenty-seven of these are 

17 

bordered by states in possession of SSMs. This will be 

discussed in more detail later. 

Today, the most powerful surface warships of any navy are 
vulnerable to small craft in the narrow seas. This is not a new 
condition. Such ships always have entered restricted waters at 
their peril. Not only do they sacrifice the advantage of their 
long-range weaponry, but they also subject themselves to mines, 
torpedoes, small submarines, shore batteries, and a host of 
other devices which have long been used skillfully by coastal 
states. 

There is an interesting parallel between the current SSM 

threat and that which was seen in the surface -launched torpedo 

1 ft 
around the turn of the century. ' The latter eventually was met 

by improvements in gunnery ranges which made it possible to 

19 

destroy attackers at a distance. In time, an analogous 



1 f\ 

U.S., Department of State, Office of Geographer, Chart 

entitled "World Straits Affected by a Twelve Mile Territorial 

Sea." 

17 

These include the important straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz, 

Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, and Ombai-Wetar. Were 
the Philippines, Bahamas and South Korea to get SSMs, the figure 
would rise to 37 out of 43 • 

1 ft 

The years between the perfection of the Whitehead 

torpedo (1867) and World War I often heard predictions of the 

early demise of the battleship at the hands of the torpedo boat 

and later the destroyer. See Harder, op_. cit . , p. 1 23 - 

19 

So far as is known, only the Japanese 61 cm oxygen 

torpedo of World War II could outrange a battleship's guns. 

Even so, most of its successes came at relatively close quarters 

in night actions. 



24 



solution may be found for the SSM, as helicopters, VTOL (Vertical 
Take-Off and Landing) aircraft, or RPVs (Remotely Piloted 

Vehicles — radio-controlled drones) are fitted in more and more 

20 

ships. In the near term, however, ECM and point defense systems 

will be the only available protection. 

One effect of the SSM has been to expand the breadth of 
the coastal danger zone. Moreover, this has more-or-less coin- 
cided with the world-wide extension of the territorial sea and 
the heightened awareness of ocean affairs. (See Chapter Three.) 
In turn, these have increased the interest of coastal states in 
defensive systems. Thus it is significant that the later SSMs — 
such as Exocet (France), Gabriel (Israel), and Harpoon (U.S.), 
are basically pre-packaged rounds. Unlike the widely- distributed 
Styx, the more modern weapons require almost no maintenance. 
Thus they can be effective in the hands of relatively unsophisti- 
cated navies. Moreover, although the West has developed elec- 

21 

tronic countermeasures for some of the older Soviet missiles, 

it is not clear that much attention has been given to defense 
against the Western missiles held by coastal states. 

Much of the above discussion has dealt with conventionally- 



20 

A point defense system is a missile or gun installation 

with a high kill probability at short ranges. It is designed to 

protect only the ship on which it is mounted. The opposite 

approach is a long range, area defense weapon. 

21 

Note the Israeli success in decoying Egyptian and Syrian 

Styxs during the Yom Kippur War. 



25 



armed SSMs against destroyer-sized targets. There are other 
applications of these weapons. One option would be nuclear war- 
heads. Such devices, which may already be operational in some 

22 

navies, pose a potentially lethal threat to any floating 

target. They may well find employment in a general war, or a 

nuclear war at sea, but such scenarios are outside the scope of 
this paper. 

Another problem is the vulnerability of aircraft carriers 
to SSM attack, particularly those launched by submarines. Much 

has been written about the survivability of these expensive 

23 

ships, and I shall not enter into that debate. I feel, how- 
ever, that they are not in very much danger outside of a U.S.- 

24 

Soviet encounter. To attack an aircraft carrier is almost 

certainly to go beyond the threshhold of retaliation for a 
coastal state. Even during the Vietnam War, Hanoi made no 
serious effort against Yankee Station. Fast patrol boats are 
not likely to get close enough to a carrier to do much damage, 



22 

As noted in Table 1-1, the Soviet SS-N-3 is believed to 

have a nuclear warhead. In any case, the nuclear-capable ship- 
board SAMs (such as Talos) could be used in an air- burst mode. 
The ballistic SSNX-13 also may be nuclear. 

23 

See, for instance, the CVAN-70 Hearings , op. cit . (note 

1-7), and Paul Schratz, "The Nuclear Carrier and Modern War," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP ), XCVIII 
(August 1972), pp. 18-25, with comments in the issues of Decem- 
ber 1972, p. 88, and April 1973, p. 86. Other criticisms of the 
carrier have been contained in a number of articles by A. Kusmak 
of the Brookings Institution. 

TEhe present rate of arms transfers to the Persian Gulf 
and Eastern Mediterranean could make these very dangerous areas 
for the carriers before too long, however. 



26 



and few coastal states will have a submerged launch capability. 
The actions between missile-armed patrol boats themselves 
have been especially interesting. Although India employed the 

Styx with considerable success during the 1970 war with Pakis- 

25 
tan, the first test involving SSMs on both sides seem to have 

come in the night actions between Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli 

boats during the Yom Kippur War. The Gabriel missile performed 

well. The Israelis also apparently confused the Styx 

guidance systems with relatively compact ECM equipment, thus 

26 

raising hopes for future encounters with such threats. It 

should be noted, however, that the ships were at general 
quarters prior to the engagement, thus minimizing the chances 
of surprise. Moreover, the maneuverability of the small patrol 
boats facilitated last-minute evasions while the presence of 
multiple targets may have misled the Arab missiles. In short, 
it is not clear how applicable these lessons are to larger war- 
ships. Certainly they were of little help to the South 
Vietnamese frigate sunk by Chinese SSMs off the Paracels in 1974* 



25 

Ravi Kaul, "The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing 

Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean," USNIP , XCVII (May 1971), 

pp. 172-195, presents the Indian view. A Pakistani outlook is 

given by M. I. Butt in the "Comment and Discussion" section of 

USNIP , XCIX (November 1973), p. 88. D. P. O'Connell notes the 

damage to neutral merchantmen caused by errant missiles in "Can 

The Navy Plan For Peace?" New Scientist (U.K.), October 25, 

1973, P. 257. 

26 

Aviation Week and Space Technology (hereafter Aviation 

Week ), December 10, 1973, P« 20. An Israeli account is given by 
Shlomo Ere 11, "Israeli Saar FPBs Pass Combat Test in Yom Kippur 
War," USNIP , C (September 1974), pp. 115-118. 



27 



Aircraft vs Surface Ships 

Across the Song Ma river in North Vietnam is the Thanh Hoa 
bridge. Between 1965 an< ^ 1967> American pilots flew nearly 700 

sorties, dropped 1250 tons of ordnance, and lost 8 aircraft trying 

27 

to destroy it. Such are the stories on which sailors build 

their hopes. If a fixed target withstood that much punishment 
(although bridges admittedly are difficult to destroy because of 
the amount of open space and inherent structural strength), 
surely a maneuvering ship would have even a better chance. 

On March 12, 1972, the Thanh Hoa bridge was attacked by a 

single flight of aircraft using newly perfected laser-designated 

28 

ordnance and destroyed with a direct hit. 

The threat posed by terminally guided air-launched weapons 
to ships at sea is considerable. In the few times that a match 



27 
'Malcolm W. Cagle, "Task Force 77 in Action Off Vietnam," 

USNIP, XCVIII (May 1972), p. 104. So indestructable was the 
bridge that new theories were developed to explain its 
resilience. One of these was: "... that the earth was com- 
posed of two giant elliptical hemispheres, spring hinged some- 
where beneath the South Atlantic Ocean and clamped firmly shut 
on the other side by the Thanh Hoa bridge. This theory had it 
that if the Thanh Hoa bridge were ever destroyed, the world 
would snap open, flipping man and beast thither and yon, and up- 
setting the gravitational balance of the universe." Ibid . , 
p. 105. 

^ew York Times , May 24, 1972. Laser-designated means 
that the target is illuminated by a laser beam either from an 
aircraft or from the ground. The attacking aircraft releases 
its weapons in the general vicinity of the target, and a seeker 
attached to the bomb aims it at the point "designated" by the 
laser. The Thanh Hoa destruction is even more impressive since 
the bridge had been hit by the television-guided Walleye bomb as 
early as 1967* Despite the accuracy, however, the Walleye 
damage was minor. ( Cagle, p. 97 )• 



28 



has been made, the results have been impressively in favor of 
the aircraft. In 1943 the Germans introduced a primitive radio- 
controlled glide bomb in the Mediterranean. In its first test 
it sank the new Italian battleship Roma on its way to surrender. 
The weapon seriously damaged a number of vessels off Salerno, 
and later was to plague the Allies off Anzio. For some reason, 
it was not used again in the war, but the potential was clear. 
Excluding the Kamikaze , which, after all, had a special form of 
terminal guidance, warships did not face such weapons again 

until the late 1960s, when H.M.A.S. Hobart, and later U.S.S. 

29 
Worden were accidently hit by U.S. missiles. Although neither 

ship was in any danger of sinking, they were rendered hors de 
c ombat by relatively small warheads not designed for the anti- 
shipping role. Under such conditions, the damage that might 
result from a 250 or 500 kg built- for- the-purpose ASM hit is 
sobering to imagine. 

Table 1-3 represents an inventory of the homing or laser- 
designated weapons now in production or under development which 
have anti-ship missions at least as part of their tasks. While 
these are not yet so widely distributed as the SSMs, their 
proliferation probably will not be long delayed, especially in 
light of the sophisticated arms now flowing to the Middle East. 



29 

H.M.A.S. Hobart , an Australian guided missile destroyer, 

was hit by two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles in June 1 9^8, when 

a U.S. pilot mistook her for a North Vietnamese helicopter. The 

1972 Worden incident was noted above (p. 21 ) . 



Table 1-3 
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND HOMING ORDNANCE 



29 













Est. 


Est. 


Country 




Name 


Guidance 


Warhead 


Ran^e 












(kg) 


(km) 


France 




AS. 11 




1 


15 


3 






AS. 12 




1 


28 


6 






AS. 20 




1 


50 


7 






AS. 50 




1 


250 


12 


Germany 




Kormoran 




4 


250 


57 






Jumbo 




2 


nuc/conv 


n.a. 


Great Britain 


Hellcat 




1 


10? 


3.5 






Skua 




3 


20 


19? 


Internat 


ional 


Martel AJ.168 




2 


n.a. 


28-55 






Martel AS. 57 




6 


n.a. 


28-55 






Otomat 




4 


n.a. 


64-570 


Japan 




ASM-1 




? 


140 


46 


Sweden 




RB 04 E 


4 


,6 


500 


28-59 






RB 05 A 




1 


150 


n.a. 


U.S. 




Bulldog 




5 


n.a. 


n.a. 






Bullpup 




1 


1 1 5-nuc . 


16 






Condor 




2 


227 


65-85 






Walleye I 




2 


585 


bomb 






Walleye II 




2 


907 


bomb 






Shrike 




6 


50 


15-17 






Maverick 




2 


59 


n.a. 






Hobo 




2 


907/1560 


bomb 






Pave way 




5 


225/540/ 
407/1 560 


bomb 
bomb 






Harpoon 




4 


540 


55 






Standard ARM 




6 


n.a. 


25 


USSR 




AS-1 "Kennel" 




4 


1000? 


90 






AS-2 "Kipper" 




4 


nuc. 


215 






AS- 5 "Kangaroc 


>" 


4 


nuc. 


650 






AS-4 "Kitchen' 


i 


4 


nuc. 


740 






AS-5 "Kelt" 




4 


n.a. 


220 






AS- 6 - 




4 


n.a. 


550? 


Source: 


Jane ' s 


Fighting Ships 


1974 


-75 








Jane' s 


Weapon Systems 


1973 


-74 








The Mi! 


Litary Balance 


1974-75 







Guidance Codes: 



1 . Wire Guided/Radio Command 

2. Electro-Optical 

5. Semi-Active Homing 

4« Active riadar Homing/infrared 

5. Laser designated 

6. Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM) 



50 



The introduction of such weapons does not alter the long- 
standing principle that ships should not venture into the range 

30 

of land-based aircraft without air cover of their own. How- 
ever, it does downgrade the size and proficiency level of the 
air fleet which is to be considered a strong threat. As with 
the SSMs, pre-packaged ASM rounds can be nearly as dangerous in 
unskilled hands as skilled ones. In those states with already 
proficient ground attack or marine patrol squadrons, they lend 

credence to the arguments that the air force should be assigned 

31 

a larger role in coastal defense. 

In one sense, however, the advent of both ASMs and SSMs 
has simplified the problem for the defender in that a point- 
defense system designed for one may be able to deal with the 
other. There are several such possibilities, ranging from 

short-range missiles to aircraft 20mm cannon with firing rates 

32 

on the order of 6000 rounds per minute. In a longer time 

frame the use of laser-designated projectiles fired from guns 



See Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea 
Power (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), passim . 

31 

The U.S. Air Force has shown an increased interest in 

such a mission since at least the early 1970s. Conclusions sup- 
porting greater Air Force participation in maritime operations 
also were reached by the Australian Maritime Airpower Study 
Group. Captain J. A. 0'Farrell, R.A.N. , to author, June 19, 1974« 

32 

Some of the best writing on this subject is contained in 

the brilliant articles by Desmond Scrivener, "Weapons for the 
General Purpose Escort," International Defense Review (hereafter 
IDR). #3/1973, pp. 331-336 and "Escort Ships— An Alternative 
Solution?" IDR, #4/1 973 , pp. 46O-463. 



31 



33 

may shift the balance back in favor of the defense. 

In short, the ASM and SSM represent a phase of the offense- 
defense cycle which definitely favors the attacker. But, as one 

respondent put it, the surface ship is too valuable a tool to 

34 
•'roll over and die." In time, technology will find a counter 

to today's threats, even though new ones will arise in their 

place. Nevertheless, for most of the period covered by this 

study, all but the most sophisticated ships will be vulnerable 

to the armed forces of small coastal states which heretofore 

have posed few dangers. 

Other Tactical Innovations 

The addition of an air capability to medium-sized com- 
batants, will greatly increase the tactical effectiveness of 
single ships in both surface and ASW roles. It also will enhance 
their defensibility against most forms of attack. As noted 
earlier, shipboard aircraft eventually may reduce the SSM threat 
in the same way that long range gunnery reduced that of the 
torpedo boat — by making it possible to destroy an attacker 
before he can get close enough to launch his weapons. Moreover, 



53 

The U.S. Navy is developing laser seekers for shore- 
bombardment projectiles. Congress evidently has been satisfied 
with the program to date. See U.S. Congress, House of Repre- 
sentatives, Armed Services Committee, Keport 95~1035 Authorizing 
Appropriations for Military Procurement and Research, Develop- 
ment , Test and Evaluation , 93rd Congress, 2nd session (Washing^- 
ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 974) , p. 45. 

%r. Geoffrey Jukes, Australian National University, 
interview, June 18, 1974* 



32 



in inshore waters, aircraft would permit reconnaissance before 
the ship itself was placed in danger. However, the kinds of 
vehicles to be found on destroyer- type ships will be no match 
for shore-based, fixed-wing machines. More importantly, they 
will not be continuously operable, and will be legally restricted 
within the territorial sea. Thus, the danger of an effective 
sudden strike by a coastal state remains in those situations on 
the borderline between diplomatic and forcible solution. 

Shipboard lasers will enter naval inventories in the next 
few years, probably as range-finders or designators for bombs or 
shells. The state-of-the-art in high-energy equipment (death 
rays, as it were) is very highly classified, but perhaps they 
will appear in point-defense roles before too long. Still, as 
optical devices, they still will be subject to atmospheric limi- 
tations. 

The most rapidly changing, and perhaps the most important, 
military field is that of electronic warfare (EST), some of which 
was discussed in the previous section. Airborne EW equipment 
was absolutely essential to the air war over Vietnam and to the 

Israeli successes in the Middle East, and such devices have a 

35 

full range of shipboard counterparts. Tactical data systems 



35 

These are shipboard digital computer systems to assist 

in command and control functions. Examples are the U.S. Navy's 
NTDS (Naval Tactical Data System), Britain's ADAWS (Action Data 
Automation Weapons System) and France's SENIT (Systeme d'Exploi- 
tation Navale des Informations Tactiques). It may not be an 
exaggeration to say that effective anti-aircraft or anti-missile 
operations have become impossible without such automated infor- 
mation processing. 



33 

already have transformed the internal organization of warships, 
and promise to be extended still further. A side effect will be 
more pressures for international standardization, if not in 
hardware, then at least in software to permit interfacing 
between national systems. It may be, someday, that battles will 
be decided by EW operators before the weapons are even launched, 
but the balance is shifting back and forth so rapidly that it is 
difficult to make any long-term statements about it. 

With speeds in the 40-100 knot range, surface skimming 
vehicles can greatly improve naval mobility and flexibility. 
Hydrofoils probably will continue to be limited to tactical roles 
because of size and range restrictions. However, surface effect 
ships or Wing- in-Ground-Ef feet transports eventually may grow 
large enough and numerous enough to become a factor in strategic 
planning. Given enough capacity, they could reduce the need for 
overseas bases. Nevertheless, such breakthroughs will not come 
quickly, and for the next few years, surface skimmers probably 
will be confined to relatively near-shore operations. 

Often overlooked, but of major importance, are mines. 
Though there have been few dramatic breakthroughs, the potential 



36 

' For many years the naval professional literature has 

been full of debates about whether or not a commanding officer 
should fight his ship from the traditional position on the bridge, 
or from the integrated sensor environment of Combat Information 
Center (CIC). Having apparently been decided in favor of the 
latter, the question now arises of how far weapons release 
authority must be delegated to effectively respond to the ultra- 
short warning times of modern threats. 



34 



of modern devices has "become so great as to have both tactical 
and strategic implications. These will be discussed in Chapter 
Nine. 

Finally, there are environmental modification techniques. 
Proposed activities range from localized rainmaking, as was 
practiced in Vietnam, to selective destruction of the earth's 

ozone layer, and "acoustic fields on the sea and ocean surface 

37 

to combat individual ships or whole flotillas." It must be 

remembered that such operations currently are directed at 
naturally unstable situations, where the relatively small 
energies which man can introduce into the system may tip the 
balance one way or the other. As such, artificial tidal waves 
and typhoons are still mostly in the realm of science fiction. 
However, even small-scale successes could have dramatic, if 
unpredictable, effects on navies. One can imagine a group of 
scientists trying to keep a task force hidden in bad weather 
while the opposition seeks to bathe it in sunshine. 



37 
Resolution submitted by the Soviet Union to the United 

Nations to ban such activities. Reported in The Washington Post , 

October 23, 1 9T4> P» A27. It is not clear what is meant by 

"acoustic fields." Perhaps they simply refer to the Western 

hydrophone arrays noted below. Alternatively, they might be 

sonic devices designed to blank out or deceive sonars. The use 

of acoustic energy for destructive purposes at any distance is 

rather limited by the laws of physics. 



^ I am indebted to Captain Don Walsh, U.S. Navy, for this 



point. 



35 



Strategic Developments 

Submarine vs An ti- Submarine 

Prom the dark days of 1941 and. 1942, the Allied anti- 
submarine warfare (ASW) rebounded spectacularly. Towards the 
end of World War II, the advantage in a contest between a sub- 
marine and its pursuers lay almost entirely with the latter. 
The primary reasons were four- fold. First, the development of 
high-frequency sea and airborne radar denied the submarine the 
time on the surface to increase its operating radius and recharge 
its batteries. Second, the availability of escort carriers made 
it possible to provide air cover for merchantmen all the way 
across the Atlantic. Third, improvements in sonar capability, 
operator skills and escort tactics gave a better chance of 
detecting a submarine prior to attack. In any event, the speed 
disparity between a submerged submarine and a surface escort 
(6-7 knots vs. 20-35) left the initiative with the surface ship 
once the sub was located. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
the organization of Allied ASW had greatly improved. High- 
frequency direction-finder stations ringed the Atlantic, and got 
generalized fixes as the U-boats sent their nightly messages to 

Admiral Doenitz. The U.S. Navy established the Tenth Fleet in 

39 

May 1943 to coordinate anti-submarine activities. Better 

cooperation was achieved between British and American authorities. 



^Ladislas Farago, The Tenth Fleet (New York: Ivan 
Obelensky, 1962). 



35 



Strategic Developments 

Submarine vs An ti- Submarine 

From the dark days of 1941 and 1942, the Allied anti- 
submarine warfare (ASW) rebounded spectacularly. Towards the 
end of World War II, the advantage in a contest between a sub- 
marine and its pursuers lay almost entirely with the latter. 
The primary reasons were four- fold. First, the development of 
high-frequency sea and airborne radar denied the submarine the 
time on the surface to increase its operating radius and recharge 
its batteries. Second, the availability of escort carriers made 
it possible to provide air cover for merchantmen all the way 
across the Atlantic. Third, improvements in sonar capability, 
operator skills and escort tactics gave a better chance of 
detecting a submarine prior to attack. In any event, the speed 
disparity between a submerged submarine and a surface escort 
(6-7 knots vs. 20-35) left the initiative with the surface ship 
once the sub was located. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
the organization of Allied ASW had greatly improved. High- 
frequency direction-finder stations ringed the Atlantic, and got 
generalized fixes as the U-boats sent their nightly messages to 

Admiral Doenitz. The U.S. Navy established the Tenth Fleet in 

39 

May 1943 to coordinate anti-submarine activities. Better 

cooperation was achieved between British and American authorities. 



^Ladislas Farago, The Tenth Fleet (New York: Ivan 
Obelensky, 1962). 



37 



specialist today, and the tactical advantages of the submarine 
can only be offset by the coordination of divers assets. It is 
for this reason, as well as the high stakes involved in defending 
the Atlantic and Pacific sealanes, that ASW is classed as a 
strategic problem. 

Extensive efforts have been made to identify submerged 
submarines. Each ship has a characteristic sound spectrum which 
can help to distinguish it, and these have been meticulously 
catalogued over the years by NATO and, presumably, the Warsaw 
Pact. Such files would become particularly important in the 
event of guerrilla submarine operations, or if belligerent and 
non-belligerent units were operating in adjacent areas. 

This paper is not directed at the problems of submarine 
war between the U.S. and the USSR, but the concept is, at least, 
feasible. In the process, it raises some difficult questions. 

If unidentified submarines began sinking Japanese merchantmen, 

41 

would this be a justification for U.S. retaliation? On what 

scale? Suppose the ships were U.S. -owned but registered under 
a flag of convenience? Even if they were American ships under 
the U.S. flag, would that be worth a nuclear exchange? If not, 



Technically not, according to the strict reading of the 
U.S. -Japan Security Treaty. Article VI obligates mutual 
assistance only in the event of an attack on one or the other's 
units "within the territory under the administration of Japan. " 
Merchantmen are not sovereign territory under international law 
as warships are. 



38 

could a conventional war at sea be kept from escalating? 

Two additional points are worth noting. First, the 
majority of the non-ballistic missile submarines in the world 
today are non-nuclear (139 to 605). Furthermore, the nuclear 

attack boats are possessed by only three countries, although 

44 
more reportedly are planned. Thus, unless the U.S. or USSR 

were directly involved in a war at sea, it is likely that the 

threat would be posed by non-nuclear craft. These are capable 

45 
units, especially in the vicinity of the coast. Moreover, 

they also have proliferated in recent years. In 1974 n ° fewer 

than 36 navies had submarine arms, up from 30 six years before. 



A O 

Both Martin, op . cit . (note 1-5) > Chapter IV, and 
Gretton, op. cit . (note 1-1 ) , Chapter 7» admit the possibility 
of extended conventional war at sea. Martin argues that tacti- 
cal nuclear weapons probably would not be used until the 
strategic threshold was crossed. Gretton speaks of a "Grey War" 
against sea lines of communication. It is my own view that, in 
a hard- fought sea war escalation might be difficult to prevent 
if for no other reason than that a commanding officer might 
expend all his conventional ammunition and be faced with the 
choice of using the nuclear devices or losing his ship, (in 
such an emergency, the principles of two-man control also might 
be circumvented. ) 

4 ^Jane's Fighting Ships 1974-75, p. 642. 

4 The U.S., Britain, and the USSR. Reports persist that 
the People's Republic of China is building an SSN. France 
planned to include a new fleet submarine in the 1974 budget, 
after years of postponements. 

45 

According to Australian sources, the British Oberon 

Class is the quietest submarine in the world. Central Studies 
Establishment personnel, interviews, June 19» 1974* See also 
Gene La Rocque, "The Nth Country Submarine /ASW Problem" in K. 
Tsipis, A. H. Cahn and B. T. Feld (eds.), The Future of the Sea- 
Based Deterrent (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973), PP« 233-258. 



39 



These doubtless will be augmented soon by transfers from the 
U.S. and Soviet fleets, as well as sales of European designs. 
The possession of similar craft by several states could 
raise serious identification problems in the event of 
unacknowledged submarine attacks. Such acts are not unprece- 
dented. Italian submarines torpedoed British, French, Spanish, 

Russian and Danish vessels bound for Republican Spain during 

46 
July and August 1 937 > and again in 1939. 

This leads to the second point, namely that it will take 

organization to defeat a submarine threat or perhaps even to 

identify it. Unconventional approaches, such as containerized 

helicopter support systems aboard merchantmen, may offer 

relatively low-cost solutions to tactical problems. These will 

be examined in later chapters. But the greater difficulties of 

early warning and target localization will require a complex, 

wide-area intelligence network. This is something which the 

major powers, particularly the U.S., would be in a position to 

offer in the event of such "Nth Country" submarine attacks. 



See Robert Goldston, The Civil War in Spain (Greenwich: 
Fawcett, 1966), PP« 1 63 and 176. Also, James W. Cortada, 
"Ships, Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War: Kyon Conference, 
September 1937," II Politico , XXXVII, #4 (Diciembre 1972), pp. 
673-689. Although all governments knew who was responsible, the 
charges could not be proved and so diplomatic fiction was pre- 
served to the extent of giving Italians the responsibility for 
ASW in one sector! Whether or not today's acoustic identifica- 
tion would be better grounds for indictment remains to be seen. 



40 



Sealift and Airlift 

Despite the increasing capacity of cargo aircraft, the 
merchant ship continues to be the foundation of the international 
movement of both military and civilian goods. In the United 

States, in 1969, 79.65/* by value and 99.8$ by weight of U.S. 

47 

exports went by ship. Figures for other industrial countries 

are comparable. 

Moreover, with the advent of industrialization, maritime 
commerce developed further strategic importance. Guerre de 
course has been an important part of naval activities since the 
days of mercantilism. Piet Heyn's capture of a silver flota off 
Cuba in 1628 was a devastating blow to Spain's financial credit 
in Europe. During the time of Louis XIV, commerce raiders 

took as proportionately heavy a toll of British shipping as the 

49 
U-boats of 1917 and 1942. But, since the only real strategic 

materials of that period were masts and naval stores, there was 

not the danger of starvation or industrial paralysis which 

characterized the blockades of Germany and Great Britain during 

Y/orld War I and Japan and Great Britain during World War II. 

In the military sphere, the strides made by strategic 



*' Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Lifelines- 



09D-P1 (Revised), June 1 971 . 

4 J. H. Parry, The Spa 
Pelican Books, 1973), pp. 261-262. 

49 

Robert G. Albion and Jenni 

time (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1942), Chapter 1. 



Aft 

J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Middlesex: 



49 
^Robert G. Albion and Jennie B. Pope, Sea Lanes in War - 



41 



airlift were dramatically demonstrated by both the U.S. and the 
USSR during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In 566 missions between 
October and December 1 973» U.S. C-5 and C-141 aircraft delivered 

22,395 tons of supplies, the Soviets 15,000 tons in 934 

50 
missions. The importance of these figures was not so much in 

their size — over 13,000 tons were delivered in one day during 
the height of the Berlin airlift — but in the distances over 
which they were carried. It is nearly 12,000 kilometers between 
Dover Air/Force Base in Delaware, where the airlift began, and 
Lod airport in Israel. By contrast, Tempelhof airfield in West 
Berlin was less than 220 kilometers from some of its supporting 
bases. 

The rapid response capability of aerial transport has 
become an indispensable part of modern warfare. Yet the move- 
ment of the quantities of equipment needed to support extended 
operations and even to replenish stocks expended in short, high- 
intensity combat remains the domain of sealift. The Chairman of 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had high praise for the Military 
Airlift Command's effort during the Middle East War, but added: 

Not so well publicized is the fact that from 
October 6, 1973 to date (May 3, 1974) sealift 
accounted for over 7O70 of the total tonnage 
moved. 51 



Aviation Week , December 10,1973? PP« 16—19. 

51 

J Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, speech to the Jacksonville 

Council of the Navy League, May 3> 1974* Quoted in Navy Times 
(Pacific), May 22,1974, P« 13- 



42 



In Vietnam, well over 95$ of the material arrived by ship. 
It can be argued, of course, that it would have been better had 
we not had the capability to sustain that effort, but that does 
not detract from the potential of shipping itself. 

None of the post-World War II airlifts, from Berlin to 
Lebanon, to the Congo, Vietnam and the Middle East, were 
seriously opposed (except for diplomatic problems involving 
overflight). Neither were the post-war sealifts, with the 
limited exception of the North Korean mines off of Wonsan in 
1950* The impact of active resistance on modern logistics 
remains untested. 

The role of sea transportation in a general war is diffi- 
cult to imagine. See, for instance, Peter Gretton's critique of 

53 

NATO resupply strategy in his Maritime Strategy . Neither is a 

54 
"Grey War" against the sea lanes alone very credible. Never- 
theless, a mine or submarine campaign against the British Isles, 
Japan, or Taiwan at least is technically feasible. Japan's 
strengths and weaknesses in the face of such a threat will be 



52 

Robert J. Blackwell, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 

Maritime Affairs. Statement before the Sea Power Subcommittee 
of the House Armed Services Committee (hereafter Blackwell 
Testimony ) . September 19, 1974 (Mimeo), p. 74* 

55 Gretton, op., cit. (note 1-1 ), pp. 76-80 and 190-191. 

%ichael MccGwire has provided a convincing rebuttal to 
scenarios of a Soviet attack on Western shipping alone. See his 
"The Submarine Threat to Western Shipping" in J. L. Moulton, 
British Maritime Strategy in the Seventies (London: Royal 
United Services Institute, 1969) • 



43 



explored in detail later. It is worth noting, however, that 
although strategic airlift may be invaluable in the delivery of 
weaponry and other war materiel, there is little that it can do 
to sustain an overall economy. 

Based on the experiences of the World Wars, there are 



indications that an island nation could suffer up to a bOfa 

55 
reduction of imports without complete collapse. From the food 

standpoint, Japan currently produces about 1,530 calories per 

day, some 40 per cent of her normal consumption in terms of 

56 

original calories. She is, of course, much less self- 

sufficient in many other critical commodities. 

The U.S. Air Force has some 77 C-5A and 276 C-141 transport 
aircraft available. Using loading rates similar to those achieved 



55 

Interviews with Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 

(hereafter MSDF) Officer, April 20, 1974. It is based on the 

fact that 1942 British imports reached a minimum of about 43$ of 

1939-40 demand. Japan's war production, on the other hand, 

deteriorated rapidly after 1944* when U.S. submarines reduced 

her raw materials imports to 35$ of pre-war amounts. British 

data from C. B. A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of 

War, U.K. Civil Series (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 

1 955)> PP« 65-200. Japanese figures from United States 

Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), "The Effects of Strategic 

Bombing on Japan's War Economy," USSBS, Yol. 53 (Washington: 

Government Printing Office, 1947)* Similarly, the British 

blockade of Germany in World War I cut the average citizen's 

calorie intake to 1,431» about 44 '5 per cent of the peacetime 

figure. See C. Ernest Fayle, Seaborne Trade , Yol. II : The 

Submarine Campaign to the End of 19 , 16 (London: John Manning, 

1923), p. 404. 

56 

Asahi Shimbun series, "Food and People," installment VT, 

July 14, 1973* See below, Chapter Five. 



44 



57 
during the 1973 Mideast War to cany raw materials from the 

West Coast to Japan, the entire U.S. Air Force heavy lift capacity 
could supply less than six percent of an austere (40/^ of peace- 
time) Japanese iron ore need alone. This in no way diminishes 
the value of these aircraft, but highlights the competitive 
advantage of ships in the transport of the bulk cargoes so 
necessary to everyday life. 

Contrary to popular opinion, it is not only the West that 
is dependent on this trade. Much has been written about the 
Soviet Union's internal lines of east-west communications, the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, the canal system, etc. However, a large 
percentage of the goods arriving in eastern Siberia comes by 
ship either through the Indian Ocean or by the Arctic route. 



57 C-141 C-5A 
Cargo Loadings (Yom Kippur 

airlift) 15 tons 75 tons 

Speed 465 kts. 465 kts. 

Distance 465O n.m. 465O n.m. 

Flying Time (Round Trip) 20 hrs. 20 hrs. 

Sorties per aircraft/day (est) .75 »75 

Available aircraft 276 77 

Total Cargo/day 51 05 T 4556 T 

Japanese Iron Ore Imports 118,785,000 tons/yr = 325,458 tons/day 
4tyo of peacetime imports FY 1972 = 130,175 tons/day 

Source: Aircraft data from Jane ' s All The World's Aircraft , 
1973-74. 

Imports from Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITl). 
Comparable figures for other commodities (at the 4.O/0 level) are: 
Petroleum - jfo, Coal - 14$, Foodstuffs - 58^. Note that cargo 
loads could be increased to 35 tons and 110 tons respectively 
over shorter distances or at full range with the mid-air 
refueling now being developed for the C~5» 

CO 

Robert E. Athay, "The Sea and Soviet Domestic 



45 



Thus, it would seem that maritime transportation will 
continue to be the mainstay of peaceful international commerce* 
Over a wide variety of wartime scenarios sealif t capability will 
be important, both for long-term conflict resupply and to deter 
by displaying the capacity to cope with blockades of long 
duration. In many cases, however, an airlift, may be necessary 
to buy enough time for the seaborne supply operations to become 
effective. 

Other Strategic Innovations 

Weapon systems with strategic implications in modern naval 
warfare range from the attack carrier to ballistic missile 
submarines to land-based bombers and missiles which could be 
targeted against convoys, task forces, etc. Although volumes 
could be written on each, these devices generally are outside of 
Japan's purview at present. They will be referred to later in 
more specific contexts. 



Transportation," USNIP , XCVTII (May 1972), pp. 158-179, does not 
give exact figures, but states: 

. . . large areas of the Soviet Union, chiefly on the 
Pacific and in the Arctic . . . rely on shipping for 
their main transport links with the rest of the 
country and with the outside world, (p. 177) 

See also U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, The Indian Ocean : Political and S_trategi_c 
Future , 92nd Cong., 1st session (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1971), P- 3» 



46 



Environment-Level Developments 

Rarely does technology actually alter the arena of conflict 
itself. The aircraft and the submarine did, of course, by intro- 
ducing new dimensions to the battlefield. Other developments 
were noted at the beginning of the chapter. At present, however, 
there are two interrelated programs underway which may one day 
have similarly far-reaching effects. 

Real-Time Ocean Surveillance Systems 

One of the prerequisites to the SALT agreements was the 

development of "national technical means of verification," 

59 
primarily reconnaissance satellites. Having proved their 

worth in strategic intelligence, attention has begun to turn to 
their tactical potential. This has profound implications. Should 
it become possible to monitor the movements of naval vessels on 
a real-time (as occurring) basis, it would change the entire 
environment of warfare at sea. 

A 1972 study indicated that satellite cameras could resolve 
objects of about one foot from an altitude of 100 miles. Infra- 
red sensors and side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) also were felt 
to be aboard some of the latest vehicles. Shipborne radar 



59 

^SALT I Agreement, Article XII, para. 1. The complete 

range of national intelligence assets naturally would be devoted 

to such work, but satellites are among the most important in this 

case. 

Ted Greenwood, Reconnaissance , Surveillance and Arms 
Control , Adelphi Papers No. 88 (London: International Institute 



47 



signals can be monitored by electronic intelligence satellites 

61 

which have been orbited since the early 1960s. 

There is thus no doubt that the capability exists for 
satellites to detect ships at sea under clear skies, both day 
and night. All-weather capability will depend on the sophisti- 
cation of the satellite radars, but this seems to be developing 

62 

rapidly. ' The important words thus are "real- time." There 

also is a significant problem with identification. 

Treating the former question first, there are two ways to 
obtain data from satellite sensors. The first is to store them 

in a recoverable capsule, which is ejected at intervals 

63 

(typically three days or longer ) for processing. This method 

is ideal for high-resolution photography, locating and analyzing 



for Strategic Studies (lISS), 1972), pp. 6-8. SLAR gives a 
photograph- like image even through cloud cover. Given the state 
of current technology, the primary limitations on visual sensors 
seem to be from atmospheric distortions. These are on the order 
of 6" to one foot. Greenwood feels that existing lenses and 
films could come close to these limits. Even if television were 
less clear by an order of magnitude or two, it still would be 
adequate for detecting ships. See also Greenwood's article 
"Reconnaissance and Arms Control," Scientific American , 228 
(February 1973), pp. 14-25- 

61 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRl), 

"Verification Using Reconnaissance Satellites," SIPRI Yearbook 
1973 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1973), pp. 60-101. 



62 u. 



S. News and Y/orld Report , October 21, 1974, P» H, 



reported that Britain "has perfected a satellite radar system 
able to pinpoint every ship in the Eastern Atlantic." 

Greenwood, Scientific American A rticle, op . cit ., 
pp. 18-20. 



48 



fixed electronic emitters, etc. The second approach is to trans- 
mit the data to the ground via radio link, often after processing 
aboard the satellite. Such systems almost never would be out of 
contact with U.S. listening stations for more than 30 minutes. 

The limitations of the first approach for ocean surveillance 
are evident. In 72 hours a 20 knot task force could be anywhere 
in a 22,342,000 square kilometer area. In other words, if it 
were detected at Guam, three days later it could be off TSkyo, 
the Philippines, New Guinea or Wake. 

Even with a continuous data link, there are problems. A 

satellite with an orbital period of exactly 90 minutes will 

65 

retrace its path over the earth's surface once every 24 hours. 

A satellite in a 200 km orbit could cover a circle roughly 



Aviation Week , August 19> 1 974> reported that the Earth 
Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) would store data on its 
tape recorder when out of touch with U.S. ground stations and 
transmit it when communication was re-established about 30 
minutes later. The U.S. Air Force reportedly maintains a 
satellite monitoring station at Alice Springs, Australia which 
might reduce the time even more. 

65 

Such a satellite would complete 16 orbits in 24 hours, 

bringing it back over its starting point just as the earth began 

another revolution, thus repeating the cycle. If the period 

were not exactly 90 minutes, the satellite would trace a 

different path each day. The limits of latitude covered by a 

satellite are defined by the inclination of its orbit to the 

Equator, i.e. an inclination of 90 degrees would reach both 

poles, while one of 75 degrees or 105 degrees would go only to 

latitude 75 degrees North and South. 



49 



66 

3120 km in diameter, although presumably its high- resolution 

sensors have a much narrower field of view. In any case, to 

provide coverage of a given point once every 90 minutes, 13 

67 

satellites at 200 km would be needed. Given that such an orbit 

would decay fairly rapidly (in about a month), perhaps as many as 

twelve launches per year would be needed to keep each satellite 

68 
on station. At about $25 million per launch, ' such a program 

quickly becomes prohibitively expensive. 

Obviously, there are trade-offs. Four satellites in 1000 

km orbit could cover the equator once every 100 minutes or so 

and remain in orbit longer, albeit at a five-fold sacrifice in 

69 

resolution. A synchronous satellite at 36,000 km could provide 




66 

Calculations as follows: 

1. Earth's radius (R) = 3448 n.m., radius 

to satellite = (R+108) = 3556 n.m. 

2. Cos Q- = .9696, Sin Q- = /l-Cos 2 Q- = .2446 

3. X = (R+108) Sin Q- = 869.8, 

Y = X Cos & = 843.2 n.m. = 1562 km 

67 

The equational circumference of the Earth is about 

40,066 km. If the diameter of each satellite's "view" is 3104 km» 
then 12.9 would be needed to cover the equator at any one moment. 
Fewer would be required for higher latitude coverage (i.e. 11 
could cover all areas above 30 degrees) . 

68 

Estimate from Mr. Philip J. Klass, Aviation V/eek, tele- 
phone interview, October 8, 1974* 

69 

A synchronous orbit is one in which the period of the 

satellite is 24 hours, thus making it appear to x*emain stationery 
over some point on the equator. The orbital plane can be inclined 
slightly to cause it to trace out a North-South figure-eight, but 
such satellites are basically confined to low latitudes. 



50 



continuous coverage of an entire hemisphere but with poor reso- 
lution and serious angular viewing problems near the poles. The 
former altitude, incidently, is close to that which the Soviets 

reportedly have used for their recent ocean reconnaissance 

70 
vehicles. Given that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 

usually have maintained only one photo satellite in orbit at 

71 

any one time since the late 1960s, it is evident that ocean 

surveillance from space will require an extensive, and expensive 

additional effort. Nevertheless, both superpowers seem committed 

72 

to the project. 

There is, however, another problem which may be even more 
serious than the detection of ships at sea — their identification. 
In 1971» some 22,900 merchant ships and fishing craft were at 



70 

' Aviation Week September 9, 1974, p. 26. The U.S. Navy's 

Project 749? however, reportedly is looking at a "low-altitude 

satellite," Aviation Week, August 9, 1972, p. 12. 

71 

SIPrtI Yearbook , op . cit . , figures derived from Tables 

of military launches. Both countries, however, have a larger 

number of electronic intelligence (ELINT) — so called "ferret 11 — 

satellites in orbit. At the end of 1972, the U.S. had 17 still 

flying to the Soviet's 15, though it is not clear how many still 

are working. 

U.S. Navy officials revealed in 1973 that the Soviets 
were using satellites for ocean surface surveil lance, stating 
that the U.S. was five years behind in the field ( Aviation Week , 
September 10, 1973). Between December 1973 and May 1 974 the 
Soviets launched 3 satellites with near-circular orbits which 
were compatible with this role. ( Aviation Week , September 9» 
1974)* The USAF recently has alunched a number of vehicles 
using the TITAN III-B booster which may be dedicated to Navy 
Projects. 



51 



73 
sea on any given day. The figure is projected to grow to 

30,437 by 1980. 4 By contrast, the U.S. Navy in 1974 had some 

268 ocean-going surface combatants and amphibious ships while 

the USSR had 270. Even assuming that 50$ of the forces would 

76 
be at sea at any one time, they would constitute only slightly 

more than one percent of the ships on the ocean, and only about 

two and a half percent if fishing boats are excluded. 

Thus there is a problem of identification. Warships 

undeniably have electromagnetic signatures which are different 



73 

'^Robert P. Thompson, "Establishing Global Traffic Flows," 

Journal of Navigation , XXV (October, 1972), pp. 483-495. The 

1971 figure was arrived at by applying the at-sea percentages 

of Table I to the vessel categories in Table IV. 

*7 A 

Ibid . The forecast is flawed by assumption of (1) con- 
tinued expansion of per capita oil consumption. in the indus- 
trialized countries at 1960s rates and (2) continued closure of 
the Suez Canal, but it is useful nonetheless. 

^Jane's Fighting Ships 1974-75, pp. 642-643. This 
includes: Carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, 
assault ships and landing ships. The point is not to compare 
the sizes of the two navies but to point out the relatively small 
number of major warships as a percent of total ships at sea. 

76 

Probably a high estimate, except in the most serious 

crises. About a third of the U.S. fleet normally is deployed 

overseas in peacetime, with the figure rising to 50-to-60 per 

cent in periods of tension, and 90 per cent in a general v/ar. 

( Washington Post , October 29, 1974). The commander of the U.S. 

Atlantic fleet stated in 1974 that the U.S. peacetime target was 

42 days at sea per quarter (46^0), but that the tempo of 

operations had fallen to about 38 days (4?$) for deployed units and 

34 days (3T/o) for others because of fuel and budget constraints. See 

U.S., House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 

Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564 , Department of 

Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975 * 

Part 2 of 4, 93rd Cong., 2nd session (Washington: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1974), p. 940. 



52 



from those of merchantmen. Naval radars can be distinguished 
from commercial ones, and the volume of communications from all 
but the smallest man-of-war is likely to dwarf that from the 
average merchant ship. But the time during which a suspected 
reconnaissance satellite will be overhead can be predicted, and 
various forms of deception exercised by naval and selected 
merchant units during that period. It also is probable that 
warship infrared signatures are different from those of com- 
mercial vessels, especially for larger units. With sensor 
resolutions of ten feet, a satellite should be able to distin- 
guish a ship with two active firerooms (i.e. a warship or fast 
liner) from one with only one. These would be more difficult to 
mask, but presumably some ambiguities could be introduced if 
desired. The difficulties are compounded if it is desired to 
know which warships are present and where they are going (other 
than just to distinguish between warships and merchant ships). 

A small vessel can simulate a larger one fairly easily through 

77 

a number of devices. Among these would be: increased communi- 
cations traffic, the use of special transmitters to simulate 
radars not actually carried, and special repeaters to enhance 
the energy of reflected signals from enemy radars to make a 
target look bigger than it is. If a ship actually is being 



77 

Jane's Weapon Systems 1973-74, pp. 241-251, contains an 

excellent description of basic Electronic Warfare (EW) pro- 
cedures and equipments, from which the examples herein are taken. 



53 



tracked by certain types of radar, techniques to give false 
direction and position information can be employed. In sum, the 
problems of real-time ocean surveillance are formidable, even 
with satellites. It is unlikely that a U.S. commander soon will 
be able to ask about the Kresta class cruiser Krasnyi Krim and 
be presented with immediate television coverage. On the other 
hand, it is not unreasonable to expect information to the effect 
that a Soviet destroyer- type ship was reported at Lat. X, 
Long. Y within the past 24 hours. Anything in between will 
depend on the amount of assets that one is willing to commit. 
The most practical approach is likely to be through the 

coordination of several sensors. In addition to the seabed 

Tft 
hydrophone arrays mentioned earlier (p. 36) • Over-The-Horizon 

(OTH) radar systems can track ships from about 1500 to 2950 

79 
kilometers. Land-based patrol aircraft have long been an 

essential part of maritime reconnaissance, and these may be 



7ft 

A knowledgeable trade journal has reported that: "One 

early experimental installation (of seabed listening systems), 

emplaced in 1956, was aimed at spotting surface and submarine 

traffic leaving and approaching Vladivostok and Nachodka [sic] 

through the Sea of Japan." Compass Publications, Sea Technology 

Handbook Directory 1^74 (Arlington: Compass Publications, 

1974), p. A/12. 

79 

Donald E. Barrick, "The Use of Skywave Radar for Remote 

Sensing of Sea States," Marine Technology Society Journal , VII 
(January-February 1973) > PP» 29-53* In addition to the back- 
scatter radar at the Naval Research Laboratory on Chesapeake Bay 
used for the studies reported in the article, the U.S. has 
deployed OTH-B radars as part of its ballistic missile early 
warning system (BMEWS). Whether or not these radars can (or 
will) be converted for sea surveillance is not known. 



54 



80 
supplemented by modified U-2s operating from carriers. High 

Frequency Direction-Finder networks have been used with great 

success since World War II. Perhaps the most cost-effective 

combination would be a satellite to provide 24 hour position 

81 
checks with updates provided by aircraft or "tattletail" ships 

as deemed necessary by on-scene commanders. Alternatively, 

integrated sensor systems could be developed in high-interest 

regions (such as the exits from the Baltic, the Norwegian Sea 

or the Sea of Japan, or the approaches to the Persian Gulf. 

82 

Perhaps as in NTDS, targets could be assigned track numbers, 

identified by electronic or other means, and then watched until 
they passed out of the surveillance area or were turned over to 
elements dedicated solely to their monitoring. In the near 
future, the Soviets are likely to have an edge in this regard 
since they are mainly interested in the relatively few U.S. air- 
craft carriers, which can be trailed if necessary. On the other 
hand, the U.S. has the computer technology to eventually develop 
a better ocean-wide surveillance system through remote sensors. 
Paradoxically, it may be easier to hide valuable ships in 



8 Aviation Week , May 8, 1972, p. 26. 

81 

A "tattletail" is a surface ship assigned to follow an 

opponent's fleet and report its movements, state of readiness, 

launches of missiles, etc. 

82 

See above, note 35* Aviation Week , August 9» 1972, 

reported "A . . . series of three small software studies dealing 

with track correlation for the ocean surveillance satellite . . ." 

(emphasis supplied) . 



55 



peacetime than in wartime since there are merchantmen to get 
lost among along the normal sealanes. At the same time, the 
general location of convoys in wartime might not be too diffi- 
cult if all ships were moving in discrete clusters. This, 
incidently, is not an adequate argument for abolishing a convoy. 
Its purpose is not to hide, but to provide for easier defense. 
This it surely does in all but a nuclear environment, since the 
initial detection problem of the submarine is partly solved if 
it is known that he must come to the vicinity of the convoy. 

What then, are the implications for naval operations of a 
partial ocean surveillance system? In a general war environment, 
it is uncertain. If there is no "tattle tail" in physical contact, 
there probably still are enough deception measures available to 
confuse the surveillance systems long enough to launch a carrier 
strike, especially if there is some bad weather around to hide 
under. 

In any case, the information likely to be available from 
any sort of ocean surveillance system over the next few years 
probably won't be able to ensure a first strike capability 
against ships at sea. In the longer term, however, it could 
seriously erode the effectiveness of surface warships by pro- 
viding targeting information for submarines, ballistic anti-ship 

missiles (which, by then, could be fitted with homing war- 

• 83 
heads), or even IRMs. 



This discussion has avoided the detection of submerged 



56 



In a limited wax, surveillance might be decisive, but the 
evidence is not conclusive. Even if ASM-carrying aircraft could 
find a task force, the outcome of an engagement between them and 
an alerted group of fighters carrying the 60-mile-plus Phoenix 
missile certainly is not a foregone conclusion, especially if 
the ships also have point-defense systems. 

If the ships themselves are not targets, the surveillance 
does not seem likely to make too much difference. A Soviet 
intelligence trawler monitored U.S. operations in the Gulf of 
Tonkin throughout the Vietnam war and doubtless passed strike 
information along to the North Vietnamese if, indeed, they could 
not have detected it themselves. 

In many peacetime operations it is helpful to have your 
opponent know what you are doing as soon as possible. One com- 
mentator has noted that, in the 1958 Quemoy crisis and the 1967 
war: 

Warship activity appeared to be an excellent 
indicator of Washington's intentions. The ^^6'J 
fleet maneuvers, in keeping with U.S. policy, were 
deliberately restrained and aggressive only at the 
time of presumed Soviet threat. Highly publicized 
augmentations in 1958 demonstrated U.S. determina- 
tion. In both cases, Soviet emphasis on naval 



submarines by satellites. Although the Skylab astronauts 
followed schools of fish in the Gulf of Mexico, some progress 
has been made in the use of blue-green airborne lasers for 
shallow water sea bed mapping, and other work has been reported 
in satellite-based lasers, it does not appear that any radical 
ASW breakthroughs will be forthcoming in the next few years. 
See Tsipis, et al., The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent , op . 
cit. (note 45), pp. 121-1 50. 



57 



activity as a true reflection of American intentions 
increased the significance of warship movements. 4 

Thus, the two principal circumstances in which ocean surveillance 

could undercut the political effectiveness of naval forces are 

(1) when it is desired to make your opponent think that you have 

much larger forces "just over the horizon" and (2) when it is 

desired to transit a strait, or arrive on the scene before he 

has a chance to prepare or protest. The classic example of the 

first occurred during Graf Spee 's brief stay in Montevideo after 

the 1939 action off the River Plate. Although the nearest heavy 

reinforcements were several hundred miles away, the British 

managed to convince her captain that the cruisers which had 

brought her to bay had been reinforced by capital ships. This 

knowledge doubtless was instrumental in the decision to scuttle 

the German raider. 

An illustration of the second might have been during the 

December 1970 Indo-Pakistani war, when the carrier Enterprise 

and her escorts entered the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Straits. 

For most, the first word of this movement was the passage of the 

86 
task force through the straits, thus giving the riparian 



Tlowe, _oj>. cit . (note 1-5) > P» 331 • 

-^Dudley Pope, The Battle of the River Plate (London: 
William Kimber, 1956). 

86 

U.S. sources officially have maintained that no prior 

notification was given for this transit and this was substanti- 
ated by interviews in Malaysia and Singapore during June 1974* 



58 



government no chance to decide on a course of action or lodge a 
complaint in advance. Similarly, in 1958, shortly after Sukarno 
proclaimed Indonesia's archipelago doctrine, U.S. destroyer 
division 31 transited Lombok and Makassar straits to register 

displeasure with the unilateral enclosure of heretofore open 

R7 
waters. One can imagine a similar scenario in which the 

Soviet Union, or U.S., might make the movements of its adver- 
saries known to a coastal state in order to allow it time to 
prepare an embarrassing protest or even ready some of the 
weapons noted earlier. 

This once again emphasizes the value of organization. 
While weapons technology may temporarily shift the advantage in 
favor of attacker or defender, organization, particularly in 
intelligence, is likely to be a permanent feature distinguishing 
major maritime powers from small or middle power navies. 

Command Control Communications (c ) 

Communications is the key to the effective utilization of 
this intelligence. The revolution which has taken place in this 
field with the advent of solid state electronics, computers and 
satellites is breathtaking. At the shipboard level are tactical 
data systems. More sophisticated equipment is required to 
manage the world-wide scope of current U.S. (and Soviet) 
operations. Finally, it is necessary to ensure that the 



87 



Cable, op_. cit . (note 1-5) » P» 216. 



59 



strategic nuclear forces can still receive their launch orders, 
even if they have absorbed a first strike . 

Errors will happen, to be sure. The communications failures 
which preceded the Liberty and Pueblo incidents are good examples. 
The trend, however, has been to concentrate more and more control 
with centralized decision-makers. On occasion, for instance, 
President Johnson was reported to have personally chosen the 
targets for strikes from the Yankee Station carriers. 

It is for this reason, as well as their close relationship 
to surveillance systems, that developments in C have been 
classed as an environmental change. Besides the flexibility 
that centralization has brought, it also has greatly increased 
a nation's vulnerability to attacks on its communications net- 
work. By deception, cryptanalysis, electro-magnetic pulses, 
jamming, or a host of other exotic measures, conflicts may be 
effectively decided in the ether while the opponents 1 major 
forces remain intact. 



Chapter Two 
THE CHANGING USES OF THE OCEANS 

Traditionally, there have been three occupations for those 
who made their living at sea — as naval hands, merchant sailors, 
or fishermen. Since the end of World War II, however, indeed, 
in the past 15 years, an entirely new range of uses has emerged 
for what has come to be called ocean space. Seabed resources, 
ranging from alluvial tin deposits to continental shelf petroleum 
to abyssal manganese nodules may bring more than 100 billion 
dollars per year by 1 985 • Man-in- the- sea programs, although 
they have not lived up to their original promise, may yet make 
significant contributions to continental shelf resource develop- 
ment. The press of population growth, industrial land use and 
on-shore pollution have increased the incentives to move urban 
and industrial activities afloat. A large percentage of future 
nuclear reactors may be located at sea. In various parts of the 
world, fertilizer plants, waste disposal facilities, airports 
and oil storage tanks already are being constructed offshore. 
A growing recognition of oceanic pollution has emphasized the 
need for multi-national approaches to problems. 

In the meantime, of course, the historic uses of the sea 
also have been radically altered. Naval operations have been 



60 



61 



dealt with in the last chapter and will be covered again in 
Chapter Four. Fish are being tracked by satellite, cultivated 
in both fresh and salt water, and dangerously over-caught in 
some areas. Merchant shipping is being transfigured by tech- 
nology. 

The unsettled marine political climate, which will be dis- 
cussed in the next Chapter, is intimately related to the changing 
economic uses of the seas. As a preface, therefore, some recent 
trends in ocean commercial activities will be reviewed, along 
with some likely future developments. 

Merchant Shipping 

As noted in the previous chapter, maritime commerce domi- 
nates international transportation and is not likely to be dis- 
lodged in the near future. The economics are quite straight- 
forward: For one dollar, a ton of U.S. freight can be moved 330 
miles by water, 70 miles by rail, 14 miles by truck, and one 
mile by air. 

At the end of 1 973 » the world's merchant fleet totaled 

2 
over 59,600 ships of 289,9 2 7,000 gross tons, broken down as 

follows: 



1 

Fairplay (British Shipping Journal), December 30, 1971, 
cited in George H. Miller, "Necessary for the National Defense," 
Shipmate (May 1974), p. 16. 

sea Technology Handbook Directory 1974, cp_» cit . 
(note 1-78), pp. A/4-5' 



62 



Table 2-1 
COMPOSITION OF THE WORLD MERCHANT FLEET 









Percent 


Type 


GRT( 1,000) 


Number 


of Tonnage 


Oil Tankers 


115,360 


6,607 


39-8 


Bulk/Oil Carriers 


19,539 


349 


6.7 


Ore and Bulk Carriers 


53,110 


2,954 


18.3 


General Cargo Ships 


70,079 


21,629 


24.2 


LNG Carriers & Others a 


3,967 


838 


1.4 


Container Ships , 


5,900 


344 


2.0 


Non-Trading Vessels 


21,972 


26,835 


7.6 


Source: Sea Technology 


Handbook Direc 


story, 1974, P. 


A/5 



Note: Includes chemical tankers, RO/ROs, large carriers, 
and ocean tug barges. 

Tugs, dredges, cable ships, ice breaker, fishing 
vessels, etc. 



In 1970, some 240 million gross tons of ships carried 2,510 
million tons of seaborne trade (three quarters of it raw materials 
and grain) and generated revenues estimated at about $40 billion 
dollars. Marine insurance premiums in 1972 totaled some 2.5 

billion dollars. 

5 
The individual and collective capacity of merchant ships 



Charles C. Bates and Paul Yost, "Where Trends the Flow of 
Merchant Ships," in John King Gamble, Jr. and Giulio Pontecorvo 
(eds.), Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans 
(Cambridge: Bal linger Publishing Company, 1974), P« 249« 

4 
George W. Handley, "The Role of the Marine Insurance 

Industry in the Emerging Regime of the Oceans," in ibid ., p. 286. 

5 
The size of ships is measured by several different 

standards. Merchant ships usually are registered by gross 

tons and have their carrying capacity expressed in deadweight 



63 



has grown dramatically, more than doubling since 1967* Some 
evidence of this may be seen in Table 2-2: 

Table 2-2 

A COMPARISON OF THE CARRYING CAPACITY OP THE 
WORLD FLEET BY BASIC SHIP TYPES 1967-1972 





1967^ 
DWT(10 ) 


1972, 

dwtOo ) 


Percent 


Type 


Change 


Tankers 


105.5 


192.5 


82.5 


Bulk Carriers 


49.6 


108. 5 


118.8 


Freighters 


89.5 


88.5 


-1.1 


Passenger and Cargo 


5.1 


4.0 


-21.6 


Barge Carriers 





.5 


- 


Container Ships 


.6 


5 '° a 


733.3 


LNG Carriers 


.07 a 


• 54 a 


671.4 



Source: Kasputys, pp. 140-142 
Note: Trillions of Cubic Meters 



tons. Warships typically are listed by displacement. Defini- 
tions, and rough conversion factors, are given below. 
GROSS TONS (GRT ) - Total number of cubic feet of enclosed space 

divided by 100 (refers to space) 
NET TONS(NRT) - That part of Gross Tonnage which may be utilized 

for passenger and cargo (refers to space) 
DISPLACEMENT TONS-The total weight of the vessel and its contents 

expressed in tons of 2,240 pounds (long tons) 
DEADWEIGHT TONS(DWT) - The difference between the displacement 

of the ship loaded and unloaded. It is an 

indication of the ship's carrying capacity 

(refers only to weight) 



To Find 


Multiply 


Multiply 


Multiply 




DWT. by 


GRT. by 


NRT. by 


DEADWEIGHT TONS 


1.00 


1.50 


2.50 


GROSS TONS 


0.67 


1.00 


1.67 


NET TONS 


0.40 


0.60 


1.00 


DISPLACEMENT TONS 


1.50 


2.25 


3.75 



For large tankers and ore carriers, the ratio of DWT to GRT is 
considerably greater than 1.5:1. 



64 



Note the dominance of large tankers and bulk carriers, the rapid 
growth of specialized designs such as container ships and LNG 
tankers, and the stagnation of general cargo freighter develop- 
ment. Japan has played a major role in this transformation by- 
pioneering the mass production of very large ships. So extensive 
has such construction become that fully 40 percent of existing 
world-wide tonnage is less than five years old. From inertia, 
if nothing else, this trend will continue, as fully 90 percent 
of the 114*3 million gross tons on orders in world shipyards in 
September 1973 were tankers and bulk carriers. 

Thus, the past twenty years have witnessed great changes 
in the nature of merchant ships themselves, and these have had 
a significant, though often unappreciated, impact on naval 
operations, domestic and international commerce, and even world 
politics. 

The Growth of Tankers and Bulk Carriers 

The economics and politics of ocean transport which have 
driven tankers from under 20,000 tons in 1945 to nearly half a 

million tons in 1973 have been eloquently recounted by Noel 

7 
Mostert. • The inflation of bulk. carrier size has been comparable. 



Sea Technology Handbook Directory 1974» P» A/4- The total 
value of these orders was some $175 billion for 4>678 new ships. 
See also Joseph Kasputys, _op. cit (note 1-6). 

7 Noe*l Mostert, Super ship (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) < 
These ships frequently are referred to as VLCCs (Very Large Crude 
Carriers — generally greater than 100,000 tons) and ULCCs (Ultra 
Large Crude Carriers — usually above 300»000 tons). 



65 



Although projected 1,000,000 ton ships seem to have been 
deferred, and renewed interest shown in 25-80,000 ton craft, the 
super tankers will continue to be a dominant feature of ocean 
commerce. 

The political problems associated with ships of this size 
mostly have been related to pollution and will be discussed in 
the next chapter. At the same time, however, the massive vessels 
have raised a host of technical issues. Marine insurance values 
have risen from $2,500,000 for a World War II ship to $25,000,000 
for the Igara , which was lost off Singapore in 1973, to $80,000,000 
for the 477,000 DWT Globtik Tokyo . Liquified natural gas (LNG) 

tankers now under construction may push this to $125,000,000 per 

9 
ship. As one expert has noted: 

Right now, because of capacity limitations, it is 
not possible to insure a $125,000,000 vessel com- 
pletely in one insurance market, be it London, 
Lloyd's, the United States or Japan. ... we are 
approaching the maximum of the world insurance 
resources presently available. 10 

Suggested solutions from an underwriter's standpoint have 
included mandatory traffic separation schemes in congested water- 
ways, better training and licensing procedures for crews, as well 



ivlarine Technology. Society Journal , VIII (February 1 974) r 
p. 15» This was the largest single marine insurance loss in 
history. 

9 

^Handley, "The Role of the Marine Insurance Industry . . .," 

op . cit. (note 2-4), passim . 
10 Ibid., p. 287. 



66 



as diversification of risks by sharing an expensive ship among 
insurance markets in several countries. 

The ships also pose special safety problems. 200,000 DWT 
vessels draw more than 21 meters, which already limits their 
operations in some parts of the North Sea, U.S. coastal waters, 
the Straits of Malacca and the Indonesian Archipelago. Moreover, 
the tankers are singularly unmaneuverable — requiring as many as 
20 minutes and several miles to stop. This has strengthened 

calls from operators and coastal states alike for navigational 

12 

controls ranging from total bans in some waterways to traffic 

13 

lanes in others. Mostert has recognised the heart of the issue: 

For those on shore, shipwreck was once not an 
unwelcome event; it drew the plunderers from far 
and near. It was talked about for generations, with 
wistful recollection of the drama and the spoils; 
but shipwreck, once feared principally by those on 
board, has become in our own time the more solemn 
dread of those on shore than those on board. For the 
first time we on land have more to lose and nothing 
to gain. Helicopters get the sailors off, we clean 
up the muck. That is why the responsibility for 
ships has become ours, and is no longer the sailors 1 

• • • 

Another consequence of the deep drafts has been the develop- 
ment of offshore morring facilities (deep water ports or super- 
ports). In addition to environmental and navigational 



11 Ibid., p. 291. 

ships greater than 200,000 DWT are not permitted in the 
Straits of Malacca. 

1 3 

Supership , op . cit . , pp. 331-332. 



67 



considerations, the legal status of these structures is 
uncertain. There is a growing body of pertinent literature, 
but the major point of interest to this study is the extent of 
additional jurisdiction which coastal states can derive from 
off-shore structures. 

C on taineri zat i on 

A freight container is nothing more than a large box of 
standard dimensions to simplify cargo handling. Nonetheless, 

since the late 1950s, the container revolution literally has 

15 

transformed international commerce. 

This method of packing has reduced pilferage at trans- 
shipment points, minimized customs delays (since only the mani- 
fest of the sealed container need be inspected), and contributed 
to world-wide standardization. Even more importantly, it has 
led to inter-modal transportation systems, with door-to-door 



%ee, inter alia , Allan Hirsch, "Special Circumstances: 
Superports," and Albert W. Koers, "Artificial Islands in the 
North Sea," with commentary in Gamble and Pontecorvo, op_. cit . , 
pp. 217-245. Can, for instance, man-made structures be used as 
the basis for claims to the surrounding water area or continental 
shelf? Can they be used to draw baselines? 

1 5 

The advantages of containerization for the shipping 

industry have been given by K. LI. Johnson and H. C. Garnett, 

The Economics of Containerization (Glascow: Social and Economic 

Survey, No. 2077 1971. Some of the problems of integrating 

containers hips and ports into rail and road networks are outlined 

in European Conference of Ministers of Transport, A Study of the 

Economic Influence of Containerization (Paris: OECD, 1974}* 



68 



1 f\ 17 

freight rates, land bridges and multinational outlooks. 

Special ships have been constructed for their conveyance which 

are considered 6.5 times as productive as a "conventional" cargo 

. . 18 
ship. 

One drawback of container! zati on is its lack of flexibility. 
It is ideally suited for the movement of large quantities of 
relatively high- value goods between modern terminals in indus- 
trialized countries. It is not, however, appropriate for bulk 
cargoes. Also, the capital requirements for supporting infra- 
structure (container ports, rail and road nets, handling equip- 
ment, etc.) are so high that it often is beyond the reach of 
developing countries. Moreover, container ships are not nearly 
so useful to the military planner as the versatile general cargo 
ship which can load and unload a wide variety of goods even at 



1 6 

Denver to Paris, for instance. In the past, separate 

rates would have been cited for factory to rail-head (truck), 
rail-head to port (train), port- to-port (ship), port to depot 
(train or truck), etc. Now a single fee can be quoted from 
shipper to destination, independent of the transportation mode. 

17 

See George D. Saunders, "Land Bridge Comes of Age," 

USNIP , XCIX (December 1973), pp. 38-44. The two most important 
are the North American Land Bridge, which links major Pacific 
ports with those on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts via U.S. and 
Canadian railroads, and the Siberian Land Bridge from Japan to 
Western Europe. Both began to be developed around 1967 and had 
matured by 1972. The North .American bridge, incidently, also 
has partly undercut the strategic value of the Panama Canal, at 
least for the United States. 

1 fl 

Xasputys, _op_. cit . (note 1-61 ) , p. 1 44- A conventional 

ship is defined as a U.S. C-2 type freighter or T-2 type tanker. 



unfinished or damaged "bases. 



69 

19 



Barges, Barge Carriers and RO/ROs 

As noted above, there are many ports (probably the 
majority) which cannot support large-scale container operations. 
At the same time, virtually any coastal pier or river wharf can 
service barges, which still carry tremendous volumes of cargo 
world-wide. Since the late 1960s, two novel approaches have 
been developed to combine the potential of barges with modern 
ocean shipping. The first is the barge carrier, or LASH, 
standing for Lighter Aboard Ship. Thus far they have been used 
mostly between the U.S. Gulf Coast and Europe, but they also 



19 

Nonetheless, containerisation does present certain mili- 
tary advantages, which the armed forces are beginning to exploit. 
See the essay, "War Logistics and the Freight Container," Jane j s 
Freight Containers 1 973 - 74 (London: Sampson Lew, Mars ton, 1973)» 
pp. 622-629. 

20 

In 1972, domestic water traffic handled 29.6% of U.S. 

intercity trade (in terms of ton-miles). The cargo carried by 
these vessels was 156$ of that taken by vessels of all flags in 
U.S. foreign trade, and constituted 97^ of all cargo moving 
under the U.S. flag. The DWT capacity of U.S. barges was more 
than double the total of all self-propelled U.S. ships on domes- 
tic, foreign and Great Lakes runs. See Wallace T. Sansone, 
"Domestic Shipping and American Maritime Policy," US II IP , C (May 
1 974) > PP- 162-177* Rear Admiral Hayes points out that the 
expansion of American barge use has been " . . . so marked that 
it may change the economic focus of the United States from the 
Northeast to the Mississippi Valley and Gulf Coast." John D. 
Hayes, "The Sea, 1967-1972," USNIP , XCIX (May 1973), p. 297. 
European river traffic also is tremendously important to the EEC, 
as the Soviet Union's canal system is to her economy. Throughout 
much of the developing world, rivers remain the primary means of 
internal transportation. 



70 



have potential for the developing country trade. A larger 
design, on the same principle, is the Seabee. Each of these 
$125 million vessels carries containers, break bulk cargo and 
38 large barges of the size used on European waterways. Rated 
at four to five- and- a-half times as productive as the C-2, a 

three- fold expansion of barge carriers under the U.S. flag is 

21 

forecast by 1985* Foreign operators are expected to follow 

suit. 

The second innovation is the ocean tug-barge, in which a 
pusher tug is mated with an ocean-going barge. Upon arrival at 
its destination, the tug need not wait for the barge to be 
unloaded, but can pick up a return cargo almost immediately. 
This simply is an oceanic application of the principle that the 
freight vehicle should be separated from its propulsion system — 
a long standing practice ashore. 

Another interesting, but not-so-new, design which is gaining 
popularity is the Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ship. This concept 
enables wheeled vehicles to be driven directly on and off via 
self-contained ramps. 

The barge-related and RO/RO ships have restored some of 
the flexibility lost by containerization and larger bulk 
carriers. This is particularly important to the military. 
Eventually, it may benefit the developing countries as well, 



21 

Kasputys, op. cit ., pp. 144» 149" 150* 



71 



although the high cost of such vessels probably will concentrate 
them in trade between a few we 11- developed river-mouths. 

LUG Carriers and OBOs 

Although they are related to the bulk carriers, two other 
recent concepts deserve mention. The first is the Liquified 

Natural Gas (LNG) carrier, which is now seen to be the most 

22 

needed ship type in the next several years. The problems of 

handling LNG at temperatures less than -255 degrees P are 
formidable, and the pollution and safety hazards are not yet 
fully understood. 

The other is the Oil/Bulk/Ore carrier (0B0) which trades 
higher building costs for the option of carrying diverse cargoes. 

Fisheries 

Estimate of the world's maximum sustainable fisheries yield 

range from 100,000,000 metric tons to somewhat over twice that 

23 

amount. The 1970 catch was 69 million tons, nearly 70 percent 



22 

John D. Hayes, "The Sea, 1967-1972, » op. cit., p. 301. 

The author goes on to note that over 90 of these ships will be 
needed in the next fifteen years — at a unit cost of 360-70 
million (which certainly will inflate since some U.S. ships 
already are over $100 million). Moreover, construction of the 
associated shore facilities may require $25 billion in the same 
period. He also illustrates the dangers of maritime forecasting 
by citing a 1968 study of shipping over the next 75 years which 
completely overlooked LNG carriers. 

25 Asahi Shimbun , "Food and People," XVI (July 30, 1972). 



72 



of the low end of the safe range and three-and-a-half times 
1950's 21 million ton harvest. By 1985, FAO estimates, the 
global take will he 100,000,000 tons — very close to the minimum 
estimated limit. Moreover, it will mostly be comprised of sar- 
dines, anchovies, and other seafood now used for animal feed 
meal and protein concentrates. This implies a shortage of the 
high and medium grade fish which heretofore have made up most of 
human consumption. 

Even today, warning signs have begun to appear in the 
guise of 30 centimeter, two year old mackerel in the Northwest 
Pacific where 50 centimeter, seven year old ones used to be 
commonplace. Also of note are declining yields per boat in the 
Gulf of Thailand, and the temporary collapse of the Peruvian 
anchovy industry. 

The problems have stemmed from a combination of techno- 
logical sophistication and unequal geographic and species 
exploitation. Japanese and Russian fleets sail with factory 
ships for on-scene processing. Their new-construction trawlers, 
equipped with advanced detection equipment, and backed by a 
strong government supported research effort, have been accused 
of overfishing certain regions. In U.S. waters, for instance, 



^See Barbara A. Keith, Fisheries of Peru , 1972-75 (Wash- 
ington: National Marine Fisheries Service, July 1974) • 

25 

Charges of overfishing by foreigners date back at least 

to the early 19th century in European waters. See Colombos, op . 
cit. (note 1-2), pp. 567-369, 374-376 and 385. Thus the Soviet 



73 



American fishermen have averaged 2 to 2.5 million tons per year 
since 1960, while foreign fleets have caught 3 to 3*5 million. 
Yet, because of the peculiarities of the human diet, some 14 to 

15 million tons of non-commercial species go unused in the same 

26 

area. 

Some efforts have been made to harvest new species of low- 
grade fish or plankton to supply human protein through fishmeal 

27 

or other refined products rather than by direct consumption. 

Aquaculture eventually may increase the supply, but now accounts 
for only about 7 percent of the total catch. Moreover, it so far 

has been profitable only for relatively expensive sea foods such 

28 

as shrimp, eel and shellfish. 



and Japanese fleets have created a problem of defree, rather 
than one of kind. 

26 

Sea Technology Handbook Directory 1974* _o£» cit . (note 

1-78), p. A/16. 

27 

For a detailed analysis and specific suggestions on the 

potential increase in yield through conventional and non- 
conventional species (i.e. shark, krill, porpoises), see James 
Joseph and Witold L. Klawe, "The Living Pelagic Resources of the 
Americas," Ocean Development and International Law (hereafter 
ODIL), II (Spring 1974), pp. 37-64. 

28 

A "sea ranch" will be developed in Okinawa for the 1975 

Ocean Expo. There has been talk of setting off parts of the 
Indonesian Archipelago for fish farms, though it would be diffi- 
cult to maintain controlled conditions on such a scale. Some 
experts doubt if aquaculture ever vail be able to provide large 
quantities of relatively low-cost food. Even if the economic 
problems could be overcome, they argue, the formidable hurdles 
of distribution, increasing pollution and traditional non-seafood 
diets will remain. While it recognizes the difficulties, EAO has 
given high priority to aquaculture, noting that "several million 



74 



Fishing disputes and attempts at resolution will be treated 
more fully in the next chapter. But whatever solutions are 
sought, the harvesting of living ocean resources will remain an 
important and controversial activity which will continue to focus 
attention on coastal state interests at the expense of distant- 
water ones. 

Non-Living Marine Resources 

These can "be divided into four principle categories: 
Alluvial and continental margin minerals, offshore petroleum and 
natural gas, deep seabed deposits, and materials extracted from 
seawater. 

29 

Alluvial and Continental Shelf Minerals 

Nearly all of the minerals found on land also exist on the 
seabed, although higher recovery costs have not made them 
economically attractive. Sand and gravel are the most widely 
exploited, and sometimes contain placer deposits of minerals 



hectares" could be developed for cultivation. Particular hope 
is held for fresh and brackish water herbiverous species, such 
as carp and milkfish. The Organization also has pointed to the 
danger that excessive harvesting of krill may reduce the catch 
of animals higher in the food chain which feed on them. For 
overviews, see FAO, "The State of Food and Agriculture 1973" 
(C73/2, August 1973, pp. 29-38) and "World Situation and Outlook: 
Fisheries Problems" (C73/13, September 1973). 

^See Manfred G. Krutein, "Ocean Mining," JJSJTP, XCV (May 
1969), PP. 135-140. 



75 



30 
such as magnetite. Tin has been dredged for years off the 

mouths of rivers in Thailand and Malaysia, and diamonds are taken 

along the western coasts of South Africa and Namibia. Other 

minerals being recovered from relatively shallow water around 

32 

the world include phosphorite and potassium. Offshore coal 

shafts have been sunk in some countries, usually from natural 
islands but occasionally from artificial ones. Figure 2-1 shows 
the distribution of these activities. 

There were some 1,000 ocean-going dredges world-wide in 
1 973 > with another 50 units under construction. Offshore 
minerals production certainly will increase and may become very 
important in some areas. On a global scale, however, it probably 
will have only a peripheral impact on marine affairs. 

33 

Offshore Hydrocarbons y 

As one review noted: "The one 'gold-plated,' guaranteed 



30 

Placer deposits contain mineral ores in sizes large 

enough to be separated by physical means, such as washing. 

Magnetite is a form of iron ore. 

See Evan Luard, "Who Gets What on the Seabed," Foreign 
Policy , 9 (Winter 1972-73), pp. 132-1 47. With the advent of 
high gold prices, some Alaskan alluvial deposits might again 
become profitable. 

bea Technology Handbook Directory 1974» op. cit ., p. k/3* 
For more details see U.S., Department of the Interior, Minerals 
Yearbook , 3 volumes (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
annual)" Offshore (vice coastal) diamond mining off Namibia was 
suspended in 1 971 • 

•Ttfany of the forecasts and statistics in this section are 
taken from "Annual Drilling and Production Report," Offshore , 
June 20, 1974> passim * 



76 



Figure 2-1 



* : --S # -■•■--- Jv£ ■■ ■■ A is^'iOh iy^- m h^fZm 

^.j VC <:-.. ~-r;'_ v L • •.-•.■> ,...-• .'.•■• - < , ■> —. . «*«ro» V'V'.--» -. . 

>^t.X ■•- •'- ■•■■ s ■ »:-* :-.■'.. : \' ~- J '• •■ • ' »' .-- ! A^ ' - 



1. Salt extraction from sea water S. Diamondj dredged from jea floor 9. Phosphorite nodule* 

2. Oyster shells dredged from sea floor' 6. Gold from sea floor 10. Mangonese nodules 

3. Iron sends dredged from lea floor 7. Coal underground below sea floor 

4. Tin ores dredged from seo floor 8. Sulfur underground belcw sea floor 



SEABED MINING ACTIVITIES 
(from Krutein) 



77 



growth industry around the world is offshore petroleum and 
gas, ... 

Experience in offshore oil production grew from the gradual 
extension of onshore fields into the swamp lands of Louisiana and 
the shallow waters of the Caspian Sea. Only in 1947 was the 
first platform erected in 20 feet of water in the Gulf of Mexico. 

By 1973t offshore output had grown to 10. 4 million barrels 
per day, or some 18^ of the world's pre-embargo output (22^ of 
non-Communist production). Mid-1974 estimates indicate that as 
many as 25 million barrels per day (35?°)> ma tf come from offshore 
fields by 1985- 

In 1973> Venezuela was the largest producer of offshore 
oil, followed by Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Table 2-3 
illustrates oil and natural gas production by leading countries. 

Note, however, that this reflects discoveries made several 
years ago and does not include a number of recent developments, 
such as the British North Sea fields. These are expected to 
produce 3 to 4 million barrels per day by 1980. 

As of mid-1974 the Persian Gulf and Lake Maracaibo held 
the lion's share of the proved offshore oil resources, with 53 
and 21 percent respectively. The Persian Gulf and the North Sea 
held the major gas fields, with ^O/o and \y/o each. 

Aside from the U.S. and Venezuela, the most intensive 



34 



Sea Technology Handbook and Directory 1974» P» A/1 . 



78 



Table 2-3 
LEADING OFFSHORE PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCERS 



Pe troleum 



Natural Gas 





1973 


1972-73 




1973 


1972-73 




Production 


Percent 




Production 
(l0 6 cu.ft/d) 


Percent 


Country 


(106 b/d) 


Change 


Country 


Change 


Venezuela 


2.70 


+1 


U.S. 


7,130.8 


-21 


S. Arabia 


1.90 


+33 


Iran 


3,360.0 


-25 


U.S. 


1.70 





U.K. 


3,000.0 


+17 


Nigeria 


.52 


+26 


Italy 


762.0 


7 


Abu Dhabi 


•45 


+31 


S. Arabia 


721.7 


+4 


World 


10.43 


+15 


World 


16,938.1 


-3 



The Fastest-Growing Producers were: 

Congo .03 +340 Angola 558.1 +409 

Brunei- Trinidad/ 

Malaysia .26 +210 Tobago 16.8 +57 

Indonesia .17 +149 U.K. 3,000.0 +17 

Source: Offshore , June 20, 1974, pp. 86-87 



drilling activities in 1973 were centered in Indonesia ( 1 43 wells), 
the United Kingdom (82), Mexico (49) and Brazil (48). The desired 
rate of both exploration and exploitation has been limited by 

shortages in drilling rigs and tubular products. While some of 

35 

these constraints will be eased in the next few years, it should 

not be expected that offshore discoveries alone will rapidly shift 



35 

The Japanese Ministry of Transportation estimates that 

620 drilling ships or platforms will be required by 1985 (vs. 
about 250 in operation in 1974) • Zosen , September 1974, P« 48. 
Some 117 are planned for 1974~76. Nihon Keizai : Shimbun Inter - 
national Weekly (hereafter NKIW ), March 26, 1974, P» 6- 



79 



the center of gravity of international oil away from the Persian 
Gulf. Proven and probable offshore petroleum reserves total 137 
billion barrels, compared with 453 billion ashore. It is esti- 
mated that these figures could be increased to 571 and 1038 
billion, respectively. 

The Middle East continues to be the most promising location 
for future discoveries, followed by the North Sea. Other areas 
with good potential include the USSR, Southeast Asia, West 
Africa and the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic shelves of North 
America. Exploration of the Northeast Asia Seabed has been 
restrained by the complex political situation there, while U.S. 
leases have been slowed by environmental concerns. 

These new projects doubtless will produce finds which will 
be great boons to certain countries, as recent ones have been 
(or soon will be) to Norway, Great Britain, and Nigeria. How- 
ever, it takes two and a half to ten years to convert discovery 
wells into commercial production, so a dramatic short-run trans- 
formation of the world energy picture through offshore efforts 
is improbable. 

Perhaps the most immediate physical problem of seabed 
drilling is the hazard it poses to navigation. It is difficult 

to learn how many wells actually are in place, but the figure is 

36 

considerable. Most such platforms have safety zones of 



36 

Over 25OO "oil well structures" are reported in the Gulf 

of Mexico by itself. John D. Hayes, "The Maritime World in 1973»" 
USNIP . C (May 1974), p. 252. 



80 



37 
500 meters around them, thus effectively restricting navigation 

in the vicinity. Nevertheless, some 50 collisions in a three- 
year period have been reported between merchant ships and off- 
shore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico alone. Therefore, more 
stringent measures probably will be necessary, especially in 
busy areas like the North Sea. 

Whether or not a coastal state intends it, the development 
of offshore resources cannot help but bring expanded national 
jurisdiction. The rumor of a terrorist plot to blow up Britain's 

North Sea oil rigs in 1974 made headlines as far away as New 

39 

Zealand. In any case, it followed by only a few months the 

revelation that V/hitehall was "considering security problems 
presented by North Sea oil and gas field development." Since 
some of the fields lie over 120 miles offshore some extension of 
sovereign rights (if only those of self-defense) at least is 
implied. 

The deepest well now spudded (mid-1 974) , is 656 meters off 
Gabon, and drilling vessels capable of working in 900 meters are 
in operation. Production operations currently are no deeper 
than 112 meters, but North Sea development will extend this 



37 

•"Permitted under Article 5 of the 1958 Geneva Convention 

on the Continental Shelf. 

58 Hayes, "The Maritime World in 1973," op. cit . , p. 252. 
59 The New Zealand Herald (Auckland), July 1, 1974- 
4 °IDR, VII (February 1974), PP- 23-24. 



81 



beyond 120, and plans for the Santa Barbara Channel call for 
production from about 255 meters. While some of the deeper 
water systems probably will be completely subsurface, thus 
reducing the navigational hazards, it is evident that the limits 

of national interest already extend beyond the 200 meter 

43 

isobath. 



Deep Seabed Mining 

Between 1872 and 1876, H.M.S. Challenger , on her historic 
cruise, recovered some unimpressive objects resembling smooth 
lumps of coal from the deep ocean floor. Chemical analysis later 
showed them to contain ores of manganese, nickel, copper, cobalt, 
zinc, molybdenum, and other metals, but because of their 
inaccessibility little attention was paid to them for nearly a 
century. 

By the mid 1960s, however, the progress of technology, the 
growth of world-wide minerals demand and (presumably), the 
increased possibility of expropriation of land-based facilities, 



* H. R. Brannon, C. G. Lyons, D. E. O'Brien, "Offshore 
Drilling and Production Technology for Deep Water," in Marine 
Technology Society (MTS), 10th Annual Conference Proceedings , 
September 23-25, 1974, pp. 517-528. 

^ bee J. C. Shore and C. B. Reeds, "Subsea Oil Drilling 
and Completion," ibid . , pp. 547~555» 

The situation only is complicated by the ambiguous 
language of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention which defines 
the depth of the continental shelf limit in terms of exploita- 
tion capability. 



82 



44 
sparked an interest in deep seabed mining. By 1 974» firms 

from Canada, France, West Germany, Great Eritain, Japan and the 

U.S. were actively engaged in the field, and commercial pro- 

45 
duction may begin as early as 1976. 

The most promising nodule locations discovered to date are 

46 
in the Central Pacific, but experts emphasize that only about 

three percent of the ocean floor has been extensively surveyed. 

The nodules occur most commonly at depths beyond 4000 meters 

(13»100 feet), but have been found in much shallower regions, 

and even in the Great Lakes. Just what causes them to form is 

uncertain, but they seem to grow around shark's teeth, pieces of 

bone, or other previously-existing cores. Whatever their origin, 

they are being formed continuously at a rate which makes them 

effectively non-deple table. 

The approximate metal content per unit weight of dry 

nodules is: Manganese 24$, Nickel 1.6$, Copper 1 .4$» Cobalt .21$, 



%ee descriptions of preliminary survey efforts in United 
Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Economic Impli - 
cations of Seabed Mineral Development in the International Area : 
Report of the Secretary General ( hereof ter Seabed Mining Impli - 
cations ) (A7conf. 62/25), May 22, 1974, pp. 14-15. One U.S. 
recovery system was patented in 1965. 

45 

Ibid ., p. 8. With the possible exception of Howard 

Hughes' venture, the principal constraints thus far appear to 

have been at least as much political as technical. See the next 

chapter. The USSR also has done nodule surveys. 

* Roughly from latitude 6°N to 20°N and from longitude 
110°W to 180°W, an east-west belt extending from a few hundred kilo- 
meters off Acapulcoto about 1850 kilometers WSW of Hawaii. 



83 



trace metals .37$. By 1985, the UN has estimated that 15 
million tons of nodules may be recovered annually, yielding 
metals as shown in Table 2-4. 

The economic implications of these operations depend on a 
variety of assumptions, but the estimated gross return for a 
3 million ton per year mine site ranges from about 250 to 300 

million dollars per year, yielding net revenues from 236 to 152 

48 
million. Nickel and copper are expected to be the most valu- 
able metals extracted, but recent studies have found traces of 
precious metals such as platinum. Even in small amounts, these 
might be economically significant. Aside from the commercial 
benefits for the firms involved, these developments could have 
important strategic consequences. Industrialized states could 
reduce their dependence on Third World resources while improving 
their balance of payments. Developing countries, however, have 
been more concerned with the potential damage to land-based pro- 
ducers from price reductions caused by seabed mining. Gabon, 
for instance, gets some 2C^S of its foreign exchange from 
manganese, while Zaire produces two- thirds of the world's mined 
cobalt. ^ 

After careful scrutiny, it has become apparent that 
manganese nodules will be a less lucrative source of funds for 



Seabed Mining Implications , op . cit . , p. 28. 
48 Ibid., p. 71. 
49 Ibid., p. 39. 



84 



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50 
international distribution than once thought. However, they 

are sufficiently promising for Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation 

to make the necessary quarter-of-a-billion dollar initial 

investment on a ship and processing facilities. They also have 

induced a number of international consortia among less well 

endowed firms. Once considered to be an area only for the very 

rich and technologically sophisticated, there are signs that 

participation may become much more widely accessible as deep sea 

mining matures — rather as jet aircraft now can be found in a 

51 
host of developing country airlines. 

Yet it has been simply the attention paid to the nodules 

itself which has brought some of the most profound changes to 

the oceans. Wide recognition of their potential began to 

52 
develop in the mid 1960s. More importantly, the prospect of 

seabed mining was one of the primary motivations behind Ambassa- 
dor Arvid Pardo's famous 1967 speech to the United Nations and 

53 

Foreign Affairs article which led the way to the "Common 



50 
Several million dollars a year could be made available, 

but competing demands will spread this very thin. 

51 

John L. Mero, Ocean Resources Incorporated, comments at 

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) 
Conference, "Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations," October 21- 
24, 1974- 

52 

See, for instance, John L. Mero, The Mineral Recources 

of the Sea (Hew York: Elsevier Publishing, 1965 J ajld William T. 

Burke, Ocean Sciences , Technology , and the Future International 

Law of the Sea (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966). 

^"Who Will Control the Seabed?" Foreign Affairs , XLVII 
(October 1968), pp. 123-137. 



86 



Heritage of Mankind" concept and the Third UN Law of the Sea 
Conference. It seems unlikely that deep sea mining alone will 
transform the oceans in the same way that weapons technology, 
containerization and petroleum drilling have done. Neither is 
it clear what kind of a regime will govern such operations. But, 
by focusing national interest on the riches beneath the deep 
seas (as opposed to adjacent waters), the nodules have contributed 
to the death of nes nullius, and accelerated the demise of nearly 
all traditional concepts of order in ocean space. 

The Extraction of Materials from Seawater 

It has long been known that ocean water contains vast 
amounts of dissolved minerals — 165 million tons of solids in 
each cubic mile of the sea, 350 million cubic miles of the sea 
itself. Most chemical elements have been detected, but only the 

extraction of salt, magnesium and bromine now are commercially 

54 
attractive. In the future, however, more uses certainly will 

be found. Japan recently announced a study for securing stable 

55 
uranium supplies from seawater. Should fusion power ever be 



54., 

TSdward Wenk, Jr., "The Physical Resources of the Oceans," 

Scientific American (September 1 969) , pp. 82-91. Over 
89 percent of U.S. magnesium and the majority of bromine pro- 
duction came from seawater or brine. 

• ^Nihon Keizai, July 29, 1974* There are about 14 tons of 
uranium in every cubic mile of sea water. A similar British 
study in 1972 found seawater extraction to be competitive if 
uranium ore prices rose to about $70 to 5140 per pound. (1974 
prices are in the $8-10 range.) Even such highly priced uranium 
could produce economical electricity in breeder reactors. 



87 



developed, the oceans would become an unlimited energy source 

since the deuterium which could be used to fuel such a plant 

occurs naturally as an isotope of hydrogen. 

Fresh water itself is an ocean extract whose importance 

will grow, particularly in the developing countries,. The 

problem, as usual, is the uneven increase in demand associated 

with improved living standards. In the words of one authority: 

In highly industrialized lands, the demand for 
water will increase about 5Q/° in the next 10 years, 
for some developing countries, an increase of as 
much as 5OO/0 is expected during this period. 5° 

The minimum subsistence level of fresh water per person is about 

2 litres per day ( »73 m per year). In Tropical Africa the annual 

per capita consumption averages about 1.5m , compared with about 

3 
500m in V/estern Europe, and twice that in the U.S. Yet, some 

projections hold that world-wide demand soon will reach 1500m / 

57 
year per person. 

There is plenty of natural fresh water available to support 
this demand, but it is inequitably distributed. Figure 2-2 
indicates the coastal regions which have shortages of fresh 
water. 

Some 800 desalinization plants now in operation produce 
about 1.2 million m of fresh water. Most of it comes from the 



56 

Hubert K. J. Hauser, "Desalinization: The Sea as a 

Source of Fresh Water," Underwater Journal (February 1 973) » 

pp. 9-17. 

^ 7 Ibid . t pp. 9-10. 



88 



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89 



sea, but some facilities purify brackish water, rivers or 
sewerage. This capacity is expected to increase between 5 and 
8 times by 1980. 

To date, energy costs have been the principal constraint 
on the widespread production of fresh water from the sea. This 
is reflected in the concentration of existing facilities in 
regions like Kuwait, where energy is cheap or on Ascension 
Island, where there is no alternative. In time, however, the 
press of demand, together with new technology and the spread of 
nuclear reactors (whose waste heat can be used for desaliniza- 
tion) will combine to make fresh water plants both more competi- 
tive and more important. 

Other new and potentially exciting sources of undersea 
wealth are the hot brine pools discovered in 1964 ^ n ^he ^ e ^ Sea. 
With concentrations of minerals nearly ten times as high as those 
found in ordinary sea water, they are associated with bottom 
sediments rich in heavy metals such as zinc, copper, lead, 
silver and gold. Similar outflows were discovered along the 
mid-Atlantic ridge in 1974* 

Ocean Engineering Structures 

Quite apart from oil rigs and seabed storage tanks, the 
proliferation of man-made offshore structures seems only to have 



wenk, op_. cit ., p. 352. 



90 



begun. Simultaneous developments in military and petroleum 
technology, on-shore crowding and pollution, and the growth of 
tanker size have pushed more and more urban and industrial 
activities out into the coastal zone. A recent summary of 

potential uses for offshore islands and platforms developed the 

59 
following list: 

Table 2-5 

POTENTIAL USES OF MULTI-PURPOSE 
OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND PLATFORMS 



DEVELOPMENT AND NUISANCE USES— Possibly harmful to the environment 



Waste disposal & recycling 

Solid waste 
Dredge material 
Sewage sludge 
Incineration plants 
Y/aste treatment plants 

Transportation & Access 

Terminals, storage & shipping 
-petroleum products & LNG 
-dry bulk cargoes 
-general cargo & container- 
ship, import, export, 
transfer 
-pipelines 
Airports 
Highways and bridges across 

sounds 
Access to is lands- -Causeway, 
tunnel, ferry, workboat, 
cables, pipeline, trestle, 
belt conveyor 



Power & energy 

Steam electric generating 

plants 
Nuclear plants 
Lesalinization 



Industry 

Manuf ac turing 

Oil refineries 

Ship building, repair, 

base for offshore 

operations 
Commercial fishing port 

& processing plant 

Oceanographic & research 
activities 



59 

^John McAleer, "Multi-use Potential of Offshore Facilities, 

Artificial Islands and Platforms in Bays and Estuaries, " 10th 

Annual MTS Conference Proceedings , 1974* PP» 697-714* 



91 



CONSERVATION AND ATTRACTIVE USES— Compatible with or enhancing 

environment 

Fish & Wildlife habitat Public recreation & cultural 

Marine parks (limited visitors) Marine parks, museums 

and preserves Aquariums, underwater 
Wetlands tourism 

Artificial reefs Beaches, swimming, water 
Mariculture ski areas 

Boating, marinas, moorings, 
Private recreation & limited harbor of refuge 

residential use Fishing piers and diving 



Same headings as above, 

plus coastal tourism 
Restaurants, sport & bait shops 
Motels, hotels — boat charter & 

rental 
Amusement park & boat rides 
Residential 



reefs 



All of these proposals are within the current state-of-the- 
art in ocean engineering. Indeed, construction of a special 
shipyard to build floating reactors has been begun in Jackson- 
ville, though its status is uncertain since some potential custo- 
mers recently have postponed their orders. The new Osaka airport 
will be located offshore. A floating city prototype has been 
built in Hawaii which could have real estate costs below those 
in Waikiki. Additional uses of such platforms have been sug- 
gested by the Navy's Mobile Ocean Basing System (MOBS) and the 
need for mid-ocean weather monitoring stations. Their construc- 
tion has been facilitated by recent advances in materials tech- 
nology (notably cement) for ocean engineering. One of the major 
current problems, however, is a world-wide lack of maritime 



92 



capacity. Offshore petroleum exploration is being delayed by a 
shortage of drilling rigs and tubular products. New construction 
is limited by the supply of steel and skilled personnel. This 
condition is expected to persist for several years. 

Other studies have indicated the competitiveness of several 
ocean-atmosphere energy systems, with primary attention being 
given to the Solar Sea Power Plant (SSPP) employing of solar 
cells and/or ocean thermal gradients. Table 2-6 outlines some 
of the possibilities: 

Table 2-6 



Amount of Energy 
if Harnessed 



Technologies 


World-Wide 


Currents 


small 


Tides 


small 


Winds 


small 


Salinity 
gradients 


medium/large 


Thermal 
gradients 


large 



Percentage of U.S. Electricity 

Demands Y/hich This System 

Could Meet in the Year 2000 



10#-19# 



12^-17$ 



% 



Mr. Roger L. Nelson, Triton Oil and Gas Co. (Manila), 
interview, May 15, 1 974» and Mr. James Blake, Geological Services 
Ltd. (Singapore), interview, May 50, 1974 

See Richard Frye, "The Economics of Unconventional Energy 
Resources," Patricia J. McWethy, "Process for Determining the 
Federal Role in Stimulating Development of Ocean Energy Tech- 
nologies," and L. Wechsler, et al., "Engineering Analysis of 
Systems for Extracting Useful Energy from the Sea," in 10th MTS 
Conference Proceedings , pp. 455— 499- 



93 



The implications of these proposals are consistent with 
other trends to focus attention on near-shore areas and to 
broaden the range of off-shore equivalents to traditionally land- 
based activities. Moreover, they contain the seeds of innumerable 
disputes, not only over ownership and responsibility, but also 
over onshore effects from seaward projects. A classic example 
was offered by the reactions of New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware and Maryland to the possible location of a 
superport off of Delaware. In addition to environmental worries, 
there were questions of revenue sharing, compensation for 
business lost by the Port Authorities of New York, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore and other cities, rail and road access, coastal storage 
and piping facilities, and a myriad of other problems. One can 
imagine the difficulties if the location had involved inter- 
national interests. 

Conclusions 

None of the developments outlined in this chapter has been 
conducive to the continued minimum regulation of ocean space. 
Moreover, with the exception of manganese nodule mining, the 
effect of technology has been to reinforce demands to bring the 
adjacent waters more under national control. Should no inter- 
national regime of the deep seabed be negotiated (or perhaps 
even if it is), pressures for the partition of the abyssal floor 
may follow as well. The struggle between proponents of 



94 



unilateral and multi- lateral solutions will be considered in 
more detail in the next chapter. 

Distant-water interests remain strong among the shipping 
companies, offshore oil producers (if they drill off others' 
coasts), certain fishermen and the great power navies. The 
first three, however, are increasingly learning to live with 
the restrictions through multinational operations, while the 
last are constrained by political and technical factors which, 
though changeable, are largely beyond their control. 



Chapter Three 
THE UNSETTLED MARINE POLITICAL CLIMATE 

In response to advances in both military and commercial 
technology the marine political climate also is changing-. 
For the most part the legal and political changes have been 
directed at specific new activities, but the cumulative effect 
has been to undercut the basis of unimpeded maritime commerce 
and naval operations. 

The Foundations of Freedom of the Seas 

The freedom of maritime commerce was codified at Paris, in 
1856. In fact, this was the culmination of a lengthy process, 
corresponding in part to the replacement of mercantilism by free- 
trade liberalism. In 1805, Britain gave up her demand for 
Channel salutes. The Royal Navy started its work as the world's 

policeman even before the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and soon 

2 

was pressing for a universal three-mile territorial sea. 



Where Britain finally accepted the principle that free 
ships make free goods — to her great regret in 1914* This decla- 
ration also eliminated privateering, although privateers were 
sponsored by the Confederacy as late as February I863. 

Michael Lewis, The History of the British Navy (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1959), PP« 189-197. 



95 



96 



In 1855» Denmark began the abolition of the Sound Dues — the last 
of the government-imposed tolls in international straits. 
Finally, by the mid-1 850s the multitude of coastal jurisdictions 
which had harbored the Barbary Pirates, the East and West African 
slavers and the Asian pirates nearly had been eliminated. 

The process by which piracy and slave trade finally were 
brought under control deserves consideration at some length. 
Not only is it illustrative of the fragility of the concept of 
freedom of the seas, and the conditions necessary for its 
maintenance, but it also provides some pertinent analogies for 
the present era of expanding coastal state jurisdictions. This 
is not to suggest that coastal state claims are equivalent to 
piracy. Neither is the resumption of widespread slave trading 
expected. The point is that infringements on maritime commerce 
usually are concentrated in a fairly limited geographic region. 
If there are no universally accepted norms governing the 
relations between coastal states and shipping, or if there is 



See Charles E. Hill, The Danish Sound Dues and the 
Command of the Baltic (Durham: Duke University Press, 1 926) , 
pp. 228-67. 

"Freedom of the Seas" has been used in a variety of ways. 
In fact, it is much easier to define what it is not than what it 
is. Herein it shall mean the establishment of an environment at 
sea which is conducive to the free and safe passage of maritime 
commerce , subject to a minimum of disruptions in peacetime by 
governments or other organizations. This description is offered 
in clarification of a general concept. Further precision 
probably would lead to more semantic difficulties than it would 
solve . 



97 



no single power or coalition capable of defending the freedom of 
navigation world-wide, it quickly will be restricted somewhere . 
Thus, it is in the interest of the trading nations to see that 
there are naval forces in each region which are strong enough to 
protect seaborne trade. These may belong to the maritime powers 
themselves, or to regional states. In the latter case, however, 
it behooves the trading states to ensure that the regional power 
in question has enough of a stake in free maritime commerce to 
defend it rather than control it for her own interests. 

The brief histories that follow may seem unrelated to 
modern Japanese seapower. Hopefully, however, they will illus- 
trate some of the problems of restoring order at sea once it has 
broken down. Of particular note is the coordination necessary 
between political and military activities in the resolution of 
regional maritime problems. 

The Barbary Corsairs (1 500-1 850) 

The Barbary Corsairs evolved from the Moors expelled from 
Spain in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. At first 
motivated as much by political and religious motives as by the 



5 
Captain Walsh has argued that merchant shipping may be 

exempt from many of the North-South disputes since the flow of 

goods also has become critically important to the developing 

countries. This may well be true in general, but such an 

exemption will require that all countries take a more-or-less 

unemotional view of their interests. It seems at least equally 

likely, therefore, that there also will be exceptions 

(restrictions on commerce) from time to time. 



98 



search for plunder, they soon became identified with the Turkish 

cause. One of their number, Kehyr-ed-Din actually supervised 

the building of the Ottoman Navy in 1534* After the myth of the 

"Invincible Turk" was shattered at Malta (1565) an< ^ Lepanto 

(1571)> the seamen of the Barbary coast reverted to piracy, at 

which they remained until the 19th century. 

Lane-Poole charges that there was no real European attempt 

to suppress the piracy between the death of Andrea Doria in 1 56O 

and the British- Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 181 6. The reason 

was basically that the European states had recognized the 

sovereignty of the Barbary Pirates and used them in various 

alliances against each other. Pella repeats this charge, noting: 

L' Eur ope, dont 1' unite fut detruite par la Reforme, 
se refusait a faire bloc contre le danger commun.7 

Some relief was provided, however, by Louis XIV s Ordonnance de 

la Marine of 1681. 

The United States' campaign on the Barbary Coast between 

1801 and 1805 was the first serious effort against the pirates 

since the 16th century. It led to the freeing of U.S. commerce 

from tribute and the release of prisoners, albeit at the cost of 

an indemnity. But when American warships were withdrawn from 

the Mediterranean in 1812 the piracy began again and another 



c 

Stanley Lane-Poole, The Story of the Barbary Corsairs 

(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1890)7" 

7 
Vespasien Pella, "La Repression de la Piraterie," Recueil 

des Cpurs, XV (1926-V), p. 162. 



99 



naval exercise was necessary in 1815* By this time, however, 
European attitudes toward freedom of the seas had begun to change 
and further tolerance of the pirates was short-lived. 

In 1816, the response to an especially outrageous set of 
demands by the Dey of Algiers was a bombardment of the city by 
a British squadron with some Dutch units in company. Although 
several concessions were extracted, by 1820 nearly all had been 
abrogated and another bombardment followed in 1824. 

Piracy on the Barbary Coast was not finally suppressed 
until 1830, however, when the French invaded Algeria and exiled 
the Dey. 

Thus the maritime strength of the Barbary States was 
developed for religious and political wars and turned to piracy 
in the absence of adequate police authority at sea. Their 
immunity was guaranteed by the struggles for European hegemony, 
and the piracy remained until the political climate on the coast 
itself was changed by the imposition of French rule. Seapower 
alone was insufficient. 

The Chinese Pirates (1 832-1 869) 8 

Although piracy had existed along the China coast for 
thousands of years, Admiralty interest really stemmed from 1832 



lAost of this section is from Grace Fox, British Admirals 
and Chinese Pirates , 1832-1869 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1940) and Harry Miller, Pirates of the Far 
East (London: Robert Hall & Co., 1970). 



100 



under the influence of Sir James Graham's economy reforms and 
fleet re-deployments. Even more important was the expiration in 
1834 of the East India Company's monopoly of the China trade. 
Heretofore, the company had used its own resources to protect 
its ships and His Majesty's warships rarely were required. 
Thereafter, however, especially after the Opium War (1839~42), 
the Koyal Navy's responsibilities in the region increased 
markedly. 

Significant problems with multiple jurisdictions soon were 
encountered. The Admiral commanding the station was responsible 
for activities on the high seas, the Peking government for those 
within Chinese territorial waters, and the British Consul at 
Hong Kong (a pirate center) for those within his sphere. In 
1848, the standing orders to flag officers on the China Station 
were changed to include the suppression of piracy in Malaysian 
and Chinese waters as a major target of the Royal Navy. The 
Navy also was ordered to cooperate with Chinese authorities in 
coastal regions. 

Britain bore this burden alone between 1848 and 1860, 
without great success. Chinese authorities usually insisted on 
primacy in their own areas which led to the ineffective enforce- 
ment of anti-piracy laws. In 1858, however, the Treaty of 
Tientsin included a provision on piracy, thus becoming the first 
formal agreement between London and Peking which specifically 
dealt with the issue. Hong Kong finally took effective measures 



101 



to control pirates in her harbors in 1866. More significantly, 
liability soon was extended to those who traded in pirated goods 
as well. Finally, concluding a momentous year, Britain proposed 
that (a) China should let the Royal Navy handle pirates anywhere 
on the coast, (b) other maritime powers should assist in the 
campaign and (c) China should pay for the increased British 
involvement. By 1869 "the international force was operating, 
although Britain still carried the lion's share. 

At last, in 1869, after his own attempts to disarm junks 
had proved unenforceable, the Viceroy of Canton established a 
junk register, which reduced the problems of junk identification. 
Once this was implemented, the British tended to leave the sup- 
pression of pirates which preyed only on non-European shipping 
to the Chinese, while their own task was greatly simplified. 
Within a year (!) attacks on foreign merchantmen had all but 
ended, and the Royal Navy soon restricted itself to the high 
seas and those remote parts of the coasts where the Chinese 
needed assistance. 

There was some resurgence of piracy during the 1920s and 
30s in connection with the general breakdown of internal order 
in the country. This eventually was curtailed by strict security 
measures aboard merchant ships and the large number of foreign 
warships then on China station. 

The problem of maintaining freedom of the seas along the 
Chinese coast was largely one of overcoming sanctuaries created 



102 



by multiple jurisdictions, some of which did not have the power 

to enforce their regulations. Similar circumstances are evident 

9 

in the history of the Caribbean, Indian Ocean and Malay pirates. 

The Slave Traders ( 1807-1 890) 1 ° 

The Royal Navy began its campaign against the West African 
slave traders in 1808, a year after the Abolition Act. For 
nearly twenty years it was an almost unilateral activity. More- 
over, it was frustrated by insufficient forces, the unwillingness 
of France and the United States to permit foreign searches of 
their vessels, excessively strict rules of evidence, the 
personal financial liability of British commanders in cases of 
nonconviction and the reluctance of governments and businessmen 
alike to suppress a profitable trade. 

Progress was made with the enlistment of French assistance 

in 1828 and the progressive acceptance of the equipment clause 

1 1 

by various countries. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 



9 
See, for instance, George A. Ballard, Rulers of the 

Indian Ocean (London: Houghton Miff lin Co., 1928), Nicholas 

Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World (Singapore: D. 

Moore, 1973), and Albion and Pope, op_. cit . (note 1 -49) » PP« 1 39" 

147. 

10 

Most of this section is from E. A. Alpers, The East 

African Slave Trade (E. African Publishing House, 1969), sond 

W. E. F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers (London: George 

Allen and Unwin, 1 969) . 

1 1 

This clause considered the presence of irons and other 

slaving equipment to be sufficient evidence that a vessel had 

been slaving. Previously it was necessary to catch a ship with 

slaves aboard. 



103 



led to the establishment of an American West African squadron 
(although USS Dolphin had patrolled the coast two years earlier) 
which was well coordinated with the British. This was important, 
since a ship could no longer avoid search merely by hoisting 
American colors. About the same time, anti- slaving treaties 
were concluded with some of the African chiefs. 

By 1850, the principal surviving trades were with Brazil, 
and with the U.S. via Cuba. The first was notoriously slow to 
enforce its anti- slavery laws and so, after five years of unsuc- 
cessful negotiations, a British admiral finally acted on his own 
against slave ships in Brazilian waters. Numerous diplomatic 
protests ensued, but the measure was successful and the Brazilian 
slave market was closed by 1853* 

Throughout the 1850s British presence and commerce increased 
along the West African Coast, further restricting the sources of 
slaves. The American Civil War was the coup de grace , and the 
final closure of the Cuban market came in 1869* 

The East African slave trade was slower to develop but 
outlived its West Coast counterpart. In part its growth was 
stimulated by the British campaign in the Atlantic. For many 
years, the Atlantic south of the equator was beyond the juris- 
diction of the anti- slavery patrols. Therefore, Brazil began to 
shift its procurement to Mozambique. 

The Royal Navy established a patrol in the Indian Ocean in 
1822 following the Moresby Treaty with the Sultan of Oman. 



104 



Although French and Brazilian merchants drew slaves from this 
area, the principal demand was generated by the growth of plan- 
tation economies in Zanzibar and the Pemba Islands, as well as 
the Omani commercial empire in the northwest Indian Ocean. 
When, in 1840, the Omani capital was moved from Muscat to Zanzi- 
bar, the task of the naval patrols became almost impossible. 
Slave ships now proceeded along coastal routes controlled by 
sympathetic rulers and needed only to put ashore whenever a 
warship hove into sight. 

The trade was at its height in 1873 when a threatened 
British blockade against the Sultan of Zanzibar forced the Anglo- 
Zanzibar Treaty. This forbade the exportation of slaves and 
included a promise from the Sultan to close his slave markets. 
By 1880 the overt trade had virtually disappeared, although it 
was reported to have persisted in less obvious forms well into 
this century and even today. 

Summary 

Several conclusions may be drawn from these examples. 
Among them are: 

(1) That naval power, by itself , rarely is decisive. The inter- 
vention of troops, either army, marines, or shore parties, or the 
conclusion of political agreements nearly always was necessary to 
achieve a permanent settlement. To cite an example from a 
different setting, Trafalgar removed the invasion threat to 
Britain, but it would not have done Napoleon very much harm had 



105 



no troops been available to pour into the Peninsula. A host of 
studies and surveys since World War II make it possible to 
extend this conclusion to the solitary exercise of air power 
as well. 

(2) That the freedom of the seas is a fragile concept, requiring 
at least three elements for its establishment and maintenance, 
(a) A community of interest among the maritime powers. 
Note the rapidity which the Barbary Pirates dis- 
appeared once Britain and France stopped using the 
pirates to harass each other. G. S. Graham also 
has argued that the lack of major conflict at sea 



12 

For instance, United States Strategic Bombing Survey 

(European War), 208 vols., and (Pacific War), 108 vols. (Wash- 
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946-48), and Raphael 
Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., The Air War in Vietnam (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1972). The closest things to exceptions in the 
Twentieth Century have been the submarine campaigns against 
Britain and Japan. Had the U-Boats not been defeated, Britain 
probably would have been unable to continue to play an active 
part in the War. Whether or not surrender could have been 
induced without invasion is not clear. By the same token, 
although Japan was prostrate from the destruction of her trans- 
portation and from naval and aerial bombardment, invasion would 
have been necessary without the dual shocks of the atomic bombs 
and the Soviet entry into the War. The U.S. Navy played an 
important role in the Cuban Crisis, but without the nuclear 
threat, it is hard to assert that the affair would have been 
settled so neatly. Those who claim that the 1972 mining of 
Haiphong and the Christmas bombing of Hanoi brought the Vietnam 
war to a close neglect the intricate diplomatic arrangements 
which preceded and accompanied these acts. In any case, until 
the North Vietnamese archives are opened, such arguments are 
circumstantial. 

*G. S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1965). 



106 



during Pax Britannia depended as much, if not more 
on the European equilibrium and the interests of 
the Continental powers in free trade than on the 
strength of the Royal Navy. 

(b) The elimination of conflicting jurisdictions which 
offer sanctuary to offenders. Key victories in 
the suppression of the slave trade were the 
abolition of havens south of "The Line" in West 
Africa and along the East African coast after the 
Treaty of Zanzibar. Chinese piracy was under con- 
trol within four years after the elimination of 
Hong Kong sanctuary and the granting to the inter- 
national force of the right to pursue its quarry 

1 A 

anywhere along the coast. 

(c) The presence of naval forces adequate to protect 
shipping where necessary. Despite multi-national 
assistance on occasion, the bulk of this task usually 
has been borne by a single global naval power both 
in Roman and recent days. In principle, however, 
there is no reason why two or more navies could not 



An interesting confirmation of these principles was pro- 
vided by U.S. Coast Guard efforts against the rum runners during 
prohibition. Key elements in the campaign were agreements with 
Britain, Germany and Sweden extending the area where the U.S. 
could carry out searches. Among the smugglers themselves, 
piracy soon became commonplace. See Malcolm F. Willoughby, Rum 
War at Sea (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964) > 
pp. 21-59. 



107 



act jointly or separately in different geographical 
areas. These points will be explored at length 
below. 

The Current Status of Maritime Politics 

The concept of freedom of the seas is thus a fragile one. 
All three of its basic elements are in danger today, and are 
likely to remain so for some time. (1) In the law of the sea 
negotiations many coastal states have indicated that the status 
quo in ocean economic activities is not in their interest. 
Regardless of the final treaty wording, such differences of 

opinion will persist. At the same time, (2) a host of conflict- 

1 5 
ing jurisdictions is on the verge of appearing. Furthermore, 

it is precisely within the areas bounded by such zones where 

surface ships will be most vulnerable to SSMs or ASLls. Thus, 

(j) the worldwide exercise of naval power is threatened by 

extensive legal and political claims which are backed by a 

newly- expanded coastal state ability to enforce them. 

The Limitations on Global Naval Force 

It must be reiterated that the present shackles on the 
major naval powers are only partly technological. At least in 



1 5 

Proposals have included over 100 exclusive economic zones 

of up to 200 miles, an equal number of territorial seas, mostly 

of 12 miles but with broader exceptions, and various other 

regimes of the deep seabed and continental margin whose form is 

not yet clear. 



108 



the West, they stem more from electorates' unwillingness to sup- 
port military campaigns against developing coastal states than 
from an actual imbalance of power at sea. This is particularly 
true if such an operation were likely to be costly or embarrassing. 
The remoteness (to the man on the street) and complexity of most 
law of the sea issues reduces the expected amount of support 
still further. This does not make the shackles any less real, 

although it does imply that they may only be temporary. As 

1 6 

Robert Osgood noted: 

. . . the political costs of the United States 
forcibly protecting American tuna fishers against 
the claims of sovereignty by Peru always seemed 
excessive compared to what could be gained by such 
drastic measures and what would be lost without them. 
But it is misleading to infer from this situation 
that the United States would be equally passive in 
the face of some threat to a more serious economic 
interest or to a military security interest. 

Many, of course, would not lament the demise of global 
naval forces, for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The fact 
remains, however, that only twice in recorded history has mari- 
time commerce been able to move without widespread interference 
by piracy or government- imposed tolls of one form or another. 



"U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," ODIL , II (Spring 
1974) , p. 29. Professor Hedley Bull of the Australian National 
University, put forth the interesting proposition that the 
present European and American wariness over the use of forces 
comes from having been on the wrong side in a recent series of 
colonial wars. Similarly, the developing countries have had an 
almost unbroken string of successes. Interview, June 19> 1974* 
Presumably, such sentiment would be reversible if the tide of 
battle changed. 



109 



The first period was from the Battle of Actium (31 BC) to the 

middle of the 3rd century AD while the Roman Navy dominated the 

17 
Mediterranean. The second, from the mid 19th century onward 

as the Royal Navy, in concert with those of other powers, com- 

1 fl 
pie ted the suppression of piracy world-wide. 

The inability of naval (and air) power to achieve a final 
conclusion is likely to continue, if not become even more pro- 
nounced. All the convoy escorts in NATO would not help the 
Indian Ocean sealanes if oil supplies were cut off at the well- 
head. The full tactical aviation resources of the 7th Fleet and 
the 7th Air Force could not halt the 1972 North Vietnamese 
invasion of the South until the South Vietnamese ground forces 
stood and fought. A submarine blockade might in principle be 
able to bring Japan, or even the U.S. to her knees, but it is 
unrealistic to think that such a campaign would remain strictly 
at sea if the nations' survival were genuinely threatened. Even 
the ultimate exercise of air (and sea) power, a nuclear exchange, 



1 7 

See John Van Duyn Southworth, The Ancient Fleets (New 

York: Twayne Publishers, 1968), pp. 218-222, 297. Also William 

L. Rodgers, Naval Warfare Under Oars (Annapolis: USNI, 1939)* 

pp. 3-4 and Pella, _op. cit . (note 3-7) • In point of fact, 

Pompey had conducted an extremely successful campaign against the 

pirates in 67 BC, but they returned amidst the power struggles 

which eventually led to Actium. 

1 8 

It is not true, of course, that piracy was totally eradi- 
cated. The immediate effect of the Royal Navy's entry into 
Chinese coastal waters was to discourage attacks only on European 
merchantmen. The fate of local sailors had to await the arrival 
of strong, anti-pirate local governments. In Southeast Asian 
seas (and probably elsewhere), a similar situation prevails to 
this day. Disorder, not tranquillity, is a natural condition on 
an un-patrolled ocean. 



11Q 



could not prevent some groups of citizens on both sides from 
re-establishing their governments and continuing the struggle 
if they so chose. 

None of this is to decry the utility of naval and air 
forces. They are indispensable tools in a nation's military and 
diplomatic arsenal. But their limitations must be remembered. 
So long as the majority of people live on the land there can be 
no ultimate weapon at sea or in the air alone. If communities 
were located on the seabed, then control of the water column in 
itself would be sufficient. Until that time, other elements of 
persuasion also must be employed. 

Extended Coastal State Claims 

The variety of claims which have been made on the world's 

19 

oceans since 1945 has been the subject of an enormous volume 

20 

of literature. Still, some review is necessary for background. 

The claims may be grouped into (1) territorial sea, (2) economic 
zones on the seabed and in the water column, (3) anti-pollution 
zones. It will be contended later that these are indicative of 



19 

The process was started by the two "Truman Declarations" 

of September 23, 1945, by which the United States laid claim to 

the "subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf" and to certain 

historic fisheries. Peru responded with a 200 mile territorial 

sea in 1947» and the process has accelerated ever since. 

20 

By September 1974, the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference 

documents had run to over 13,000 pages. 



111 



a fundamental change in the nature of thinking about the oceans 

themselves. 

(1) The Territorial Sea 

Territorial Sea olaims may themselves be subdivided into 
three categories — the 12 mile limit, archipelegos, and broader 
claims. 

(a) The 12 mile limit . One likely outcome of the UN Law 

of the Sea Conference will be a general extension of the histori- 

21 

cal, but outmoded, three mile limit to 12 miles. Even with a 

treaty, however, some states probably will continue to claim 

22 

broader areas. 

Under such limits some 116 straits between 6 and 24 miles 
in width would fall entirely within the territorial waters of 

9 A 

their riparian states. Since the rules of innocent passage 
apply within the territorial sea, the transit of these straits 



21 

See S. A. Swart ztrauber, The Three Mile Limit of the 

Territorial Sea (Annapolis: USNI, 1972). 

22 

In October 1 974> & breakdown of territorial sea claims 

was as follows: 

Less than 12 J2 15 to 50 51 to 200 Other 
46 52 8 11 4 

Source: Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State. 

23 

The number varies, ranging from 105 to 121 depending on 

the source. 116 is the figure used by the U.S. Department of 
State. 

^The basic conditions of innocent passage are that (1) 
navigation shall not be "prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal state," (2) submarines must navigate on 
the surface, and (}) there is no right of aircraft overflight 
above territorial waters. 



112 



is exposed to the coastal state's definition of innocent. The 
major naval powers contend that, since the straits historically 
have been high seas, their accessibility cannot suddenly be 
conditioned by such subjective judgments. Moreover, in an era 
of strategic missile submarines and intercontinental airlift, 
the provisions of innocent passage are inadequate for the pro- 
tection of great power interests. 

The security implications of straits transit have been the 

25 

subject of extensive debates, which need not be repeated here. 

In any event, the issue will be re-examined later in connection 
with Japan's particular needs (see page 246). Whatever the out- 



2S 

The U.S. view, and the enunciation of the "Free Transit" 

doctrine, was presented in Subcommittee II of the UN Seabed 
Committee on July 30, 1971 (A/AC.138/SCIl/L.4; A/8421, pp. 241- 
245)» The Soviet Union, which has been closely aligned with the 
U.S. on this issue, announced its view on international straits 
on July 25, 1972 (a/AC.133/SCII/L.7; A/8721, pp. 16 -163). 
Typical coastal state objections and counter-proposals were made 
by an interesting alliance of Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Philippines, Spain and Yemen (a/AC.1 38/SCII/L.18 of 
March 27, 1973). The People's Republic of China (PRC) consis- 
tently has denounced the imperialistic ambitions of both super- 
powers. At one time, the U.S. seemed ready to back off from the 
overflight and submerged passage provisions of "Free Transit," 
but the denial of landing rights by European allies during the 
Yora Kippur War airlift forced the aircraft to overfly the Straits 
of Gibraltar ( Aviation Week, December 12, 1973) and may have 
hardened the U.S. position again. Within and without the U.S. 
government a debate has continued over the advisability of risking 
other American interests solely for the sake of free transit. For 
a detailed analysis, and dissenting conclusions, see Robert E. 
Osgood, "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," _op_. cit . (note 
3 - 16), wnose publication was bitterly opposed by the Navy. In 
an effort to make "Free Transit" more palatable, it recently has 
been slightly re-defined and re-presented under the title 
"unimpeded passage." 



115 



come of the 1975 meeting in Geneva or later conferences, the dis- 
agreement is likely to persist. If the developing country 
majority insists on a convention stipulating innocent passage, 
the superpowers probably will not ratify it, thus destroying its 
practical utility. If a convention with an acceptable guarantee 
of transit is concluded it almost certainly will be challenged 
by a future revolutionary government which can claim that it was 
not represented, or by a present one which refuses to sign the 

agreement. If no compromise is reached, the issue is likely to 

26 

be tested by force sooner or later. 

Even without transit restrictions, there are a variety of 

economic advantages which a coastal state could reap from its 

27 

newfound sovereignty. One such measure would be tolls. Others 

are more subtle. For instance, Singapore's Foreign Minister 

Rajartnam, offered the following comments about the Straits of 

Malacca in a Japanese press interview: 

I have no such idea [to collect tolls. But] for 
providing facilities useful for correct and safe 
navigation, mainly buoys, communication facilities 



26 

In a sense, it already has, with the blockade of the 

Straits of Tiran in 1557 and again a decade later. Also, the 

dispatch of the U.S. carrier Ticonderof.a. into the Red Sea in 

early 1974* The fact that the major power warships have not 

actually opened fire in straits recently does not remove the 

threat inherent in their presence. 

27 

There are several reminders of past practices of this 

sort. For instance, the town of Tarifa, on the Spanish side of 

the Straits of Gibraltar, derives its name from its function as 

a collection point during the Moorish occupation. 



114 



and light houses, and for dredging operations in 
the strait, a huge amount of expenses [sic] is 
required. We want those nations using the strait 
to bear them proportionately. 28 

(b) The Archipelago Doctrine . As first enunciated by the 
World Court in 195% the basis for this doctrine is that straight 
base lines longer than twice the width of the territorial seas 

may be drawn between points in an archipelago in order to dis- 

29 

tinguish it as a single geographic entity. There are a number 

of coastal and mid-ocean archipelagoes whose limits are in dispute, 
but the principle areas of international concern are the five 

archipelagic states: The Bahamas, Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, 

30 

and the Philippines. The key to their claims lies in the 

31 

"intimate and inseparable combinations of land and sea" for an 

archipelagic state. From the standpoint of the maritime powers 
the principle objections have been (1) a lack of historical and 
legal precedents, (2) the relatively small land-to-water ratio 
in most of the archipelegos, (3) the implications for transit, 
(4) the implications for marine resources. 



%ainichi Shimbun (hereafter Mainichi ), August 6, 1974- 
Translation from U.S. Embassy, Daily Summary of the Japanese 
Press (hereafter Press Summary ) . 

9 ICJ Reports, 1951. 

30 

Papua-New Guinea is likely to claim similar status for 

the Bismarck and Louisiade archipelagoes when it becomes inde- 
pendent in 1975* 

31 

J Judge Jorge Coquia, quoted in "The National Territory," 

New Philippines (Manila), February 1974> P» 1» 



115 



In point of fact, most of the important international 
straits which would be affected by the Archipelego Doctrine 
(Lombok, Sunda, Ombai-Wetar, New Providence Channel) also would 
be enclosed by a 12 mile territorial sea. The most important 

difference is that the archipelagic states consider the waters 

32 

within their base lines as internal. 

Archipelagoes also have been the subject of extended 
debates, with the result that the concept has won steadily 
increasing acceptance. Even the United States has indicated a 
willingness to recognize the principle in exchange for some 
agreement on transit rights. 

Whether or not the Law of the Sea Conference resolves the 
issue, the Archipelago Doctrine will not be dismantled. It pro- 
vides exceptional potential for the political and economic 
development of appropriately situated states. Moreover, it is 
in keeping with the growing world-wide tendency to blur the dis- 
tinction between land and sea. (See below, p. 1 35 • ) 

(c) Broader Coastal State Claims. In 1974> 22 states 

34 
claimed territorial seas greater than 12 miles. Some of these 



32 

Internal waters are completely subject to coastal state 

control, i.e. there is no right even of innocent passage. 

33 

It was reported by various sources in Indonesia and the 

Philippines during interviews with the author in Llay and June 

1974, that a U.S. negotiating team had brought up the subject 

while visiting the area in the Spring of 1974* 

* H[J.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer 
(includes archipelagic states). One of the four states listed 
under "other" on page 111 has put forth no specific claim. 



116 



were subject to disclaimers about not infringing on the freedom 
of navigation. Others probably will be converted to economic 
zones if a 12 mile limit were universally agreed upon. Some 
holdouts for extended claims probably will remain even if a 
general convention were negotiated, but none of these is 
strategically critical in the sense that such a stand would 
infringe on a major waterway. There is, however, a danger of 
territorial sea claims expanding again in the future, possibly 
under the guise of increasingly strict controls over economic 
or pollution zones. This will be discussed more fully in the 
next chapter. 
(2) Economic Zones 

Economic Zones are designed to give coastal states prefer- 

35 

ential or exclusive rights to exploit the living and non-living 

resources of the seabed, the subsoil thereof, and/or the super- 
adjacent water column. The alternative proposals for such zones 
have been bewildering, but it appears that some form of coastal 



35 

A preferential right allows a coastal state to exploit 

the resources to the full extent of its capability, after which 
it is open to the international community within the limits pre- 
scribed by conservation. Exclusive rights, as the name implies, 
leave the admission of foreigners totally at the discretion of 
the coastal state. 

No less than 29 sets of declarations or proposals, 
falling into 9 major groups were put forward in the Law of the 
Sea Conference preparations. See Tentative Comparative Table of 
Proposals , Declarations , Working Fai>ers , etc . , Relating to 
Subjects and Issues Allocated to Sub-Committee II (SC II/v7G/ 
Paper No. 4, with Revision 1 through July 1 9> 1 973) • 



117 



state primacy will be established within a 200 mile limit and 

37 
possibly further in some cases. 

Table 3-1 summarized the ocean areas which would accrue to 
each of the top 10 coastal states under four different regimes; 
a 40 mile limit, 200 miles, the 200 meter isobath, and the edge 
of the continental margin. Note that, in most cases, the 200 
mile limit also includes the edge of the margin. Not surprising- 
ly, the major beneficiaries usually are the developed countries. 
What is more important, however, is the potential ocean contri- 
bution to the national resource base under the exclusive economic 
zone. Table 3-2 presents some of the likely allocations of off- 
shore minerals, petroleum and natural gas within a 200 mile zone. 
For several countries, notably Mexico, Britain, Norway, Nigeria, 
Angola, Indonesia and Malaysia, offshore petroleum deposits 
represent a major expansion of the national resource base. It 
goes without saying that every effort will be made to strengthen 
the states' grip on these reserves. It also seems likely that 
such claims will, in time, spread from the seabed to the water 
column above it. 

Despite the tremendous importance of minerals within the 



37 

Australia, for instance, has proposed a 200 mile limit 

or the edge of the continental margin, whichever is further. 

Moreover, in cases of overlap between a 200 mile zone and another 

state's continental margin, "... The natural phenomenon of the 

margin should always prevail over the artificial rule of 200 

miles ..." See "Preventing a Scramble for the Seas," xerox 

copy from an unidentified magazine, p. 653 i provided by the 

Australian Foreign Office, Canberra. 



118 



Table 3-1 
RANK ORDER OP SEABED AREAS ACCRUING TO 
COASTAL STATES UNDER DIFFERENT CLAIMS 











(in Sq. Nauti- 










cal miles) 


Rank 


40 n.m. 


200 n.m. 


200 meters 


Edge of Margin 


1 


Indonesia 
(1,031,100) 


U.S. 
(2,222,000) 


Canada 
(846,500) 


Australia 
(1,445,400) 


2 


Canada 
(963,000) 


Australia 
(2,043,300) 


Indonesia 
(809,600) 


Canada 
(1,240,000) 


3 


Soviet Union 
(857,200) 


Indonesia 
(1,577,300) 


Australia 
(661,600) 


Indonesia 
(1,229,800) 


4 


U.S. 
(731,900) 


New Zealand 
(1,409,500) 


U.S. 
(545,400) 


U.S. 
(862,600) 


5 


Australia 
(408,600) 


Canada 
(1,370,000) 


Soviet Union 
(364,300) 


Soviet Union 
(735,900) 


6 


Mexico 
(236,100) 


Soviet Union 
(1,309,500) 


Argentina 
(232,200) 


New Zealand 
(571,100) 


7 


Philippines 
(230,200) 


Japan 
(1,126,000) 


PRC 
(230,100) 


Argentina 
(484,100) 


8 


Brazil 
(189,700) 


Brazil 
(924,000) 


Brazil 
(224,100) 


Norway 
(463,700) 


9 


Japan 
(180,100) 


Mexico 
(831,500) 


U.K. 
(143,500) 


Japan 
(440,900) 


10 


Norway 
(178,000) 


Chile 
(667,300) 


Japan 
(140,100) 


Brazil 
(435,700) 


Source 


s: U.S. Departi 


nent of State, 


"Theoretical Areal Allocations 



of Seabed to Coastal States ..." International 
Boundary Study Series A, Limits in the Seas , No. 46, 
August 12, 1972. 



119 



Table 3-2 



OCEAN RESOURCE POTENTIALS 



Distance to 





Offshore 


Offshore 


Nodule Concentration 


Country 


Oil 


Natural Gas 


(nautical miles) 


N. America 






Bahamas 


■>■ 


- 


50-200 


Canada 


III 


Ill 


50-200 


Dominican 








Republic 


- 


- 


50-200 


Haiti 


- 


- 


50-200 


Honduras 


- 


- 


50-200 


Mexico 


II 


II 


0-50 


USA 


II 


I 


50-200 


S. America 








Argentina 


III 


III 


- 


Brazil 


- 


III 


- 


Chile 


- 


III 


50-200 


Columbia 


- 


III 


- 


Ecuador 


- 


III 


- 


Trinidad & 








Tabago 


- 


III 


- 


Venezuela 


Ill 


II 


— 


Europe 








Italy 


- 


III 


- 


Netherlands 


- 


III 


- 


Norway 


Ill 


III 


- 


Poland 


- 


- 


0-50 


Sweden 


- 


- 


0-50 


UK 


Ill 


Ill 


— 


Africa 








Angola 


- 


III 


- 


Egypt 


Ill 


III 


- 


Gabon 


- 


III 


- 


Libya 


II 


II 


- 


Nigeria 


III 


III 


- 


S. Africa 


- 


- 


200-400 



120 



Country 

Asia 

Bangladesh 
Burma 
PRC 
India 
Indone sia 
Iran 

S. Korea 
Kuwait 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Qatar 

Saudi Arabia 
USSR 

Union Arab 
Emirates 



Offshore 
Oil 



III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 

III 
II 
II 

III 



Offshore 

Natural Gas 



III 
III 
.III 
III 
III 
II 
III 

III 

III 

III 

II 

II 

III 



Distance to 
Nodule Concentration 



0-50 



Oceania 



Australia 
New Zealand 



III 



II 
III 



200-400 



III - 10 to 100 billion bbls of petroleum _or 10 to 100 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas 
II - 100 to 1000 billion bbls of petroleum or 100 to 1000 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
I - Greater than 1000 billion bbls of petroleum _or 1000 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas 

Dash indicates fewer than 10 billion bbls or trillion cubic feet, 
not that there are no reserves at all. 

Potential reserves are estimates based on general geological 
structure. They usually are a few orders of magnitude larger 
than proved recoverable reserves, but have been used because 
extensive investigation of offshore fields has only recently begun. 

Distance to manganese nodule concentrations is the distance to 
sites with moderate density or greater. Sparse density sites have 
been disregarded. 

Source: John P. Albers, _et al., Summary Petroleum and Selected 
Mineral Statistics for 120 Countries , Including Offshore Areas , 
Geological Survey Professional Paper 817 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973) • 



121 



economic zone, disagreements over the living resources of the 
sea are likely to be the most frequent and visible of ocean 
controversies. Fisheries disputes always have been volatile. 
However, with catches of traditional fish approaching physical 
limits, they are bound to intensify. The initial impact of 
this technological progress has been two-fold. Coastal fishermen 
in developing and developed countries alike have demanded 
increased national protection. An offshoot has been the spread 
of the South American view that fish are natural resources, 
having a similar status to the mineral deposits of the continen- 
tal shelf. 

At the same time, many distant water operators have come 
to approach national claims more with an attitude of compromise 
than of defiance. Joint ventures and foreign subsidiaries, in 
particular, have become popular means of getting at least some 
of the fruits from catches in foreign coastal waters. 



Bote the disputes which led to the Anglo-French Agree- 
ment of 1839, and the North Sea Convention of 1882. Practically 
the entire history of U.S. -Canadian relations along the Atlantic 
coast has been marked by one fishery problem or another. Cable, 
op . cit . , (note 1-5) lists 79 cases of naval intervention 
between 1946 and 1969. Of these, 10 involved fisheries. But 
this does not include the hundreds of fishing boats that are 
taken every year, particularly in the Northwest Pacific. In 
addition, since 1970, there have been the second Cod War between 
Britain and Iceland, several incidents of shooting in the Gulf 
of Thailand, continuing seizures of foreign tuna boats off South 
America, the arrest of a fisheries research ship of an inter- 
national organization by Burma, and other problems. 



122 



(3) Pollution Zones 

Among the broadest restrictions which nations unilaterally 
have placed on the uses of the ocean in recent years have been 
anti-pollution zones. These have not been limited to developing 
countries, as Canada has been among the leaders in its domestic 
legislation. Efforts to control pollution represent a signifi- 
cant step in the extension of land-based control over the seas, 
although their full impact may not be felt for some time. 

One major problem is the disparity of standards between 
different nations. Even since the potential danger was high- 
lighted by the 1967 Torrey Canyon sinking, various forms of 

limitations on pollution in national waters have been imple- 

39 

mented, and international standards on ocean dumping codified. 

Unfortunately, however, the approaches which different nations 
have taken sometimes have been incompatible. The U.S., for 
instance, requires certain safeguards in the construction of the 

ship itself. Iran, on the other hand, has proposed that ships 

41 
entering the 50 mile zone must have adequate insurance coverage. 



39 

Mostert argues compellingly that even these efforts are 

inadequate in view of the destructive potential of the VLCCs and 

ULCCs. 

See the proposed Coast Guard changes to the Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C., 1221 _et seq.) in 
Federal Register , June 28, 1974. Parts of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act of December 21, 1972 also apply. 

4 Robert Osgood, "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," 
op . cit . , p. 27. 



123 



Japan's laws, despite severe local pollution problems, are 

42 

relatively mild. 

Preliminary results from Caracas point to a future effort 
to set international standards while leaving coastal states free 
to establish more restrictive laws in their own waters. The 
difficulties lie in the authority assigned for enforcement of 
these standards. Some claim that the coastal state should have 
full powers to arrest vessels polluting in its territorial sea. 
Others want minimum coastal state control to avoid the possi- 
bility that exaggerated pollution claims may be used to restrain 

43 
or fine foreign vessels. The U.S. Navy, for one, has gone to 

great lengths to minimize vessel-source pollution. This is not 

only because of U.S. regulations, but also to avoid future 

restrictions on mobility through coastal state pollution 

regulations. 

The Regime of the Deep Seabed 

One of the most publicized issues at the Law of the Sea 
conference has been the mining of deep seabed manganese nodules. 



4 The Marine Pollution Prevention Law (#1$6 of 1970) con- 
tains no construction or insurance provisions and imposes a maxi- 
mum fine of only 200,000 yen (about $670) for vessel discharge. 

45 The U.S. proposal (A/AC.1J8/SC IIl/L.40 of July 18, 1973) 
distinguishes between flag state (state of registry), coastal 
state, and port state duties and responsibilities. Although the 
coastal state can take emergency measures to safeguard its 
shores, under normal conditions, a complaint is to be filed and 
the action delayed until the vessel reaches its next port of 
call. 



124 



It already has suggested that the prospect of nodule exploitation 

was partly responsible for the 1970 declaration that: 

The Seabed and Ocean Floor, and the subsoil 

thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 

. . ., as well as the resources of the area, are the 
common heritage of mankind. 44 

Consequently, a number of alternatives were proposed for 

an international regime to ensure that the proceeds from seabed 

operations will be adequately shared within the international 

45 
community. ^ J The debates over this body have been long and con- 
tentious, with no sign of resolution as of the end of the 
Caracas session. Their content is beyond the scope of this 
inquiry, but whatever form the seabed regime will take will mark 
another departure from the freedom of action on the high seas. 
Should no organization be created, operations conducted in its 
absence will be the subject of contention, and possibly even 
violence, for years to come. 

Shipping 

Not only the technology, but also the organization of 
international shipping has undergone great changes in the last 
few years. There are doubts (in early 1975) about the future 
course of vrorld trade in general. Moreover, two historical 



44 General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXV) of December 17, 
1970. 

45 
^These have ranged from a licensing body for private 

ventures to "The Enterprise" — a completely international organ 

for exploitation and revenue distribution. 



125 



maritime freedoms — of the choice of shippers and of navigation — 
have been subject to restrictions. 

International shipping is organized into Liner, Tramp and 
Tanker trades. Liners ply regularly scheduled routes, incorpo- 
rating the latest available technology, such as containers. 
They are regulated through about J60 "Conferences," which set 
freight rates, assign routes, and determine cargo shares among 
the vessels of the member shipping lines. Tramps are 
unscheduled bottoms in search of cargoes of opportunity, often 
carrying bulk materials, such as coal, ore and cereals. His- 
torically, their only regulation has been through international 
safety and sanitary conventions, and some port state limitations. 
Tankers carry a variety of liquids, from LNG to palm oil. They 
are divided into spot (short- term/ single voyage) and long-term 
charter markets. For a number of reasons, the long-term pros- 
pects for each of these markets are cloudy. This, in itself, 



The history and economics of conferences in the British 
trades through 1970 are examined in Brian M. Deakin and T. 
Seward, Shipping; Conferences (Cambridge: University Press, 1973) 

In addition to the political problems described in the 
next few pages, long-range shipping plans are hampered by the 
uncertain world economic outlook, and the general inflation. 
Higher fuel costs mostly have been passed on to consumers, but 
developed country vessels have the additional problem of 
spiralling wages, which cannot be completely offset by labor- 
saving technology. Tanker and liner operators both suffer in 
an inflation because they cannot guarantee long-term rates, 
which may be a condition of government subsidies or profitable 
charters. Particularly in the former trade, the availability of 
long-term charters has been a key to the structure of fleets 



126 



is not unusual — the shipping business always has been risky, and 

a gloomy picture in one year often has been replaced by a bright 

48 
one in the next. However, the political climate in which 

international shipping operates has been radically altered since 

the 1950s, and particularly since the late 1960s. 

The first significant change was the development of flags 

of convenience, dating almost entirely from 1949 when Liberia 

49 
opened its registry to foreign ships. By 1973, nearly 3 1 percent of 

the world's deadweight tonnage sailed under Liberian or 
Panamanian colors. Aside from the limited ties on the Effective 
U.S. Control (EUSC) fleet, these vessels are free from the con- 
trols of their owner's governments. Although Lieutenant Emery 



world-wide, since the number of ships actually owned by the oil 
companies could be reduced accordingly. Additional problems of 
the moment include an over-supply of tankers because of (1) 
large building programs undertaken over the past several years, 
(2) the reduced demand for petroleum products at current prices 
and (3) the desire of producing states to shift refineries 
closer to the well head. This, in turn, has shifted some tanker 
bottoms to the tramp market, contributing to its slackness. 
Liners, however, are doing fairly well, at least in the short 
run. ( Shipping and Trade News [TokyS], March 22, 1974; Nihon 
Keizai, May 2, 1 974; KKJW, October 22~ 1974.) Further uncer- 
tainty, particularly for tankers and bulk carriers, will be 
introduced by the re-opening of the Suez Canal. 

AR 

In 1970-71, for instance, the tanker market was 

depressed. It rebounded in 1972-73 to reach the highest points 

in history, and now is depressed again. 

4°See S. W. Emery, "The United States Effective Control 
Fleet," USNIP, XCVI (May 1970), pp. 158-177, and John D. Hayes, 
"The Sea, 1967-72," op. cit. (note 2-20), pp. 303~305. Foreign 
registry, however, was used as early as the 16th century when 
British merchants sailed under the Spanish flag to gain access 
to the West Indies. 



127 



concluded in 1968 that the EUSC ships, if requisitioned in an 

50 
emergency, could meet the needs of the U.S. civilian economy, 

more recent studies have questioned their availability at such 

51 

times. In any case, flags of convenience, together with 

intermodal (often international) transportation systems, and the 

dispersal of the insurance markets have greatly reduced the 

feasibility of, or indeed the justification for, sole reliance 

on national assets for international commerce. In the words of 

a high-ranking U.S. Maritime Administration official. 

. . . Trading centers now are connected by a compli- 
cated network of common carrier merchant fleets, 
flying the flags of many nations, that provide 
regular and reliable service .... it is difficult 
to conceive of goods not moving across the North 
Atlantic due to the lack of shipping under any 
particular flag. 52 

This declining perception of the utility of national 

merchant marines, however, definitely has not applied in the 

Third World, Shipping issues were raised at the First UN 

Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1 9^4> a^d. have 

53 
grown in importance ever since. Developing country demands 



50 

J Emery, o p . c i t . , p. 175* EUSC ships are registered 

under foreign flags, but their American owners are obligated to 

make them available for U.S. needs in times of crisis. One 

problem, of course, is finding the ships in a port where U.S. 

jurisdiction applies. 

51 

Kasputys, op_. cit . , p. 1 45 • 

52 Ibid., p. 136. 

53 

yy See UNCTAD, Review of International Trade and Development 

1969 (TDB. 257, Rev. 1), Chapter V, 



128 



for a larger share of maritime commerce are not without justifi- 
cation, for, as the following table illustrates, their share in 
World trade has deteriorated: 

Table 5-5 
COMPOSITION OF WORLD TRADE 



World 

Developing 
Countries 

Centrally Planned 
Economies 

Developed 
Countries 



Percentage Share Compound Annual 

Growth Rate of 
Exports Imports Exports 1960-1970 

1960 1970 1960 1970 



100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



21.3 17.1 23.7 18. 5 



11.8 10.6 11.9 10.5 



66.9 72.3 64.4 71.0 



9.3 



7.1 



8.2 



10.2 



Source: OECD, Policy Perspectives For Inte mat i onal Trade and 
Economic Relations (Paris: OECD, 1972), p. 140. 



Accordingly, two conferences were held under UN auspices 
(hereafter Liner Conferences) in 1973 and '74» From them 
emerged a "Declaration of Principles," which was signed in April 
1974* Some claimed that this destroyed the principle of the 



%ote that the UN meetings about the liner conferences 
are, themselves, called Liner Conferences. To minimize con- 
fusion, the meetings will be capitalized, and the organizations 
referred to as freight or shipping conferences. 



129 



55 
freedom of shipping. In reality, of course, the freight 

conferences themselves, tied aid provisions, and a host of other 

devices had stifled free competition for years. 

The declaration covered three principal areas: Cargo 

sharing, freight rates, and dispute settlements. 

(1) Cargo sharing. Cargoes should be shared equally 
between importers and exporters. If parties of third countries 
are involved, 20 percent of the cargoes may be carried in ships 
not of the exporting or importing country, with 40 percent each 

carried by ships of the trading partners. This is the so-called 

56 

40- 40-20 formula. (Obviously, if one party does not have the 

shipping capacity to carry its 40 percent, someone else can make 
up the difference . ) 

(2) An obligatory 150-day advance notice before 

57 

conferences can raise freight rates. 

(3) Compulsory international mediation of disputes 
between shippers and the conferences, with limited participation 
of governments concerned. 

Developing countries also demanded that trampers, and 



55 

J See, for instance, the Kyodo News dispatch from Geneva 

in Mainichi Daily News , April 9, 1974* 

J "Convention On a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences" 
(Mimeo), Part I, Chapter II, Article 2, paragraphs 10-1 3. 

57 Ibid. , Article 49 • 

58 Ibid., Part II, Chapter VI, Article 6. 



130 



non-conference vessels be totally excluded from trade, but this 
was not accepted. A number of them already have enacted dis- 
criminatory legislation forcing the use of national ships or 

requiring foreign ships work through the agents of national 

59 
lines. " 

It is not clear how much advantage the developing countries 
will be able to take of their newly- legitimized cause. National 
shipping lines in the Third World have been notoriously 
inefficient and unprofitable. In times of increasing containeri- 
zation, their reliance on relatively unsophisticated general 
cargo ships is not likely to improve their position. 

Furthermore, the developed maritime states have begun to 

take countermeasures. Japan is considering a "Foreign Ships 

61 

Control Law," and the U.S. and several European states have 

legislation pending. More important than these national 
responses, however, is the International Council of Containership 
Operators (ICCO). Formed in 1972, the group still is informal, 
but there are signs that it will grow more powerful. The 
expansion of, and projections for containerized trade have been 
noted in the previous chapter. The lack of growth of ICCO thus 



(59 
^See details of the Venezuelan law in Nihon Keizai, 

April 16, 1974. 

See R. 0. Gross, Studies in Maritime Economics (Cambridge! 
University Press, 1968), Chapter 3 for a consideration of the 
balance of payments issues in merchant marine expansion. 

61 

Nihon Keizai , April 16, 1974- 



131 



far is due mostly to European resistance to U.S. government 

62 

requirements that its talks be reported. ' But competition 

among container ship operators and the current state of maritime 
trade in general have become sufficiently restrictive that the 
European shipowners now appear ready to proceed with ICCO even 
if the U.S. Government listens in. 

The likely result of such a drive would be to concentrate 
high value trade between major ports in ICCO hands, relegating 
conventional vessels to the less profitable feeder runs between 
non-container ports and the containerization centers. This 
would force developing countries to pool their resources and buy 
container ships, cooperate in regional arrangements to handle the 
feeder services for the container ports (i.e. an ASEAN merchant 
marine), or become flags of convenience. There is, of course, 
an option open to a wealthy few to take advantage of the high 
wage rates and other costs on developed country ships to build 
up their own merchant marines. " But the concept of a national 
flag carrier for every flag is not economically viable, whatever 



62 

Gross, op . cit ., Chapt. 2, has examined the impact of 

U.S. anti-monopoly laws on foreign shipowners. 

63 

Far Eastern Economic Review ( PEER ), April 22, 1 974> 

PP» 45-46. 

^Several of the Persian Gulf States, for instance, are 
building tanker fleets. 



132 

65 

declarations of principle may be adopted. 

In the face of this, Third World countries may either opt 
for the cooperative ventures noted above, or seek the regulation 
of shipping on a global basis, rather as utilities currently are 
regulated nationally. They may, of course, continue to press 
for national solutions, but this will not lead most of them very 
far. On the other hand, it might be profitable for the maritime 
states to encourage the development of the merchant marines of 
strategic coastal states in order to give them enough of a stake 
in the freedom of navigation to keep them from disrupting it. 

Conclusion 

If anything, the political demands for control over ocean 
areas have outstripped the technological imperatives of the 
previous chapter. Early prospects for enlightened international- 
ism have been replaced by successively more self-interested 
unilateral claims. Although some of these may be primarily 
negotiating positions, the potential for disputes over marine 
jurisdiction has been increased. 

The disparity in the willingness of developing and 
developed countries to use force may be only a temporary 
phenomenon. It can equally be argued, however, that perceptions 



^See Olav Knudsen, The Politics of International Shipping 
(London: Lexington Books, 1973)* 



133 



of national interest in coastal waters almost always will be 
more intense and easily justifiable than those far offshore. 
This, coupled with expanded national jurisdiction is likely to 
subject merchantmen to a variety of regimes in the course of 
their voyages. Some of these, certainly, will be more restrictive 
and disorderly than that of the high seas which we have come to 
be used to. 



Chapter Pour 
THE OCEAN SETTING 1975-85 

Several distinguished authors recently have examined the 
future uses of military force in support of diplomacy and as a 

reserve " . . . to which the public will turn in moments of 

2 
crisis." Aside from the general danger that the most serious 

crises in the modern world may be so complex and subtle that the 

public will not realize what is happening until it is too late 

(momentary policies, environment modification by industrial 

usage, etc.), there are signs which point to increasing disorder 

at sea over the next few years. Although most of the incidents 

are likely to be limited in scope and violence, their nature may 

be such as to undermine the usefulness of naval forces in 

diplomacy vis a vis coastal states. The indications of this 



1 
See, among others, Stanley Hoffmann, Laurence Martin, and 

Ian Smart in Force in Modem Societies : Its Place in Inter - 
national Politics , Adelphi Paper 102 (London: IISS, 1973), and 
Samuel P. Huntington, "After Containment: The Function of the 
Military Establishment," The Annals , Vol. 406 (March 1973), 
pp. 1-16. 

Martin's phrase, in "The Utility of Military Force," 
Adelphi 102, op_. cit ., p. 21. 

Somewhat paradoxically, however, this may have little 
effect on the role of warships in U.S. -Soviet negotiations. See 
below, p. 148. 



134 



135 



stem from the accumulated impacts of the changes which have been 
considered separately in the previous chapters. 

Signs of Disorder 

The Changing Character of the Oceans 

The first sign is a fundamental change in the nature of 
thinking about the oceans themselves — literally a blurring of 
the distinction between the sea and the land. Its basis lies in 
four factors, three technological and one political. They are: 

(1) The ability to project power into a rival's heartland 
from land bases. As noted in Chapter One, the advent of inter- 
continental weapons means that the expansion of a land power into 
the maritime dimension now poses only an incremental threat to 
the security of a maritime state. A strong Soviet or Chinese 
navy may bring great flexibility to its owner in dealing with 
the U.S. or Japan, but it does not imply the same life-or-death 
challenge as the fleets of Europe once did for England. 



It has been suggested that the sea power-land poy/er schism 
was the unre solvable dilemma of the European balance of power. 
For reasons of her ovm security, England (and later the United 
States) could not tolerate the maritime expansion of any state 
with a lar^-e standing army. For a land power to achieve true 
great power status, it was necessary for her to acquire some of 
the wealth from overseas trade and colonies. This, plus the 
utility of seapower in attracting allies, led to maritime 
expansion by aspiring continental states, thus threatening 
Britain. Furthermore, in the process of acquiring the strength 
necessary for even a try at global leadership, France, and later 
Germany, came to pose a direct and immediate menace in Europe 
itself. This provided a succession of willing allies which 
London wielded into coalitions. In turn these spurred attempts 



136 



(2) The development of inter-modal transportation systems. 
Land-bridges, door-to-door freight rates and the standardization 
brought by containers are in keeping with commercial trends 
towards multi-nationalization and the elimination of trade 
barriers, be they nationalistic or geographic. The political 
implications of these changes are only beginning to be felt. 
Even in the military, after years of partisan squabbling, there 
is growing recognition that sealift and airlift offer comple- 
mentary rather than competitive solutions to logistics problems. 

(3) The current state of ocean development technology. 
The increased value of marine resources has changed the image of 
the seas from one of a neutral medium of communication and com- 
merce to one in which portions of ocean space may be seen as 
major additions to the national resource base. The future 
development of floating nuclear power plants, offshore industrial 
sites, airports and perhaps even cities will accentuate this 
image. Failure to agree on an international regime for the deep 
seabed would only expand the area open for division, not change 
its basic nature. 

(4) The expanded impact of near-shore marine issues on 
domestic politics. Whatever the outcome at Geneva, Caracas, or 
wherever future Law of the Sea Conferences may be held, the 



by the land power to avoid encirclement through accelerated naval 
development. In whatever sequence the cycle proceeded, the net 
effect was to preclude the co-existence of maritime and continen- 
tal powers. 



137 



combination of shortages, pollution and overcrowding will focus 
even more attention on the adjacent seas as safety valves for 
pressing national problems. Infringements on these areas will 
be resisted accordingly. Also of interest is the tendency to 
diplomatically link maritime activities with otherwise remote 
events ashore. Thus the Cod War became tied to Iceland's 
membership in NATO, while the blockade of Bab-el-Mandeb was 
maintained until some relief was arranged for the Egyptian 
Third Army encircled east of the Suez Canal. 

The net result of these changes will be to reduce the 
apparent importance of distant-water maritime activities — 
commercial or military — while highlighting that of the coastal 
region. Distant-water interests certainly will continue, but 
their bargaining power will be diminished when they conflict 
with coastal ones, either domestic or foreign. Moreover, near- 
shore disputes probably will continue to be more visible and 
sensitive in developing countries than in industrialized ones, 
if only because of the fewer issues competing for the public's 
attention. 

Asymmetrical Acceptabilities of Force 

The second indicator is the oft-noted asymmetry in the 
acceptability of force between developed and developing states. 
The U.S., Britain and France showed a surprisingly consistent 
willingness to commit naval forces in support of major interests 
between the end of World War II and 1967, particularly if 



138 



5 
strategic waterways were involved. Nevertheless, one wonders 

if the British concessions in the Cod War, and the U.S. restraint 

in the South American tuna boat disputes may not be more typical 

of future responses than the attack on Suez or the Gulf of 

Tonkin reprisals. Even leaving aside the Pueblo and EC-121 

incidents (where American options were limited by over- commitment 

in Indo China and the decision to recover the Pueblo crew) and the 

attack on USS Liberty (which might have been differently received 

had it been made by an Arab state), the trend since the late 

1960s has been toward Great Power forebearance. Hence there has 

been little response to such heretofore unacceptable acts as the 

1973 Libyan attack on a U.S. EC-130 in the Mediterranean, or the 

Cuban seizure of two Miami- based Panamanian cargo ships in 

December 1971* So long as these limitations on the use of force 

c 

remain political, they also are reversible, but it may become 



-^Mediterranean (U.S.), 1946; Corfu Channel (Britain), 1946; 
Taiwan Straits (U.S.), 1950; Gulf of Aqaba (Britain), 1951; Suez 
(Britain), 1 951-52; Suez (France, Britain), 1956; Straits of 
Tiran (U.S.), 1957; Makassar and Lombok Straits (U.S.), 1958; 
Lebanon (U.S.), 1958; Quemoy (U.S.), 1958; Kuwait (Britain), 
1961; Bizerte (France), 1961; Cuba (U.S.), 1962; Tanganyika 
(Britain), 1964; Gulf of Tonkin (U.S.), 1964; Dominican Republic 
(U.S.), 1964; Straits of Tiran (Britain, U.S.), 1967; Aden 
(Britain), 1967. Data from Cable, op_. eft. (note 1-5), PP» 2 06- 
229. This list is not complete, but it indicates a certain con- 
sistency of behavior. See also the list of 73 "Wars and Near 
Wars" in which U.S. naval forces were involved (18 of them 
[deleted]) in CVAN-70 Hearings , op. cit. (note 1-4), pp. 163-165. 

Luttwak, op_. cit. (note 1-5), has suggested that the key 
to this moderation is detente, and that, should one superpower 
actually use force unilaterally it not only would invalidate the 
principle of asymmetrical acceptability, but also the structure 



139 



more and more difficult as precedents of coastal state authority 
accumulate. 

Current Weapons Technology 

The net effect of the sophisticated weapons now finding 
their way into coastal state hands will be to increase their 
freedom of action at the expense of the maritime powers. This 
latitude vanishes, of course, should the latter choose to employ 
all the means at their disposal, but at lower levels of conflict, 
the new equipments can reduce some of the distant water navy's 
advantages in training and maintenance. Moreover, the simple 
knowledge of their possession may lead to an over- rating of the 
developing country's power, and thus dissuade attempts to test 



which supports it. Whether or not an American military inter- 
vention in the Middle East would destroy detente is not clear, 
but it certainly would re-establish the credibility of the use 
of force by Western states (assuming, of course, that it was 
successful). 

7 
The Persian Gulf States may be a current example. 

Although it has been argued that homing weapons reduce the level 
of operator proficiency needed to pose a serious threat, there 
must be some skill there in the first place. A South American 
nation with years of experience in propeller or elderly jet air- 
craft could upgrade its capability almost immediately upon 
receipt of some of the ordnance discussed in Chapter One. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on the other hand, may buy the same, 
or better, weapons and fit them on superior aircraft. In time 
this will produce a much more credible force, but not until the 
pilots and mechanics are trained to keep the launch platforms 
flying. Given the quantum jump in technology involved, this 
may be several years, unless mercenaries or "advisors" are 
brought in. 



140 



Diminished Freedom of the Sea3 

Finally, there is the erosion of the foundation of the 
freedom of the seas, closely related to the points above and 
discussed at length in Chapter Three. 

The Use of Force at Sea 

Prototypes of the most likely kinds of future maritime 
disputes already have taken place. Among those which may be 
expected are: 

(a) Continued conflicts over fishing. Shooting has been 

Q 

underway since the Spring of 1974 in the Gulf of Thailand, not 
to mention the dozens of other controversies from Iceland to 
New Zealand. 

(b) Fights over ocean resource boundaries — notably those 
involving petroleum. Not counting the PRC's claim to most of 
the East Asian continental shelf, there are at least seven sea- 
bed boundary disputes in that part of the world (Indonesia- 
Vietnam, Vietnam-Malaysia, Thailand-Cambodia, Cambodia-Vietnam, 
Japan-Korea, Japan-Taiwan, and the Philippine concessions west 



South Vietnam extended its territorial sea to 62 miles 
on April 5, 1974, thus touching off a series of incidents which 
led to the killing of a Thai fishing boat captain. See The 
Nation (Bangkok), April 26, 1974, The World (Bangkok), May 9, 
1974, and FEER , May 13, 1974, p. 13. At one point the Thai Navy 
was reportedly developing a contingency plan to protect the 
fishermen. (The Nation , May 10, 1974). 



141 



of Palawan passage around the Spratly Islands). The Aegean and 
Norwegian Seas also are sensitive. 

(c) Additional harrassment of ocean commercial activities. 

The reported terrorist threat to North Sea oil rigs in 1974 may 

10 

only be a beginning. Another prospect, perhaps more serious in 

the long run, is that of interference with merchantmen. In the 
Spring of 1974 a lumber ship nearly was hijacked by rebels in the 
southern Philippines. Naval responses to such actions may be 

limited by the fact that politically-motivated seizures may not 

1 1 

be dealt with as piracy. Between July 1st, 1964 an( i June 1st, 



9 / 

Each issue of Petroleum News Southeast Asia (hereafter 

PNSEA) , has a map of the Southeast Asian region showing national 
claims, company leases, and existing wells. For more detail, 
including Northeast Asia, Oceania and the Indian Ocean, see the 
annual "Map and Contract Issue," most recently IV (#10, 1974)* 

10 

In 1970, R. Ota, a Japanese radical theoretician wrote 

a piece entitled "Modern Systematic Methods of Destruction." In 
it he proposed to: 

Cut off crude oil transportation; hijack or destroy 
J.A.L. (Japan Air Lines) Middle East routes and tankers 
carrying oil from the Gulf of Persia in order for Japan 
to change her policy towards Israel; attack Singapore, 
make it the starting point in [sic] armed revolution 
in Tokyo. 

(Quoted in Patrick Low, "New Dimension to the Oil Crisis," PNSEA , 
[February 1974], p» 30.) These words acquired new meaning late 
in 1973> when a Palestinian terrorist group attacked the Shell 
Pulau Bukom Refinery in Singapore. Although it did little 
damage, and apparently was directed against supplies to Vietnam 
rather than Japan, it was, in Low's words, "The first attempt 
by a multinational revolutionary front to destroy a major 
installation of an international oil company." 

1 1 

This was a factor limiting U.S. and British assistance 

during the 1961 seizure of the Portuguese liner Santa Maria . 



142 



1965, there were 42 reported piracies in the Straits of Malacca. 

Fourteen of these were not attributed to Indonesian units 

12 

operating under Konfrontasi. The spectre of coastal states 

extracting payments in the guise of tolls for the maintenance of 

navigation aids or pollution funds has been raised in the Law of 

13 
the Sea negotiations. Even guerrilla submarine attacks, often 

discussed but not seen since the 1930s, were suggested by the 

reported Libyan attempt to use an Egyptian submarine to sink the 

British passenger liner Queen Elizabeth II enroute to Israel in 

February 1973. 4 

Professor Martin has suggested that disputes at sea will 

1 5 

be self-limiting on four accounts: (1) for most states, ocean 

1 6 
interests are important, but not vital, (2) both sides will 

be trying to win legal acceptance of, or at least political 

support for, their position, (3) warships can be effective 



Malaysia, Ministry of External Affairs, Indonesian 
Aggression Against Malaysia , Volume II (Kuala Lumpur, June 1965)> 
pp. 18-24. " 

^See above, p. 122. 

Reported by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in a BBC 
interview, July 16, 1974. Sadat did not name Libya directly, 
but later accounts did. 

1 5 
^Laurence Martin, The Role of Force in the Ocean , paper 

presented to the SAIS Conference on "Conflict and Order in Ocean 

Relations," October 22, 1974, pp. 10-12. 

Maritime commerce certainly is vital to most trading 
states, but the disputes in question probably will not cut off 
such services, though they may increase their costs. 



143 



without actually opening fire and without violating their 
opponents sovereignty and (4) naval force, once applied, can be 
readily tailored to maintain a balance between challenge and 
response. These points are well taken, to the extent that ocean 
issue conflicts, by themselves , are not likely to escalate to 
another Vietnam War, or a super-power confrontation. However, 
some states are likely to be more self-limiting than others, and 
it may be that maritime problems could provide pretexts or 
aggravate other grievances to create potentially expansive situ- 
ations. Moreover, a series of low-level disorders in which the 
imbalance of usable force was clearly displayed eventually could 
undermine the utility of great power naval forces in diplomatic 
roles. 

Case studies of the mechanisms by which gunboat diplomacy 
actually affects decision-making in a developing coastal state 
are rare. During the s umm er of 1 974» however, a series of inter- 
views were conducted in East Asia concerning local perceptions of 

17 
seapower. The net result was the not-very-surpris- 



17 

93 in Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singa- 
pore and Indonesia, and 38 more in Australia, New Zealand and 
Hawaii between May 6 and July 5, 1974* Although the content of 
individual interviews varied, the overall purpose of the study 
was to examine: (1) the prospects for Japanese contributions to 
East Asian security, (2) the local perceptions of regional and 
distant-water navies, and (3) the ocean development programs of 
the countries concerned. Obviously, an average of 1 5 interviews 
in each country is statistically tenuous and may even be mis- 
leading. But, in the absence of alternative written sources, it 
was useful as a first approximation. In any case, the responses 
to the first two questions in different countries were sur- 
prisingly consistent. They will be referred to again later. 



144 



ing conclusion that, while the force levels of adjacent or 
nearby powers are watched with care, the influence of foreign 
warships stems at least as much from memories of past actions as 
from a detailed analysis of their current capabilities and limi- 
tations. 

Although the presence of great power warships off one's 
coast is unlikely to lead to a bombardment or invasion, there is 

some justification for coastal state fears. After all, since 

1 ft 
1956 the U.S. actually has intervened with its naval and marine 

19 20 

forces seven times. Britain has done so five times, France 

21 22 

twice, and the People's Republic of China once in the same 

period. Note, however, that with the exception of the comic- 
opera Anguila operation, there has been no Western naval inter- 
vention for nearly ten years. (This assumes that the 1972 mining 
of North Vietnamese waters and the bombardment of her coasts were 
a continuation of an intervention begun much earlier.) 



1 ft 

Here considered to be the firing of shots, imposition of 

a blockade, or the landing of troops. Not included are offshore 

patrols or the evacuation of nationals. 

Alexandria and other mid-East posts (1956), Lebanon 
(1958), Thailand (1962), Cuba (1962), North Vietnam (1964), South 
Vietnam ( 1 965) > the Dominican Republic ( 1 9^5) • 

20 Suez (1956), Kuwait (1961) , Tanganyika (1964), Beira 
(1965-66), Anguila (1969). 

21 

Suez (1956), Tunisia (1961). In addition, during the 

Algerian War, France stopped and searched the merchant ships of 
at least ten countries. 

22 The Paracels (1974). 



145 



Given the destabilizing forces in the world today, it is 
possible to imagine that some future incident will involve a 
major power warship and a coastal state. If the warship is fired 
upon, the maritime power has two choices — to respond with force, 
or to respond diplomatically. At present, it is unlikely that 
Western electorates will support military campaigns in the Third 
World, particularly if they promise to be costly. In any case, 
there will be many who will argue (with some justification) that 
U.S., British or French interests are not sufficiently threatened 
by any one incident to justify a forcible response. At the same 
time, however, diplomatic redress, however complete, will be much 
less dramatic (and hence less impressive) than the original 
challenge. If the above comments on the nature of warships' 
influence are correct, then it would not take many such incidents 
to cast doubt on the credibility of any use of force by Western 
naval powers, and hence on the diplomatic usefulness of their 
fleets. 25 

One analysis might lead to the conclusion that only three 
choices are open to the maritime state. A relatively small amount 
of force in response to early challenges, a larger amount later 
to re-establish it as a viable policy option, or acceptance of a 



27) 

'This discussion mostly has involved the ability of war- 
ships to directly influence a coastal state on a particular issue— 
what Luttwak has called "active suasion." Presumably this also 
would effect the more general case where the mere presence of 
one's forces in a region equates to influence ("latent suasion"), 
but the linkage is less clear. 



146 



radical transformation of the marine environment. In point of 
fact, there may be other alternatives as well. For instance, if 
a particular state, organization of states, or non-national 
group frequently and consistently acts in ways unacceptable to 
the majority of interested parties, it will become easier to 
respond more firmly as time goes on. The diminished willingness 

of governments to agree to hijackers' or terrorists' demands is 

• + 24 
a case m point. 

Perhaps some radical transformation is inevitable. Although 

declarations of ocean areas as zones of peace, neutrality, etc. 

are unlikely to have much effect, extended jurisdiction eventually 

may lead to the exclusion of non-littoral power warships from 

25 

semi-enclosed seas, either by convention or by physical control 

of access points. Well before such situations develop, the 
superpowers, at least, will begin to nurture middle power surro- 
gates within the region itself. This is not a new approach. The 
British devolution of power to the United States in the Caribbean 
and Japan in the Far East foreshadowed the consolidation of the 



Admittedly there is little evidence for coordinated, 
hardened responses by the international community. Within many 
individual states, however, more stringent security measures and 
the use of force against skyjackers became more acceptable as 
the number of incidents mounted. See "Aerial Piracy" in 
Strategic Survey 1975 (London: IISS, 1974), pp. 82-83- 

25 
^Such as the Mediterranean, Baltic or the Persian Gulf. 

The Black Sea already is controlled by the Montreux Convention. 

See Lewis M. Alexander, "Special Circumstances: Semi-enclosed 

Seas," in Gamble and Pontecorvo, op_. cit . (note 2-3), pp- 201- 

216. 



147 



26 

Royal Navy in European waters in 1904. More recently, Iran's 

development as a major force in the Persian Gulf and Northwest 
Indian Ocean has made her a plausible candidate for such a role 
since Britain's withdrawal east of Suez. Suggestions that Japan 
should he groomed for a similar part in the We stern Pacific will 
be treated at length in later chapters. 

Whether or not one wishes to entrust the primary responsi- 
bility for regional peacekeeping to a surrogate must hinge on 
factors beyond the scope of this study. Even if one does not, 
such allies still can be useful. British fleet movements, for 
instance, were of considerable importance to the United States 

during both the Lebanon operation of 1958 and the 1967 Middle 

27 

East war. Although a comparable degree of trust, coordination 

and capability will be hard to find elsewhere, a regional, 
middle power navy dedicated to keeping a certain amount of order 
could free one's own diminishing assets for higher priority tasks, 

It is recognized that the price that might have to be paid 
for such stability would be infringements on maritime activities 
by the middle power itself — perhaps Iranian tolls on shipping 
entering the Straits of Hormuz, or an Indian Oceanwise pollution 
zone. Still, such penalties might be preferable to turmoil, and 
can be partly countered by ensuring that the strategic states in 



2f> 

See Harder, op. cit. (note 1-2), pp. 427-450, 



27 



See Howe, op. cit . (note 1-5) > passim . 



148 



question have enough of a stake in the freedom of the seas 
(possibly by encouraging them to build large merchant fleets 
along with their navies) that totally unreasonable demands could 
be met with counter pressures. Such leverage, of course, also 
could be exerted through non-maritime issues. 

Should the seas be divided, merchant shipping may find 
adequate freedom under flags of convenience and multi-national 
control. This is not unreasonable, commercial aircraft have 
operated across sovereign airspace since their inception. 
Already some ocean policy studies are examining parallels between 
air law and an emerging law of the sea. 

Despite these factors, however, visions of the imminent 
relegation of aircraft carriers to the protection of oil rigs, 
floating cities and fisheries zones are premature. For all the 
restrictions on their activities, naval vessels still are a 
useful (if expensive) way for the superpowers to signal to each 
other. Although other governments may not be cowed in the way 
they once might have been, neither would a major shift in deploy- 
ments go unnoticed. Moreover, in those situations where critical 
interests truly are threatened, the presence of a few symbolic 
ships can be significant. In the words of one commentator: 

When naval forces are introduced in order to affirm 
the commitment of national power in all its dimensions, 
their actual tactical capabilities do not delimit their 
political effectiveness. ^Q 



28 

Luttwak, op_. cit . , p. 52. 



149 



Even the restriction of movement will come slowly, for 
there will continue to be enough insecure states to practically 
guarantee bi-lateral access agreements (with which the Air Force 
has always operated) under the most pessimistic Law of the Sea 
Conference outcome. 

Nevertheless, trends do seem to point to an eventual demise 
of the freedom of naval mobility, with consequences well beyond 
unemployment for those skilled in such arts. This is not 
unprecedented. The spread of civilization to the European 
steppes impeded the movements of the Cossacks and Tartars just 
as surely as ocean economic activities and extended national 
jurisdictions (and the ability to enforce them) will limit the 
military mariner. 

The consequences of this may not be entirely bad. Regional 
hegemonies may arise in some areas, but cooperative solutions may 
be found in others. If fisheries and pollution could be managed 
on a regional basis, it certainly would be an improvement over 
current practices. The superpowers also may be discouraged from 
intervening in disputes which are not really in their national 
interests. (For those that are, it will be many years before 
the sanctity of ocean boundaries v/ill be a binding constraint.) 

In any case, it is against this changing background that 
Japan must examine her ocean programs, even to the point of 
relinquishing some of the traditional concepts which have served 
her so well to date. 



PART II 

THE SETTING OP JAPAN'S SEAPOWER: 
PURPOSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 



Chapter Five . . . Japanese Interests and Strategic Thinking 1974 
Chapter Six . . . The Status of the MSDF and Its Constraints 
Chapter Seven . . . The Evolution of the Constraints 



Chapter Five 
JAPANESE INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC THINKING 1974 

It always is risky, if not presumptious, to comment on 
such a value-laden and variable subject as the national interest. 
This is particularly true for an American writing of a land as 
foreign to his own as Japan. Nevertheless, certain elements of 
Japanese national interests are relatively fixed by geography, 
population and natural resources. Others, involving industrial 
structures, dietary habits, the cultural heritage, etc., may be 
variable, but will not change very quickly. Those interests 
most volatile and difficult to assess result from the interplay 
of domestic pressure groups or from the need to satisfy some 
national cultural or psychological demand. Typically, they 
really are strategies for the protection of more permanent con- 
cerns. For instance, one way of preserving the social and 

political structure would be through the containment of Communism. 



1 
John M. Collins, in his Grand Strategy (Annapolis: USNI, 

1973), states that "National Survival is the only abiding 
interest." (p. 3). He does, however, define national interests 

S.S * 

A highly generalized concept of elements that consti- 
tute a state's compelling needs, including self- 
preservation, independence, national integrity, 
military security, and economic well-being, (p. 273) 

He further distinguishes them as being of long, short or medium 
term. 



151 



152 



Alternatives could be neutrality or an anti-imperialist stance. 
Another example would be to support domestic fisheries (and 
fishermen) by declaring a 200 mile economic zone (instead of a 
more internationalist approach, or by increasing the competitive- 
ness of one's own fleets). 

With these caveats in mind, some of the interests which 

2 

currently are of major importance to Japan are outlined below. 

Obviously all are not related to seapower, and some choices may 
be open to dispute. Still, a listing of this sort may provide a 
background for later chapters and clarify the author's biases 
and shortcomings. 

A. The Physical Security of the Japanese People (fixed) 
1 . Protection of the home islands (fixed) 

(a) Diplomatic: avoidance of war/isolation (interest 
fixed, arrangements variable) 

(1) Ties with U.S. and West 

(2) Improved relations with PRC 

(3) Improved relations with USSR 

(4) Shedding of neo-imperialist image in Third 
World (to reduce terrorist targets) 

(5) Membership in international organizations 

(b) Military 

(1) Maintenance or modification of Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty 

(2) Other arrangements 

(3) Level of Self- Defense Forces' unilateral 
capabilities 

(4) Nuclear/non-nuclear stance 



2 

Insofar as possible, the issues have been approached from 

the Japanese point of view. All these points have been discussed 
by Japanese officials or commentators over the last two years. 



153 



2. Disaster relief program (fixed) 



(3 



a} Domestic relief capability 

b) Reliance on international agencies 



B. Maintenance of Economic Weil-Being (basically fixed, 
but definitions of "well-being" vary) 

1 . International measures 

(a) Protection against resources nationalism and 
cartelization (including food) 

(1) Diversification of suppliers 

(2) Flexible diplomacy 

(3) Provisions to transport raw materials 
and finished goods 

(4) Development of effective countermeasures 
if possible, and a willingness to use them 
if necessary 

(b) Maintenance of existing markets/opening of new ones 

(1) Joint ventures 

2) Measures to increase competitiveness 

3) Improvements of the image of Japanese 
businessmen 

(c) Avoidance of isolation 

1) Minimization of trade barriers 
2; Formation of alliances, resource-sharing 
programs, improved financial associations 
(3) Promotion of interdependence 

2. Domestic measures 

a) Inflation/recession countermeasures 

b) Appropriate restructuring of the economic structure 

(c) Pollution control 

(d) Increased stockpiles and food buffers 

(e) Improvement of the social capital structure 

Preservation of Political Autonomy/independence (fixed) 

1 . Closely related to A. and B. above 

2. In Japan's case avoidance of isolation is especially 
important 



154 



D. Contributions to the Development of the International System 
(variable) 

1 . Demonstration effect of Japan as an economic power 
without military power 

2. Projects for the integration of developing countries 
into the international system 

3. Projects for promoting interdependence 

E. Maintenance of Psychological Well-Being (interest fixed, 
needs variable) 

1 . Preservation of social cohesion 

2. Determination of Japan's world role 
(a) Must be greater than Japan, Inc. 

3. Search for international acceptance 

This list, of course, is not all-inclusive, but it is 
indicative of the breadth of the problems which Japan faces today. 
There is a general consensus on the interests themselves, but much 
less of one on the strategies for protecting them. The balance of 
this chapter briefly will summarize the thinking and debates on 
these issues as of late 1974* 

The Physical Security of the Japanese People 

The Setting 

The dominant fact of Japanese life is overcrowding. In 
early 1975, more than 110 million people lived on the four main 
islands, an area slightly smaller than California. Although this 
already creates one of the highest population densities in the 



155 



3 

world, the problem is compounded by unequal distribution. In 

1970, 51 • 4$ of the nation lived in the so-called "Tokaido 
Megalopolis" (along the eastern seaboard from Tokyo to Kobe), 
which accounts for only 18.8% of the land area. Thus the region 
around Tokyo supports over 5300 persons per square kilometer 
while the Northern Island of Hokkaido has only 66. (Lest this 
seem too sparse, however, it should be noted that Hokkaido is 
more crowded than 40 of the 50 United States.) Although the 
population growth rate has been stabilized at about 1 percent, 
this still means an increase of over a million persons per year. 
Threats to Japan's physical security may be either natural 
or man-made. The former are quite important psychologically, 
although their hazards have been reduced in recent times. For 
instance, the life and property damage from earthquakes in an 
average year is fairly light, but the threat of another major 
disaster like the one in 1 923 is not far from anyone's mind. An 
average of six or seven typhoons strike the country each year, 
beginning in Okinawa about August, and gradually moving northward 
through October. Although improved weather forecasts and 



5 287 people/km 2 (1972), vs 22/km for the U.S. (A similar 
U.S. density would equate to a population of over 2,600 million.) 
On a world-wide basis, Japan's population density is between that 
of Belgium (318) and West Germany (248). Data from Sorifu Tokei 
Kyoku (Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office), Kokusai Tokei 
Yoran (international Statistics Handbook), Tokyo: March 1974- 

4 Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office, Statistical 
Handbook of Japan 1 97 1 (Tokyo: June 1971), P- 20. 



156 



Figure JM 




^cS^v^i^v^--^ ■ 



JAPAN IN ASIA 



157 



construction techniques have lessened the dangers from these 
storms, they cannot help but have a major impact on those in 
their paths. Some 60 volcanoes also are active, but these rarely 
pose problems. 

By contrast, except for terrorism, which will be discussed 
later, few Japanese can envision a credible military threat to 
the homeland itself. An invasion of Japan would hardly be justi- 
fied by someone else's need for living space or raw materials. 
She has few boundary or territorial disputes, although the search 
for ocean resources will add new ones and may intensify others. 
Except for limiting the Soviet navy's access to the Pacific, she 
does not stand in the way of any great power's line of advance. 
Japan's strategic value, on the other hand, lies in her industrial 
potential (which probably would be severely damaged in the 
fighting), her availability for U.S. bases in the Northeast Asia 
(which seems to be declining) or for a Soviet window on the 
Pacific, and the impact which her defection from the Western camp 
might have on the psychological balance of power. Even should an 
invasion succeed, it is argued, it would be difficult to ensure 
that the efforts of such a closely-knit people could be directed 
towards one's own ends. With the reduced tensions in the region 
resulting from detente and the American withdrawal from Vietnam, 
the direct threat from any of her neighbors appears to have 
diminished even farther. 

It is possible, of course, for these warming trends to be 



158 



reversed, and to be reversed rapidly. Therefore, classical mili- 
tary doctrine holds that the capabilities of possible opponents, 
rather than their intentions, should be the guide to one's 
defenses. Most Japanese, however, do not subscribe to this 
thesis, on four grounds: (1) the nuclear threshold is such that 
much of the superpowers' capability is effectively unusable, 
(2) Japan is sufficiently important that she could count on 
foreign assistance if any great power deployed its forces against 
her, (3) even if she could not count on such help, her geographi- 
cal situation is such that she could not defend herself against, 
or absorb, even a moderate nuclear attack, (4) whatever the 
physical situation, the constitutional limitations and the 
domestic political realities absolutely preclude the development 
of military forces to compete with the superpowers. Therefore, 
it becomes pointless to argue in terms of capabilities alone. 
At the same time, the consideration of intentions shifts the 
focus outside of the military plane. Indeed, it has been in the 



5 
Due to the concentration of cities and industrial areas 

(70/o of the industry is located in 20;£ of the land area), it has 

been estimated that as few as eight megaton-range weapons could 

destroy virtually the entire productive capacity of the Tokaido 

region and Northern Kyushu. Jack D. Salmon, "Japan as a Great 

Power: The Military Context and Policy Options," Japan 

Interpreter , VII (1972), pp. 396-408. 

This is separate from the issue of Japanese nuclearization 
itself. The domestic and international merits and demerits of 
a few nuclear weapons could be argued endlessly. Almost no one, 
however, considers that Japan could build a warfighting capa- 
bility comparable to that of the U.S. or the Soviet Union. 



159 



realm of diplomacy and economics (which Tokyo has managed to 
separate so skillfully) where Japan has pursued her primary quest 



7 
for security. 



Diplomatic Security 
(1) The United States . 

At present, the United States is Japan's official guarantor, 
both through the "nuclear umbrella" and the conventional forces 
which might be activated under the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual 

Cooperation and Security. Although relations between the two 

q 
countries in early 1975 were relatively tranquil, there are 

several long-range problems which could cause frictions in the 

future. Among these are: (1) U.S. bases in a Japan where land 

is increasingly scarce and where their use in support of Japan's 

interests (as opposed to America's) is seen to be more and more 



7 

See Okumiya Masatake, "Proposal for a Weil-Balanced 
National Security," Shin Boei lionshu , March 1974* Translation 
in American Embassy, Tokyo, Summary of S elected Japanese Maga - 
zines (hereafter Magazine Summary ) , June 1974* Also F. C 
Langdon, Japan' s Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1 973) . 

o 

Hereafter "Security Treaty." 

q 

^The column "Japan Currents" in Sekai, July 1974> suggests 

that this may be because both sides are avoiding a real dialogue 

in the hope of avoiding the exposure of differences. 

1 

Shiratori Rei, "U.S. -Japan Relations Headed Toward 

Dangerous and Unstable Period," Economist , June 4> 1974* Trans- 
lation in Magazine Summary , June 1 974- 



160 



1 1 
unlikely. (2) Continued U.S. reminders that Japan should be 

grateful for the security it receives when the Japanese have 

1 2 

begun to question the need for such protection. (3) Intensified 

competition in a number of markets in which Japan recently has 
lost many of the competitive advantages which it held for so 
long. (4) Competition for scarce world-wide resources. 



11 

This question frequently was raised during Vietnam, and 

in the debates over the homeporting of the U.S. aircraft carrier 
Midway at Yokosuka. It surfaced again during the summer of 1974 
when U.S. ICEM warning radars were found to be located in Japan. 
American bases are permitted under Article VI of the Security 
Treaty, which states: 

For the purpose of contributing to the security of 
Japan and the maintenance of international peace and 
security in the Far East, the United States of America 
is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces 
of facilities and areas in Japan. 

Taoka Shunji provides a number of cogent arguments for the abo- 
lition of the formal U.S. base structure in the interests of 
better overall relations. See "Japan's Strategic Situation and 
the U.S. Military Presence." (Copy provided by author. Publica- 
tion forthcoming.) These were strengthened by the release of 
evidence from several sources during September and October 1974 
which pointed to the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. 
ships in Japanese ports. 

12 

A frequently-heard criticism is that the nuclear umbrella 

really is a by-product of the U.S. -Soviet balance and thus would 
be equally effective whether or not Japan had formal security 
arrangements with the U.S. Royama Michio made this point in an 
interview on January J, 1973* See also Shiratori, _op_. cit . 
There also is an interesting difference in perception in that 
many Japanese feel that it is the U.S. which should be grateful 
(for the base rights), rather than the other way around. 

1 "5 
^In Southeast Asia, for one, U.S. firms recently have been 

making strong inroads. See the 3~part New York Times series, 
"The United States and South Asia," June 24-26, 1974. For a 
radical critique (and book review), which holds that the U.S. 
always has been dominant, see T. A. Bisson, "The American- 
Japanese 'Co-Prosperity Sphere, 1 " BCAS, VI ( January-March 1974) » 



161 



(5) The asymmetry between American and Japanese dependence on 
foreign suppliers, which might make Japan vulnerable to counter- 
measures for U.S. actions. 4 (6) Japanese reliance on the U.S. 
for a number of crucial commodities, such as food. Should the 
U.S. be unable to provide Japan with the materials it needs in 

times of shortage, serious ramifications are possible, as 

15 

presaged by the 1973 soy bean embargo. 

Relations with the United States are likely to remain as 
the keystone of Japanese diplomacy. This certainly will be true 
so long as conservative governments are in power, and probably 

would be even for a coalition. Nevertheless, Tokyo also will 

16 

continue to seek greater independence from Washington. 



pp. 52-64. A good summary of Japanese competitive problems was 
provided in Asahi Shimbun (hereafter Asahi ), September 17, 1974, 
p. 9. 

Since before the oil embargo, Japan consistently has 
rejected U.S. proposals for agreements among oil consumers which 
might lead to confrontations with producing countries. Japan's 
contradictory allegiances are outlined in Mainichi's September JO, 
1974 summary of Foreign Minister Kimura's U.S. visit. 

1 5 

Although the September 21, 1974 communique between 

President Ford and Prime Minister Tanaka included a denial of 

U.S. intent to restrict the export of foodstuffs, the imposition 

of de-facto controls on grain shipments to the Soviet Union less 

than three weeks later was highly disturbing. Thus far, 

Japanese demand for U.S. cereals is not large enough to fall 

under the regulations, but the future is uncertain. See, inter 

alia , Sankei , October 11, 1974 (editorial). 

1 6 

For instance, Eto Shinkichi and Miyoshi Osamu, 'What is 

the Axis of Japanese Diplomacy?" Keizai Orai, December 1973* 

Translation in Magazine Summary , April 1974* 



162 



A Japanese Foreign Minister stated in September 1974 that; 

Japanese diplomacy, from now on, must be a diplomacy 
in which the centripetal force and the centrifugal 
force are balanced. "Centripetal force" means, in 
other words, efforts to make the U.S. -Japan cooperation 
policy line, which has been the axis of post-war 
Japanese diplomacy, still more solid. By "centrifugal 
force," I mean the steady establishment of friendly 
and good-will relations with countries with which our 17 
country did not have such close political ties so far. 

This trend has become stronger and more visible since the Nixon 
shocks of 1971 » but it really began earlier as an offshoot of the 
economic recovery. It has been evidenced by the increasingly far- 
ranging trips of high government officials, from Peking to Moscow 
to Europe on the one hand, and to Latin America, the Middle East 
and Africa on the other. 

All of these moves have been designed to increase Japan's 
flexibility. But they also are contingent on the continued 
relaxation of tensions in the Western Pacific. Eventually, Japan 
may achieve enough of a balance in her multi- lateral relations to 
safeguard an independent course even if the political climate in 
Northeast Asia worsened. For the time being, however, such a 
trend almost certainly would drive her back towards Washington. 

(2) The Soviet Union 

Relations with the Soviet Union are burdened with a long 
history of distrust and conflict, not to mention ideological 
differences and a territorial dispute. Although there are strong 



1 "^Quoted in Mainichi , September 10, 1974, P- 2. Trans- 
lation from Press Summary , September 19, 1974, P» 9« 



163 



anti- communist factions within the Japanese government, the ideo- 
logical fervor of the Cold War has eased in Tokyo, as elsewhere, 
in recent years. Moscow's principal offerings, besides a general 

reduction in tensions, are resources, fish, and the northern 

1 ft 
islands. ' Siberian development projects provided the initial 

basis for Japanese commercial interest, but recent circumstances, 

especially the growing availability of Chinese oil, increasingly 

severe Soviet terms, and a lack of U.S. co-participation have 

19 

reduced their attractiveness. Fisheries disputes are an on- 
going source of irritation for Tokyo, since several thousand of 
her seamen have been seized since 1945 and a Soviet 200 mile 
economic zone is seen as a serious threat to the pelagic catch. 
The northern islands issue remains the stumbling block to a 
formal World War II peace treaty. Relations were normalized, 



1 fl 

Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which the 

Soviets acquired at the end of World War II. Japan maintains 
(and the USSR agrees) that the former pair are related to Hokkaido, 
rather than to the Soviet-ovmed Kuriles. The latter pair, it is 
claimed, belong to the Southern Kuriles, which are said to be a 
distinct island group. Moreover, since all of the islands were 
settled peacefully and belonged to Japan before she began her 
imperial expansion (a fact recognized by 19th century Russo- 
Japanese treaties), they are not covered by the Potsdam declara- 
tion. Moscow has offered to return the first two as part of a 
peace treaty, but holds that the others are not negotiable since 
war-related boundary issues cannot be re-opened. The Japanese 
arguments are given in the Foreign Ministry publication, The 
Northern Territorial Issue (Tokyo, 1970). 

1 9 Tokyo Shimbun , September JO, 1974, P« 3» A key factor 
was the Soviet decision to build a new track for the Trans- 
Siberian railway rather than a pipeline as originally discussed. 
The strategic implications of this choice, plus a reduction in 
the guaranteed amount from 40 to 25 million kiloliters, raised 
doubts not only in Tokyo, but also in Washington and Peking. 



164 



however, by a joint agreement in 1956. 

The Soviet Union has headed the list of "disliked countries" 

20 
in Japanese opinion polls for years. Nevertheless, both sides 

can profit from increased cooperation and it appears that this 
will be the governing factor in the near future. Such cooperation 
is possible under the correct, if lukewarm relations now prevail- 
ing. Some further warming may be expected, but the deep-seated 
anti- communism of most Japanese leaders, and their probable 
successors, will continue to discourage very close ties. 

(3) The People's Republic of China 

Despite more than 75 years of often violent hostility, 
Japan' s basic relationship with China is much closer than with 
the Soviet Union. In addition to a long history of cultural 
borrowing, there still is some Japanese guilt about the wartime 
experiences. While it is recognized that the economic potential 
of the "China Market" will not be realized for years, the PRC 
recently has become a supplier of petroleum. Though initial 
shipments have been fairly small, the expansion potential and 

lack of strings have distracted attention from Siberian develop- 

21 

ment. In the next few years, China's importance as a determi- 

nant of Japan's course will grow. Specific predictions are 



20 

For instance, Sankei , September 17, 1964, P« 6. Part of 

the distrust stems from Moscow's attack on Japan in the last 
days of World War II in violation of a non-aggression pact, and 
her slowness in repatriating prisoners of war. 

21 

Sankei , August 16, 1974, P» 9» 



165 



impossible, given the ■uncertainties of the post-Maoist period, 
but some alternatives and Japan's possible reactions to them will 
be offered in Chapter Seven. 

(4) Taiwan and Korea 

Taiwan and Korea are the other two areas of immediate con- 
cern to Japan's security. With the decline of East-West tensions, 
the likelihood that Japan will be drawn into a conflict over 
either area also has diminished. This probably is more true of 

Taiwan than of Korea. Once declared "important" to the security 

22 - - 

of Japan, the ties between Tokyo and Taipei have been cool 

since the former established diplomatic relations with Peking. 
The abortive 1974 negotiations over the Japan-China air route 
made matters even worse. This has not prevented the growth of 
economic links, but Japan now has little ideological reason to 
become directly involved in a conflict between the two Chinas. 

Korea, on the other hand, remains of primary importance. 

23 

Traditionally the "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," there 

has been a history of mutual animosity at least since Hideyoshi's 
invasion of the peninsula at the end of the 16th century. Recent 



Nixon-Sato communique, November 21, 1 9^9- 

*The two invasions by Kublai Khan in the 13th century were 
launched from Korea. Some reports even credit an attempted 
Chinese invasion in the 7th century. Fear of foreign possession 
of Korea played a particularly important role in Japanese foreign 
policy in the late 19th-early 20th centuries. Japan's perspec- 
tive on Korea is similar to Britain's historical view of the 
Netherlands. 



166 



problems have included fishing disputes, sometimes involving 
violence, continental shelf boundary issues, and the Korean 
occupation of Takeshima, an island in the Sea of Japan. The 
1969 Nixon-Sato communique affirmed that the security of South 
Korea (ROK) was "essential" to that of Japan, but the Kim Dae 
Jung kidnapping and the assassination attempt on President Park 
have brought relations between the two countries to a post-World 
War II low. In fact, a Japanese Foreign Minister recently made 
the highly controversial remark that the essential element for 
Japan now was "stability on the Korean Peninsula," rather than 
the ROK's security. At the same time he decried President Park's 

9 A 

warnings of the threat from the North." Whether or not Korean 
instability results from internal or external pressures, it is 
likely to be of more direct interest to Japan than almost any 
other single issue. 

(5) Other States 

Diplomatic relations with the rest of the world have varied 
in direct proportion to Japan's economic interest therein. Some 
measure of this interest may be indicated by Tables 5~1 through 
5-3 • Note the truly world-wide nature of her resource dependence, 
the importance of the North American and Southeast Asian markets, 
and the growing level of investment in Europe. 

The economic basis of this interest has been well described 



^omiuri Shimbun (hereafter Yomiuri), October 10, 1974, 
p. 7. 



167 



Table 5-1 

JAPANESE STRATEGIC REGIONS 

FY 1972 RESOURCES SUPPLY 



North America (11.5$) 

Soy Beans 

Wheat 

Lead Ore 

Coal 

Copper Ore 

Forestry Products 

Central and South America (6.7$) 

Sugar 

Raw Cotton 

Iron Ore 

East and Southeast Asia (11.7%) 

Crude 

Forestry Products 

Bauxite 

Copper Ore 

Rubber 

Africa (3«7%) 

West Asia and Middle East (40.9%) 

Crude Oil 
Iron Ore 

Oceania (16.7%) 

Wool 

Nickel Ore 
Bauxi te 
Iron Ore 
Coal 



% of 


% 


% Total 


Imports 


Dependency 


Demand 


91 


96 


88 


80 


91 


73 


71 


76 


54 


54 


57 


31 


39 


99 


39 


23 


51 


12 


44 


89 


39 


36 


100 


36 


22 


99 


22 


I 

13 


99.8 


13 


53 


51 


27 


42 


100 


42 


40 


99 


40 


96 


100 


96 



85 


99.8 


85 


16 


99 


16 


93 


100 


93 


83 


100 


83 


56 


100 


56 


42 


99 


43 


35 


57 


20 



Source: MITI 



168 



Table 5-2 
JAPANESE STRATEGIC REGIONS 
TRADE 



a. 


Exports (percent of 


value) 










I960 1 


1970 2 


1973 5 


1980 4 


1985 4 


N. America 




32.8 


33-7 


28.3 






Central & S. America 




4.4 


6.1 


7.5 


rH 


rH 
rH 


W. Europe 
Southeast Asia 




11.7 
23.3 


15.0 
25.4 


17.4 
24.2 


cd 

rH 

•a 


Africa 




8.7 


7.4 


8.5 





5 

-P 
O 


W. Asia and Middle East 
Oceania 


12.4 
4.9 


2.8 
4.2 


4.4 
4.4 


Communist 




1.8 
4,055 


5-4 
19,318 


50 

36,930 






TOTAL (8x10 ) 


43,419 


61,039 


a /o of GNP 




9.4 


9.5 


9.2 


9.6 


9.9 


b. 


Imports (percent of 


value) 










I960 1 


1970 2 


1973 5 


1980 4 


1985 4 


N. America 




42.8 


34.1 


29.5 






Central & S. America 
W . Europe 




3.2 

8.8 


7.2 

10.2 


5.1 

10.5 


rH 


rH 

■3 


East and Southeast Asia 

Africa 

W. Asia and Middle East 

Oceania 


14.0 
3.7 

15.7 
9.0 


16.0 
5.8 

12.0 
9.6 


20.8 

4-6 

12.6 

11.1 


rH 

•H 

-p 



rH 
•H 

s 




Communist 




2.8 

4,491 


.Ail 

18,881 


6.0 
38,314 


G 


K 


TOTAL ($x10 6 ) 


39,879 


57,046 


°/o of GNP 




10.4 


9.3 


9.6 


8.8 


9.2 


Sources: 














1 MITI 














IJKIW Industrial Review 74, P« 


8 









"TfllTI, International Trade White Paper 1974,Data Summary, pp. 18-19 
TCETI. Computed in real terms in Yen; converted at $1 = ¥ 300 



169 





Table 


5-5 








JAPANESE STRATEGIC REGIONS 








INVESTMENT 








a. Cumulative Direct 


Investments by Japanese Pj 


.rms (pe 


rcent) 




1968 


1970 


1972 


1980 


1985 


N. America 


29.5 


25.5 


22.9 




<D 


Central and S. America 


21.0 


15.9 


14.6 


crj 


€ 


Europe 


10.6 


17.9 


24.5 


■H 


rH 

I 


Asia 


19.3 


21.0 


20.5 


crj 


Africa 


3.0 


2.6 


2.2 


5 


Sd 


Middle East 


130 


9-3 


8.9 


-p 



-P 
O 


Oceania 


3.4 


7.8 


6.4 


fl 


PI 


TOTAL ($x10 ) 


2,008 


3,577 


6,773 


45,000 


93,500 



io of World Inv. 9.3 12.0 

b. _ Investment by Foreign States in Japan (percent) 

1968 1970 1972 1980 1985 

N. America 69. 1 64.6 67.8 Q « Q d 

Europe 21.7 21.8 17*5 rt ^ c % 



TOTAL ($x10 6 ) 411 596 1,012 



Source: Bank of Japan 



170 



by the term "Resources Diplomacy" (shigen gaiko) (discussed more 
fully below) and by the rash of Foreign Ministry interest in 
Arabia since the Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, as noted above 

(p. 162), there are signs that a broader-based policy may be in 

25 

the making, especially with regard to Africa and Latin America. 

Despite formation of such groups as the Trilateral Commission, 
interest in Europe mostly seems limited to possible EEC restric- 
tions on Japanese products and the availability of petrodollars 

26 

through the Eurodollar market. 

There is little feeling that Japan should try to play the 

role of a major power. Indeed, almost all such visions of her 

27 

have come from abroad. Domestic views usually have stressed 

28 
Japan's weaknesses rather than her strengths. In this sense, 



25, 

vVitness Prime Minister Tanaka's September 1974 visits to 

Brazil, Canada and Mexico, plus Foreign Minister Kimura's Septem- 
ber 24, 1974 speech to the UN and his October-November 1974 trip 
to five Black African states. It may be that these moves are 
more superficial than substantive, but they also are consistent 
with Japan's tendency to retain as many options as possible. 

A broader view was taken in Curt Gasteyger (ed.), Japan 
and the Atlantic Y/orld (Atlantic Papers 3) (Westmead: Saxon 
Hill, 1972), but this has not been representative. 



Most conspicuously, Herman Kahn's The Emerging Japanese 

")). 



2 \ 

Superstate (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). Many 
Marxist writings also have stressed the imperialist nature of 
Japan's economic influence and the potential for a revival of 
militarism. One of the most recent is Jon Halliday and Gavin 
McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1973). 

28 

Zbigniew Brzezinski's The Fragile Blossom (New York: 

Harper and Row, 1972) seems to have been closer to the thinking 

of most Japanese than Kahn's work. 



171 



the energy crisis and oil embargo may have been useful in 
bringing foreign expectations of Japan more in line with reality. 

(6) Some Alternatives 

This leaves several options in the search for security 
through diplomacy: (a) continued alliance with a major power in 
the Northwest Pacific; (b) adoption of an equidistant posture 
within the Northeast Asian balance of power; (c) participation 
in an Asian Collective Security System; (d) realignment as a 
champion of the Third World (especially that part which is rich 
in resources); (e) a search for allies among countries with 
previously unexploited common interests. This might include a 

Pacific Regional grouping, or the promotion of ties among 

29 
emerging oceanic states. 

So far the first has been chosen. A departure from it will 
depend on such diverse but inter-related factors as the progress 
of detente, the state of U.S. -China relations and the health of 
the world economy, among others. Space does not permit an ade- 
quate analysis of any of the alternatives, but it must be remem- 
bered that Japan is not completely free to choose among them. A 
stable equidistant posture is attractive, but it will be many 
years before such non-alignment would be respected in times of 
stress. Similarly, an Asian collective security pact has 



29 

Ambassador Arvid Pardo's term, referring to those nations 

which would be particularly advantaged by broad extensions of 

national jurisdiction at sea. (See below, Chapter Seven.) 



172 



theoretical advantages, "but the only current proposal was put 
forth by the Soviet Union in 1954 and revived in 1972. This 
automatically makes it suspect in Tokyo's eyes. By the same 
token, though Japan may he able to dilute the suspicions of many 
developing countries, there is little prospect that they will 
accept her as their champion. The fifth option may bear fruit 
one day, but any broad-based cooperation among the Pacific Basin 
states is out of the question for the near future. Similarly, 
oceanic states may support each other in law of the sea negoti- 
ations or related disputes, but this is not enough of a founda- 
tion for an entire foreign policy. 

Thus, although there are pressures to modify the present 
Japanese diplomatic approach, there are not many options immedi- 
ately available. The most consistently cited, and easily remedied 
weakness is the inadequacy of her intelligence. This was particu- 
larly criticized in the aftermath of the oil boycott, which 
almost no one had foreseen. The Self Defense Forces recently 
have reorganized their intelligence structure, and it is assumed 
that the Foreign Ministry also has taken this to heart. 

Revision of the Security Treaty is another possibility. 



50 

See the essays by Kotani Hidejiro and Gennady V. Astafiev 

in Council on National Security Problems (CNSP), Peace in A3ia 

(Toky5: CNSP, August 1975), pp. 27-44. 

51 

y This is not to say that awareness of an approaching energy 

crisis did not pre-date the Yom Kippur War. The coming supply 

shortage officially had been recognized at least by the Spring of 

1973. NOT, April 3, 1973, P. 1. 



173 



Though it has served Japan well over the years, there is increas- 
ing talk that it has outlived its usefulness. In view of the 
uncertainties of the next few years, Tokyo's diplomats probably 
would prefer to de-emphasize the Treaty quietly rather than 
abandon one of the more constant elements of their foreign 
policy. They may, however, be overpowered by domestic pressures 
on this point. 

Mil i tar:/ Security 

At the heart of military security issues in Japan is 

Article IX of the Constitution, which states: 

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based 
on justice and order the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat of force as a means of settling inter- 
national disputes. 

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 

The Japanese Government has maintained ever since 194& that 

" . . • the renunciation of war does not directly deny the right 

33 
of self-defense." Accordingly, despite a relatively low 

priority and often severe domestic opposition, defense capabili- 
ties have been systematically developed under a variety of names 



^ For instance, the Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) has favored 
the ratification of the Ilon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as 
an internationalist position in the Law of the Sea negotiations. 
It has been overruled on both occasions. 

■^Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, June 26, 1946, quoted in 
John K. Emmerson, Arms , Yen and Power (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 
1972), p. 53. 



174 



(some of them American- imposed) , culminating in the present Air, 

Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces (SDF). 

The basic Japanese defense policies were outlined by the 

Cabinet and National Defense Council in 1 957 • They are: 

(1) Basic Policies for National Defense 

The objective of National Defense is to prevent 
direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to 
repel such aggression, thereby preserving the inde- 
pendence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic 
principles. 

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan 
hereby establishes the following principles: 

A. To support the activities of the United Nations, 
and promote international cooperation, thereby 
contributing to the realization of world peace. 

B. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the 
people's love for country, thereby establishing 
the sound basis essential for Japan's security. 

C. To develop progressively the effective defense 
capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due 
regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing 
domestic situation. 

D. To deal with external aggression on the basis of 
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements pending more 
effective functioning of the United Nations in the 
future in deterring and repelling such aggression. 



See James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japan's 
Maritime Forces (New York: Praeger, 1 97 3 ) » iisnerson, cp_. cit ., 
Michael Hughes, "Japan's Airpower Options" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1972), 
Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy , 1947-1968 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1 971 ), and James H. Buck, 
"Japan's Defense Policy," Asian Affairs 3 (January/February 
1974), PP. 136-150. 

-^ Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1973, p. !• 



175 



In order to win public acceptance for the Self-Defense 
Forces, the official literature has placed particular emphasis 
on their non-combat roles such as disaster relief, civil engi- 
neering and educational training. 

As noted earlier, the nature of the direct military threat 
is obscure. The Fourth Defense Build-up Plan (1972-76) is 
designed to produce: "An efficient defense force capable of 

dealing effectively with aggression on a scale not greater than 

37 

a localized war in which conventional weapons are used." In 

the face of more serious threats, the SDF are to resist until 
U.S. forces can be deployed to defeat the attack. Renewed 
fighting in Korea is a potential problem, but the most frequently 
discussed direct threat to Japan itself would come from Sakhalin 

7Q 

and the Soviet Far East. Certainly the concentration of the 
Air (ASDF) and Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) in Hokkaido and 
Northern Honshu reflects this view. 

It has been suggested that the limited range of Soviet 
tactical aircraft, the geographic obstacles of the Tsugaru 



■* Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan (Defense White 
Paper), October 1970, pp. 46-56. 

Japan Defense Agency, Japan' s Fourth Five -Year Defense 
Plan (TokyS, 1972). 

^ In 1973, it wa3 reported that Japan planned to hold out 
as long as possible against a Soviet invasion and then surrender 
if no U.S. help was forthcoming. The principal Chinese threat 
was considered to be infiltration, which Japan could mostly 
handle alone. (Richard Halloran, Herald Tribune (international), 
March 5, 1973.) 



176 



Strait and the mountainous terrain in Northern Honshu, the rela- 
tively small amphibious capability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, 
and the need to operate at the end of the Trans-Siberian railroad 
with a hostile China on her flank would restrict the ability of 

the USSR to achieve a quick decision over Japan with conventional 

39 

weapons* Others have emphasized Japan's vulnerability to air 

strikes and the restricted mobility of the Ground Self-Defense 
Forces* Whichever view prevails, the ASDF and GSDF at least 
have a threat axis on which to base their planning. 

This is not the case with the Maritime Self-Defense Force 
(MSDF). Torn between theoreticians who argue for a coastal 
defense fleet to repel invasions, or for a "blue water navy" to 

protect the sea lanes, its assignment never has been clarified 

41 
officially. Consequently, it is mainly deployed along the 

Pacific Coast, towards the sea lanes which it can only partly 

defend and away from the direction faced by its sister services. 

The future make-up and employment of the MSDF will be examined 

in later chapters, but it is worth noting that some observers 

have suggested that the greatest dangers to the physical security 

of the Japanese people are earthquakes, typhoons, and traffic 



Taoka, cp_. cit . (note ^-^\) . 

^ Kaihara Osamu, "Study on Realistic National Defense," 7 
parts, Mainichi Daily News (hereafter MDN) , January 30-February 
5, 1973- 

41 See Auer, op_. cit., pp. 128-153, for a review of these 

arguments . 



177 



accidents. Therefore, it can be argued, the SDF training and 
organization should be oriented towards disaster relief and 
safety measures, rather than external aggression. 

In any case, whatever their capabilities, the most impor- 
tant function of the SDF may be performed by their very existence. 
Without any self-defense effort of her own, Japan would have much 
less claim to great power protection. Moreover, in the absence 
of any forces at all, a decision to develop a defense capability 
would be a qualitative policy shift of possibly destabilizing 
proportions. As it is, the levels of the SDF can be adjusted to 
the international environment. 

The Maintenance of Economic Well-Being 

International Measures 
(1) Food 

Physical security has little meaning without enough to eat. 
Since domestic production provides for less than half of Japan' 3 
caloric intake, even in peacetime she is vulnerable to changes 
in the delicate balance of world food distribution. 

In monetary terms, self-sufficiency in food declined from 

43 
over 90 percent to 73 percent between 1960 and 1972. The 

reasons are manifold. One is the fact that less than 20 percent 



4 Ii\ikushima Yasuto, interview, March 20, 1974* 

^Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, White Paper on 
Agriculture , 1973 . Reported in Japan Times , April 19, 1974* 



178 



of the mountainous country is arable. In the years following 
World War II agricultural productivity reached remarkable 
levels. Nevertheless, with restricted space there is a limit 

to the ability of technology to meet the added demand generated 

45 

by affluence and population growth. 

A second, and possibly even more important reason has been 
the changes in the Japanese diet. Meat and dairy products have 
become more popular in recent years, partially replacing pre-war 
staples such as fish and rice (see Table 5-4) • 

Table 5~4 
LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTERED (1,000 MT) 

1967 1970 1972 
Adult Cattle 154 269 313 

Pigs 103 734 885 



Source: Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, Abstract 
of Statistics 1973* 



^hiice - 5.85 metric tons/hectare, second only to Australia; 
White Potatoes - 24.33 M.T. /hectare, 6th in the world; Wheat - 
2.31 M.T. /hectare, greater than the U.S., but less than most 
European producers. 

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Abstract of 
Statistics on Agriculture , Forestry and Fisheries 1 973 (Tokyo, 
1973), Table IV. 

^Despite a relatively low growth rate of 1.3$> Japan added 
nearly 1,400,000 people during fiscal 1973* This is equivalent 
to almost 100,000 additional hectares of rice fields. NKIW , 
July 30, 1974, p. 2. 



179 



The difficulty with meat is that it is an inefficient way 
of providing nourishment. It has been estimated that 7 calories 
of feed grains are needed for each calorie of beef consumed. 
A more important measure than per capita calorie consumption is 
thus "original calories," i.e. including the amount needed to 
feed the livestock and poultry which later went for human con- 
sumption. The differences can be startling. In 1971 , the 
average Japanese consumed 2,840 calories per day, 230 of which 
came from meat. This, however, was equivalent to 3,860 original 
calories. For the average American, 11,000 original calories 
were needed to generate a daily per capita consumption of 3200. 

It is in terms of original calories that Japan's dependence 

on imported food is most evident. By this measure she is less 

Aft 
than 50 percent self-sufficient. Some 80 to 90 percent of 

meat, milk, and dairy products are produced domestically, but 

49 
fully two-thirds of the feed grains must be imported. Indeed, 



See the excellent Asahi Evening News series, "Food and 
Feople" (30 installments, July 7, 1973 to August 21, 1973), 
especially installment VI, "The Shadow Islands," July 13, 1973. 
Other estimates put the ratio as high as 10:1. 

4'2480-230+( 230x7) = 3860. The Japanese consumption of 
2840 calories is equal to the 1971 world nutritional standard. 
Food and Feople V, "Earth's Capacity to Feed Mankind." 

4 Published figures vary from 4O70 (Agriculture and Forestry 
Minister Kuraishi, March 14, 1974) to 49$ ( Food and People VI) . 
Along with Great Britain, this is one of the lowest rates in the 
world. Even Italy and West Germany are nearly 8O/0 self-sufficient 
in original calories. 

49 Japan Times, April 19, 1974- 



180 



nearly twice the total amount of arable land would be needed to 

50 
grow all the foodstuffs now imported. 

Should all imports of food cease, domestic production 

initially could provide about 1,530 calories per day — enough to 

sustain life, but little else. In a year or so, some 2,100 

calories could be produced by replanting paddies now set aside, 

and by such emergency measures as converting two- thirds of the 

51 

nation's golf courses into sweet potato farms. Such a drastic 

event seems unlikely. The Japanese also have endured austere 
diets before — most recently in the mid 1940s. The fact remains, 
however, that this aspect of her prosperity is a fragile one, 

particularly if some of the projected world-wide food shortages 

52 

appear. 

Government countermeasures were promulgated in 1974 with 

the goal of raising the level of self-sufficiency to 70 percent 

53 
by 1 985 • A revision of farm policy to reduce inefficiencies 

is planned. Efforts will be intensified to halt the pollution 

which has diminished yields per hectare and caused the stagnation 



5 °Pood and People VI, July 13, 1973- 

5 1 NKIW, October 22, 1974, p. 5 and Mainichi , September 19, 
1974. 

52 

J See, for instance, Lester R. Brown, "The Next Crisis?" 

Foreign Policy #13 (Winter 1973-74) » PP» 3~33- The Agriculture 
and Forestry Ministry has forecast shortages of rice, beef and 
milk by 1980, and of wheat, feed grains and soybeans by 1985* 
Asahi , August 19, 1974* P« 2. 

- ^ Japan Times, April 19, 1974; Sankei , March 28, 1974- 



181 



54 
of coastal fisheries. ^ Aquaculture will be stressed. 

In the international arena, efforts are under way to 

solidify ties with agriculture producers and states with rich 

coastal fisheries. Although this has received less publicity 

than "resources diplomacy," it is no less important. Indeed, 

the potential volatility of the issue can be gauged by the 

Japanese reaction to the 1973 American soy bean embargo. Japan 



already takes 20 percent of the world's corn exports and 30 per- 

y 

56 



55 
cent of those of soy beans. Such imports cost her nearly 



$6 billion in 1973 t an increase of 66 percent in one year.' 

It may be that the food problem is the most serious, long 
term threat to U.S. -Japan relations, especially if supply cuts 
are made in response to future crises. The impact can be reduced 
by the restraint of both governments and Tokyo's success at 
altering Japan's environment, farm patterns, eating habits and 
other measures to increase self-sufficiency. But it also will 
hinge on factors beyond the control of either nation, and will 
remain a source of friction for years to come. 



%!he potential impact of continued pollution on Japan's 
agriculture and indeed on the health of the nation as a whole 
is very serious. Pesticide poisoning, in particular, is a 
problem. See Japan, Environment Agency, The Quality of the 
Environment in Japan (Tokyo, December 1972). 

55 

- ^Nihon Keizai (editorial), June 3, 1974* 

56 

Japan Economic Yearbook 1 974> P» 49* 



182 



(2) Resources Diplomacy 

Lacking natural resources, Japan imports enormous quantities 

57 

of raw materials. Some projections hold that, by 1980, the 

Japanese steel industry alone will generate nearly three-fourths 
of the world-wide demand for seaborne trade in iron ore and 

coal. While they are valued at only 34 percent of her total 

/ \59 

imports (and 3*3 percent of GNP; these fuel and ore supplies 

clearly are crucial to the maintenance of the economy. 

Well before the oil embargo, Japan recognized her vulnera- 
bility to the actions of raw material suppliers. Accordingly, 
Tokyo adopted a policy of "Resources Diplomacy" which was 
designed to provide maximum diversity and long term stability 
of supply, while bringing as much of it as possible under 
Japanese control. This has led her to remarkable lengths to 



57 

See Table 5-1 for the degree of dependence on foreign 

supplies. 

58 

Fa- r Eastern Economic Review , May 20, 1972, p. 39 • This 

probably will not be realized, however, since it was based on an 
assumption of continued rapid growth. 

59 

Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Statistical Survey of Japan's Economy , 1972. Table 38. 

One of the foremost proponents of such wide-ranging 
relationships has been economist Okita Saburo. See his "Natural 
Resource Dependency and Japan's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 
LII (July 1974), pp. 714-724. The limits to Japan's choices are 
summed up in John Surrey, "Japan's Uncertain Energy Prospects: 
The Problem of Import Dependence," Energy Policy , II (September 
1974), pp. 204-230. 

fi1 

Miyoshi Shuichi, "Japan's Resource Policy at a Turning 

Point," Japan Quarterly XVIII (July-September 1971), pp. 281- 



183 



accommodate resource rich states — some say to the point of 
servility. Nowhere is this better illustrated than by her 
reaction to issues involving petroleum. In May 1 973» ITI 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro refused to join a "common front" 

against OPEC, calling instead for an "understanding" between 

62 
the oil consuming and oil producing states. Six months later, 

in the face of reduced Arab production, Tokyo altered its stand 
on the 1967 UN Mid-East Peace Resolution (242) from a call for 
mere implementation, to support of the Arab view that the terms 
require a return to Israel's 19&7 borders. At the same time, 
much effort has been devoted to joint ventures and industrializa- 
tion plans to enhance Japan's image among the suppliers of this 
crucial commodity. Even though the increase in oil prices has 
hurt deeply, she has shown little interest in policy coordination 
with other consumers. 

Resource supply, however, has two parts. The first is 
getting the materials out of the ground (or out of the sea). The 
second is getting them to Japan. The latter problem, of course, 
requires ships. The Japanese, therefore, have become wary of the 
growing Arab control over tanker fleets, although they are 



287. An example of this policy was the purchase, early in 1973, 
of some 30;o of British Petroleum's holdings in the Abu Dhabi 
Marine Areas (ADMA) by a group of Japanese firms. The target is 
that 30$ of domestic oil consumption should be under Japanese 
control. The scope of foreign drilling operations is outlined 
in Figure 5-2 and in MM, July 31, 1974, P» 13. 

The Washington Post , May 9, 1973, P- A27. 



184 



contributing to it by building ships and training seamen. During 
the Mid-East embargo, Western control of most tankers enabled 
them to re-route shipments in such a way to minimize the impact 
of the sanctions on the United States and Holland. As the Arabs 

gain more influence over the transport facilities such diversions 

63 

will become proportionately more difficult. 

In addition to food, already noted, timber also may be 
coming into short supply through a combination of commercial 
efforts and resources nationalism. The implications for Japan 
are particularly serious in light of widespread use of wood in 
the housing industry. Cartels in other materials, such as 

copper or bauxite, are cause for concern, but will not be as 

65 
serious as OPEC. 

(3) Avoidance of Isolation 

One of Japan's greatest fears is economic isolation through 
the erection of tariff barriers, nationalism, cartels, or other 
measures. The increasing trade liberalization within Japan 
itself offers some potential for counter-leverage, but she can 
hardly afford to exercise it vigorously. More characteristic is 



G 7 ) 

^Robert L. Johnson, Mobil Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, inter- 
view, July 23, 1974. 

^Forestry White Paper, 1974* Reported in Yomiuri, April 
13, 1974. 

-^See the debate begun by C. Fred Bergsten's "The Threat 
from the Third World," Forei/yn Policy , 11 (Summer 1973) and 
continued over several issues of that journal. 



185 



C\J 

I 



•H 




36 PETROLEUM NEWS SEA.. DECEM3ER 1973 



186 



the diversification of resource suppliers and recent overtures 
towards the Third World. While this may reduce the risk of over- 
dependence on any one region, it also may bring Japan into con- 
flicting relationships, particularly if she maintains her 
security ties with the U.S. For example, TSkyC's continued 
reluctance to commit herself to cooperative oil consumption plans 
eventually may force her into the choice between restricted 
energy supplies or restricted access to U.S. or European markets. 

( 4) Maintenance of Markets 

Other measures for the maintenance of markets (see Tables 
5-2 and 5 - 3) require both foreign and domestic efforts. 
Japanese competitiveness has been hurt by her own inflation and 
the 1974 round of wage hikes which averaged 30 percent. The 
damage has been particularly evident in the sale of industrial 
plants which was one of the keys to the future restructuring of 
the economy. Especially since mid-1 97 4 > U.S. and European firms 
have won contracts over Japanese firms from Southeast Asia to the 
Middle East. It is likely that the future will see more efforts 
to concentrate in technologically- intensive industries to maxi- 
mize competitiveness, but the experience gained in petrochemicals, 
steel and other heavy industries cannot be redirected easily. 
Most recent studies have been quite pessimistic, especially for 
the next two to three years. 



See Naraiki Nobuyoshi, "Japanese Industry's Competitive 
Power Examined," Economist , July 2, 1974* (Translation in 



187 



Joint ventures have been an important means of securing 
host country cooperation. Recently, however, even this approach 
has been challenged. One factor has been a general increase in 
nationalism, but the aggressive tactics of Japanese businessmen 
also have brought ill-will and charges of exploitation. It has 
been widely recognized that such concentration on short- run 
profits and their rapid repatriation is completely antithetical 
to Japan's broader interests. Nevertheless, the changes to date 
have been more cosmetic than substantive. 

In the long term, Japan's exports and investments will have 
to satisfy increasingly strict criteria of benefit to the 
recipients. Technological assistance, or the programmed phase- 
out of Japan's participation in joint ventures may become pre- 
requisites for entrance into future markets, at least in those 
states with enough resources to be able to bargain. 

Domestic Measures 

( 1 ) Inflation Countermeasures, Indus t rial Restructuring 
and Pollution Control 

International measures alone will not suffice if present 
domestic trends continue in Japan. The 1 975 — 74 inflation rate 
of 24 percent was one of the highest in the industrialized world, 
and it certainly was not helped by the Spring 1974 round of wage 



Magazine Summary , July 1 974) • Also Asahi , September 17, 1 974> 
p. 9, and the report by the Mitsubish General Research Institute, 
"Rise in Costs and Prospects for International Competitive 
Power," August 15, 1974. 



188 



increases. Opinion polls have shown this to be the primary issue 
in the public's mind. Another problem concerns the social 

capital structure, which is inadequate — only 21 percent of the 

67 
roads are paved, for instance. Pollution is among the worst 

in the world. Buffers against food and resource shortages will 
be needed. Finally, the economy must be restructured to take 
into account not only the physical limits of present day Japan, 
but also the future international climate. 

Recognition of these problems led to sporadic demands for 
a modification of the goal of unimpeded economic growth in the 
late 1960s and early 70s. The need for a revision of the indus- 
trial structure itself finally was acknowledged in 1971 » when 
the Industrial Structure Deliberation Committee produced a docu- 
ment entitled "Trade and Industrial Policies in the 1970' s." 
This proposed a concentration on knowledge-intensive industries 
and marked a drastic shift away from the heavy and chemical 
industries which had formed the basis of the "Economic Miracle" 
of the 1960s. It was on the crest of this new wave of thinking 

that Prime Minister Tanaka launched his vaunted proposal for 

69 
remodeling the Japanese Archipelago. 



'Hational Police Agency , 1973 White Paper. By comparison, 
the U.S. figure is about 43/o. Similarly, only about 9.2/o of 
Japanese houses have flush toilets — roughly on a par with Jordan 
and Nepal . 

68 Toky5, May 1971. 

"Note that the heart of Tanaka' s plan— regional 



189 



Little progress was made in this direction, however, until 
the oil crisis refocused attention on the impossibility of main- 
taining the status quo . Accordingly, in July 1 974> MITI sub- 
mitted a more comprehensive report which called for emphasis on 
the aircraft and computer indus tries, somewhat reduced economic 
growth and diversification of secondary industrial sites. The 
net result was to be a reduction in resource imports, improve- 
ments in the social capital structure, an easing of pollution 
and population dispersal. It remains to be seen how workable 
this particular plan is, but the general direction is one in 
which Japan will have to move. 

(2) Stockpiles 

In the wake of the oil crisis, the decision was made to 
build up petroleum stocks from 60 to 90 days by 1980. This will 
entail tremendous capital investments. In addition to storage 
facilities, a three month supply of crude oil at $10.00 per 



development — had been proposed ten years earlier in a MITI paper 
entitled Industrial Location in Japan (Tokyo, 1962). 

70 

There have been several criticisms of the report, not the 

least of which were that it predicted: (a) a 7 to 6 percent real 

growth rate annually between 1975 and 1985, ( b) a $10 billion 

balance of payments surplus by 1980 and (c) an average inflation 

rate of 7-8/0 between 1873 and 1980 (the 1973~74 rate was about 

2470). Furthermore, its vaunted reduction in petroleum as an 

imported energy source is nearly matched by the rise in imported 

LNG. (See, for instance, Sankei and TSkyg Shimbun editorials, 

July 12, 1974. Kenneth R. Stunkel offers considerable evidence 

that the Japanese environment could not support the plan even if 

it was fulfilled. See below, Chapter Seven. 



190 



barrel is worth some $4,500,000,000. Furthermore, some 2000 
additional hectares of land will be needed for storage. In 
October 1974, MITT recommended ¥1,700 billion (about $5-7 billion) 

for this program over a five year period. The measure must be 

71 

approved by the Diet. 

Japan's effective reserves are, in fact, somewhat larger 
than officially stated. For instance, the oil in tankers already 
enroute from the Persian Gulf, on their 20 day voyage to Japan 

may be considered part of her stockpile under some circum- 

72 

stances. In addition, the huge central terminal storage (CTS) 

to be built in Indonesia (and perhaps in Thailand) will provide 
a buffer against sudden supply interruptions. However, it is the 
policy of the Japanese government only to consider as stockpiles 
those supplies which are actually under national control. Even 
during the 1974 oil shortage, in fact, they rejected a proposal 
by western oil companies to set up so-called off-shore reserves 

in foreign countries in order to alleviate the high cost of 

73 

establishing such facilities in Japan itself. Whether or not 

they will be able to continue this policy in the face of the 
local opposition to the Okinawa CTS (and presumably to those 



71 

Niho n KPfyo , September 5, 1974« 

Moreover, the speed of the ships can be varied if neces- 
sary to compensate for domestic supply-demand conditions. This 
was done in September 1974, when the tankers were slowed down in 
response to surplus stocks. 

'^Robert L. Johnson, Mobil Sekiyu, interview, July 23, 1974* 

\ihpn Keizai , September 27, 1974, P» 3» 



191 



storages associated with the 90 day reserves as well) remains to 
be seen. 

In late 1 974» decisions also were made to establish stock- 

75 

piles for lumber and non-ferrous metals. 

Preservation of the Political Autonomy/independence 

This is, of course, closely related to the degree of physi- 
cal and economic security that Japan can muster. Some would 
charge that, in fact, Japan already is so close to the United 
States as to be unable to move independently. It is not clear, 
however, that Tokyo could be more flexible should it disassociate 
itself from Washington. Certainly there would not be much more 
freedom in ties with Moscow. Some of the problems of alliances 
with other states or neutrality will be discussed in later 
chapters. 

All Japanese feel the country's resource poverty and over- 
population. Moreover, there is general recognition that these 
cannot be overcome unilaterally. Thus the problem again becomes 
one of avoiding isolation. This is a frequent press theme when- 
ever international negotiations arise, for instance at the Caracas 

76 
Lav/ of the Sea Conference, or at the time of the oil crisis. 



75 Ibid., September 11, 1974, P» 3« 

"Japan is now completely isolated" (in her opposition to 
200 mile economic zones), Japan Times , July 24, 1974- This was 
a very interesting position, and one which bodes ill for future 
Japanese diplomatic efforts should it become commonplace. 



192 



Contributions to the Development of the International System 

The first step in this process, obviously, is the determi- 
nation of what Japan's role should be. It is widely felt that, 
over the long run, something more satisfying than "Japan, Inc.," 
or the "economic animal" must be found. Proposals have ranged 
from becoming a benevolent friend of developing countries to a 
reassertion of Japan's prewar spirituality, but no consensus has 
yet developed. A few of the alternatives will be examined in 
Chapter Seven. 

In the long run, the most likely threats to Japan's 
security probably will come from the world-wide maldistribution 
of resources and wealth. Japan is a status quo power, in a world 
where the status quo rapidly is changing. Despite the fact that 
she is Asian she also is industrialized power, and this image 
will dominate. The December 1973 attack on Singapore's Pulau 
Bunom refinery complex already has been noted as a part of a 

global offensive by the Japanese Red Army and the PFLP against 

77 
"Japanese Imperialism." Such an approach may ha.ve only margi- 

nal value in inducing "armed revolution in Tokyo," but it 
certainly can have a major impact on governments and multi- 
national corporations. Moreover, with the proliferation of 
fissionable materials, the eventual likelihood of terrorism via 



77 

See above, no te 4-10. 

78— 

Ota's phrase, ibid . 



193 



nuclear weapons in the developed countries themselves has 
increased. 

There is probably little that Japan can do alone to reduce 
its status as a target for such groups. Defenses might be 
bolstered around strategic installations, intelligence services 
improved, and ports of entry checked more closely, but these will 
neither deter nor detect truly determined adversaries. Despite 
the fact that there always will be violently dissident minorities, 
however, it still will be in the nation's long run interests to 
promote the developing countries' stake in the international 
system. The alternative would leave some of them in the position 

where they could only gain by trying to bring it down. Already 

79 
there has been official recognition of this fact, but it 

remains to be seen what the actual impact will be on Japan's 

diplomatic and economic activities. 

Several volumes could have been devoted to each of the 

interests which this chapter has attempted to summarize. The 

emphasis has been on existing conditions, however some possible 

changes will be examined later in relation to Japan's seapower. 

The next two chapters will return to the ocean setting with a 

review of the Maritime Self- Defense Force and its possible future. 



^For instance, Prime Minister Tanaka's September 28, 1974 
press conference. 



Chapter Six 

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE 
AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON ITS DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 



The Current Status of the MSDF 



In mid-1974, the Maritime Self- Defense Force was composed 
as follows: 

Table 6-1 





Fleet Strength 




Type Ship 


Number (Build: 


ing) 


Tonnage (Building) 


Destroyers/Frigates 


45 (5) 
14 (2) 




85,550 (12,960) 
19,810 ( 5,700) 


Submarines 




Minecraft 


50 (6) 




18,789 ( 1,626) 


Subchasers & Torpedo 
Amphibious Ships 


Boats 25 (1) 
6 (2) 




8,180 ( 100) 
8,650 ( 3,480) 


Service Forces 


18 (0) 
61 (0) 




21,997 (0) 

2,528 (0) 


Misc. Small Craft 





219 (16) 



Fleet Air Arm 



166,254 (21,866) 



1 2 Anti-submarine Squadrons 
5 Air Training Squadrons 
1 Transport Squadron 

Approximately 200 Aircraft 

Source: Sobi Henkan '73, Jane ' s Fighting Ships 1974~75 



In English, in addition to works already cited, see James 
H. Buck, "The Japanese Self -Defense Force," Naval War College 
Review , XXVI (January-February 1974), PP» 40-54; Sekino Hideo, 
"Japan and Her Maritime Defense," PS NIP t XCVII (May 1971), 



194 



195 



Each ship is assigned a homeport in one of the five 
Regional District Commands (see Figures 6-1 and 6-2), which are 
responsible for the personnel administration, repair and mainte- 
nance of their ships, as well as logistics support to the fleet 
in general. Although some units are permanently attached to the 
Districts, the majority of combatant vessels and aircraft are 
included in the organization of the Self -Defense Fleet. Roughly 

45 percent of the MSDF's 38,325 personnel were assigned to these 

2 

ships. Another 26 percent were with the fleet air squadrons. 

In time of emergency and when otherwise directed by the Director 
General of the JDA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet will 

assume operational control over all forces. 

Japan's naval power lias been developed, since 1 957> through 
a series of four Defense Power Consolidation Programs which are 
summarized in Table 6-2. Although the current plan (the fourth) 



pp. 93-121; and Uchida Kazutomi, "The Rearmament of the Japanese 
Maritime Forces," Naval V/ar College Review , XXVI (November- 
December 1 973) y PP« 41-48. An analysis which stresses strength, 
rather than weakness, is contained in Herbert P. Bix, "Report on 
Japan 1972. Part One: The Military Dimension," Bulletin of Con- 
cerned Asian Scholars (hereafter BCAS), IV (7/2), pp. 22-32. The 
writings in Japanese are voluminous. Note especially the on- 
going debate between Sekino Hideo and Kaihara Osamu. The Jietai 
Sobi Nenkan (Self-Defense Force Equipment Yearbook) (Tokyo: 
Asagumo Shimbunsha, annual), is a convenient reference. The 
excellent magazine Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World) provides 
particularly good coverage of the MSDF. It also is one of the 
finest publications in any language on current naval developments 
world-wide . 

2 

The combined complements of the MSDF ships listed in 

Table 6-2 is slightly over 17,000. According to the JDA, 
10,100 were assigned to the aircraft squadrons. 



196 



Figure 6-1 



Organization of the Maritime Self-Defense Fore* 
as of April 1, 1971 

JDA Director General 

of Mar ft! r 



Chief 






lme Staff 



Maritime Staff Offlc* 



Self 

-Defense- 
Fleet 



— Self Defense Fleet Headquarters (Tokosuka) 

Fleet Escort Force Headquarters 
(YoVosuka) 

- 1st Escort Flotilla 
— Escort Divisions 

Fleet ]- 2nd Escort Flotilla 

— Escort --Escort Divisions 

Force \~ 3rd Escort Flotilla 

--Escort Divisions 

- 4th Escort Flotilla 
--Escort Divisions 

- Other Units under Direct Command 



- Fleet Air Force Headquarters (Shonan Town, 
Higashi-Katsushika-Gun, Chiba Prefecture) 

- 1st Air Wing (Kanoya City) 

- 2nd Air Wing (Hachlnohe City) 

- 3rd Air Wing (Tokushima City) 

- 4th Air Wing (Shonan Town, Higashi-Katsushika-Gun, Chiba 
Prefecture) 

- 21st Air Wing (Tateyama City) 

- 51st Flight Squadron (Shonan Town, Higashi- 
Katsushika-Gun, Chiba Prefecture) 



Fleet 
-Air — 
Force 



— 1st Minesweeper FlotiUa 

--Minesweeper Divisions 

— 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla 
--Minesweeper Divisions 

— 1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure) 

— Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka) 
--Fleet Training Groups 

—Other Units under Direct Command 
Yokosuka Regional District 

Typical Regional Districts 

includes: 
Headquarters 
Escort Units 
Patrol Units 
Subchaser Units 
Minesweeper Units 
Torpedo Boat Units 
Landing Craft Units 
Local Bases 
Air Stations 



Kure Regional District 
Sasebo Regional District 
Maizuru Regional District 
Omlnato Regional District 



Source: Auer, p. 106. 



196a 



Figure 6-1 (c*mt) 



Organlratlon of the Maritime Sell-Defense Fore* 
a. o! April 1, 1971 

JDA Director General 

Chief of Maritime Stall " 

Maritime Stili Olflc* 



Alx 

--Training- 
Co mmand 



Recruit Training Cenlei 
Communications Station 
Base Oper. and AcUy. 
Base Aclly. Onlt 
Base Oper. Onlt 

I — Headijiiarters, Air Training Command (Uts-unornij-a) 

Kanoya Air Training Group 
— Utsunomlya Air Training Group 
— OzuW Alx Training Group (ShlmODOSeld) 

Other Units under Direct Command 
- MSDF Staff College {Sh!njuku-Vu, Tokyo) 

■ MSDF Officer Candidate Schcol (HTtaJima Town, Akl-Gun, Hiroshima 

Prefecture) 

■ MSDF 1st Service School (Etajlma Town, AJd-Ojn, Hiroshima Pre- 

fecture) 

■ MSDF 2nd Service School (Yokosuka) 

• MSDF 3rd Service School (Shona_n Town, Hi£ashi-Katsushika-Giin, Chiba 
Prefecture) 
MSDF Youth Basic Service School (Etajlma Town, Aki-Cun, Hiroshima Prefec- 
ture) 
MSDF Yokosuka Hospital (Yokosuka) 

MSDF Etajima Hospital (Etajlma Town, Aid-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture) 

MSDF Maizuru Hospital (Maizuru) ' 

MSDF Ominalo Hospital (Mutsu) 

Other Units under the Director General's Direct Command 

Miscellaneous Ur.its including; 

Central Communications Center 

Oceanographic Unit 

Print Supply Unit 

MSDF Intelligence Service Unit 

Operational De\elopment Croup 

MSDF Shore Folice Command 

Supply Demand Control Point 

MSDF Tokyo Band 

MSDF Tokyo Service Activity 



Source: Japan Defense Agency. 

Auer, p. 107* 



197 



Figure 6-2 



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has been severely undermined by inflation and several other 

factors, the eventual target of a 280,000 ton fleet has not been 

officially repudiated. 

As noted in Chapter Five, the mission for which the MSDF 

is to prepare itself remains imprecise. The maritime goal of 

the Fourth Defense Plan however is: 

To improve defense capabilities in the sea areas 
around Japan and the ability to ensure the safety 
of the sealines.3 

In the "sea areas around Japan" the focus is on invasion 
defense. Never officially defined, their width has been taken 
to be about 200-300 nautical miles (kairi ) in the Pacific, and 
100-200 miles in the Sea of Japan. Sealane protection has con- 
centrated on the southeast and southwest route zones. These 
corridors, extending roughly 1,000 miles in each direction, run 
south from Tokyo along the islands of the Nampo Shoto, Bonin and 
Kazan Ret to on the one hand, and southwest from Osaka along the 



"Japan's Fourth Five Year Defense Plan," _op_. cit . (note 
5~37)> p« 5« There is some ambiguity in this statement. The 
official translation reads: 

to improve defense capabilities in the sea areas 
around Japan and the ability to ensure the safety 
of the sealines in those areas , [emphasis supplied] 

The Japanese text is subject to both interpretations. Critics 
of a blue water role for the MSDF choose the latter meaning, since 
it admits only the protection of coastal shipping. MSDF 
officials, however, steadfastly maintain that the "safety of the 
sealine" mission extends beyond the "sea areas around Japan." 

Tokyo Simbun, May 24, 1973, and Mainichi, September 20, 
1973. 



201 



Ryukyus on the other. (See Figure 6-3.) Should fixed hydro- 
phone arrays be developed for initial contacts, the protection 
of convoys could be improved by coordinating acoustic data with 
anti-submarine aircraft from the island bases. In this way an 
effective escort might be extended at least as far as Taiwan and 
the Marianas. 

Aside from submarines and the few PT boats, little atten- 
tion apparently has been given to the role of the MSDF in invasion 
defense. This is understandable, given the improbability of the 
event and the preference of naval officers for offshore operations. 
Nonetheless, the ocean escorts which comprise the bulk of the 
naval firepower are ill-suited to operations in restricted waters 
in the face of an even moderate air threat. 

One area in which the MSDF is well equipped, however, is 
mine warfare, particularly mine sweeping. This is prudent, for 
Japan is uniquely vulnerable to the interdiction of her water- 
borne domestic transportation by minefields. This somewhat 
uninspiring field of warfare consistently has received inadequate 

attention, only to play a major part in most of the naval conflicts 

7 

of the century. Already returned to the "back burner" after the 



•'ibid. Also Tokyo Shimbun , July 2, 1973* One of the 
islands to be used as a base is Iwo Jima. 

Indeed, minesweeping was central to the development of 
postwar Japan's maritime forces. See Auer, _op_* cit . (note 5-34) > 
passim , especially pp. 49 - 89 • 

n 

To cite but a few examples, the irreparable Russian loss 



202 



Figure 6-5 




THE SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST ROUTE ZONES 



203 



dramatic demonstration of their potential in Haiphong, mines are 
certain to reassert their importance in connection with the 
growing controversies over strategic straits. 

Much of the peacetime work of protecting the safety of life 
at sea is assigned to the 327 ships and 11,000 men of the Mari- 
time Safety Agency (MSA — the Japanese Coast Guard). 

Despite the lack of guidance, the leaders of the MSDF have 
built up an impressive array of ships. Their "blue water" con- 
ventional forces are exceeded only by the U.S. and USSR in Asia 
and, on paper at least, may be sufficient to rank Japan behind 
France and Britain as the world's fifth naval power. Such a 
comparison is presented in Table 6-3« One purpose of this and 
later chapters will be to illustrate that such macro- analyses of 
military strength usually conceal more than they illuminate. But 
the fact remains that the very size of Japan's fleet, and the 
economic potential behind it, can be manipulated to her disadvan- 
tage. This is particularly true among the still-suspicious 

Q 

peoples of the 7/estern Pacific. 



of Admiral Makarov when his flagship was mined in 1904> the 
North Sea mine barrage of 1 918> the mining of Japanese home 
waters from March 1945 which thereafter crippled the economy even 
more effectively than the U.S. submarine campaign, the Corfu 
Channel incident of 1946, North Korea's denial of control of the 
seas to the U.S. Navy off Wonsan in October 1950, and the closure 
of North Vietnam's ports and inland waterways in 1972. 

8 Halliday and LIcCormick, op_. cit. (note 5-27) » state: "By 
1975, Japan will be the mightiest non-nuclear power in the world" 
(p. 89). Bisson, in his review, op_. cit . (note 5-1 3) ? comments: 
"that Japan is a weak military power is a widely accepted myth, 
but the facts are otherwise." 



204 



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205 



For all its apparent strength the Maritime Self- Defense 
Force operates under a number of severe constraints, both domes- 
tic and international. Some of these limit the freedom with 
which existing ships can be employed, others hinder the develop- 
ment of the SDF in general. In any case, in combination, they 
are sufficient to offset many of the MSDF's apparent strengths. 
The present constraints will be summarized below, and their 
possible evolution examined in Chapter Nine. It should be noted, 
however, that several are deeply- rooted, and will not be easily 
changed (for better or for worse). 

Domestic Constraints 

Constitutional-Political 

As noted in Chapter Five, Article 9 of the Constitution is 
central to most debates over Japan's security. The controversy 
has focused on two points: (1) are the Self -Defense Forces them- 
selves "war potential" and hence unconstitutional, and (2) at 
what level of capability do the SDF become "war potential"? 
Since the courts so far have refused to rule on the first 
question, the opposition arguments of inherent unconstitutionality 



"The Supreme Court upheld Japan's sovereign right of self- 
defense in the 1959 Sunakawa decision, but did not rule on the 
constitutionality of the SDF themselves. In September 1975 a 
Hokkaido Judge in the Naganuma case held that the SDF are land, 
sea and air forces "in view of their scale, equipment and capaci- 
ties," and are unconstitutional. This is being appealed to the 
Supreme Court, where it probably will be overturned on the 



206 



have "been kept alive, although there are differences between 
the parties. On the other hand, the absence of a definitive 
interpretation on prohibition has permitted the Government to 
preserve and expand the SDF. 

The dispatch of forces overseas has been prohibited not 
only on a constitutional basis, but also as a result of a House 
of Councillors resolution at the time of the creation of the SDF 
in 1954* In addition to limiting Japan's ability to comply with 
collective security agreements, the restriction has precluded her 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Though the oppo- 
sition parties have been quick to question any statement which 
might indicate a change on this position, the government has not 
pressed the issue. 

The net result has been to focus attention on the design 
of specific weapons systems and, in recent years, the total pro- 
curement levels. One debate centered on the mid-air refueling 
system of the F-4 fighter. Charges were made that such a 



grounds that the determination of SDF equipment is a political 
decision outside of the competence of the judiciary. See Ninon 
Keizai , September 8, 1973, and Tokyo Shimbun , September 8, 1 973 • 
The government opinion was in Yomiuri , October 2, 1973* 

10 

U.S. hints for greater Japanese participation in Asian 

security have been embarrassing in this regard, as was Lee Kuan 

Yew's 1973 call for Japanese units in a multinational task force 

in Southeast Asian waters. For a recent denial of overseas 

dispatch intentions, see Defense Agency Director General 

Yamanaka's Diet Remarks in Asagumo , May 30, 1 974- It should be 

noted, however, that an IvISDF training squadron is permitted to 

visit foreign ports every year. 



207 



capability would enable the aircraft to be used in offensive 
roles since its range would be increased. The government, which 

had plated over the fuel ducts prior to the controversy, now was 

11 
forced to remove the associated piping entirely. Another 

objection was that a newly proposed anti-submarine escort group 

' 12 
should not be designated as a "hunter-killer unit" in peacetime. 

Finally, there was the Diet member who questioned whether or not 

a new conventional submarine could be converted into a nuclear 

one simply by the insertion of a reactor. 

This relatively low level of inquiry, however, still has 

resulted in serious restrictions on the development of the SDF. 

One of the most significant developments was the "limits to 

defense power in peacetime" controversy in early 1973* Although 

defense spending consistently has been less than one percent of 

GNP, the tremendous growth of Japan's economy had given her the 

tenth largest military budget in the world by 1971 > and could 

have driven it to sixth or seventh place by the end of the Fourth 

Defense Plan. Moreover, though the defense buildup was expected 



11 Mainichi , March 21, 1973; Sankei, (eve) April 10, 1973- 

1 ? 

Yasui Yoshinori, Japan Socialist Party (JSP), in Lower 

House Budget Committee interpellations, February 5, 1973* 

^Narazaki Yanosuke (JSP), in Lower House Budget Committee 
interpellations, February 7, 1974. Reported in Asahi , February 
8, 1974- 

^Compared with 2.&/o in West Germany and 3.7$ in Sweden in 
1971. 



208 



to be completed by 1981 with the conclusion of the Fifth Program, 
the lack of specific planning guidance and seemingly limitless 
economic expansion led to calls in the early 1970s for the 
establishment of a firm upper limit on the size of the SDF. 
This also, it should be recalled, came soon after a period of 
widespread warnings of the revival of Japanese militarism and 
a spate of predictions of Japan's future as a superpower. The 
result was an effective freeze on the quantity of SDF equipment 

at Fourth Defense Program targets (except for naval vessels) but 

15 
with few controls on future qualitative advances. 

Closely related to the political climate is public opinion 

which, at best, is ambiguous about the SDF. Although public 

acceptance has grown since their formation, there is no strong 

pressure for their expansion. Moreover, any attempt at overseas 

deployments almost certainly would be vigorously 



15 / 

See the Defense Agency "view" (to avoid involvement of 

the cabinet-level National Defense Council) of January 26, 1973> 

and the succeeding debate through early February. The final ' 

Program was: 

GSDF: 5 Area Armies; 13 divisions, 180,000 men 

MSDF: 5 Regional Units; 4~5 escort Flotillas, 280,000 

tons of ships (vs 4 Flotillas and 214,000 tons 

under the 4th Defense Plan) 
ASDF: 3 Regional Air Defense Forces (8 wings); 1 composite 

air wing, about 800 aircraft (vs about 770 under the 

4th Defense Plan) 

16 

Emmerson, op. cit. (note 5-33) » indicates that support 

for the SDF rose from 58? in 1956 opinion polls to 75$ in 1969 
(p. 118). A survey taken right after the Nagamuna verdict showed 
a 58-1 Qfo margin for the SDF with 245S undecided. (Sankei , Septem- 
ber 15, 1973). 



209 



17 
opposed. In part, this stems from the generally homogeneous, 

skeptical attitude of the media towards defense. A high literacy 

1 8 
rate, the huge circulations of the three major newspapers, and 

a vast television audience makes the Japanese public particularly 
susceptible to such pressures. The corollary, of course, is that 
should the media's stance change, the public's could quickly 
follow. 

Another aspect of public opinion, which is particularly 
difficult for the ASDF and GSDF, is local opposition to bases. 
Such objections usually stem either from the nuisance effects 
and peripheral dangers of military operations (aircraft noise, 
unexploded shells, etc.) or from the feeling that the large land 
areas could be better used in such a crowded country. Except for 
the air squadrons, the MSDF is relatively immune to such pres- 
sures, but it is affected insofar as such controversies reflect 
negatively on the SDF (and the U.S. military presence) in general. 



17 
Taoka, _op_. cit . (note 5-1 1)i notes that Hideyoshi's 

abortive Korean campaign, the subsequent 250 years of isolation 

and domestic tranquillity, and the following era of imperial 

expansion and foreign wars have meant that "in the Japanese 

language 'war' is now almost synonymous to 'expedition' in 

nuance." Thus the concept of defensive wars and overseas 

deployments in stabilizing or peacekeeping roles is inconsistent 

with their historical experience. Whether or not these qualms 

also would apply to extensions of Japan's claims to heretofore 

uncertain territories, such as broader ocean resource zones or 

some of the East China Sea islets, is not clear. 

1 ft 

The Asahi, IJainichi and Yomiuri morning circulations each 

exceed four and a half million, compared with 2-3 million for the 

largest U.S. daily (The New York Daily News). Moreover, the 

Japanese papers are nationally distributed, thus reducing the 

influence of local journals. 



210 



Bureaucratic 

The Defense Agency is hampered in the intra- governmental 
power struggle by its bureaucratic weakness. As an agency 
located within the Prime Minister's office, it is one level below 
the twelve ministries on the organizational ladder. In itself, 
this is not critical. The National Police Agency is very strong, 
some ministries are weak. However, the Defense Agency has 
acquired a reputation for a lack of political influence over the 
years. Furthermore, many of its important functions are performed 

by personnel on loan, notably from the Police Agency, MIT I and 

19 
the Finance Ministry. Since their loyalty is to their parent 

organization rather than to the Agency, the latter' s autonomy is 

undermined further. 

Another problem is the fief-like nature of the Japanese 

20 
bureaucracy. In a recent example, centering on the Caracas 

negotiations, the Transportation Ministry and Defense Agency 

virtually stopped communications over the issue of free transit 



1 Q 

Hughes, op_. eft. (note 5~34) > contains a detailed 

description of the way in which this has affected the Air Self 
Defense Force. 

20 

In the weeks prior to the Caracas conference, a search 

was made for a suitable ministry/cabinet level delegate. The 
infighting became so intense that a Foreign Ministry spokesman 
remarked: "Regardless of whoever is dispatched, it is hoped 
that he will rise above the government office under his juris- 
diction and that he will work as a state minister of Japan." 
Ninon Keizai , June 19, 1974. This problem, of course, is not 
unique to Japan. 



211 



21 

through international straits. This lack of coordination is 

further evidenced by the fact that no contingency plans for 
naval control of shipping in war time have been developed — 

despite the lessons of two World Wars that such authority is 

22 

essential to the survival of an island state. Finally, this 

communications gap will seriously hamper efforts to develop, 
much less install, containerized weapon and point defense systems 
for merchantmen. (See Chapters Eight and Nine.) 

Economic and Industrial 

Soon after the limits of defense power debates, there was 
talk of shifting the appropriations basis from a five-year pro- 
gram to an annual "rolling budget" following the end of the 

23 

Fourth Consolidation Plan ( 1 97 7 ) - As price hikes and personnel 

costs pushed the 4th Program's 4»630 billion year budget towards 
6 trillion, fewer references to the Fifth Program were heard, if 
only because announcements of year by year outlays would be less 
provocative than that of a huge sum for a five year 



21 - - 

Tokyo Shimbun (eve), June 12, 1974 and Nihon Keizai , June 

19» 1 974* In an interesting variation from the Pentagon's 
stance, the Defense Agency called for a straits regime of inno- 
cent passage, largely because it did not want to grant the 
Soviets free access through Tsugaru Strait. The Transportation 
Ministry, on the other hand, sought to avoid possible restric- 
tions on supertankers. 

22 

See Eehrens, op. cit . (note 1-55) » P» 9» ?° r tne British 

case in both wars, and USSBS, The War Against Japanese Transpor - 
tation , 1941-1945 , op . cit . (note 1-55) » -for the Japanese 
experience . 



^Nihon Keizai , June 16, 1973. 



212 



package. Throughout 1974, each successive month's inflation 
brought further reduction in Fourth Defense Plan targets. "* At 
the same time, the MSDF peacetime limits of 280,000 tons and the 

use of military power itself as the basis of national security 

26 

policy also were called into question. 

The current inflation, however, only compounded a number 



^Pokyo Shimbun, March 14, 1974* Figures mentioned for the 
5th plan were 10 trillion yen ($36 billion at March 1974 exchange 
rates) — once again more than doubling the previous program. An 
interesting sidelight is that, although the Japanese name of the 
Defense Plan has not changed (Boei-Hyoku Seibi Keikaku ) , the 
Defense Agency^ English language publications referred to it as 
a "Build-up Plan" in 1971, while the 1973 materials used the 
less- suggestive term "consolidation plan." 

25 

First were douots about the fifth escort flotilla which 

the MSDF might have acquired under the 280,000 ton peacetime 
limits (Tokyo 1 Shimbun , March 2, 1974)* Then a proposal was made 
to reduce the quality of the equipment on the 10 ships programmed 
for FY1974 (the Japanese fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 
31), and construction of a landing ship (LST) had been deleted. 
(The contracts still had not been signed by August.) Moreover, 
the whole question of what constituted "necessary defense power" 
was under review ( Ninon Keizai , April 5, "1974) • The following 
month the Defense Agency Director General admitted that he had 
given up the idea of "achieving completely" the Fourth Defense 
Plan (Sankei , May 5)« Finally, in September, he stated that 
accomplishment of the plan now was "hopeless" ( Yomiuri , Septem- 
ber 7)- The extent of this escalation is indicated by the 
following cost estimates (JDA Data): 

(million yen) 
1974 1972 Percent Increase 

Helicopter Destroyer (DDH) 44,372 



Anti-Submarine Destroyer oc Q , n 
(DDK) 25 ' 83 ° 

Submarine (SS) 26,789 

2 6 Asahi , May 7, 1974, and Yomiuri , October 10, 1974- 



20,471 


116.8 


11,089 


132.9 


12,801 


121.7 



213 



of long*- standing problems in the defense industry. ' For years, 
military production in Japan has been relatively unprofitable. 

In a 1972-73 study by Keidanren, it was found that only in 11 of 

28 

293 defense projects were builders 1 costs below contract price. 

Most warship construction in particular was 10 to 30 percent 
above contract. In another study of 67 contractors, the busi- 
nesses averaged 7 percent losses on defense work. When asked 
why they accepted such orders and their likely unprofitability, 
the answers given in Table 6-4 resulted. 

In Fiscal 1972 (April 1972-March 1973), average costs were 
17.4 percent over budget, with warships running 46.6 percent. 
As noted above, the situation now has deteriorated even further. 

Quite apart from issues of profit, the complexity of modern 
warships also is a problem. The fact that they require construc- 
tion techniques which are markedly different (more labor- 
intensive) from those of the merchantmen in which Japanese 



27 

The 25-part series "Defense Industry in Japan," NKIW, 

July 4- December 19, 197 2 , is a good introduction in English. 
.Recent structural shifts were outlined on April 23, 1974, P» 12. 
Also Auer, op_. cit . (note 5~34) , chapter 13* For critical views 
(whose ominous predictions seem to have been premature), see 
Herbert P. Bix, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese 
Military- Indus trial Complex," BCAS, II (January 1972), pp. 30-53 
and Albert Axel bank, Black Star Over Japan (TOkyO: Charles E. 
Tuttle, 1973), PP. 29-45. 

28 

Keidanren, Boei Seisan I-inkai Jimukyoku (Defense Pro- 
duction Committee Secretariat), "Chotatsukaku no Jittai ni 
Kansuru Chosa Kenkyu Hokokusho" (investigative Research Heport 
Concerning the Realities of Procurement Costs) (So-called 
Kurosawa 2nd Report), 1973, provided by Keidanren, p. 4« Here- 
after Kurosawa Report . 



214 



Table 6-4 
COMPANY REASONS FOR ACCEPTING UNPROFITABLE 
DEFENSE CONTRACTS 



1. To support the Company's 
work scale 

2. Expectations of Techno- 
logical spin off 

3. Cooperation with National 
Defense Policy, not profit 

4. Expectations of Improving 
the Conditions for Receiving 
Future (Government) Business 

5. Had carried out preparation 
for production prior to 
(receipt of) contract 

6. Thoughts of Publicity from 
the equipment 

7 . Other 



#1 


Priority 


a 


Weighted 
Average 


17 


19 


10 


99 


2 


16 


13 


51 


16 


18 


13 


97 



33 

13 


5 



14 

14 

5 




17 

8 




130 

84 

14 
15 



Source: Kurosawa Report , p. 16 

Note: 1st priority = 3 pts., 2nd = 2 pts., 3rd = 1 pt, 



215 



shipyards have specialized makes them inherently less attractive 
to shipbuilders. The business incentives for defense production 
might increase if the economy continues to weaken but, without 
foreign sales, it is doubtful that such work could absorb more 
than a small fraction of Japan's industrial capacity. 

Closely related to the state of the defense industry is the 
issue of domestic production itself. This has been most hotly 
contested in the aircraft sector, and so has affected the MSDF 
mostly in the case of the PXL (new anti-submarine patrol plane) . 
The first post-war destroyers and frigates were completed by 

Japanese yards in 1956, and all construction has been domestic 

30 
since. The structural quality of the ships has won high 

31 
praise, and dependence on the U.S. for shipboard, weapon, 



29 

In any case the firms themselves are not counting on it. 

Medium and small manufacturers who have specialized in defense 
sub-contracting now are seeking' to diversify. (Ni hon Keizai , 
July 31 2nd August 2, 1974)* There are not that many. Defense 
production in Japan has accounted for about .4/° of industrial 
output in recent years. One survey of 83 firms engaged in such 
work showed that it accounted for less than 10$ of total business 
in 52 cases (64^). (NKIW , December 19, 1972). Foreign arms 
sales will be discussed in Chapter Nine but, in sum, the pros- 
pects for Japanese defense production (with the possible 
exception of the electronics sector) are not considered bright. 
Fusano Natsuki, Defense Production Committee of Keidanren , 
interview, August 6, 1974* See also Nihon Kei zai, May 16, 1 974- 
This is more a matter of policy and public opinion than of capa- 
bility, but the fact remains nonetheless. 

vVashington has transferred some U.S. -built ships and 
funded two Japanese-built destroyers, however. 

Although some regret that newer designs, such as the 
helicopter destroyer (DDIl) Haruna , have not been more innovative. 
Fukui Shizuo, interview, January 20, 1973* 



216 



sensor and communication systems has been steadily reduced. 
Indeed, defense electronics is one area where there is a hopeful 
outlook for expansion as an offshoot of the general economic 
shift to technologically- intensive industry. Nevertheless, 
given the interrelationship between air and sea power, the MSDF 

cannot really be considered independent so long as the ASDF is 

34 
not. At the same time, the scale of projected SDF aircraft 

demand hardly justifies domestic production, while the drain on 
currency reserves mitigates against foreign procurement. Thus 
the eventual decision could favor the curtailment of aircraft 
acquisition (which probably would be accompanied by calls for 
general defense spending limitations), an easing of the restric- 
tion on foreign sales (see Chapter Nine), or a concentration on 
missiles and technologically-advanced installable equipment. 
There also is the possibility that defense contracts could be 
used for economic "pump priming," but this does not seem likely. 



Nearly all l.ISDF equipments now are home-made, though 
they are compatible with American ammunition and, to a lesser 
extent, with U.S. spare parts. 

^NKIW, April 23, 1974, P- 12. 

XA 

One example of the dangers of relying on foreign 
weaponry was given in April 1 974, when the U.S. announced that 
it was phasing out its Nike-Hercules SAM system. Since Japan 
uses a similar missile there eventually will be difficulties in 
obtaining spare parts. However, domestic production of spares 
is unlikely since the missiles 1 1950s-vintage electronics con- 
tain vacuum tubes which are so outdated that Japanese firms are 
unwilling to make them. Asahi, April 4» 1974* 



217 



A further impact of inflation on the MSDF, of course, has 
been a reduction in operating time due to higher fuel costs. 

Manpower 

The Self-Defense Forces long have had recruiting and 
retention problems. In the short run, this situation may ease 
if the economy worsens. In the longer term, however, demographic 
forecasts predict a reduction in the size of the 18-25 age group 
from which the SDF (and industry) draw most of their recruits. 
These problems are compounded by anti-military sentiment and the 
low prestige of the Self-Defense Forces. Concern has been voiced 
about the quality of recent officer candidates. Further diffi- 
culties have been added by the restrictive measures placed on 
voting permits for SDF personnel by some local governments in 
the wake of the Naganuma decision. 

The MSDF has achieved more than 95 percent of its overall 
personnel target, but this figure is somewhat overstated since 

the manning levels of some critical shipboard rates are only 

56 
about 80 percent. As a result, both maintenance and 

operational proficiency have suffered. Shortages of fuel and 

airspace for training have compounded the difficulties. 



3S 

Asahi Evening New s, November 8, 1 97 3 • 

Figures cited by Kaihara Osamu, interview, March 24, 1974' 
The manning level issue actually is quite complicated, involving 
reserves, personnel away at schools or detached for new construc- 
tion units, and many other factors. Moreover, it is a problem 
faced by nearly all navies in one form or another. Nonetheless, 
it has affected the MSDF's operational readiness. 



218 



37 

Logistical 

Despite the impressive hardware which the S elf-Defense 
Forces operates, their logistics backup is woefully inadequate. 
For instance, ASDF interceptors have as few as four anti-air 
missiles per aircraft. The Ground Self Defense Forces have been 
estimated to have only about 30 minutes of combat stores. The 
MSDF surface-to-air missile inventory- consists of about 50 
weapons — which can be expended at a rate of more than 10 per 
minute. Moreover, there are few facilities in Japan capable of 
producing relatively sophisticated ammunition. Most of the 
missiles and artillery shells are supplied from the U.S. 

It must be noted, however, that this has been the result 
of a conscious decision on the part of SDF leaders. Since the 
beginning of the defense build-up, the emphasis has been on long 
lead-time items such as ships and aircraft. There would be 
enough warning, it is argued, to upgrade the logistics structure 
in the event of an increase in regional tensions or a divorce 
from the United States. This approach has served Japan well to 
date. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the warning 
time will be available, and whether or not her leaders will 
respond to it in time. 



57 

""Mostly from Auer, op. cit ., Chapter 14. 



* A study of 20th century wars by the Australian Central 
Studies Establishment concluded that the mean warning time has 
been about four years, but that there have been large variances. 
The Korean War, for instance, came with only about two days' 



219 



International Constraints 

Among the international constraints on Japanese seapower 
are the reactions of great powers and those of East Asian 
developing countries. The Arab view also has become a consider- 
ation since the oil crisis. 

Great Power Reactions 

Short of nuclearization it is difficult to see that the 
United States would have any objection to an increased share of 
the defense burden by Japan. The People's Republic of China, 
which once accused the S elf-Defense Forces of being the reincar- 
nation of Japanese militarism, now seems to view them as a 
stabilizing force, so long as they remain within the framework 
of the Security Treaty and confine themselves to local waters. 
Within these limits, she probably would have little objection to 
an expansion of Japanese naval forces. The Soviet Union is some- 
thing of an enigma. In 1971 and 72 it was bitterly attacking, 
along with the People's Republic, the prospect of renewed 
Japanese militarism. These attacks abated dramatically in the 
wake of the Nixon and Tanaka visits to Peking as Moscow sought 
to improve relations with TokyC and attract capital for Siberian 
development. Since increased Japanese naval power almost 
certainly would be directed against the USSR in time of war, 



notice to the West. Author's interview with CSE personnel, 
June 20, 1974. 



220 



she probably would not encourage an SDF buildup. However, if 
such a move were conducted in the framework of abolishing the 
Security-Treaty and the establishment of an Asian collective 
security system, it might be more welcome. 

Developing Country Reactions 

The results of the Southeast Asia interviews, noted in 
Chapter Four, were not surprising. With the exception of Singa- 
pore, which seeks security in a local balance between as many 
great powers as possible, the reaction of observers in all 
countries to a Japanese naval presence (even as part of a multi- 
lateral force) was overwhelmingly negative. These _a priori 
objections, however, do not imply an effective constraint. 
Should Japan unilaterally decide to expand her naval forces, and 
even the sphere of their employment, there would be very little 
that they could do about it. In an actual engagement, however, 
the SSMs of the coastal state patrol boats could be effective, 
particularly since MSDF ships are mainly ASW configured. 

Some Arab states have shown an interest in buying Japanese 
weaponry, although they are not likely to get it. Japan's own 
defense programs probably will have little influence on her 
Middle East diplomacy so long as her forces remain outside of 
the Indian Ocean. 



221 



Summary 

The use of ship or aircraft rosters as measures of Japan's 
military power and potential is misleading. For a host of 
reasons the MSDF is truly a "Paper Tiger." Even should the 
quantity and quality of its equipment expand markedly, the lack 
of national inclination to use such force would undercut its 
credibility, thus making attempts to use it even more dangerous. 
Projections of Western naval forces being used in support of 
diplomacy are difficult to extrapolate to present-day Japan. 
Such leverage implies a linkage between military force, economic 
power and political influence which is rarely voiced in TokyS. 
In fact, the Japanese Government consistently has sought to 
separate politics and economics in international negotiations. 
This has brought her a number of spectacular successes, such as 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking while 
increasing her trade with Taiwan. It is not clear, however, 
that this happy separation can be continued. Certainly it is 
hard to insist that food and oil are not both political and 
economic weapons. 

The potential evolution of the above mentioned constraints 
will be examined in the next chapter. For the present, however, 
the political-economic dichotomy is incompatible with the active 
use of seapower (or almost any power) to protect vital interests, 
since nearly all of the interests which Japan perceives as vital 
are economic. 



Chapter Seven 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERESTS AND CONSTRAINTS 

Intangible issues will be central to Japan's future mari- 
time posture (indeed to her whole security problem). Among these 
are (1) the possible emotional reaction to severe and prolonged 
economic difficulties, (2) the development of a consensus con- 
cerning Japan's future course, and (3) Japan's continued 
acceptance of a passive international role. Her reactions to 
the external environment also will be critical. This chapter 
will examine some of the domestic and international changes which 
may affect the acceptability and employment of the SDP in general 
and the MSDF in particular in the next few years. 

Domestic Issues 

An Uncertain Future 

So long as Japan's major political decisions involved the 
domestic division of an ever-growing economic pie, there was 
little incentive to change, or even to challenge the national 
course. There were unwanted side effects to be sure. Worsening 
pollution, urban overcrowding and a few clouds on the resource 
horizon had been apparent since the late 1960s. Indeed, by 1971 
or 72 there was widespread recognition that the economy would 



222 



223 



have to be reoriented from unimpeded growth towards social 

1 

welfare goals. Though the two Nixon shocks had shown the rate 

at which the world was changing, it always was felt that there 
would be time enough to make the transition. This comfortable 
vision was shattered in October 1973* 

The Japanese overreacted to the oil embargo and later price 
increases, as did most of the world. These sentiments moderated 
once it was clear that the country would not grind to a halt for 
lack of fuel or foreign currency. However, a more sober analysis 
has revealed other serious, long-term weaknesses — notably a 
combination of persistent inflation, a high debt- to- equity ratio 
for most Japanese firms (which makes them vulnerable to inflation 
countermeasures — even as they profited from the price rises 

themselves), the disappearance of cheap energy and transportation 

2 

and an ever worsening pollution problem. These are coupled with 

3 
an industrial structure which limits conservation possibilities. 

These difficulties are compounded by the weakened position of the 



i 
For instance, the 1971 report on "Trade and Industrial 

Policies in the 1970s,* 1 op_. cit . (note 5-68). It also is inter- 
esting to compare the changing tone of Keidanren President Uemura 
Kogoro's speeches as reprinted in Keidanren Review during this 
period. 

2 
See Donald Keene, "The Short, Happy Life of Japan as a 

Superpower," New York Times Magazine, March 3> 1 974» P» 1 9» 

^Japan has resisted Secretary Kissinger's pressures for a 
commitment to a J i l f/o energy consumption reduction on the grounds 
that Japan's energy usage is much more industrial than America's, 
thus there is less room for savings through consumer conservation 
measures. 



224 



ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which will find it hard 
to take the necessary strict, and thus unpopular, economic 
measures. 

In retrospect, the problems did not arise so suddenly. 
Japanese prosperity, throughout the 1960s, had fed, indeed 
thrived, on inflation. Thus, so long as real growth continued 
at 9 to 11 percent per year, there was little incentive to con- 
trol the inflation at an early stage. Even by early 1973, when 
prices were rising at an annual rate of about 13 percent, no 
effective measures were taken. 

Japan also profited from the U.S. efforts in Korea and 
Indochina, although they don't like to admit it. It is not yet 
clear what impact the end of the Vietnam War and the U.S. 
retrenchment will have on the future peace and stability of Asia. 
It is fairly evident, however, that it already has resulted in a 



The average annual increase of the consumer price index 
in the late 1960s and early '70s was about Gfo. The real cost of 
money thus was very cheap (a typical prime rate being around 
7.5?° — NKIW , October 28, 1972). 

5 
See Bix, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese 

Military-Industrial Complex," op. cit . (note 6-27), pp. 49 _ 50. 

In 1950-53* U.S. special payments to Japan totalled #2, 374*000, 

which was 50.3$ of her total exports for the same period. It 

has been estimated that direct Vietnam procurement between 1965 

and '67 was $450 million, and that indirect effects totalled 

nearly a billion dollars, (indirect effects stem from exports 

which satisfy war-generated excess demand either in the U.S. or 

in Asia.) This figure Y/as supported by a Nihon Keizai estimate 

that: "Realization of the peace in Vietnam is going to become a 

factor in causing a maximum yearly deficit of around $1 billion 

in Japan's balance of payments." (NKJW, November 21, 1973)* P» 2, 



225 



substantial financial loss to Japanese business. Farther 
afield, the so-called North-South problem has been apparent ever 
since the 1964 UNCTAD, if not before. The only really surprising 
development was the ability of OAPEC to act in concert. 

Whatever their origins, Japan's domestic weaknesses are 
likely to be compounded by the international situation. There 
are, for instance, signs that many countries may be adopting a 
neo-mercantilist outlook in place of the free-trade liberalism 
under which Japan has prospered. The most obvious effect is 
resources nationalism, now finding its way to the industrialized 
world as well. 

Paradoxically, Japan's commitment to unrestricted trade 
and inflation countermeasures may contribute to the world-wide 
recession to which she is so vulnerable. Though her own 1974 
export drive succeeded spectacularly in balancing the increased 
costs of raw materials, it has accentuated the same problem in 



The interpretation of this is left to the beholder. A 
radical critique may point to the ties between Japan and American 
imperialism. Others may see a welcome partnership in the pursuit 
of common goals. Still others may visualize unwarranted Japanese 
profits from the defense burdens of others. (A Republic of 
China naval officer, who requested anonymity, made the last 
observation in an interview, May 8, 1 974* ) In &h> r case, it is 
an economic fact of life. Whether or not such monetary gains 
alone would ensure Japan's support for future American military 
activities is doubtful, especially if such actions might subject 
her to resource cut-offs or terrorism. A billion dollars a 
year, after all, is less than ,j/o of GNP or 2fo of 1974 exports. 



226 



7 

many other countries. In the long run, this will be counter- 
productive since it eventually will reduce the demand for 
exports itself, or even stimulate trade barriers. By the same 
token, the domestic success of Japanese inflation countermeasures 
also will aggravate the balance of payments problems of those 
countries which will be drawn to import from her. 

The point is that Japan has become too important to the 
world's economy to allow her the luxury of unilateral measures, 
vulnerable though she may be in many ways. While she has no 
organization like the EEC to support her in times of stress, 
neither does she have such a body to encourage cooperative 
solutions. It would indeed be ironic if Japan's success at, and 
continued commitment to free trade once again brought her out of 
phase with her times, just as her imperialism was anachronistic 
in the 1930s and her isolation had grown untenable by the mid- 
nineteenth century. 

Signs which point to domestic disharmony and a lack of 



7 

This is a criticism of degree rather than of kind. Japan 

must export to survive. She also had to cope with a massive 
increase in oil payments. Thus a move to expand exports was 
understandable. The problem has stemmed from the decision to 
promote exports at the maximum possible level, rather than to 
accept a more moderate income (and possible payments deficit of 
her own) in consideration of the problems of her trading partners 
Japan, of course, can legitimately complain that her diligence 
and talent should not be penalized by the lack of others' 
competitiveness, but the problem remains nonetheless. 

Q 

Takane Masaaki, "Historical Structure of Japanese 
Bureaucracy — Bureaucracy and Modernization in Japan," Chuo Koron , 
September 1 974* Translation in Magazine Summary , October 1974* 



227 



g 

self-discipline and group identity among the young are on a 

different plane. Should these predictions be realized, they 
would undermine the very conditions which lay at the heart of 
the post-war prosperity. Another possibly significant develop- 
ment is the growth of citizens' groups, which have especially 
centered on environmental issues. Their importance lies in 
the complications which they have introduced into regional 
development and nuclear power plant plans. 

Given any sort of direction, the inherent talent, loyalty 
and homogeneity of the Japanese people will enable them to 
succeed wherever they are led. It is this problem of leadership, 
however, which is critical. There virtually is no group in 
Tokyo now capable of innovative political guidance. This is not 
a problem unique to Japan, but it may be more critical for her 
than for some other industrialized states because of her 
vulnerabi 1 i ty . 

The LDP has been losing votes for years. The July 1974 
elections were indicative of voter dissatisfaction, which only 
was compounded by the personal scandals which later surrounded 



9 Morita Akira (President of Sony) in NKT.7, May 28, 1974. 
Also, Prime Minister's Office, 1974 Y/hite Paper on Youths . 
Reported in MM, December 7» 1974* 

1 

Some have argued that these were spawned by weaknesses 

in the policy-making process and can be expected to increase in 

the future. See B. L. Simcock, "Environmental Pollution and the 

Citizen's Movements," Area Development in Japan _£ (T5ky3, 1972). 



228 



Prime Minister Tanaka. Whether or not future Prime Ministers 
can regain public confidence remains to be seen. But their 
success will depend on factors largely beyond their own control, 
such as the health of the U.S. economy and the cooperation of 
other faction leaders (who are also potential successors). 

One solution might be some sort of party realignment to 
permit the continuation of conservative government. Coalitions 
among the present parties are possible, but probably would be 
unstable. Though a revitalization of the LDP is doubtful without 
sweeping (and improbable) leadership changes, neither is any 
opposition party considered able to win a majority of its own. 
At the same time, the latter seem totally incapable of acting in 
concert. Thus several years of domestic political uncertainty 
may result. Under these circumstances, the possibility of a 
more authoritarian government must at least be considered. This 

requires some explanation. 

11 

Consensus is important to nearly all Japanese evolutions. 

The formation of such an outlook rarely is very rapid. In 
general, it is an incremental process, almost imperceptible at 
each step, but suddenly evident after seemingly endless wrangling 
(or drifting, since important parts of the sequence often are 
conducted out of the public view). In many cases, preparations 
will have been made for a number of contingencies while awaiting 



11 See Nakane Chie, Japanese Society (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1972). 



229 



clarification of the situation. Once an appropriate policy 

becomes apparent, control devolves to the group or faction best 

1 2 

suited to the circumstances, which then acts quickly. This is 

one reason why Japanese policy sometimes seems prone to radical 
shifts of direction. Such a consensus is not equivalent to 
unanimous support, but it does mean that the views of all groups 
at least have been considered. 

In any case, the success of Japanese business and the LDP 
(and conversely the failure of the opposition) has been the 
ability to achieve inter- group coordination. This was not very 
difficult when the parties concerned were competing for relatively 
larger or smaller shares of an expanding economy. Today, however, 
some vested interests are faced with the spectre of absolute 
losses. Under such circumstances, the very group-orientation 
which has been the strength of Japan's post-war recovery could 
become a detriment should intra-organizational loyalty preclude 
inter-organizational cooperation. This is especially true within 
the bureaucracy. 



12 

This approach also is the key to Japanese business 

practices. These usually are low-risk strategies, often pre- 
ferring to pay additional money for foreign patents or to invest 
in joint ventures rather than pioneer in new areas. The ocean 
mining field, to be examined later, is a classic example. 

1 5 

^For instance, the i960 opposition to the Security Treaty 

was directed more against Prime Minister Kishi's strong-arm tac- 
tics in obtaining Diet approval than against the alliance itself. 

^Takane, op. cit . This condition apparently prevailed in 
the preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference negotiations. 



230 



Thus, although charismatic leadership rarely has been a 
feature of Japanese politics, some sort of Oyabun (chief or boss) 
may be needed to resolve conflicting interests. Without it, 
extended delay, or even paralysis on important issues is possible, 
indeed probable. That such circumstances might lead to an 
authoritarian government is by no means certain. Indeed, it is 
less likely than a party reshuffling, but it cannot be ruled out. 
The prospects for renewed Japanese militarism, however, are 
virtually nil. These will be noted in the next section. 

Given these conditions, the Japanese are not optimistic 
about the future. In a recent survey, a group of academic 
experts was asked: "What image do you have about the Japanese 
society in the latter half of the 1970s?" The answers, in order 

of frequency, were: "upheaval, instability, disaster, crisis, 

15 

disruption and dispute." 

In many respects, logic would so indicate. But Japan con- 
sistently has shown herself more resilient and adaptable than 
would seem possible on the basis of tangible assets alone. In 
any struggle for economic survival, a nation's fate vri.ll hinge 
on the performance of her average citizens, plus the resources 
and the productive capacity available to them. Japan surely 
excels in the first and third areas just as she is weak in the 
second. Even under rampant nationalism, however, there will be 
those who must sell their raw materials to survive. In such a 
cutthroat scramble for resources, Japan's capital and intellectual 



15 NKJW, July 30, 1974. 



231 



stocks certainly can be traded for enough of a supply to ensure 
a decent (if unspectacular) living for her people. In fact, the 
pollution generated by continued production is likely to be more 
of a threat than the curtailment of that production by external 
factors. 

The days of dramatic growth may be over, but Japan will 
remain one of the world's major reservoirs of industrial 
potential and technological skills. As such, she will continue 
to have a significant influence on the global economy. 

Japanese Militarism 

Militarism is defined as: 

Predominance of the military class or prevalence 
of their ideals; subordination of the civil ideals 



1 fc\ 

Kenneth R. Stunkel and John Copper argue persuasively in 

a forthcoming book (Economic Superpowers and the Environment ) 
that Japan's industrialization alreaay has brought her to the 
brink of irreversible environmental damage. Moreover, although 
lip service is paid to emission control laws, conservation and 
the need to clean up coastal waters, neither government nor 
business has really recognized the magnitude of the problem. For 
instance, the MITI plan noted earlier (note 5 _ 70) has been criti- 
cized for predicting 6-7 percent growth on the grounds of resource 
unavailability. Stunkel suggests that the target of such growth 
itself is out of touch with reality. No thought, apparently, has 
been given to the impact of burning or refining 4,000,000,000 
kiloliters of oil in Japan's already marginal atmosphere over the 
next ten years. (This is, it should be noted, nearly two and a 
half times the amount consumed in the quarter- century between 
1947 and 1972.) Similarly, even the maintenance of present 
levels of production may lead to major shortages of fresh water, 
the disappearance of many fish from adjacent waters and reduced 
agriculture. No doubt the Japanese would endure these hardships 
stoically, but that is not equivalent to finding a solution for 
them. 



232 



or policies of a government to the military; the 
spirit which exalts military virtues and ideals; 
the policy of aggressive military preparedness. 

Webster's New International Dictionary — 2nd ed. 

Warnings of the revival of Japanese militarism were heard 

17 

frequently in the early 1970s. ' Even moderate analysts argued 

that the self-confidence bred of the post-war recovery and a 

desire to play a political role commensurate with her economic 

1 ft 

power would lead Japan to a larger military commitment. Now, 

with the limits to growth apparent, new warnings have arisen. 



17 

Bix, "Report on Japan 1972," part I, _op_. cit . (note 6-1), 

saw Japan's conservative leadership pushing for a revision of the 
Constitution and other changes which, if accomplished, would mean 
that: "... the internal position and status of both military 
and emperor in Japanese life are sure to be greatly enhanced . . .' 
(p« 29). Axelbank, o_p_. cit . (note 6-27), was concerned that a 
combination of industrialists, former Imperial Army and Navy 
officers and right wing politicians were "vigorously backing 
stepped-up rearmament" (p. 25) while "the people are showing in- 
creasing apathy towards politics . . ." (p. 21). Other revision- 
ist writings raised similar critiques. The last major attack in 
the Chinese press was in September 1971 (Peking Review , September 
17 and 24). See also James Reston's interview with Chou En-lai, 
New York Times , August 10, 1971. In late 1972, however, Chou 
reportedly told Prime Minister Tanaka that he "welcomed a 'reason- 
able growth' of Japanese strength as a potential counterweight 
to the Soviet Union's 'aggressive designs' in Asia." ( New York 
Times , December 13, 1972). The Soviet Press, whose view of 
"reviving militarism" also seemed to depend on the broader state 
of Moscow-Tokyo" relations, launched several attacks in January 
1973, but has been quiet since. See Angus M. Praser, "Some 
Thoughts of the Resurgence of Militarism in Japan," Pacific 
Community (April 1 973) > PP» 437-451 • 

1 fi 

Herman Kahn, for instance, wrote: "I do not suggest 

that Japan in the year 2000 will aspire to the role of world 

policeman, at least not by itself. But the Japanese may well 

wish — indeed feel obliged because of their pervasive worldwide 

interests and capabilities — to take part in such a role . • ." 

(p. 8). 



235 



It is said that the desperation borne of a coming economic crisis 

may stimulate nationalism, an authoritarian government, nucleari- 

19 

zation, and a militarist foreign policy. Japan, it seems, is 

forever suspect. 

The possibility of a more authoritarian government was 
admitted earlier in this chapter. Most emphatically, however, 
this would not be equivalent to militarism in the pre-war sense. 
Whatever similarities the international system may come to have 
to the 1930s, Japan's domestic circumstances are sufficiently 
different to invalidate the analogy. 

For instance, (1) there is no divine symbol which radical 
groups could use for leverage to control the government as the 
Imperial Army and Navy once did. (2) No longer is the public 
dazzled by the victories of 1895 and 1905* Indeed, the defeat 
in 1945 thoroughly discredited the military in most people's 
eyes. (3) Today's politicians, whatever their faults, are much 

better educated and more experienced than were their 1930s 

20 
counterparts. At the same time, the SDF do not attract the 

cream of Japan's youth as the Imperial armed forces did before 

the war. (4) The principle of civilian control of the military 



%iaxtin Weinstein, "Japan's Foreign Policy Options in the 
Coming Decade." Paper prepared in September 1973 for a. forth- 
coming book entitled Japan's Coming Decade , edited by Hugh 
Patrick and Lewis Austin. 



20 



See Takane, op. cit . (note 7-8). 



234 



21 

is firmly established. The Prime Minister also is in a much 

stronger position with respect to his cabinet than in pre-war 
days. The Defense Agency, on the other hand, is not even a 
ministry. Finally, (5) the perceived gains of military action 
have been much reduced. In the first place, the basic justifi- 
cation for colonial wars has vanished. In the second, Japan's 
economy has outgrown regional self-sufficiency. The prospect of 
a self-contained Co-Prosperity Sphere at least had popular credi- 
bility, whatever the realities might have been. In any present 
or future international environment, from super-power condominium 

to anarchy, Japan's use of military force to secure even a 

22 

fraction of the resources she requires is an impossibility. 



21 

As one writer has noted, in a slightly different context, 

any clandestine planning to undermine this arrangement almost 
certainly would bring forth an "Ellsberg-san" to leak the story. 
See Monte R. Bullard, "Japan's Nuclear Choice," Asian Survey , 
XIV (September 1974) » P« 852. An example of the outcry stirred 
by a relatively innocuous contingency plan in the mid-1960s is 
given in Matsueda Tsukasa and George Moore, "Japan's Shifting 
Attitudes Towards the Military: Mitsuya Kenkyu and the S elf- 
Defense Forces," Asian Survey , VIII (September 1965)1 PP» 61 4-625. 

22 

This would be true even if other powers acted successfully 

to gain access to raw materials elsewhere. Japan's only options 
would be Southeast Asia, Korea, and perhaps Taiwan, which could 
not possibly make her self-sufficient. This is illustrated by 
the following data. 

Total Japanese 

Material Production (A) Demand (B) A/B (1972 data) 

Petroleum (m/t) 67,354,000 249,193,000 .27 

Iron Ore (M/T) 1,969,000 111,521,000 .02 

Coal (M/T) 12,621,000 49,280,000 .26 

Wheat (M/T) 322,000 5,148,282 .06 

Source: (A) 0"N Statistical Yearbook 1973* Korea, Taiwan, South- 
east Asia 
(B) Finance Ministry 



2J5 



Analogies to the 1930s thus have been discounted on five 

23 

grounds. ' The third and fourth conditions may change. Indeed, 

one potential problem of Japanese politics is that it might be 
difficult to contain, quickly, a regime which was prepared to 
disregard minority party and media opposition in the conduct of 
its programs. However, the first condition noted above would 
prevent the cloaking of consistently unsuccessful policies in 
Imperial protection. Some may long for a return to pre-war 
spirituality and frugality. Others may wish for increased 
defense spending. Except for a few extremists, however, there 
is no support for the dominance of military values. At the same 
time, the physical limits of the utility of Japan's use of force 
will preclude jingoist adventurism. 

Charges of militarism will persist, however. They are too 
useful a political tool for the opposition. In fact, this 
equation of legitimate self-defense concerns with militarism has 
been one of the main reasons for the lack of a meaningful debate 
on security policy in Japan. The same is true for nuclear 
questions. 



^For some additional reasons, see Richard Ellingworth, 
Japanese Economic Policies and Security , Adelphi Paper No. 90 
(London: IISS, 1972). 

lJakane Chie has voiced concern that the single-minded 
dedication of the Japanese once their goal is defined could be 
dangerous if the wrong ideal were chosen. See Y/akaizumi Kei, 
"Japan's Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act," Foreign Policy , 16 
(Fall 1974), PP. 30-47. 



236 



The Quest for a Satisfying World Role 

Since 1945> Japan's international political role has been 
relatively passive. Her economic strategies have been reactive, 
but also highly nationalist. 

Quite apart from the militarism issue, it is possible that 
Japan might try to influence external events more actively in 
the future. There is no doubt that she would appreciate more 
international recognition. But how far she will go in seeking 
the associated commitments, or even accepting those now avail- 
able (such as UK peace-keeping assignments), remains to be seen. 

The key question is whether or not Japan can find a place 
for herself which is emotionally satisfying without being 
expansive. It is not clear that she can. On the other hand, 
it does not necessarily follow that dissatisfaction will lead to 
expansion, at least in the near term. In the first place, so 
long as the Japanese are undecided about their own self-image, 
they probably will not try to impose it on others. Should they 
again succeed in some national achievement which could be the 
object of collective pride, such as the Meiji modernization or 
the post-war economic miracle, it might be tempting to hold it 
up as a model. The establishment of a stable, welfare-oriented, 
low-waste society might be such an example, but its fulfillment 
seems years away. 

In the second, if Japan's economy really is endangered, 
the excess energy (physical or mental) available for non-essential 



237 



foreign policy projects will be marginal. * A diminished 
emphasis on the separation of politics and economics, and increased 
commitments to international cooperative plans might give the 
appearance of an expanded political role. Such moves, however, 
could he understood better as new strategies for the economy's 
maintenance than as a fundamental redefinition of international 
responsibilities. 

Finally, the characterization of even Japan's current role 
as "passive" is misleading. It is true that it is reactive in 
the sense that the major initiatives usually are left to others. 
But it also is highly opportunistic, self-serving, and fast-paced. 
The diversification of resource suppliers, strategies to cope 
with nationalizations and trade barriers, and steps to reduce 
vulnerabilities to third party actions are challenging, time 



25 

It might, of course, be tempting to resort to the ploy 

of foreign distractions to domestic problems. 77ere strikes, 

riots, or terrorist activities to proliferate, for instance, 

externally- sponsored subversion always could be blamed. But this 

is not the same as embarking on foreign ventures oneself. 

2£> 

There is a strong possibility, however, that economic 

activities will be more formally related to security. For 
instance, aid to developing countries may come to be considered 
as non-military defense spending. (Shinohara Hiroshi, interview, 
December 9» 1 974* This also v/as suggested by Ellingworth, op . 
cit . , p. 31 •) Additional developments eventually might include 
arms sales or much harder positions on lav/ of the sea issues, 
but would exclude almost any attempts by Japan to forcibly coerce 
other states. As has been argued throughout this paper, the 
ability of naval vessels to exercise such suasion is declining, 
while the introduction of ground troops is out of the question. 
A nuclear decision might further Japan's general bargaining 
position, but she would be limited in her ability to use it out- 
side of a deterrent role. 



238 



consuming, ever-changing, and vitally important. While they may 
have had a one- dimensional economic aura in the past, they 
certainly will become multi- faceted in the future. Should the 
security ties with the U.S. loosen, the additional burden of 
balancing her position among the nuclear powers would be added. 
In sum, Japan's weaknesses require, and will continue to 
require, continuous foreign policy adjustments. Even with the 
constant factor of the U.S. military relationship, a successful 
course amidst these often-conflicting pressures is a noteworthy 
achievement, though it could be better presented to the public 
as such. Should a neutralist option be chosen, she will not be 
permitted the luxury of a Swiss or Swedish-style aloofness from 
international entanglements, especially since economics has been 
elevated to the status of "high politics." Her dilemma is not 
between international ties or their absence, but rather how to 
balance the conflicting demands of multiple linkages. Indeed, 
the problems of Singapore's survival might be a better analogy 
than Switzerland's perpetual neutrality or Sweden's non-alignment. 
In time, perhaps, Japan might acquire a reputation for imparti- 
ality which would insulate her from some of these challenges, 
but it certainly will not be within the time frame of this study. 

External Changes 

The People ' s Republic of China 

Predictions regarding post-Maoist China seem to lie more 
in the realm of astrology than political science. Some 



239 



alternatives, however, include (1) a general continuation of 
present trends, (2) rapprochement with the USSR, (3) a more 
belligerent China or (4) a fragmentation of the nation in the 
course of a power struggle. 

It seems evident that the present situation maximizes 
Japan's flexibility. A tri-lateral structure in the Northwest 
Pacific offers opportunities for approaching both the PRG and the 
Soviet Union while reducing her dependence on the United States. 
The easing of tensions also encourages trade relationships and 
eases the pressures for defense spending. Washington's recog- 
nition of Peking would further institutionalize these develop- 
ments although it could have unpleasant aftereffects if China 
then chose to strike against Taiwan. 

Much of this flexibility would be lost should the Sine— 
Soviet dispute be resolved. In this event, Japan might feel the 
need to increase her own defense effort, but she also would 
almost certainly be driven back towards the United States. 

Similarly, if China became more belligerent, either towards 
the U.S. or her neighbors, there would be strong pressures for a 
larger Japanese security role. An armed PRC attack on Taiwan, 
though less inflamatory than it once might have been, would 
reverse the relaxation of tensions in the region, at least 
temporarily. To succeed, China also would have to demonstrate 
a quantum jump in amphibious or airborne capability which Japan 
might find disquieting. Certainly it would change the balance 



240 



of power in the Senkakus and western Ryukyus. A PRC naval build- 
up could be another justification for enlarging the MSDF. At 
the same time, unless the U.S. showed complete indifference, 
Japan probably would prefer to restrengthen the bi-lateral ties 
rather than face the People's Republic alone. It is possible, 
of course, that Peking could try to force Tokyo to chose between 
itself and Washington. It even is possible that this might suc- 
ceed if coordinated with some of the U.S. -Japan strains noted 
earlier. However, the initiative in such circumstances would 
remain with Washington, which could maintain the ties if it were 
willing to make the effort. This gambit also would threaten 
China with isolation against both the West and the Soviets. 

The fourth choice, a fragmented China, would have world- 
wide implications. The key question for Japan is whether the 
return to bipolarity in the Northwest Pacific would push her back 
to the U.S. alliance or whether she would be drawn into the 
vacuum herself. The only real benefit of the latter course for 
Japan would be psychological. It is by no means certain, however, 



27 

In the face of competing demands by the nuclear program, 

a 3 million man army, and an air force and riverine force for the 
northern border, the "blue water" component of China's navy has 
done well just to survive. Nevertheless, reports persist in the 
Western press and technical literature suggesting that the PRC 
navy may soon try to spread its influence farther afield. 
Missile destroyers have been built, but there is little that 
could operate beyond the range of fighter cover. In any case, 
even if such a decision were made soon, the time lags involved 
in the intelligence evaluation, decision-making and ship con- 
'stfuction would put it well into the 1980s before a PRC build-up 
was reflected in 13SDF force levels. 



241 



that she could take China's place even if she wanted to. At the 
heart of the PRC's credibility as a major power is her ability 
both to absorb a nuclear strike and to swallow an invading army. 
Japan can do neither, and her leaders know it very well. 

One probable consequence of a sharp decline in Chinese 
influence would be a stronger Japanese position towards Taiwan 
and Korea. This would be especially true in the case of seabed 
resource disputes. However, the relative increase in Soviet 
power would make the U.S. security ties more attractive. In 
turn, this would restrict Japan's freedom of action in Southeast 
Asia. Even if she were tempted to overlook her own weaknesses 
and play a larger role in the Northwest Pacific, she would be 
limited farther south to those efforts which did not threaten 
America's growing economic presence there. 

In sum, events in China will be keenly felt in Japan. It 
is possible that these would spur an expansion of the SDF, or a 
less conciliatory posture towards her immediate neighbors. But 
unless Washington were to cut her off completely, Japan would 
not become significantly more activist in the region as a whole. 

The Soviet Union 

The future course of the USSR is relatively more predictable 
than China's. A continued policy of detente on the one hand and 
friendship and economic cooperation with Japan on the other would 
facilitate Tokyo's equidistant diplomacy. But the replacement of 
the Security Treaty with a Moscow-oriented pact is inconceivable 



242 



in the near future. At the same time, Japan's development of 
Soviet resources will be carefully designed to increase her own 
flexibility, not simply to substitute one potential source of 
blackmail for another. 

The completion of the second Trans-Siberian rail line in 
the early 1980s will increase Russia's military potential in the 
Far East. Without a complete abdication by the U.S., however, 
any hint of its use would only drive Japan closer to Washington 
again. The same probably would be true for a general breakdown 
in detente. 

The United States 

The U.S. and Japan may drift apart if the axis of confron- 
tation continues to shift from East-West to North-South problems. 
In case of renewed tensions in the Northwest Pacific, America's 
reaction will be the key to Japan's response. Neither the Soviet 
Union nor China would be able to keep her from returning to the 
West unless the U.S. turned away. 

In the meantime, though both Washington and Tokyo may want 
to retain some tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment, budgetary 

and balance of payments constraints could restrict the basing of 

2ft 
American units in Japan before too long. In turn, this might 

provide the occasion for a reevaluation of the Security Treaty 



28 

One estimate of the U.S. base costs is ¥200 billion 

(about $670 million) annually. Cited by Taoka Shunji, December 
30, 1974. 



243 



system. A total abolition of security ties would not be in the 
interests of either side, but some sort of redefinition will be 
almost inevitable. 

Such a shift, by itself, probably would not lead to more 
emphasis on the SDF, but it could in some areas. Particularly 
in the logistics field, the more distant the U.S. re-supply 
forces, the larger the domestic capacity would have to be. 
Without an increase in tensions, however, few changes would be 
demanded. Some additional funds might be appropriated as a 
symbol of resolve, but the unit costs of new construction are so 
high as to preclude a major expansion of forces without a drastic 
change in priorities. If anything, it would be the non-SDF com- 
ponent of security spending which probably would be increased. 

It is, of course, theoretically possible that an increase 
in tension might be accompanied by American indifference. 
Japan's options in such a case would be three-fold: accommoda- 
tion, an attempt to establish her neutrality, or expansion of 
the SDF, with a possible re-definition of their roles. A priori 
it is difficult to predict which course she would follow. A 
combination of neutrality and enhanced self-defense might be 
ideal, but the choices would depend greatly on the state of the 
Sino-Soviet balance at the time. The likelihood of such an 
abandonment seems remote, however. In Robert Osgood's words: 

. . . There is no American interest in Asia that 
does not depend on America's central interest in 



244 



maintaining the vitality of its alliance with 
Japan . . .29 



Other States 

It has been argued earlier that the opinions of Southeast 
Asian states would not really be a constraint if Japan saw her 
basic interests threatened. Whether or not they could be a 
determinant of MSDF deployments i3 another question. Disturbances 
in Indonesian waters might threaten the crucial tanker routes. 
This certainly would produce calls for protection of the ships, but 
it will be shown later that no amount of harassment could cause 
enough economic harm to offset the costs of deployments. More- 
over, it already has been argued that naval vessels alone are 
unlikely to quell such disturbances, and it is very doubtful if 
anyone would be willing to commit any of the other Self-Defense 
Forces to such work. Finally, given the lack of logistics sup- 
port, it is not clear that the MSDF ships could operate that far 

from home. Nevertheless, the psychology of the issue is such 

30 
that it might stimulate a few token deployments. 



^Robert Osgood, The Weary and the Wary (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 91* 

* Donald C. Hellmann, in Japan and East Asia (New York: 
Praeger, 19?2), argues that the web of economic ties linking 
Japan to East Asia (including Southeast Asia) inevitably will 
draw her into regional politics ". . .in ways that ultimately 
will require a new and expanded security policy." (p. 169). 
This may well be true eventually, but in part it is predicated 
on continued rapid economic expansion which seems at best to 
have been delayed. 



245 



Changes and Continuities in Maritime Affairs 

Although these arguments mostly seem to point to a mainte- 
nance of the status quo, this is by no means the case. Japan 
will continue to act to maximize her flexibility. Her nuclear 
power programs; shipbuilding, electronics and aircraft industries; 
and scientific rocket development have given her the basis of a 
nuclear option should she so choose. The Security Treaty System 
has enabled her to concentrate on economic growth for over 
twenty years. Even the SDF reflect this propensity for flexi- 
bility since their force structures, for the MSDF and ASDP at 
least, consistently have stressed future potential at the expense 
of current capability. Similarly, the whole thrust of resources 
diplomacy is directed to the maximization of alternatives. 

This stylistic continuity, however, may encompass major 
substantive changes. For instance, new resource finds, techno- 
logical breakthroughs, local wars, nationalizations or other 
discontinuities may alter the relative importance of raw 
materials suppliers. (U.S. and European markets, however, 
almost certainly will remain central to Japan's trade.) 
Increased contacts with the socialist countries may have far- 



31 

J Whether or not this was the result of a deliberate 

decision in 1947, as Weinstein argues, or through the lack of 
one, as advocated by Auer, does not alter the result. 

52 See Auer, op_. cit. (note 5-34), P« 145, and Hughes, op_. 
cit . (note 5-34), P» 338. 



246 



reaching consequences as the PRC and USSR enter into economic 
competition and interdependence with the capitalist world. Such 
topics quickly will lead too far afield for this study. One 
area which can be investigated, however, concerns extended 
claims to ocean jurisdiction. 

A Twelve Mile Territorial Sea 

Having agreed in principle to a universal twelve mile 

33 

limit, Japan will extend her own three mile territorial sea 

before very long. Aside from the fact that the area to be 
defended has been increased severalfold, the shift will bring 
the Tsugaru Strait (between Honshu and Hokkaido) completely with- 
in Japanese jurisdiction. This poses two problems. 

The first is whether or not the strait should be governed 
by a regime of free transit, or one of innocent passage. The 
latter, it is argued (usually by defense personnel), is more 
appropriate on national security grounds because of the limita- 
tions which it would pose on Soviet naval and air operations 
(see Chapter Three). The mobility of U.S. forces would not be 



^Tokyo Shimbun , April 23, 1974- 

^From 58,650 sq. km. to over 240,000 oq. km. 3-mile data 
from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer. 12-mile 
figure estimated from linear extensions (4x) in some areas plus 
greater enlargements (up to 16x) around outlying islands. 

^The Eastern Tsushima Strait (between Iki Island and 
Shimonoshima) is 25 miles wide and thus there still will be a 
mile-wide corridor of the high seas in the center. The Soya 
Strait (between Hokkaido and Sakhalin) is less than 24 miles, 



247 



affected by virtue of bilateral agreements. Opponents of this 
position point to Japan's call for free transit (at least for 
surface ships) in all other straits, and the difficulty (and 

danger) of doing anything about Soviet submarines and aircraft 

57 

if they did not comply with innocent passage provisions. It 

seems likely that a regime of free transit eventually will be 
decided on for the Tsugaru Strait. 

The second problem involves Japan's three non-nuclear 
principles. A warship carrying nuclear weapons in territorial 
waters presumably would violate the restrictions on the importa- 
tion of such devices. However, if Tsugaru Strait traffic is not 
to be restricted, some compromise must be made on the principles 
themselves. 

By rights, the broadened territorial sea should justify 
some increased expenditures for its protection, at least for 



but lies partly within Soviet jurisdiction. The Western side of 
the Tsushima Strait is 23 miles wide and would be overlapped by 
Japan and South Korea. 

36 

J Yomiuri, August 3, 1974* 

^'In the event of hostilities, Japan would have an obliga- 
tion as a neutral power to ensure that belligerent warships did 
not violate her waters. Norway's failure to enforce such rights 
led in part to the Altmark affair, while Uruguay's insistence 
on them resulted in the scuttling of the pocket battleship Graf 
Spec . Whether or not Japan would choose the latter course and 
risk Soviet wrath remains to be seen. 

58 See Mainichi , August 8, 1974- The three principles are 
that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction 
of nuclear weapons into her territory. 



248 



improved surveillance systems and patrol craft. It probably will 
not, however. In any case, the additional requirements of the 
territorial sea will pale before the demands of the 200 mile 
economic zone (see below). The nuclear weapons question does not 
affect the MSDF directly, but any devaluation of the three non- 
nuclear principles (some now are calling them the 2.5 principles) 
may simplify future changes in attitude. 

200 Mile Economic Zone 

Although Japan consistently has opposed the 200 mile con- 
cept, it is almost inevitable that she will follow world trends 
and declare one herself. The complications introduced by a pro- 
liferation of strictly 200 mile claims in the Northwest Pacific 
would be formidable, as shown in Figure '/-1 . Under any set of 
baselines, Japan will have oceanic borders with The Philippines, 
Taiwan, the People's Republic, South Korea, North Korea and the 
USSR. If the Northern Marianas become an American territory, 
she will add a boundary with the U.S. as well. Moreover, 80 
percent of Japan's distant-water fish catch (40 percent of her 
total yield) would be within the zones of Canada, the U.S., the 
USSR and the PRC . 

To these issues also must be added the difficult problems 
of the Senkaku islands ownership, whether or not various rocks 
and islets can be used for baseline measurements, the use of 
median lines or continental shelf geomorphology as the basis for 
delimitation and the status of the Soviet-occupied northern 



249 




=^ _r&.\..0-r = 



250 



islands as the source of a 200 mile claim. The four hatched 
(disputed) regions on Figure 7-1 total over 340,000 square kilo- 
meters, more than 90 percent of Japan's land area. Figure 7-2 
illustrates the unresolved boundaries on the East China and 
Yellow Sea shelves. Because of overlaps, these ocean issues 
also are tied to the hostilities between Taiwan and the PRC and 

between North and South Korea. There is not space to examine 

39 

these arguments in detail, but a greatly increased potential 

for disagreement certainly will exist when the zones are 
designated. 

It is this development (if any will) which may bring the 

greatest changes for the MSDF and, perhaps, for the ASDF as well. 

The requirements for enforcing one's jurisdiction in a 200-mile 

economic zone are much more complicated than in a twelve-mile 

40 

territorial sea. Not only is the area covered much larger, 

but existing radars also inadequate for monitoring even 20 or 30 
miles off the coast. Besides providing issues in which the MSDF 
might get involved, the zone also will require more LISA patrol 
craft. 

Though officials recognize that Japan would be better off 
in a free trade environment, the economic zone could come to have 



^See park Choon Ho, "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The 
Northeast Asia Seabed Controversy," Harvard International Law 
Journal , XIV (Spring 1973), PP» 212-260. 

4°3, 862, 000 sq. km. vs. about 240,000 sq. km. 



251 



Figure 7-2 




This dormant 11 lor backa'ound Ml ond del noi 



Disputed Seabed Areas on the East China and Yellow 
Sea Continental Shelf 



252 



great popular appeal. After all, the area of a 200-mile claim 
would be more than ten times the present area of a country which 
always has been concerned about its lack of space. 

It is too early to tell whether or not zone-related dis- 
agreements will be resolved by means other than diplomacy. While 
no formal protest was made, the 1974 Chinese action in the 
Paracels caused private concern within the Gaimusho . Had China 
extended her reach to the Spratlies, fears of a similar gesture 
in the East China Sea disputes (notably the Senkakus) would have 
been intensified. For the moment, however, the Senkaku issue 

A 

officially has been shelved between Tokyo and Peking. 

All these disputes, of course, will be submerged in the 
larger framework of Japanese diplomacy. As rich as the East 
China Sea continental shelf may be, it has been less important 
so far than improved ties with the People's Republic. By the 
same token, the emotional Northern Islands issue has not pre- 
vented a v/arming of relations with Moscow. Resentment over ever- 
more-severe fishing limitations by the U.S., Canada and the 
Soviet Union also has been kept in perspective. In the future, 



/•1 
f See Jay H. Long, "The Paracels Incident: Implications 

for Chinese Policy," Asian Affairs , 4 (l.larch/ April 1 974) » PP» 

229-239. 

Agence Prance Presse reported (October 1, 1972) that 
Chou En-lai had dismissed them as "a few fly-specks on a map" 
during his meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka. 

A 1968 ECAFE survey pronounced it as potentially "one of 
the most prolific oil reserves in the world." See Park, p. 213. 



253 



it is probable that Japan will intensively develop the resources 
in her own area and avoid issues provocative to the superpowers. 
Whether or not she will be so deferential to Korea, Taiwan or 
the Philippines is questionable. 

Oceanic States and the "World Lake" 

Figure 7~3 is a reproduction of part of a State Department 
chart showing the area under Japan's jurisdiction should the 
seas be entirely divided on the basis of median lines. Even 
before this ultimate erosion of the high seas was reached, how- 
ever, extensions of national ocean claims would create a group 
of geographically advantaged states with control over especially 
large areas of the seas. Malta's Ambassador Pardo has termed 
these Oceanic States, and has suggested that they may come to 

have a considerable community of interest linking otherwise 

45 

disparate stages of economic development or social systems. 

This may v/ell be the case in the future, but even if such a 
division could be arranged in the period of this study, it will 
be many more years before Japan is likely to forge major diplo- 
matic ties based on ocean interests alone. In the Northwest 
Pacific, such an area would not add many more problems than the 



^^U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer, 
"World Lake" Chart. 

^Some of the more prominent are: The U.S., the USSR, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Britain and France (by virtue of 
distant islands), Chile, Mexico and Brazil. Japan ranks approxi- 
mately 10th in ocean area under such a regime. 



254 



Figure 7~3 




Office of the Geographer 
U.S. Department of State 



JAPAN'S SHARE OP A PARTITIONED OCEAN 



255 



200 mile zone, though Japanese fishermen would suffer. 

Summary 

There is no compelling evidence to support forecasts of a 
major change in the domestic political constraints on the MSDF 
during the next five years or so. Beyond that there is more un- 
certainty, but little indication of what the SDF might be used 
for even if they were unrestricted. Even were commitments to be 
made to UN peacekeeping forces, the budgetary limits show no 
signs of relaxation. Indeed, the multi-nationalization of 
Japanese shipping (along with that of most other nations) may 
reduce support for the MSDF's merchant marine protection even 
further. In a severe recession, some defense construction 
might be used for pump-priming, but this probably would not be 
significant. If the decision were taken to permit foreign arms 
sales, the lowered costs from longer production runs might ease 
some SDF procurement problems but, again, its influence would be 
marginal. A U.S. pullback probably would dictate a logistical 
strengthening, and perhaps some increased appropriations. But 
there are no signs that the MSDF would be used to fill part of 
the vacuum. If any stimulus does arise for an increase in LISDF 



Of course, the reverse argument also could be made, 
namely that since Japan could only count on her own dwindling 
number of ships in time of emergency, she could not afford to 
suffer heavy losses and thus should increase her sealane defense 
capabilities. Nonetheless, bureaucratic and political consider- 
ations make it doubtful that this view would prevail. 



256 



capabilities, short of a drastic change in the international 
situation, it may be from ocean resource zone extensions. 

The hypothesis that emotionally-based demand for a larger 
world role will spur a defense build-up also is tenuous. Unless 
an immediate threat arises in the Northwest Pacific, diplomacy 
will continue to be the focal point of Japan's security measures, 



PART III 



THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS 



Chapter Eight . 
Chapter Nine 
Chapter Ten 



Introduction 

. The Military Dimension - Part I: 
Global and Regional Interests 

. The Military Dimension - Part II: 

The Local Balance and Other Considerations 

. The Non-Military Dimensions of Japanese 
Seapower 



THE SEA AND JAPAN'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS 
Introduction 

The relationship between seapower and Japan's strategic 
interests can be approached in at least two ways. The first is 
the concept that Japanese security depends on a stable balance 
of power on three levels — global, regional and local. The second 
is keyed to the versatility of naval forces in meeting or deter- 
ring a variety of threats, and to the potential for leverage 
inherent in non-military ocean activities. The distinction also 
must be made between actions designed to exert pressures on 
other states, and those meant to reduce one's own vulnerabilities 
to such pressures. 

This section will consider some ways in which Japan can use 
the seas to promote or protect the interests outlined in Chapter 
Five. The general roles which the MSDF can play on each of the 
three levels will be examined, followed by more specific discus- 
sions of force mixes. The constraints and their evolution out- 
lined in the previous chapter will be considered to apply, but 
sometimes will be relaxed for the sake of argument. A final 
chapter will be devoted to Japan's commercial seapower. 



258 



Chapter Eight 

THE MILITARY DIMENSION - PART I 
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS 

At the present time, any discussion of the MSDF's roles 
(indeed of any part of Japan's external security) must consider 
the United States as well. These calculations include at least 
four questions: 

1. What are Japan's interests on a particular issue, 
and does she have the ability to defend them by 

herself? 

2. If not, do U.S. and Japanese interests coincide? 

3. If they do, does the U.S. have the capability and, 
just as importantly, the will to act? 

4. If the second and third conditions are satisfied, 
what contributions can Japan make to the U.S. 
effort? If they are not, are there other powers 
to which she can turn? 

One may question the wisdom of basing plans on such 

continued reliance on the U.S., but it is a current fact of life. 

The Global Balance 

Japan's interests on the global level lie in the prevention 
of a general war and in the stability of the international climate , 
She will be unable to secure them by herself. On the whole, how- 
ever, they coincide with those of the United States, especially 



259 



260 



on the prevention of nuclear war. 

By almost any projection, Japan's armed forces will not 
have a major impact on the global military balance within the 
next 10-15 years. Even were a decision on full-scale nucleari- 
zation to be made today, it is doubtful that anything more than 
a force de frappe could be created within this time frame. Had 
the great economic growth rates of the 1960s been sustained, it 
might have become possible to offset this military weakness with 
other forms of pressure. However, the world-wide shortages, 
uncertainties and instabilities which loom in the future are 
poor conditions for Japan's prosperity. Neither does she have 
large reserves of food or raw materials to offset international 
imbalances and promote moderation. Japan doubtless will continue 
to play an important role as a major industrial nation, but her 
image as an emerging superstate with the key to global equilibrium 
no longer is credible (if it ever was). 

Without becoming enmeshed in the debates over "How much is 
enough?", or whether or not mutual deterrence is a sane v/ay of 
avoiding the holocaust, it is certain that Japan's sense of 

insecurity would be increased if the effectiveness of the U.S. 

2 
strategic forces were in doubt. In any case, there is nothing 



For instance, after more than a decade of the French and 
Chinese weapons programs, each reportedly still had fewer war- 
heads than the U.S. has on one (MIRVed) Poseidon submarine 
(160 to 224 according to published accounts). 

T?his is not simply the question of whether or not the 



261 



that Japan can do about it except to hope that America's efforts 
to preserve the balance on her own account will be adequate. 

Both nations also have a stake in creating a stable inter- 
national climate, but Japan's need for such stability is greater, 
while her ability to promote it is less. This asymmetry contains 
the seeds of several possible differences, summarily noted in 
Chapter Five. In the first place, actions which America takes 

to stabilize local and regional conflicts may be seen as escala- 

3 
tory by Japan. In the second, Washington's ability to withstand 

pressures involving resources and energy is much greater than 
Tokyo's, (indeed, the U.S. itself may be seen as a primary 
villain in a crisis over foodstuffs.) This is related to the 
third point, which is that the U.S. has opted for strategies to 
maximize its independence from resource suppliers while promoting 
interdependence in the industrialized world. Japan, on the other 
hand, has tried to increase its interdependence with developed 
and developing countries alike. So long as U.S. policy continues 
to consider the weaknesses of the Western alliance as a whole, 
Japan will be protected by those even more vulnerable than her- 
self. But she could pay dearly for her previously close ties 



U.S. "nuclear umbrella" applies to Japan. As noted earlier 
(p» 159)j the "nuclear umbrella" issue is associated with the 
continued utility of the Security Treaty. Without the treaty 
there still might be an effective "umbrella" but without a 
credible U.S. deterrent neither formal nor informal ties would 
provide much protection. 

%itness the alarmed Japanese reaction to the U.S. military 
alert during the Yom Kippur War. 



262 



should Washington retreat to a more nationalistic stance. 

In point of fact, Japan's economic policies now are able 
to affect the prosperity, or at least the balance of payments, 
of most of her trading partners. Such strength implies an 
influence on global stability as well, though it is much less 
easily assessed or controlled. Nevertheless, the military ele- 
ments of global peacekeeping will remain the province of foreign 
forces. 

For whatever purpose, American seapower can bring to bear 
the fleet ballistic missile system (Pffl) ; a flexible array of 
general purpose naval forces; a limited, but increasingly modern 
merchant marine; and a number of technologies for extracting 
food and energy from the seas. 

The FBM is, and will remain, one of the most secure parts 
of the strategic balance. The U.S. merchant marine, progressive 
though it may have become, will not play much of a role in 
global stability. Advanced maritime technology may be stabilizing 
if it can provide distributable surplusses of food, resources or 
energy. If it is used simply for the benefit of the industrial- 
ized countries, its effect will be neutral at best. In either 
case, its impact probably will be felt only gradually over the 
next few years. 

The key issue, then, is the degree to which American 



^See Tsipis, et al. , The Future of the Sea Based Deterrent , 
op. cit . (note 1-45T7 PP» 3 _ 9» 



263 



general purpose forces can, or will, support Japanese interests. 
In the global context, this boils down to how much such naval 
power actually contributes to stability. A definitive answer, 
of course, is impossible, but it has been argued in Part I that 
the absence of major power naval forces has led to disorder at 
sea in the past. However, the rising costs of technological 
sophistication have reduced the numbers of ships available for 
peacekeeping roles. Moreover, unless some dramatic event occurs 
to re-establish the political credibility of Western warships, 
their impact on coastal states will decline even when they can 
be present. 

Thus, should present trends continue, the U.S. Navy's 
general purpose forces will become less and less able to maintain 
order on a global scale. In turn, this would reduce the incen- 
tive for Japan to build her own naval force to take up the thank- 
less mantle, even if the domestic situation allowed it. 

On the other hand, if the U.S. acted successfully to 
restore the efficacy of gunboat diplomacy, the choices would be 
more difficult. In the short run, American military action 
against either resource-rich states or oceanic claims could sub- 
ject Japan to severe pressures through embargoes or retaliatory 
terrorism unless she publicly broke with the U.S. Should that 
happen, calls for a naval buildup could develop since (a) the 
heretofore all-important security links with Washington might no 
longer be credible and (b) the example of using force to control 



264 



resources might have been made attractive as a last resort. 
Although her growing dependence on increasingly diverse regions 
would make it impossible for Japan to pursue such a policy 
successfully, its advocates might arise nonetheless. 

Should an American campaign fail, an even more ambiguous 
situation could result. The apparently diminished utility of 
distant-water naval forces would have to be weighed against the 
loss of reassurance which would accompany the break-up of the 
Security Treaty. 

In either case, however, if the basic relationship could 
survive the short-term stresses (perhaps through resource- 
sharing), there would be little incentive for naval expansion. 
Either someone else would be doing the peacekeeping already or 
it would be evident that no one could. 

This discussion has considered neither the probability nor 
the propriety of such actions from the U.S. point of view. The 
point simply has been to note possible Japanese reactions. The 

prospects that others might execute such a policy also have been 

5 

discounted, mainly on the grounds of capability. 

Regional Balances 

The Japanese usually think of their regional concerns only 
within East Asia and the Western Pacific. In point of fact, they 



The question of the re source- related disputes in the eco- 
nomic zones or along the East China Sea continental shelf will 
be examined later. 



265 



also depend on stability in other regions as well, notably the 
Indian Ocean, and, increasingly, Latin America. (See Tables 
5-1 to 5-30 

Japan's interest in these areas typically involves (1) the 
acquisition of raw materials, (2) the maintenance and expansion 
of markets, (3) the safe transport of exports and imports and 
(4) the containment of regional disputes. Her commercial sea- 
power can support the first two objectives. Naval forces may be 
necessary, though not sufficient to achieve the last two goals. 

Although the MSDF now is restricted to training squadron 
visits outside of home waters, this may not be so in the future. 
Japan's regional security options include the development of 
enough naval power to act as a surrogate for the United States 
in the Western Pacific. Alternatively, she could totally disavow 
such involvements and abolish the American presence. In between 
are a variety of choices, to be discussed below. 

Options Involving the United States 

( 1 ) The continued provision of bases for U.S. Forces 
(Western Pacific only) 

The deployment of extra-regional warships for stabilizing 
regional disputes usually has all the disadvantages associated 
with global peacekeeping. In an area such as the Northwest 
Pacific, however, where the interests of three nuclear powers 
and Japan converge, America's ability to introduce general pur- 
pose naval forces can be genuinely balancing. Moreover, thi3 



266 



interest extends throughout the region in so far as neither Japan 
nor the United States would welcome a hostile presence or a state 
of turmoil astride the gateways to the Indian Ocean. 

The availability of Japanese bases greatly facilitates 
U.S. operations in the Northwest Pacific, but the Japanese them- 
selves have reservations about the extent of America's activities. 

The contentious points have been the "Par East" clause of the 

c 

Security Treaty and the system of "prior consultations." The 

Vietnam Y/ar raised questions about the geographic scope of per- 
missible American operations. Reports of nuclear weapons aboard 
U.S. warships have brought doubts about Washington's compliance 
with consultation agreements. So long as the bases are used to 
counter Soviet or Chinese pressures on Japan, or are seen to 
deter a Sino-Soviet conflict, there will be few limits on 
America's freedom of action. However, should Japan be used to 
support operations related to a Taiwan-PRC or Korean conflict 
there is likely to be a serious domestic outcry. This also is 
true for possible outbreaks elsewhere in Asia, although neither 
the Japanese reaction nor the U.S. need for the bases would be 
as strong. 

In the past many members of the LDP have supported U.S. 



The Par East clause stems from Article IV of the Security 
Treaty. The consultation formula was contained in an exchange 
of notes between Washington and Tokyo dated January 19, i960. 
Some of the resulting problems have been outlined by Emmerson, 
op. cit . (note 5~33)> PP» 82-89» 



267 



actions in private more strongly than they have been able to do 
openly. But it is not certain that such support will continue 
as younger politicians come into positions of leadership. This 
is even more true if some sort of coalition government develops. 

Thus, America might find itself basing contingency plans 
on facilities which could become unavailable when they were most 
necessary. In fact, the base right agreements may come to have 
little meaning. So long as the two countries remain close, U.S. 
ships will have access to Japanese ports and repair facilities 
in peacetime. In wartime, if Japan's interests are threatened 
she would ask for assistance and the U.S. probably would accept. 
Should Japan not see her interests in jeopardy she would probably 
refuse landing rights or ship entry in the same way that much of 
Europe did during the Yom Kippur War. 

From the U.S. military standpoint, of course, it would be 
better to keep the Japanese facilities even though they will have 

to be consolidated rapidly. Broader consideration, however, 

7 
might suggest a retrenchment to the Llarianas or the Philippines. 

A full discussion of this point would extend far beyond the scope 



^See Chapters Five (p. 160) and Seven (p. 242). One impor- 
tant counter- argument to such a move is that the return of 
Okinawa has made it very difficult for the U.S. to get to Korea 
without crossing Japanese airspace. Indeed, were both the 
Philippines and Japan to declare a 200-mile territorial sea, it 
also could become impossible to get to Taiwan legally without 
permission. Some of the benefits of an American pullback are 
given in James H. Webb, Jr., Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy ; 
A Blueprint for the 1980s (New York: Praeger, 1974). 



268 



of this study. As argued in Chapter Seven, however, such a with- 
drawal probably would not lead to a major expansion of the Self- 
Defense Forces, especially if it were done tactfully and with 
adequate consultation. This is particularly true if America 
explicitly re-stated its commitment to Japan's security in the 
process. 

(2) Developing the SDF to free U.S. forces for other duties 
(primarily Western Pacific, but also the Indian Ocean in 
a more limited sense). 

This could be accomplished by having the MSDF: (a) take 
over some of the reconnaissance and surveillance duties in the 
Northwest Pacific, (b) be able to extend the period in which 
Japan could resist direct military pressure to permit the wider 
dispersal of American assets, (c) become more closely integrated 
into the U.S. force structure, for instance by exercising more 
frequently with available U.S. units, or even by providing 
escorts for carriers where possible, (d) develop into a regional 
force capable of acting as a surrogate peace keeper should the 
need arise. 

In the present domestic climate only the first and second 
alternatives are feasible, although the conduct of more joint 
training might be beneficial and not too sensitive. 

Since the MSDF would like to improve its intelligence 
apparatus anyway, it probably will acquire more capability for 
acoustic surveillance and surface ship tracking in the next few 



269 



years. In turn, this information could be made available to the 
United States. Although the remote sensing technology outlined 
in Chapter One may reduce American reliance on foreign sources 
for strategic intelligence, the need for identification and 
timeliness will continue to require as many tactical inputs as 
possible. Given the amount of cloud cover in the Northwest 
Pacific (see Figure 8-1), some low-level reconnaissance plat- 
forms could be very useful. 

Since no major acceleration is seen in the rate of Japan's 
defense build-up, the improved capabilities of the SDF, per se, 
are unlikely to enable the U.S. to redeploy many of its units. 
Some problems of the defense of Japan itself and suggestion for 
SDF improvements will be found in the next chapter. 

The integration of Japanese ships or aircraft into American 
operational units will be politically impossible without a 
drastic change in the threat situation. Indeed, it will take 
concerted efforts just to keep the military relationship from 
drifting apart, much less to strengthen it. 

In the final case, the previous chapter already has con- 
cluded that the next decade will see no compelling domestic 
pressures for a geographically expanded MSDF role. Even were 
the defense perimeter pushed outward, a more activist form of 
naval supremacy is unlikely. As Michael MccGwire has noted: 
"The flexibility of seapower . . . can only be successfully 
exploited when there exists a surplus of capability over one's 



Figure 8-1 



270 




-+- l i, i 



NORTHWEST PACIFIC CLOUD COYER (in tenths) 

Top figure in each block is the average for the clearest month. 

Middle figure in each block is the average for all months. 

Bottom figure in each block is the average for the cloudiest month. 

Source: Hc0 o 97. Sailing Directions for Japan . 



271 



Q 

essential defensive requirements ....'• Japan will not have 
such a surplus in the near future. With the exception of Singa- 
pore, it also is hard to imagine many Southeast Asian countries 
which would welcome a Japanese naval presence in the same period, 
defensively oriented or otherwise. Though this would not be a 
binding constraint in itself, it would reduce the incentive for 
such developments from Tokyo's point of view. 

Even should it become theoretically attractive, a serious 
drawback in attempting a wider naval role is the historical 
generality that maritime or air forces rarely have been decisive 
by themselves. It would be one thing to extend the MSDF to play 
a more visible part in the Western Pacific. It would be quite 
another to develop the intervention capability which might be 
necessary to make that presence credible. On the other hand, it 
was suggested in Chapter Four that such pointed calculations 
rarely enter into the evaluation of naval presence, at least 
among the persons interviewed by the author in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, the real significance of a distant-water I.ISDF deploy- 
ment would be as a reflection of a major political change within 
Japan itself. Under such condition of uncertainty, the influence 
of Japanese units might be greater than would be warranted by 
their actual capabilities, at least in the beginning. 

Leaving aside the development of a regional navy, it is 
interesting that none of the above suggestions would require 



8 



MccGwire, _op. cit . (note 1 -54) > P» 8i 



272 



major changes in the current composition of the SDP (the second 
point, for instance, could partly be accomplished by improved 
logistics). As will be discussed later, Japan's present force 
structure may not be best suited to the unilateral protection of 
her own interests, but it is nicely complementary to the U.S. 
Navy. 

Options Involving Countries other than the U.S., or 

Multi-lateral Ties 

(1) Cooperate with the PRC or USSR (Western Pacific) 

Both the USSR and the PRC could profit greatly from mari- 
time cooperation with Japan. Indeed, each might gain more from 
such assistance than the United States. Were Japan's ties with 
the U.S. to loosen, she may well seek closer relations with her 
mainland neighbors, particularly with China. Commercial maritime 
associations may grow rapidly. However, for either socialist 
country to play an active part in regional peacekeeping and for 
Japan to align herself with one of them would require domestic 
and international transformations which would completely alter 
the Pacific balance. So far there is little evidence of such a 
shift. Moreover, the anti-communist sentiment noted in Japan's 
leaders extends to most other levels of the society as well. 
Recent election gains by the JCP have been seen more as an anti- 
LDP vote than as a pro-communist one. While this would not 
dampen Japan's general desire to improve relations, it would 
pose serious obstacles to the conclusion of closer ties, 
especially in the military sphere. 



273 



(2) Japanese participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations 
(any region) 

The political problems of Japanese manpower contributions 
to UN forces were noted in Chapter Six. Although such partici- 
pation would seem a simple way to begin Japan's demonstration of 
increased responsibility in international affairs, the fact that 
it would involve the dispatch of ground troops will continue to 
be a major stumbling block. If some form of maritime observers 
(perhaps for fisheries disputes) could be arranged, it might find 

an easier acceptance (LISA officials could be sent, for instance). 

9 
If it were outside Asia, so much the better. While such 

arrangements may seem unlikely at present, they may become less 

so if law of the sea disputes proliferate. 

(3) An Asian Multi-Lateral Force (Western Pacific) 

In 1973, Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore proposed 
that Japanese warships might join a multi-lateral task force in 
Southeast Asian waters. Although Lee was concerned mainly with 
a balance of major power fleets, suggestions also have been made 

that some sort of ASPAC or ASEAN squadron might be feasible, 

10 
along the lines of NATO's Standing Naval Forces. 



°This discussion is limited to personnel. The MSDF or 
LISA also probably would be reluctant to part with a scarce ship, 
although the icebreaker Fuji has been dedicated to international 
Antarctic research for several years. 

10 STANAVFORLANT consists of about four destroyers or 
frigates each drawn from one of the NATO fleets. It has been 
in operation since January 1968, but is more of a political 



274 



Within ASEAN itself, such an organization might have some 
merit, at least symbolically. There even is an operational 
foundation. Thai and Malaysian units have conducted joint anti- 
smuggling patrols along the Kra Isthmus. Indonesia and Malayesia 
also have cooperated in the Straits of Malacca. But an ocean- 
going standing force is improbable. For one thing, Singapore 
has no ships larger than missile patrol boats. Thailand and 
Malaysia each have one modern frigate, the fleet flagship in 
each case, which they would be reluctant to commit to detached 
control. For another, there are a number of serious ocean- 
related disputes among the member states — Malaysia (Sabah) has 
at least tacitly supported the Moslem insurrection in the southern 
Philippines around the Sulu Sea, shelf-locked Singapore differs 
with her neighbors on the control of the Straits of Malacca, and 
there are several unresolved seabed delimitation issues. 

Even should an ASEAN force materialize, it is doubtful that 
Japan would be invited to participate. 

The anti-communist oriented ASPAC has become moribund with 
the advent of de tente . 

Perhaps the most interesting arrangement (and the most com- 
patible from a philosophical and material standpoint) would be 
MSDF cooperation with Australian or New Zealand units. One might 
even speculate on Japan's taking Britain's place in the Five 



showpiece than an effective combat force. In May 1973 a Standing 
Naval Force Channel was activated, and there is hope of a similar 
unit in the Mediterranean. 



275 



Power Defense Agreement (FPDA) for Singapore. 

It must be reiterated that this is pure speculation. There 
is no evidence pointing to such cooperation at present. As 
noted earlier, the first signs of Japanese participation in 
international peacekeeping probably would come through the UN 

outside of Asia. But the possibility of jie facto maritime 

12 

arrangements with other states cannot be excluded. 

(4) Arms Sales 

Present limitations on arms sales stem from two sources: 
(a) the Government's 1962 position that weapons cannot be ex- 
ported to (1) countries at war, (2) Communist countries, or (3) 
countries under UN sanctions; and (b) the genez*al political 
sensitivity of military matters in Japan. A weapon officially 

has been regarded as "a tool for killing and injuring and for 

13 
direct combat purposes," but the interpretation is subjective. 

For instance, a jeep with a gun mount is a weapon, and cannot be 



"1 *1 

Bix, "The Security Treaty System," op_. cit. (note 6-27), 
quotes a report of " . . . naval maneuvers with Australian and 
Malaysian warships during the summer of 1969 . . . ." Just what 
these consisted of is not clear. There are, however, few 
references to them in revisionist wri tings which would hardly be 
the case had any sort of important ties been developed. 

1 p 
The U.S. Navy, for instance, might act as an intermediary, 

i.e. joint U.S. -Japanese exercises held simultaneously with ANZU3 

training. 

1 ^Given in the Diet, March 23, 1972. Quoted by an official 
of the Equipment Bureau, JDA, in an interview, July 25, 1974* 



276 



exported. Without the mounting, it may be. Such equipment as 
Japan has sent overseas generally has been oriented towards 
police work, but some have been questioned. One of the most 
controversial contracts involved the 1 971 sale of helicopters to 
Sweden. 

Nearly all Japanese who were interviewed regarded the pros- 
pects for a future expansion of arms exports as doubtful. 

Certainly the defense production sector of Japanese industry is 

15 
in no position to initiate such a program on its own. But the 

profitability of such a trade might promote it nonetheless. This 
is particularly true if a major arms market developed in East or 
South Asia. In 1 974> for instance, it was reported that several 
European firms were considering the establishment of weapons- 
related plants in Singapore. 

In the past twenty-five years there have been adequate 
opportunities for Japanese exports in other fields. Should the 



1 A 

Although Sweden had requested them for police work, they 

were based on a U.S. military design. 

1 S 
^Defense production in Japan in 1973 accounted for about 

• 496 of GNP. 

1 ( 

Several sources indicated that the Dutch Fire Control 

System manufacturer Ilollandse Signaalapparaten would establish a 
factory in conjunction with a Phillips Electric venture already 
in operation. The Swedish and Swiss firms of Bofors and Oerlikon 
also were ostensively interested in a Singapore-based operation. 
These have not yet been verified however. The Singapore Ship- 
building Company builds fast patrol boats with assistance from 
Lurssen of West Germany. Similar craft also are constructed by 
a subsidiary of Britain's Vosper Thorneycraft. All data derived 
from interviews conducted in Singapore between May 28 and June 4, 
1974. 



277 



economic climate become particularly severe, however, this here- 
tofore forbidden source of foreign exchange might become more 
attractive. The production of such equipment in overseas sub- 
sidiaries also might become politically acceptable, though it is 
not at present. 

The naval component of such sales could range from warships 

to electronic equipment such as radars or radios which are common 

17 

to all vessels. Japanese and subsidiary yards have, in fact, 

built a number of vessels which appear on foreign naval rosters. 
They are listed in Table 8-1 . 

Note that most of these ships pre-date the 1962 export 
restrictions. Even for those that do not, such designs as patrol 
craft can be considered as being for internal security (police) 
rather than external security (naval) duties. Moreover, any 
armament now on board almost certainly was mounted after leaving 
the shipyard. One measure of the scrupulousness with which the 
principles have been observed was the 1965 decision to turn down 

an Indonesian request for landing craft because of Konfrontasi 

1 ft 
with Malaysia. 

Marine-related defense production for export probably will 

continue to bo concentrated in shipboard equipments, such as 



17 

The Republic of China (ROC) navy, for instance, uses 

Japanese navigational x-adars on some units. ROC naval officer 

(who requested anonymity), interview, May 8, 1974* 

1 ft 

Cited in Mat sue da and Moore, op_. cit . (note 7-21), p. 619« 



278 



Table 8-1 



FOREIGN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BY JAPANESE SHIPYARDS 



Year 


Country 


Type Ship 


Number 


Builder 


1954 


Brazil 


Transport 


2 


Ishikawajima 


1955 


Taiwan 


Landing Craft (LCU) 


5 


Ishikawajima 


1956 


Brazil 


Transport 


2 


Ishikawajima 


1957 


Taiwan 


Torpedo Boats (FT) 


2 


Mitsubishi 


1957 


Brazil 


Survey Ship (armed) 


2 


Ishikawajima 


1958 


Philippines 


Command Ship 


1 


Ishikawajima 


1961 


Indonesia 


Landing Ship (LST) 


1 


n.a. 






Submarine Tender 


1 


Ishikawajima 






Ocean Tug 


1 


n.a. 






Harbor Tug 


2 


n.a. 


1966 


Philippines 


Hydrofoil Patrol 
Craft 


2 


Hitachi Zosen 


1968 


Israel 


Coastal Patrol Craft 


4 


Mitsubishi 




Brazil 


Oiler 


1 


Ishibras 

(in Brazil) 


1969 


Taiwan 


Oiler 


1 


Ujina 


1974 


Burma 


River Patrol Craft 


20 
(about) 


Mitsubishi 



Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1974~75» passim . The year, in 

general, is the date of launching. Burmese craft noted 
during several interviews. They are part of a group of 
about 50 boats, some of which are used for cargo, some 
for ferry, and some for patrol purposes. 



279 



electronics or auxiliary machinery. It is unlikely that such 
sales will approach anything like the present volumes of Euro- 
pean firms, but some increase would not be surprising. 

(5) Training of personnel 

In the future, it is possible that Japan might be more 
willing to accept the overtures for the training of developing 

country military personnel. Officers of Singapore and Thailand 

19 

have attended Japan's National Defense College in recent years. 

Reportedly, many other requests for training from Southeast Asian 
countries have been declined. Such assistance can leave lasting 
impressions, witness the influence of the Royal Navy in Japan 
from the beginning of the build-up of the Imperial Navy to the 
end of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. 

(6) Financial and Technical Assistance 

The previous chapter indicated that non-military security 
spending, namely various forms of aid, almost certainly would be 
used to complement the formal defense budget. The explicit 
designation of such funds for military purposes by the recipient 
country would cause political difficulties in Japan, but this 
constraint may weaken in the next few years. Even if it does 
not, however, security assistance could be feasible in a multi- 
lateral context. For instance, a financial pool might be 
established with contributions from several countries. 



19 
y Momoi Makoto, interview, January 25, 1973' 



280 



Recipient states could put such funds to a variety of uses, 

20 

including security. The direct linkage between Japan and 

foreign weapons procurement thus would be broken. 

By the same token, technical assistance or ventures with 
multiple purposes — developing country shipyards, for instance — 
also could be acceptable. 

Other Regional Considerations 

Two final points of regional security must be considered. 
The first is the safety of tankers far from Japanese home waters. 
The second is the advantage of seeking stability, particularly in 
the Indian Ocean, through ties with other middle power navies. 

There are four situations under which Japanese merchantmen 

could be threatened — through a breakdown of order at sea, as an 

21 

offshoot of a local war, as a result of a campaign specifically 

directed against Japan, or in connection with a general war at 
sea. Unless the U.S. and USSR actively oppose the first trend, 
Japan can neither expect much assistance nor act effectively in 
her own behalf. If the ocean situation became highly chaotic, 
it might become possible to escort shipping as far as Southeast 



20 

This is similar to the "Pacific Fund" idea advanced by 

several prominent Japanese. The author also investigated this 

concept during the trip to Southeast Asia and found it well 

received, in principle at least. 

21 

Foreign merchantmen have been damaged in most of the 

recent limited wars — in North Vietnamese ports by U.S. bombing, 
off Karachi by Indian Styxs, at Latakia by Israeli patrol craft, 
in Tripoli by Libyan minefields, and on other occasions. 



281 



Asian waters. But beyond there, MSDF logistics limitations would 
preclude effective protection unless someone else was willing to 
include Japanese ships under their own escort. 

Similarly, in the second event, the overall power of the 
U.S. or the Soviet Union might deter deliberate attacks on their 
merchantmen, but the damage incurred in local wars usually has 

been accidental, and hence largely undeterrable. It is possible 

22 

that some sort of Nyon-type guarantee of the security of 

shipping in the vicinity of a protracted war could be set up. 
But probably the best that Japan could hope for would be that 
superpower intervention would halt the fighting itself, rather 
than protect the ships per se . 

The impact of law of the sea changes on Japan's attitudes 
towards distant shipping should not be discounted. In the late 
1960s and early 70s, any interruption of traffic in the Straits 
of Malacca would have led to calls for defense of the sealanes 
by right-wing Japanese and forecasts of J.ISDF dispatch by leftist 
critics. The 1968 grounding of a VLCC in the Straits prompted a 
series of navigational surveys in which Japan' s participation 
generated considerable riparian state resentment. In January 

1 97 5 » however, the 237>698-ton tanker Show a Maru struck a reef 

23 - - 

off Singapore. Tokyo's response was reported as follows: 



22 

See above, note 1-46. 

23 

It is interesting that the ship was in the Straits at 

all, in light of the December 1972 Malay-Indonesian declaration 
excluding ships over 200,000 tons. Many coastal state claims 
have been disregarded during the law of the sea negotiations, 
however. 



282 



Confronted with this big incident of a Japanese 
ship polluting international waters with oil, the 
Government has come around to the view that it 
appears inevitable that free navigation of shipping 
is due to come under some form of international 
restriction in the future. ^4 

This is hardly the militaristic outcry once envisioned. 

The increasing acceptance of restrictions on shipping 
through legal regimes will make it harder to justify unilateral 
responses to restrictions which stem from local wars or other 
disturbances not specifically directed at Japan. As noted 
earlier, however, some sort of multi-national action might be 
possible if violations of propriety become too flagrant. 

The cases of a campaign against Japan itself and a general 
war at sea will be considered in the next chapter. 

The other basic question, concerning the advisability of 
seeking regional stability through local naval hegemonies 
probably will not be Japan's to decide. Devolutions of power, 
should they take place, will be determined by the superpowers. 
Moreover, such surrogates will derive their primary strengths 
from superpower arms, to which Japan can offer few alternatives. 
In its pursuit of a maximum diversification of resource 
suppliers, Japan cannot afford to be on the wrong side of a 
power struggle involving an entire region, and so would do best 
to sell her offerings (military or otherwise) to all sides or 
none. It was suggested in Chapter Four that stability as an 



"%KIW, January 14, 1975, P- 2. 



283 



offshoot of regional hegemony was preferable to anarchy, recog- 
nizing that the price for such equilibrium might be restrictions 
on the very navigation it professes to protect. It is in such 
situations that Japan can best contribute to both her own 
interests and the evolution of the international system. By 
using her own formidable marine commercial potential to build 
ships, train seamen, etc., she can enhance the stake of the con- 
testing powers in eliminating restrictions on seaborne trade, at 
least between regions. In time, these might lead to the reduc- 
tion of discrimination to some lowest common denominator while 
broadening the focus of ocean management beyond the national 
level. 



Chapter Nine 

THE MILITARY DIMENSION - PART II 
THE LOCAL BALANCE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 

Japan's physical security and political autonomy both rest 

1 

on a balance among the nuclear powers in the Northwest Pacific. 

A deterioration in this local equilibrium could lead to threats 
of invasion, air attack or blockade, attempts at intimidation by 
demonstrations of force, or moves against third parties which could 
create undesirable precedents. Whether or not there were any 
overt pressures, Japan would be at least deferential towards any 
power which held naval superiority in the Northwest Pacific. 
Even within a generally stable balance there may be conflicts 
over ocean resource zones, terrorist activities or infiltration. 

It is at this local level that the MS DP is designed to 
operate. It also is within the adjacent sea areas that its 
greatest potential lies, for that is where Japan can act as a 
coastal state in the defense of her interests. 

Patterns of Threats 

No one so far has been able to put forth a txuly believable 



This would be true even if she pursued armed or unarmed 



neutrality. 



284 



285 



scenario for an attack on Japan. There simply are too many 
hypotheses which must be strung together to arrive at such a 
threat from the present situation. Another approach, however, 
may be more fruitful. Namely, by beginning with the objectives— 
the internal changes in Japan which an opponent might wish to 
encourage — one can work backwards to the methods which might be 
used to achieve them. 

Basically, Japan could find herself threatened with force 

2 

on the strategic level by those who sought to (a) overwhelm a 

united country, (b) weaken the nation by accentuating internal 
divisions, (c) intimidate the government if the State were 

divided or (d) promote revolution or social upheaval. Tacti- 

3 
cally, force may be employed to impose one's point of view in 

a particular dispute, or to improve a negotiating stance. 

The key point is that neither the international situation 
nor the domestic one can be considered independently. The inter- 
action between the two will be at least as important as either 
by itself. 



2 

I.e., in such a way as to endanger the territorial 

integrity, political autonomy or economic well-being of the home 
islands themselves. Some rationales for such pressures might be 
to gain better access to the Pacific, split the Western Alliance, 
eliminate economic competition or encourage one's own brand of 
revolution. 



cally. 



I.e., less important issues, usually localized geographi- 



286 



Direct Threats to the National Territory 

It is unlikely that a united Japan would be left to face a 
major assault alone. Such an attack could not be quick and 

easy. Moreover, there is no question of the legitimacy of 

5 
Japan's borders. Thus the international community would not be 

presented with a fait accompli . It would witness several weeks 
(at least) of attacks on territory whose sovereignty is unques- 
tionable. However far America might have renounced its inter- 
national commitments, the success of such aggression would 
establish a very dangerous precedent. Similarly, although 
sporadic attacks on individual merchant ships might not invoke 
U.S. assistance, America is too dependent on her own sealanes to 
allow a coordinated campaign against Japan to go unanswered. 

A weakened and divided Japan, on the other hand, probably 
could be coerced towards the desired position without the actual 
use of force. 



H'/hile I accept Mr. Kaihara's critiques of the Self-Defense 
Forces, I do not agree that the country could be quickly over- 
whelmed — assuming that it chose to resist. See Taoka, op_. cit . , 
(note 5-11), passim . 

Excepting the Northern Islands question and some seabed 
disputes. But these will be discussed later. 

Whether or not the process of such intimidation would 
unify the country will have to await the actual course of events. 
Perhaps the most dangerous situation (in the sense of leading to 
a longer struggle) would be a case where outside pressures 
created a will to resist which was not recognized by attacker 
and allies alike until the fighting already had begun. This, of 
course, is precisely the error that Japan herself made at Pearl 
Harbor. 



287 



The potential threats which a united Japan might face 
range from nuclear or conventional air strikes to invasion. 
Among the roles which naval forces could play in such situations 
are: deterrence, early warning, air defense, and invasion 
defense. 
(1 ) Deterrence 

The question of Japanese nuclearization has been explicitly 
excluded from this study. Were such weapons to be decided on, 
however, there would be valid arguments for putting them in sub- 
marines to enhance their survivability. Such a force probably 
would not affect the MSDF very much. The fact that sea-based 
deterrence resides in naval ships does not increase a nation's 
naval power per se. The missile submarines would not be avail- 
able for ASW or anti-shipping roles until they had launched their 
weapons, by which time such additional capability probably 
wouldn't matter very much. 

The conventionally- armed SDF, however, can deter simply by 
reducing the prospects for the quick (not necessarily the ulti- 
mate) success of an assault. Such a philosophy implies that at 
least some capability should be maintained against as broad a 
range of threats as possible to minimize the chances of blackmail 
by means for which there are no defenses. This is reinforced by 
the fact that Japan is limited in her ability to exert counter- 
pressure on other issues. 



288 



(2) Eaxl.y Warning 

One of the weaknesses of Japan's air-defense system is the 
vulnerability and limited number of air-search radar sites. 
(See Figure 9 - 1«) One writer has noted that the destruction of 

any two adjacent radars could leave a detection- free approach 

7 
corridor for low altitude aircraft. Furthermore, even when 

operational, such sites are horizon- limited in the detection of 

low flyers. 

Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft can give the most 

effective notice of impending air attack. Surprisingly, none 

are included in the ASDF inventory, although halting steps are 



7 

Hughes, _op_. cit . (note 5 _ 34), P« 334* It should be 
remembered, however, that few other countries are better off. 
In NATO, for instance, the NADGE system (NATO Air Defense Ground 
Environment) contains ". . .no provisions for the detection and 
countering of missiles and low-level, sub-radar threats." 
Furthermore, although additional coverage is provided by inter- 
faces with national air defense systems in some countries, NADGE 
also is vulnerable to the creation of detection- free corridors 
by the destruction of only a few radars — particularly in the 
south. This probably will not be remedied until the U.S. A7/ACS 
(Airborne Warning and Control System) becomes operational late 
in the 1970s. (See Jane's Weapon Systems , 1973-74, pp. 195-196.) 
The U.S. southern coast is vulnerable from Cuba — a fact often 
stressed in the early 1960s. In part, each of these cases is a 
corollary of the 7Je stern defense philosophy which (until 
recently, anyway) emphasized sophisticated equipment in neces- 
sarily smaller numbers. The contrasting approach is provided by 
the Soviet air defense network, which is built around thousands 
of relatively simple (and overlapping) radar, missile ajid gun 
sites. 

Q 

See the description of the American AWACS in Richard D. 
English and Dan I. Bolef, "Defense Against Bomber Attack," 
Scientific American , CCXXIX (August 1973), pp. 11-19. 



289 



Figure 9-1 




Hughes, p. 355 



JAPANESE AIR DEFENSE RADAR COVERAGE 



290 



9 
being taken to procure them. On an interim basis, therefore, 

and also in areas away from the primary threat axis, MSDF units 
sometimes could provide mobile radar coverage and additional 
intelligence. 

It is recognized that picket duty is an inefficient use of 
Japan's ASW-oriented destroyers and frigates. Furthermore, the 
ships assigned to such stations traditionally have suffered 
heavy casualties — witness the tremendous losses of U.S. destroyers 
off Okinawa in 1 945* Nevertheless, if no alternatives were avail- 
able, and air attacks were expected, the diversion of some MSDF 
ships to early warning tasks might be attractive. As a change in 
policy, it also would signal an awareness of a coming crisis and 
a willingness to respond to it. 

(3) Air Defense 

Most MSDF ships are poorly suited to break up massed air 
attacks, or even to defend themselves. Only Amatsukaze has a 
surface-to-air missile capability, although two more guided 
missile destroyers (DDG) will be added by the end of the Fourth 
Defense Plan. 

In any case, the important targets to be defended are on 
land, except possibly for offshore oil fields. Moreover, even 
a missile ship probably would require more fighters to defend it 



9 

The AEW acquisition, along with the PXL, was delayed by 

the debate over domestic production. 



291 



than its armament could free for other tasks. Should forward 
air defense, fighter cover for ocean resource disputes, or pro- 
tection of outlying islands be required, however, the limitations 

10 
of the F4EJ (the Japanese version of the U.S. F-4 Phantom air- 

11 

craft) might necessitate shipboard air control. This in turn 

would require greater coordination between MSDF and ASDF units — 

the more so because the MSDF, unlike the USN, does not have air 

12 

defense aircraft of its own to draw on for experience. 

In inshore waters, air defense weapons on patroling ships 
could force frequent changes in the approach and exit corridors 



10 

In order to restrict the offensive potential of the air- 
craft, its self-contained air- intercept capability was reduced. 
Instead, target information is fed to the aircraft from ground 
radars. It is questionable how well this would work in an 
intensive electronic warfare (EW) environment or if some of the 
ground stations were destroyed, but even in peacetime some sort 
of forward base probably would be needed for offshore operations, 

11 

Air control, in this sense, means the shipboard capa- 
bility to direct fighters to intercept other aircraft. One 
essential device for such work is a height- finding radar, which 
now only is found on Amatsukaze . The MSDF potential for air 
control missions could be improved fairly quickly by the instal- 
lation of height-finding or three-dimensional radars on newly 
built or refitted ships. 

12 

Hegrettably, there is little evidence that such coopera- 
tion is developing. No ASDF aircraft were involved in the Yuyo 
Maru sinking (see below, p. $17)* Though this had some basis in 
budgetary and operational concerns, it also appears that neither 
the MSDF nor ASDF was very enthusiastic about a joint training 
exercise. (JDA official, interview, December 13, 1 974* ) Auer, 
op . cit . (note 5 - 34) > PP« 291 ff. 16, notes a 1971 case where 
ASDF aircraft, assigned to make simulated attacks on MSDF units, 
mistakenly made their passes against a Soviet destroyer, thus 
precipitating a minor international incident. 



292 



for attacking aircraft, thus complicating an opponent's planning. 
In this regard, mobile anti-aircraft units on barges, or con- 
tainerized SAM mountings could be very useful items of coastal 
air defense. 
(4) Defense Against Invasion 

Whatever their other missions, the SDF must have some 

ability to defend Japan against invasion, however remote that 

•1 2 

possibility may be. It has been suggested (Chapter One) that 

air superiority is the key to control of coastal waters. Despite 
the limited range of Soviet fighters, it is doubtful that the 
ASDF could maintain control over the skies of Hokkaido and 
northern Honshu, especially since its airfields would become 
early casualties. However, during the first stages of an 
invasion they could provide cover for a naval strike against 
the landing force in addition to delivering their own ordnance. 
Moreover, by distracting the escorts they could provide better 
opportunities for submarine attack. 



13 

See above, p. 15/. One uncertain factor in invasion 

defense is the willingness of the Japanese people to resist. 
A recent survey indicated that "if Japan is invaded by armed 
force by a foreign country," 44/« of those interviewed would flee 
or not resist. ( Tokyo Shimbun , November 24, 1973)* On the other 
hand, the same poll showed over yQf/o willing to fight with the SDF 
or to offer guerrilla- type resistance — a manpower pool of over 
thirty million if extrapolated to a national response. It is 
very hard to judge wartime reactions from peacetime polls. How- 
ever, several observers have suggested that the surrender and 
peaceful occupation of 1945 were possible so long as foreign 
troops were not on Japanese soil. Had the invasion actually 
taken place, it is said, the resistance would have been bitter 
and lengthy. 



293 



As Taoka has pointed out, the amphibious forces of the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet are limited. In particular, they have: 



Table 9-1 

SOVIET PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS 
(as of July 1, 1974) 



Type 


Class 


Number 


1ST 


Alligator 


4 


lsv/m 


Polnocny 

MP8 

MP4 


15 
2 

8 


LCT 


Vydra 
MP 10 


35 
10 



Capacity (each) 

1,700 tons, 30 light tanks, about 
15 medium tanks 

350 tons, 6 tanks (est.) 
400 tons, 6 tanks 
? tons, 6-8 tanks 

250 tons, 6 tanks (est.) 
150 tons, 4 tanks 



59 24-25,000 tons, about 480 tanks 

and armored vehicles 



Source: M. MccGwire, et al., Soviet Naval Policy , Chapter 22 

(LSV and LCT class figures estimated. Type totals only 
were specified in most cases.) These numbers are con- 
siderably higher than those given in Jane's Fighting 
Ships , 1974-75. 



Thus the 250 medium tanks (T54/55) and 19 light tanks 

1 R 

(PT76) of a single Soviet mechanized division would require 
more than half the capacity of the Pacific amphibious forces. 
The problem is compounded when armored personnel carriers, tank 



^Taoka, _op_. cit . (note 5 _ 11)> P» 28. 
1 ^The Military Balance 1974~75, p. 83. 



294 



destroyers and artillery are included. When coupled with the 
tenuous supply lines at the end of the Trans-Siberian Railway 
and the Chinese position on the Russian flank, the direct 
invasion threat to the home islands does not seem particularly 
impressive. This is true even should the Soviet Union use 
merchant shipping support and airborne troops for the initial 
strike. This point is magnified by the frequently rough waters 
in the Sea of Japan, the vulnerability of such a landing force 
to submarine attack throughout its transit, the Japanese exper- 
tise at mine warfare, and the fact that the GSDF keeps four 
divisions and 300 tanks deployed in Hokkaido against such an 
eventuality. 

The People's Republic of China is even less of a direct 
menace, with some 4-00 miles of sea to cross, and a much less 
capable long-range amphibious force. Indeed, the PRC has had 
great difficulties mounting assaults against the Nationalist- 
held offshore islands ever since 1 949 • 

The use of Korea as a stepping stone would add several 
possible threat axes to complicate Japan's planning, but would 
not offset the socialist countries' logistics or transport weak- 
nesses. 

Thus, neither China nor the Soviet Union could afford to 
suffer many losses in an amphibious operation without seriously 
degrading its ability to sustain the campaign. 

This situation is not so secure with regard either to the 



295 



southwestern Ryukyus, or some islands on the East China Sea 
continental shelf. Both probably could be taken by a quick 
attack, and an incentive might be provided if there were dis- 
coveries of nearby seabed resources. The defense of these areas 
will be discussed below in connection with oceanic boundary pro- 
tection. 

The question now arises of the armament for ships in an 
anti- invasion role. The advantages of ship-to-ship missiles 
have been proven on numerous occasions. Speed and sea-keeping 
ability will be important, especially in the Sea of Japan. 
Although some air defense will be necessary, it would be expected 
that fighters would provide cover insofar as possible. Thus 
point defense rather than area defense systems would be more 
cost-effective. A major anti-submarine suit would be superfluous 
since most of the sensors would be incompatible with a sudden, 
high-speed strike. Should some sort of screen be needed, it 
might be provided by shipboard helicopters. The most suitable 
platform for such a mission from speed and maneuverability stand- 
points probably would be a surface skimmer. 

In sum, then, the optimum surface ship for the protection 
of Japanese coastal waters would seem to be a surface effect 
ship or hydrofoil with SSMs, a reasonable air control capability, 
point defense weapons, and a minimal ASW suit. Air cover, par- 
ticularly in the Sea of Japan, should be available. These also 
should be complemented by submarines, both for attacks on the 



296 



landing force and on escorts or pickets. 

Such submarines, incidently, need not be nuclear. The 
increased cost of an SSN makes sense only if Japan were to adapt 
a defense-in-depth strategy of carrying attacks to the enemy 

while his submarines were in transit, or sinking his own coastal 

1 6 

shipping. If attacks on invasion forces or blockades of 

straits are to remain their primary mission, it is not certain 

that a noisy, first-generation SSN would be much more effective 

17 

than a quiet, advanced conventional boat. On the other hand, 

building at least a few nuclear submarines would give Japan 

additional options, as well as experience in the construction of 

1 8 
such ships. ' With the increased cost of fuel, the life cycle 

19 

costs of an SSN also might not be disproportionate. In any 



1 C\ 

Janes E. Auer, in "Japanese Militarism," US NIP t XCIX 

(September 1973)> P» 51 1 notes that "If attacked, [Japan's] 

forces would be authorized, the government has stated since 1 959? 

to attack enemy bases." Presumably this also would include 

forays into the Sea of Okhotsk or the western Sea of Japan. 

17 

The Soviet Union has continued to build non-nuclear sub- 
marines, some of which may use exotic propulsion systems such as 
the Walther-cycle pioneered by Germany during Y/orld War II. 
Alternatives might be hydrogen peroxide systems like Britain's 
Explorer and Excaliber, improved fuel cells or high-capacity 
batteries. 

1 ft 

Commander Sekino has noted that a warship power reactor 

would not be subjected to international inspection under the 

non-proliferation treaty. Japan thus could carry out advanced 

research without fear of losing industrial secrets if NPT were 

ratified. 

19 

A 1972 study found that the average construction costs 

of a nuclear submarine ranged from 2.4 to 11. 4 times those of a 
conventional boat, with 5*1 a- s "the most likely figure. Life 



297 



case, the decision probably will be based more on political con- 
siderations than on military ones. It would be facilitated if 
world-wide trends pointed to the wide-spread use of such plants 
in merchant ships. 

It may be useful at this point to compare this approach to 
that adopted by Sweden and in Germany whose naval concerns are 
mostly coastal defense. Table 9~2 summarizes Swedish, German 
and Japanese defense forces. 

Note that Japan is able to maintain a force roughly three 
times as large as Sweden's with only a quarter of the burden. 
The SDF have become slightly less than half the size of Germany's 

with only about a third of the relative expenditures. Of course, 
numbers alone are a poor measure of a nation's military effec- 
tiveness. The point, however, is to show that the general result 
of the Japanese defense effort does not compare unfavorably with 
that of some European States. Neither is it unreasonable in 
light of the current threat to environment and her more secure 
geographic situation. 



cycle multiples lay between 1 .65 and 4»25 with 2.90 as most 
probable. See the abstract of LCDR James R. Shreckengaust, USN, 
"Conventional vs Nuclear Attack Submarines" (U), unpublished 
thesis, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, K.I., 1972. SECRET/ 
NOFORN in Naval War College Journal of Abstracts 1971-72 , p. 95* 

20 

This is true even despite the Ivlutsu fiasco. See below, 

note 10-13. 

21 

For instance, much of German land effort is devoted to 

tanks and armored personnel carriers for use on her northern 



298 



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Still, the emphasis placed by Germany and Sweden on small 
patrol craft for coastal defense is important. Particularly 
valuable, although not shown in the table, are the shelters which 
Sweden has built for her ships. Carved out of rock along the 
coast, they are said to be capable of withstanding nuclear 
attacks. Earthquakes would be a drawback against such a plan for 
Japan, but since civilian submarine tunnels have been designed, 
this should not be insoluble. In any case, the fate of the North 
Vietnamese torpedo boat fleet after the Gulf of Tonkin incident 
indicates the fragility of exposed fast patrol boats. Unlike 
logistics improvements, such shelters would be fairly long lead- 
time items, whose construction would have to be begun well in 
advance of hostilities. 

Direct Threats to the Sea Lines of Communication 

(1) The Nature of the Problem 

In contrast to the coastal orientations of Germany and 
Sweden, problems of sealane protection weigh heavily on Japanese 
defense planners. The experiences of World War II are an impor- 
tant part of these concerns. In that conflict: 



plains. Aside from the obvious lack of land frontiers, Japan's 
topography limits the usefulness of such mobility even if it 
were available. Similarly, Japanese ground attack aircraft are 
restricted by their potential as "offense weapons." Note also 
that, despite its large size, the Bundesmarine is primarily a 
coastal defense force. Over half its tonnage is devoted to 
support ships. 



301 



The war against shipping was perhaps the most 
decisive single factor in the collapse of the 
Japanese economy and the logistic support of 
Japanese military and naval power. 22 

Today the nation is even more dependent on imports than in the 
1940s, and its stockpiles are lower. The size and value of 
modern tankers and container ships drastically increases the 
importance of each sinking, while the modern submarine is much 
more capable than its predecessors. By no stretch of the imagi- 
nation could the present Self-Defense Forces protect the ocean 
lifelines in a sustained campaign. 

The improbability of such an offensive may suggest that 
it should be dismissed out-of-hand but the fact remains that 
Japan's weakness to this form of attack is conceded by nearly 
all analysts, whether they support or oppose an escort role for 
the MSDF. What are frequently overlooked, however, are her 
strengths and the vulnerabilities of her potential opponents. 
Therefore, to highlight these points, as well as to introduce 
the concept of containerized weapon systems, it is worth dis- 
cussing sealane defense at some length. 

For the sake of argument this analysis accepts the "worst 
case'* assumption of a Soviet campaign against Western Pacific 



uSSBS, The War Against Japanese Transportation (hereafter 
Transportation ) , op . cit . (note 1-55) » P« 6. 

^fccGwire, op_. cit . (note 1 — 54) » has pointed to the 
unlikelihood of a submarine attack against NATO on the grounds 
of Soviet capabilities, requirements, national interests and 
intentions. Many of the same arguments operate in Japan's behalf 
as well. 



J02 



shipping around 1980. It already has been suggested that the 
U.S. would almost be forced to offer at least some assistance 
under these circumstances. The less intense, but perhaps even 
more dangerous case of sporadic attacks on widely dispersed 
merchantmen will be examined later. 

The crucial factor for Japan in a modern guerre de course 
would be time. Initial losses would be heavy, since the sub- 
marine fleets probably would be deployed prior to hostilities, 

O A 

and convoy systems could not be organized immediately. These 
sinkings, particularly if they included a few supertankers, would 
have a great psychological impact. Insurance and freight rates 
would be driven to extraordinary levels. Seamen might balk at 
serving. But the rapidity with which the overall economy would 
be affected will depend on a number of conditions. Among them 
are: (1) stockpiles, (2) austerity measures, (3) the availability 
of substitute materials, either domestically or from regions which 
are not cut off by the fighting, (4) the ability of the ship- 
building industry to replace losses, and (5) the effectiveness of 
defensive measures, taken either unilaterally or in concert with 
allies. 



O A 

The critical shipping situation faced by the Allies 
immediately after the resumption of unrestricted submarine war- 
fare in 1917 probably is a better analogy for a modern undersea 
campaign than the World War II experiences. In the latter case, 
nearly three years passed between the commencement of hostilities 
and the greatest submarine successes. The U-boats recorded their 
best hunting in 1941 and '42, while U.S. submarine sinkings 
peaked in 1944* 



303 



Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the defense of the 
sealanes is not an end in itself. The United States must keep 
the North Atlantic and Pacific open in order to fulfill its 
treaty commitments, as well as for its own security and com- 
mercial motives. Japan, on the other hand, needs only to be 
able to survive for the duration of a conflict. A combination 
of increased stockpiles, domestic conservation and a credible 
capability to protect at least part of her commerce may enable 
her to remain neutral in a war which is not specifically directed 
at her, and to hold out long enough for foreign help to arrive in 
one that is. 

Unclassified reports of U.S. war planning are difficult to 

come by. In the North Atlantic, however, a termination within 

25 

90 days is assumed. Under such conditions, in a NATO war in 

1980, it is expected that some 185 American merchantmen would be 

26 

sunk — from a total of about 450 U.S. flag vessels. The assump- 
tions and data underlying this study are not available r and it 
therefore is hazardous to extrapolate the results to the Pacific. 
However, a figure of about 200 ships lost in the first three 
months of a Pacific War also might be reasonable as a first 



25 

Blackwell Testimony, op_. cit . (note 1-52), pp. 58-69. 

26 

Ibid . Included are 43 containerships, 83 other dry 

cargo vessels, 39 tankers, and 20 older vessels from the reserve 
fleet. U.S. fleet total is a 1978 estimate from Kasputys, op . 
cit . , p. 162. 



304 

27 

approximation. One reason for this is indicated in Table 9~3» 

Note that the U.S. Pacific fleet and the MSDF comprise a rela- 
tively larger share of non-communist ASW units than the Soviet 

28 
Pacific Fleet does of socialist submarines. Moreover, in both 

oceans geography has been unkind to the USSR, with choke points 

at the entrance to the Baltic and the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland- 

UK) gap in the Atlantic, and at the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya 

Straits in the Pacific. Only Petropavlosk in Kamchatka faces 

the open ocean, and it is restricted by weather and logistics. 

Bases in the Kuriles could be developed or serviced by tenders, 

but there still would be logistics problems. 

Thus, though it would seem that fewer than 185 ships would 

be lost in the Pacific, a figure of 200 will be used to allow 

for LIS DP weaknesses and the possible diversion of U.S. assets to 

a simultaneous NATO crisis. This is a tremendous loss rate. 

Drawing from one projection of average ship size and numbers in 

29 

1980, 7 it would equate to over 3,900,000 GRT. By contrast, the 



27 

The Soviet decline is derived from the assumed phase-out 

of more than 120 diesel submarines (Q, W and Z classes) built 

during the mid-1950s. A replacement rate of 9 attack submarines 

a year was assumed, with the rest of Soviet attention being 

devoted to missile boats. 

28 

This assumes that USSR and PRC assets would not be addi- 
tive in an oceanic conflict in the near future. Were they to be, 
the geographic constraints on the USSR would be broken since, 
presumably, she also could use Chinese bases. 

29 

Bates and Yost, "Where Trends the Flow of Llerchant 

Ships," op. cit. (note 2-3), pp. 258-259. Data as follows: 



305 



Table 9-3 
A COMPARISON OF SUBMARINE AND ASW ASSETS IN THE NORTH 
ATLANTIC AND NORTH PACIFIC IN 1974 AND 1980 



Submarines (excluding FBMs) 



Atlantic 



USSR (Northern & Baltic Fleets) 
Warsaw Pact 



Pacific 

USSR (Pacific Fleet) 
PRC 



1214 

204 

6 

210 



75 

49 



(a) 



1980 



155 
6 

161 



55 
50 







ASW Units 










Carriers 


00 

Ocean v ' 


Sub» 


Carriers 








& Helo 


& Helo 


Ocean 


Sub- 




Carriers 


Escorts 


marines 


Carriers 


Escorts 


marines 


Atlantic 














U.S. 


7 


96 


39 


6 


94 


38 


Potential 


-z 


148 


100 


_^ 


152 


_28 


Allies(d) 


10 


244 


139 


11 


246 


135 


Pacific 














U.S. 


8 


96 


39 


6 


94 


38 


Japan 


__— 


45 


14 


, 


JA 


12 




8 


141 


53 


6 


148 


51 



Source: Jane's Fighting Ships , 1 974 _ 75 • 1980 figures estimated 
from probable fleet buildup programs and retirements of aging 
ships. U.S. assets distributed equally between Atlantic and 
Pacific — a reasonable assumption based on 1971 data. 

Notes: 

(a) Soviet Naval Developments , Chapters 22 and 23, give 155 and 
60 respectively for mid-1974 Soviet submarine strengths. 
1980 figures, however, are not markedly different. 

(b) CG(ex DLG), DDG, DD, FF or foreign equivalents 

(c) SSN, SSGN, SSG, SS. Coastal submarines included for those 
nations bordering choke points. 

(d) Britain, France (two- thirds only, assuming some Mediterranean 
commitment), Canada (two- thirds, assuming a Pacific squadron), 
Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, Norway, Denmark. 



506 



heaviest losses which Japan suffered to submarines during an 

equivalent period in World War II were 1 64 ships of 756,000 

30 
tons . 

Even in the unlikely case that the full weight of the 

attack fell on Japanese shipping it is not the magnitude of the 

loss alone which must be considered. It is submitted that the 

important issues are (a) the amount of the loss as a percent of 

Japan's total transportation capacity and (b) the ability of her 

shipyards to replace it. The tonnage noted above comprises about 

10 percent of the 1973 Japanese merchant marine (presumably, it 

51 

would be a somewhat smaller part of the 1980 fleet ) and is 



Type Ship 

Tanker 
Bulk Carrier 
Container Ship 
General Cargo 



Avg.Size 

(cwt) 

75,000 

45,000 

13,500 

8,000 



io of 

Total No. 

19.5 

14.4 

7.8 

58.5 



Number 
Lost 

39 

23 

16 

117 



Tonnage 
Lost 

2,925,000 

1,260,000 

360,000 

936,000 



5,861,000 DWT 
equals about 3,926,800 GRT 

If the mix of lost ships was the same as the 1974 Japanese fleet 
proportion, the losses would total 4,825,000 GRT. Using the 
breakdown of U.S. projections given by Secretary Blackwell 
(extended to 200 ships) adds up to 3,447,000 GRT. 

*HJSSBS, Transportation , op. cit. (note 1-55), p. 47. The 
maximum sinkings occurred between August and October 1944' It is 
not clear whether this is GRT or DWT. 

31 

Although Japan's merchant tonnage is expected to increase 

in the next few years with the completion of large tankers and 

bulk carriers now on order, this trend eventually may be reversed 

as less profitable ships are sold off to foreign owners. It is 

probable, however, that the capacity of the 1980 fleet will be 

larger than today's, though its numbers may be smaller. 



307 



proportionately about half as much as the quarterly losses 
during 1944* However, at its wartime peak Japan's shipbuild- 
ing produced only about a half million tons annually, whereas 
the country's average quarterly output during 1973 was about 
3,900>000 GRT — nearly enough to replace the losses. Admittedly 
resource shortages eventually would curtail the building, but 
the backlog of nearly- completed ships probably would be enough 
to last through the first critical period. It also may be that 
the post-1977 volume of Japanese ship construction will be con- 
siderably less than during the recent heyday of the large 
tankers. Nevertheless, it almost certainly will continue to be 
a sizeable percentage of the expected sinkings. 

Other factors also work to Japan's advantage. There is no 

need today to support a war economy such as that which consumed 

33 
over 50 percent of GNP in 1 944- The number of hostile sub- 
marines will decline over time as they fall victim to mines and 

other hazards while returning to base, as well as by attrition 

34 
in mid-ocean engagements. Facilities for providing contact 



32 

Ibid . , p. 114* An average of 3*710,000 tons of Japanese 

merchant shipping was afloat at the time. 

33 

USSBS, War Economy , op . cit . (note 1-55)* P» 16. 

34 

The decline in her potential opponents' ability to build 

submarines rapidly is almost a mirror of her own increased ability 
to build merchant ships. Nuclear submarine production probably 
will not exceed two dozen boats per year and, although the con- 
struction of conventional units could be accelerated, no country 
or coalition is likely to match Hitler's 1943 figure of 281 new 
U-boats. MccGwire, "The Submarine Threat to Western Shipping, " 



308 



localization information from seabed hydrophones, satellites or 
radio-direction finding nets give on-scene ASW commanders better 
intelligence than they ever have had. 

None of this is to deny Japan's vulnerability at sea. 

Neither is it wise to base all calculations on a single 

35 
scenario. It can be argued that the probable weapons expendi- 
ture rates would exhaust both sides early in such a war, that 

the conflict would escalate, or even that the attacker would run 

36 

out of torpedoes before Japan ran out of ships. On the other 

hand, the engagement could drag out over an extended period of 



op . cit . (note 1-54) > P» 3, estimates that 50 or so diesel sub- 
marines might be turned out per year by the Soviets if priorities 
were so re-ordered. A separate Congressional reference to a 
study of a NATO war at sea (perhaps the same one cited by Secre- 
tary Blackwell) projects Soviet submarine losses at 70 to JQfo 
during the first 90 days. See U.S., Congress, Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy, Military Applications of Nuclear Technology , 
Part 2, 93 r d Cong., 1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 78. 

35 

This also has been one of the most important lessons of 

World War II for the Japanese. In that conflict her strategic 

planning was keyed too much to the concept of a single great 

fleet engagement a la Tsushima. See SenC Sadao, "A Chess Game 

with no Checkmate: Admiral Inoue and the Pacific War," Naval 

War College Review , XXVI (January-February 1974), PP» 26-39* 

36 

J As of July 1973 Japan had 4,171 ships larger than 1000 

deadweight tons. During 1944, the best year of the Second World 

War for U.S. submarines, 6,092 torpedoes were used to sink 548 

ships — over 11 fish per sinking. Even assuming that a modern 

submarine could average only 5 shots per successful attack, it 

still could take as many as 10,000 torpedoes to destroy half of 

Japan's merchant marine. Were each of the Soviet's 55 submarines 

to carry 24 torpedoes and replenish them once a month, at least 

seven months would be required even if the Soviets suffered no 

losses. If a net of five submarines a month could be removed 

from the order of battle, the campaign would terminate in about 



309 



time, in which case Japan would suffer severely. Indeed, the 
post-war effects of even the abbreviated campaign noted above 
would be traumatic. But the problem is not of the hopeless pro- 
portions in which it often is couched. 

(2) Some Possible Solutions 

In fiscal 1972, Japan imported over 512 million tons of 
cargo, mostly raw materials, including 118,785*000 tons of iron 

ore, 50,783,000 tons of coal, 256,832,000 kiloliters of petroleum 

37 

and over 12,000,000 tons of foodstuffs. At the same time, her 

merchant fleet contained 159 bulk cargo vessels of over 50,000 
GRT, totaling 12,600,000 deadweight tons (carrying capacity). 
The tanker portion included 149 similarly sized ships which com- 
bined to more than 18,500,000 DWT. 

If these vessels could be arranged into six convoys of 

about 50 ships each, capable of making eight round trips a 

39 
year, they could cariy 148,000,000 tons of petroleum 



11 months with the loss of about 40/'o of Japan's merchant fleet. 
In point of fact, even these losses probably are exaggerated, 
since it would be very difficult to maintain much more than 40 
to 50fo 01 the available submarines on station. 

37 

MITI, Statistics on Japanese I ndustries , 1973, PP« 76-79* 

Although these quantities probably will grow in the next few 
years — at least until conservation measures and the industrial 
re- structuring can take effect, their growth will be matched by 
the size of new cargo ships, thus reducing the need for 
additional bottoms. 

Japanese Shipowners Association, Review of Japanese 
Shipping , 1973 (Tokyo, 1974), p. 28. 

39 

Obviously, the convoys would be routed to different 



310 



(57-8 percent of peacetime imports) and 100,800,000 tons of bulk 
cargoes (about 55*6 percent of the raw materials listed). 
Although the MSDF only has 45 ocean escorts, it is submitted 

that meaningful protection could be provided for such convoys 

40 
through the use of unconventional concepts. 

One such idea is the U.S. Navy's ARAPAH0 project, which 
entails the placement of helicopters and containerized support 
facilities directly on the merchantmen themselves. At a cost 
of $3»5 to 4 million per package, exclusive of aircraft, nearly 
any large tanker or containership could be equipped to operate 
up to six helicopters or eventually V/STOLs. A particular ad- 
vantage of the system for Japan is that no special structural 



destinations, i.e. to the Persian Gulf for some oil, to Indonesia 
for some other, North America for grain, etc. Sight round trips 
per year corresponds to a 20-day voyage each way (including 
loading) with 45 days leeway for repairs, delay, etc. At 14 
knots (which 85;"'j of Japan's merchant fleet can exceed), the oil 
depot at Kiire is about 19 days from Kuwait and 8 days from 
Indonesia. Other major Pacific ports, from Long Beach to Sydney, 
are within 15 days of Yokohama. 

In a nuclear environment, concentrations of ships would 
be vulnerable to attack by IltE.Is or IviPJSI.is, especially if targeting 
could be done by satellite. The use of such weapons, however, 
would open the possibility of like reprisals against isolated 
bases such as Petropavlosk. (See LIccGwire, op_» cit . f paragraph 
J1 •) In any case, there is little that Japan could do except 
disperse the convoys under such circumstances. 

41 

See, for instance, J. J. I.lulquin, "ARAPAH0 — Emergency 

Helo Cover for Merchantmen," USNIP , XCIX (November 1973) » PP» 
113-117* with comments by H. E. Obedin in the I.Iarch 1974 issue, 
pp. 103-104. Also, I.lulquin, "The ARAPAH0 System and Its Impli- 
cations for Future Ship- Aviation Concept Development," Naval 
Engineers Journal , DQDCV (October 1973), pp. 25-34. 



311 



provisions axe needed for the host ships. Thus the political 
questions of getting approval from other Ministries or the com- 
panies concerned would not be necessary until a crisis actually 
arose. Moreover, much of the training could be accomplished 
ashore, perhaps even by reserve units, thus saving both fuel and 
family separation in peacetime. 

If ocean escorts with helicopter decks are in company, the 
effectiveness of the system would be increased severalfold. The 
difficult command and control problems of vectoring the heli- 
copters would be reduced. Long-range, hull-mounted sonars and 
the associated classification and signal processing equipment 
would be available. Moreover, by using the ARAPAHO platform 
primarily for maintenance (vice both maintenance and operations), 
the number of helicopters supported could be as high as ten or 
twelve. In short, a convoy with two or three suitably equipped 
merchantmen and about four escorts could operate perhaps twenty 
to twenty- five helicopters. Moreover, this capability could be 
acquired for less than the cost of one additional escort. 

This is not an argument for the immediate suspension of 



4 T?he new 5,200 ton DDH ordered by the LISDF in FY 1975 will 
cost ¥44,372,000,000 (about $148 million). 6 HSS-2 anti-sub- 
marine helicopters also are budgeted at around $4»5 million each 
(¥8,173 million for 6). At $4 million per ARAPAHO package, 3 
would cost $512 million. 25 helicopters would add $112.5 million, 
for a total of 124.5 million. 100 to 1 50 men would be required 
per package as compared with about 350 in a DDH crew. Alterna- 
tively, 2 ARAPAHO units and 15 helicopters would be about $75»5 
million vs. $86.2 million (¥25,830 million) for a 2,500 ton 
escort. 



312 



destroyer or frigate construction. In the first place, ARAPAHO 
works much more efficiently in conjunction with ocean escorts. 
Moreover, it will not become available much before 1978, even 
in U.S. hands. In the second, the warships are long-lead-time 
items whose numbers cannot be quickly augmented in an emergency. 
Finally, the 45 ships planned for the end of the Fourth Defense 

Plan will barely cover Japan's coastal defense needs, much less 

43 
those of convoy escort. However, under the assumption that 

the budgetary constraints on the MSDF will remain tight, such 

modular systems seem to offer promise for the qualitative 

improvements envisioned in the Post-Fourth Defense Plan period. 

It should be noted that air defense weapons also lend 

themselves to containerization. There are at least two 



Sekino Hideo has estimated that 32 destroyers and 
frigates (among other units) would be needed for coastal defense 
purposes ("Japan and Her Maritime Defense," op_. cit. [note 6-1], 
p. 121). This tallies closely with a study by a group of former 
Imperial Navy officers who concluded that the protection of small 
cargo ships in home waters would require 36 destroyers and 16 
aircraft. (Reported by Doba Hajime in the series "Maboroshi no 
Jishu B5ei" [Visionary Autonomous Defense], Yomiuri , June 15, 
1970.) Estimates of convoy defense needs have ranged from 78 
(Sekino, interview, December 6, 1974) to 54 (Doba article). 
Even accounting for new techniques which might reduce the number 
of escorts per convoy, and the possibility of refueling from the 
convoyed tankers themselves, 45 total escorts is a marginal 
figure. 

'Tor instance, the U.S. is considering a system tenta- 
tively known as Sentry. This would be a completely self-con- 
tained unit including radars, command and control facilities, 
and 16 vertically- launched missiles in a single container costing 
about $1 million. Alternatively, the Close In Weapon System 
(CIWS) might be adaptable. (Mr. Roland Baker, China Lake, tele- 
phone interview, October 18, 1974») 



313 



merchantmen sunk by SSMs (one of them Japanese) since 1970 which 
might have been saved by such devices. 

Discussions of a full-scale anti-shipping campaign _in vacuo 
have an aura of unreality somewhat akin to those concerning 
optimal strategies for a nuclear war. But the fact that some 
defenses can be provided is important insofar as it will reduce 
Japan's sense of insecurity which stems from her import depen- 
dence. Moreover, an ARAPAHO-like system would violate none of 
the restrictions against offensive weapons (since, almost by 
definition, it is a defensive arrangement) and could quickly be 
tailored to threats ranging from a blockade around the home 
islands to the distant harassment of passing ships. It also is 
compatible with neutral rights of self-defense and is ideally 
suited to Japan's primary maritime assets — her merchant fleet 
and commercial shipbuilding industry. 

There is, however, another potential hazard to Japan's 
shipping — a mine blockade. 

Mine Y/arfare 

On March 27, 1 945 » B-29 mine laying operations were begun 
in Japanese ports and inland waterways, particularly around the 
strategic Shimonoseki Strait between Honshu and Kyushu. A post- 
war analysis concluded that: 

. . . this campaign, begun earlier and laid on with 
greater weight, would have reduced effective ship- 
ping nearly to the vanishing point. 45 



45 



USSBS, Transportation , op. eft. (note 1~55)» P« 8. 



314 



Waterborne transport in pre-war Japan carried about two- 
thirds of domestic trade, with nearly all the remainder going by 
railroad. The post-war years have seen a dramatic increase in 
road traffic: 



Railroad (<fo) 
Motor Car ($) 
Ship (<?o) 

Total (10 ton-km) 



Table 


9-4 






DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION 


SHARES 




1?55 




1965 


1972 


52.9 
11.6 

35.5 




30.7 
26.0 

43.3 


17.4 

44.7 
37.9 



81,786 



186,343 



343,390 



Source: Review of Ja panese Shipping 1973 , P» 34, a^d Un-yu 
Keizai Kenkyu. Center, Un-yu Keizai Zusetsu Showa 49 , 
p. 11. 



Nevertheless, a mining campaign, conducted either from aircraft 
or submarines, could disrupt Japanese shipping as quickly, and 
much more cheaply, than a submarine offensive. The MSDF is 

well trained and equipped for minesweeping work, but it took the 

U.S. Navy several weeks to clear its own mines from North Vietna- 
mese ports, and a number of months to locate and identify all the 
debris in the Northern Suez Canal. Thus major dislocations could 



46 
47, 



Ibid ., pp. 17, 28. 



Harassment might even be done by using ocean currents to 
carry floating mines. 



315 



be expected from even a sporadic application of sophisticated 
mines. Sweeping helicopters or special mine-hunting craft 
might be partial answers, but the job inevitably will be tedious. 
On the other hand, mines or devices like the U.S. Navy's Captor 
(encapsulated torpedo) also can make the straits around Japan 
very hazardous for foreign submarines. 

Divisive/intimidating Actions 

Perhaps more likely than direct threats to the nation or 
the sealanes would be pressures designed to create uncertainty, 
undermine morale and increase domestic divisions. Such acts 
might include sporadic attacks on Japanese ships or ships bound 
for Japan, naval demonstrations or harassment of economic 
activities overseas or offshore. 

These would be very difficult to guard against. For one 

thing, if kept to a low enough intensity, they might not invoke 

49 
foreign assistance. For another, being more-or-less random, 

guerrilla-like activities away from Japan itself, they would be 

beyond the capabilities of the SDF. 

However, the creation of such disharmony in Japanese 



The complexity of modern mines should not be underesti- 
mated. In addition to fuzes which are triggered by magnetism, 
noise, pressure, or combinations thereof, there also are timers 
to turn the weapons on and off, ship counters to allow the 
sweepers to pass before activation, and other exotic features. 

49 

The U.S. is not legally bound by the Security Treaty to 

come to the defense of Japanese merchantmen, for instance. 



316 



society would be more difficult than in most other states. 
Vertical dissensions (i.e. between industries or factions) would 
come more easily than horizontal splits between classes. 

Tactics for such a strategy might include sanctions 
directed against a whole range of Japanese interests in specific 

reprisal for the policies of one industrial group or political 

50 

leader. Presumably only revolutionary governments or terrorist 

groups would acknowledge such acts, but more established govern- 
ments also could proceed clandestinely. Alternatively, specific 
companies or activities could be singled out to pay for the 
"sins" of Japanese exploitation in general. By themselves, such 
activities probably would not have much immediate impact, but 
they could aggravate existing internal tensions and heighten 
Japan's sense of isolation if no one comes to her aid. 

Physical damage need not be inflicted to make an iinpression- 

at least not at first. The sighting of submarines near potential 

51 
targets could be very unsettling. Similarly, the difficulties 



50 

It has been suggested, for instance, that during the 1972 

textile problems with the U.S., the Japanese textile manufac- 
turers found themselves domestically isolated by prospects of 
American import restrictions which would have affected other pro- 
ducts as well. Although it is not clear that Washington had 
sought this result consciously, it was advantageous to the U.S. 
position. 

51 

The prevailing hypothesis that submarines have little 

use in presence roles deserves to be challenged. In peacetime 
the either/or nature of a submarine's weaponry lowers its credi- 
bility in the eyes of informed observers. The submarine can, 
however, have great impact on popular thinking, if only for short 
periods. Soviet submarines in Cuba made the front pages of U.S. 



317 



of sinking modern tankers or bulk carriers offers the possibility 
of graduated applications of force, i.e. using only one or two 
torpedoes to damage, rather than destroy. 

The best that Japan might be able to do under these circum- 
stances would be to organize potential targets into convoys to 
at least improve the chances for survival of the crews of ships 
which might be hit. Point-defense systems or AELAPAHO- type suits 
could be helpful if the danger were geographically localized, 
but could hardly be bought in sufficient quantities to counter 
sporadic threats in widespread areas. 

V/hether or not any of these acts would be unifying, 
divisive or intimidating cannot be known in advance. The equip- 
ment needed to counter them, however, generally would be included 



newspapers on several occasions in the late 1960s and 70s. Dis- 
coveries of suspicious craft in Scandinavian fjords also have 
been widely reported. In times of terrorism, the emotional 
response to sightings of unidentified submarines in local waters 
or near shipping routes could significantly influence decision- 
making. This would be particularly true in a nation as sensitive 
about her sealanes as Japan. 

J In October 1974, the 40,000 DWT Liquified Petroleum Gas 
(LPG) tanker Yuyo Maru #10 was set afire in a collision near 
Tokyo. Since the ship would have burned for months, it was 
decided that the MSDF would sink it. LPG being much lighter 
than water, shellfire was used on the afternoon of November 27 
to open up escape holes and accelerate burning. The following 
morning two torpedoes were fired to encourage flooding (two more 
failed to hit) . The coup de grace then was administered by 
additional shellfire. Even admitting the special problems of 
LPG, it is easy to visualize the difficulties of dispatching a 
VLCC by torpedoes alone. Indeed, perhaps the optimal wartime 
tactic against such ships would be to use one or two fish to 
enflame or disable them rather than try for actual sinkings. 



318 



in that designed for more intense threats. 

Threats Which Promote Revolution or Social Unrest 

Except for infiltration by sea, such threats fall mostly 
outside of the province of the MSDF. As noted earlier, Japan 1 s 
27,000 km coastline would be difficult to defend in wartime. In 
peacetime, with the myriads of fishing craft and coastal ships, 
the assured interception of smugglers or infiltrators is 
impossible. 

Nevertheless, there are some possible countermeasures. 
(1) Coastal surveillance radars should be improved. This ought 
to be done anyway in conjunction with the 12-mile territorial 
sea and the establishment of traffic separation lanes. (2) More 
fast patrol boats would be useful. Although hydrofoils might be 
better suited to open-water operations, their rather deep draft 

while transitioning between foilbome and hullborne modes could 

53 
limit their effectiveness close to the beach. All-in-all, 

some sort of fast launches or hovercraft might be more suitable. 

Finally, (3) the general scope of Japan's intelligence activities 

should be expanded. This, of course, would suit a variety of 

other purposes as well. 



S3 

-^The NATO Patrol Hydrofoil, for instance, draws only 2 

meters with its foils retracted, but must extend them to nearly 

7 meters prior to flight. 



519 



Defense of the Economic Zone 

The extent of a Japanese 200-mile claim has been outlined 
in Chapter Seven. Whatever the timing of the legal declaration* 
Japan's exploitation of the continental shelf and coastal zone 
will make her adjacent seas even more important than they have 
been to date. The extent to which these activities can supply 
the economy's demands will be explored in the next chapter. It 
does seem, however, that the national resource base will be 
significantly enhanced. Moreover, the additional space probably 
will come to be cherished for its own sake. 

In sum, there are ample economic and psychological reasons 
why the Japanese will resent infringements on their economic 
zone once it is declared. Moreover, nearly all of the states to 
the west have defined their own ocean areas in ways which are at 
variance with Japan's. At present, South Korea is almost the 
only country with which Tokyo could safely let a conflict arise, 
but whether or not this balance of more important interests will 
continue to restrain oceanic disputes is questionable. In any 
case, defense of a 200-mile claim and ocean development struc- 
tures will pose special problems for the SDF. 

It is about 400 kilometers from Naha airport to the Yaeyama 
Retto where Japanese oil exploration now is underway. Some of 
these same islands are only 110 kilometers from Taiwan and about 
320 from the coast of mainland China. Indeed, they lie within 



320 



54 
the Taiwan ADIZ. Japan's F4EJs are better aircraft than the 

F5s and F104s of Nationalist China, and the locally- built 

fighters of the People's Republic. There also are differences 

in pilot training and logistics, but the Japanese aircraft do 

depend on ground- control facilities. As noted above, warships 

could be valuable as air control units away from the Home Islands 

55 

particularly if they are fitted with computer-aided equipment. 

Such a capability might be a necessary backdrop to any negoti- 
ations in the area. As has been noted with regard to the 
Senkaku island ownership: 

. . . [the] controversy is essentially a political 
one that is being argued in the more polite language 
of international law and diplomacy. No territorial 
issue between East Asian states has ever been 
settled in this way . . . .56 



54 

Air Defense Identification Zone, a unilaterally imposed 

area in which aircraft must identify themselves. The Japanese 

and Taiwanese ADIZ overlap in this region. 

55 
Examples were noted in Chapter One. One illustration of 

the capabilities of such a system was provided by NTDS in the 
Gulf of Tonkin. Computer-equipped frigates and cruisers were 
assigned to a station known as PIRAZ (Positive Identification 
Radar Advisory Zone) well north of the carriers on Yankee Station. 
The ships were able to keep track of U.S. aircraft over the Gulf 
(which sometimes numbered more than 100), weed out enemy air- 
craft, if any, from returning U.S. strikes and vector fighters 
to several dozen intercepts. In addition they accounted for a 
number of MIGs with their own missiles and operated search and 
rescue (SAR) helicopters. See G. Lockee, "PIRAZ," USNIP, XCV 
(April 1969), pp. 100-102. While the LISDF is not likely to have 
the resources to conduct PIRAZ- type operations, automated infor- 
mation systems are planned for future units. 

* Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters," op_. cit. (note 7-39), 
p. 257. 



321 



Aside from disputes at the borders of the economic zone, 
offshore drilling platforms, pipelines, seabed mining equipment 
and, of course, fishing boats also are vulnerable to attack or 

harassment. NATO is worried about this in regard to the North 

57 
Sea fields. Among the defenses which have been considered are 

fast patrol craft, ready-alert heliborne units or VTOL aircraft 

based on offshore platforms, and increased reconnaissance. Once 

again, an air-tight shield is impossible, but some security 

improvements can be made. 

Naval Power as a Bargaining Chip 

Instead of starting the development of advanced strategic 
weapon systems, Japan can use the threat of a qualitative change 
in defense policy itself for international leverage. This is 
perhaps more true in the nuclear sphere than in the naval one 
(indeed, the advantages derived from the threat of nuclearization 
has been advanced as one argument for not closing the option by 
ratifying NPT), but some influence might be possible nonetheless. 
Abrogation of the Security Treaty, or the removal of the U.S. 
bases would bring Japan's actions under closer scrutiny through- 
out the Far East. Announcement of plans for nuclear submarines 
or helicopter carriers might then somehow be linked to negoti- 
ations with Washington, Peking, Moscow, or even Southeast Asia. 



57 

J New York Times , December 25, 1974- 



322 



Summary 

While it is difficult to postulate a single most likely 
threat for the MSDP to prepare for, the range of possibilities 
is broad enough to suggest that future force levels should be 
keyed to balance and flexibility. The limits of conventional 
warship design can go only so far in providing such options at 
reasonable cost. 

Containerized defensive systems for merchantmen have uses 
ranging from local instabilities to full-scale wars against ship- 
ping. Ocean escorts are complementary to such systems in many 
cases. Indeed, they are the most flexible units which the MSDF 
could acquire under its present constraints, although they are 
becoming prohibitively expensive. Their effectiveness could be 
greatly improved by the addition of tactical data systems and 
three-dimensional radars, and the upgrading of aircraft facili- 
ties to handle manned helicopters and RPVs. Nuclear submarines 
might become politically possible in the 1980s. Wixhout an 
increase in budget, however, the increased effectiveness of the 
SSN might be outweighted by its additional costs. The present 
emphasis on minesweeping must be continued, and new equipment 
procured to deal with modern devices. 

Surface skimming patrol craft would have great advantages 
in invasion defense, policing of the economic zone and rapid 
reaction missions. If surface effect ships or hovercraft develop 
rapidly enough, they might fill both offshore and inshore roles. 



323 



Hydrofoils, however, probably would have to be supplemented by 
displacement-hull patrol boats in restricted waters. Surveil- 
lance radars will be needed for defense and safe navigation in 
the economic zone. Hydrophone and sensor technology should be 
developed to improve intelligence-gathering capabilities and 
initial contact localization. In turn, this will necessitate 
a more sophisticated command and control system, both to handle 
the increased volume of data and to cover the expanded area of 
operations. Provisions also must be made to upgrade the elec- 
tronic warfare capabilities of individual units and to ensure 
the ability of communications systems to operate in an intense 
EW environment. 

In a longer term, v/STOL aircraft eventually will be neces- 
sary for ships or offshore platforms. Although new weapon 
systems should be planned to include better domestic logistics 
support than has been provided to date, the basic philosophy of 
emphasizing long lead-time hardware still seems to be valid. 
Should the international climate deteriorate, however, the focus 
should be shifted to develop the full potential of existing 
equipment before continuing with expansion. 



Chapter 10 
THE NON-MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF JAPANESE SEAPOWER 

Japan probably makes more intensive use of the seas than 
any other state. Her shipbuilding has led the world for nearly 
two decades and completely dominated all competition in recent 
years. The Japanese merchant marine ranks second only to the 
Liberian flag of convenience in tonnage. Her fishing industry 

has been characterized as "the most important, diversified, 

1 

extensive and far ranging in the world." 

To date, these ocean economic interests have been largely 
apolitical — particularly because of Tokyo's continuing efforts 
to separate them from diplomatic problems. With the advent of 
resource shortages, economic warfare, and the changing marine 
political climate, however, the commercial elements of Japan's 

seapower can have important political uses. The first of these 
is protective — those ocean resources and marine services under 
Japan's control can help to insulate her from pressures applied 
by other states or non-national groups. The second is acquisi- 
tive — maritime capital and expertise can be traded for resources. 



United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Country Fishery Profiles, 1972. 



524 



325 



Finally there is the potential for suasive applications of com- 
mercial seapower. This is an aspect little explored to date, 
but it holds some promise should Japan choose to exercise it. 

The Scope of Japan's Commercial Ocean Interests 

Shipping 

The Japanese merchant marine consisted of 9,459 vessels of 

2 

36,790,000 GRT in March 1 974- Over three-quarters of this ton- 
nage was accounted for by tankers and bulk carriers — rather above 
the world average of about 67 percent (see Table 2-1 ). An 
additional 711 ships of 15,070,000 GET were on charter. During 
Fiscal 1973? Japanese ships and charters carried 319,200,000 tons 

of cargo. 26.6 percent of her exports, and 43*7 percent of 

3 

imports were loaded in domestic bottoms. This share has been 

declining for several years and it is doubtful that the Govern- 
ment target of 50 percent ever will be met. Nonetheless, the 
1973 figures do represent a 21 percent increase in absolute 
volume . 

Although Japanese shipping earned over 3 billion dollars 

4 
in 1973, her maritime transportation international payments 



Ministry of Transport, Transportation 77hite Paper , 1974* 

nJnyusho, Kaiun Koku (Shipping Bureau, Ministry of Trans- 
port) , Ninon Kaiun no Genkyo (Present Condition of Japanese 
Shipping), TokyS, July 20, 1974, p. 21. By contrast the 1973 
U.S. flag share of American trade was 6.4/^, totaling 40 million 
tons. (Blackwell Testimony, op_. cit . (note 1-52), p. 7.) 

TCaiun no Genkyo , p. 23. 



326 



balance was in deficit by 1,707 million dollars in the same 

5 
period. This situation probably will worsen in the years ahead, 

for Japan 1 s merchant marine is faced with a number of serious 

problems. In the short run, there are the current inflationary 

pressures, and weaknesses in the international shipping market. 

In the longer term, however, Japanese shipowners are particularly 

vulnerable to the worldwide changes in the marine political 

climate described in Chapter Three. Those pertaining to merchant 

shipping include: 

(1) Flag discrimination by developing countries. 

(2) Possible navigation restrictions from broader 
coastal state law of the sea claims. 

(3) Marine anti-pollution regulations. 
Counter-measures for each of these are being considered. 

Despite some reservations, notably on the dispute settlement pro- 
visions, Japan voted for the Declaration of Principles at the 
Geneva Liner Conference. This was partly designed to improve 
relations with the Third World. More important, however, was the 
fact that a guaranteed 50 percent share in bilateral trade (40 

percent where third country ships are involved), would be advan- 

7 
tageous if present trends continue. Nonetheless, the convention 



^Nihon Kai.ji , June 10, 1974. 

Maritime wage hikes averaged 41»5/J in the 1974 Spring 
Offensive. The increase in operating costs due to these raises 
is expected to vary from 5% i* 1 the case of VLCCs, to nearly 30/£ 
for conventional cargo ships. In the case of the more labor in- 
tensive coastal vessels, it is even higher. Ninon Keizai , April 
19, 1974. 

' Asahi , March 13, 1974. 



327 



will not be effective for several years, and in the interim the 
Ministry of Transport is preparing options for legal retaliation 
in the event of excessive damage to Japanese interests. 

The principal victims of the law of the sea claims will he 
the large tankers upon which Japan's economy is so dependent. 
The restrictions on the Straits of Malacca already have been 
described (Chapter Three). Nevertheless, unless the entire 

Indonesian archipelago were totally closed to tankers, the 

9 
economic impact will not be excessive. It also is probable 

that drastic limitations would be necessary to justify the long- 

10 
delayed Kra canal. The Showa Maru incident, however, may have 



Some of the measures under consideration were listed in 
Mihon Keizai, April 16, 1974. 

9 
In late 1974 a 250,000 ton Japanese tanker cost about 

¥10 million per day — about $33)000. (Data provided by U.S. 

Maritime Administration, Tokyo.) The voyage from the Persian 

Gulf to Japan is about 6,800 miles via the Malacca Strait (the 

shortest course), 8,000 via the Lombok Strait, and 14*000 south 

of Australia. This translates to about 7 extra days (at 15 knots) 

on a round trip via Lombok or 40 days via the southern route. At 

$10 per barrel (and roughly 7 barrels per ton), the value of a 

250,000-ton load would be about $17, 500,000.^ Thus the added 

transportation costs would come to only 1.3$ of the value of the 

cargo for the first alternative, or 7«5?° fo r the second. Clearly, 

these figures will vary. Smaller tankers, for instance, would 

cost more. The increased value of oil inventories tied up during 

the longer voyages also must be considered. Although even the 

sum of these costs might not make too much difference for the 

Lombok route (note Japan' s willingness to re-route her ships 

after the Showa Maru grounding), they could become significant 

on the Australian transit, especially given the narrow profit 

margins of Japanese firms. 

10 

Several construction plans for a canal across Thailand's 

Kra isthmus have been drawn up since the project first was pro- 
posed in the 19th century. Some schemes involve nuclear 



328 



11 
given impetus to a pipeline across the isthmus. 

Japan has begun to revise her pollution laws to reduce the 
vulnerability of her ovm ships to foreign pressures. They also 
may facilitate counter-measures on others' vessels in her waters. 

In addition to these political problems, there also are 
structural difficulties. These include the reduced efficiency 
of existing general cargo liners in the face of containerization, 
and the planned restructuring of the Japanese economy towards 
service industries and reduced dependence on raw materials 
imports. 

It is not clear how the shipping industry will cope with 
these changes, particularly the latter. However, the merchant 
marine is too important to a maritime nation like Japan to let 
it die. Suggested directions have included less emphasis on 
tankers and more on oil product carriers, refrigerated vessels 

to import fish, containerships and self-propelled petroleum 

12 

drilling ships. Nuclear ship development received a serious 



explosives, which has made Japanese participation sensitive. For 
some of the analyses, see Kra Canal Project, "Preliminary Survey 
Report: A Summary," Revision 5 (Bangkok: K. Y. Chow, April 30, 
1974) and Patrick Low and Yeung Yue-man, The Proposed Kra, Canal : 
A Critical Evaluation and Its Impact on Singapore (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, February 1 973) • 

11 

NKIW , January 14, 1 975? P« 4» suggests that Saudi Arabian 

interests may provide the capital for a CTS and pipeline. 

12 

See the excellent 25th anniversary supplement to the 

Shipping and Tra.de News (Tokyo, October 25, 1974) for a review 
of the development of Japan's shipping and shipbuilding indus- 
tries and discussions of their future. Particularly, in this 
context, see the panel discussion on pp. 67-70. 



329 



13 
setback from the Mutsu debacle, but could be revived if world 

trends pointed in that direction. Perhaps even more certain, 

and revolutionary, will be the multi-nationalization of the 

industry. Profitability could be increased by the use of 

14 
foreign subsidiaries, "tie-in" ships and a mixture of Japanese 

and foreign crews. In turn, this may give the companies con- 
cerned broader interests than those of Japan alone. As one ship- 
ping executive noted: 

... I think the Japanese Merchant Marine from now 
on should become more international. I think it is 
nonsensical for unarmed Japan to adhere to such . _ 
narrow concepts as Japanese territory or nationalism. 

Such developments would make it progressively more difficult 

to justify the commitment of the USE or SDP in defense of 

merchantmen with suspect loyalties. 



1 3 

The sea trials of Japan's first nuclear powered ship, 

Mutsu, were delayed for nearly too years by fishermen in her 
homeport, who feared that their market would be damaged by con- 
tamination, or even rumors of it. In August 1974 the ship 
finally put to sea, only to develop a reactor leak due to gross 
engineering defects. In the ensuing uproar, she was refused 
re-entry to Japanese ports and drifted for over seven weeks 
before arrangements were made to bring her in. As of January 
1975 her fate is undecided, with suggestions ranging from 
reactor shielding improvements to scuttling. 

"Tie-in" (Shikumisen) and "Charter- back" arrangements 
are ways of maintaining control of bottoms under less-expensive 
foreign flags. See Bruce Littman, "How the 'Shikumisen' Deal 
Works," Seatrade, December 1973, pp. 137-138. 

15 

Kikuchi Shojiro, President of Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Ltd. 

(NYK Line), in Shipping and Trade Hews Supplement, op_. cit . , 
p. 70. 



330 



Shipbuilding 

No less than 49*8 percent of worldwide ship construction 

16 
was launched from Japanese yards during 1973* Ship sales alone 

accounted for more than 10 percent of export earnings, second 

17 
only to steel. The industry continued the spectacular rebound 

begun in 1972, and by the end of fiscal 1973 (March 1974), a 

backlog of 630 vessels of over 50 million gross tons was on order, 

mostly for export. This should keep the yards busy well into 

1978. 18 

Forecasts, however, were not so bright as recent performance 

As noted earlier, the world shipping market is weak, and there is 

a widespread feeling that shipowners everywhere may have over- 

19 
booked during 1973* The oil crisis and potential reopening of 

Suez also have undercut the market for VLCCs and ULCCs which had 

20 
been counted on for much of future business. Japanese yard3 



1 £ 

Japan Times , February 28, 1974* 

1 7 
'Tsusansho (MITl), 1974 Tsilsho Hakusho (1974 International 

Trade White Paper), Yoyakulian Shiryos hu (an) (Lata Summary 

Volume — draft), Tokyo, June 1974, Figure 12. This was up from 

about Tfo in 1972. 

18 

Japan Times, April 20, 1974* 

19 

Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Annual Report 1 974 * 

Reported in MLN, April 4, 1974. 

20 

Japan Times, Japan's Shipbuilding and Shipping , 1974 

Survey , May 1974, P« 8. Also Shipping and Trade I Jews , Supple- 
ment, op_. cit . According to figures published in Zosen , new 
monthly orders for export ships had fallen from over 2,^00,000 
tons in January 1974 "to about 250,000 tons in September. 



331 



have been hard hit by inflationary pressures, and these have cur- 
tailed expansion plans (especially for very large dry docks) as 
well as upsetting previous contracts. However such problems were 
common to most other major shipbuilding countries, so Japan's 
relative competitive position will not suffer too badly. Foreign 
leads in sophisticated product carriers, such as LKG Tankers were 
worrisome, however, as was the possibility of EEC or U.S. counter- 
measures. 

Another potential threat is from the growing shipbuilding 
and ship repair industries in the developing countries. South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore all have made sizeable commitments 
in this field. Spain and Portugal also have been attracting 
business which once went to Japanese yards. 

It is likely that the construction of relatively simple 
craft and those below 100,000 tons will cease to be profitable 
in Japan. Nevertheless, the industry has shown remarkable 
resilience in the past, and tliis is likely to continue. More- 
over, despite their lower labor costs, developing country ship- 
yards cannot match the skill of Japan's labor pool, her advanced 
technology, and the integrated industrial structure which 
enables her to produce both hulls and machinery for a variety 
of ships. 

Japan is fortunate in that the current backlog of orders 



21 

Ninon Keizai , June 8, 1974* 



332 



will give her managers tine to evaluate future prospects before 

22 

committing themselves. The future of her shipbuilding, how- 
ever, would seem to be in a combination of advanced designs and 

overseas movement. Among the former may well be oil product 

23 
carriers, super-automated ships and ocean engineering structures. 

These are consistent with the needs of the merchant marine, noted 
earlier. Joint ventures and technological assistance programs 
already are well under way, originally in Brazil and East Asia, 
and now increasingly in the Middle East. Such offshore invest- 
ments have been dictated not only by the lack of land in Japan 
itself, but also by the planned foreign diversification of the 
steel industry. 

It is possible that this construction will come to include 
export warships, but such ships probably would not amount to more 
than a small fraction of total work. 

Fisheries 

Well over 50 percent of the animal protein in the Japanese 



see the round-table discussion in the Stripping and Trade 
News Supplement, op_. cit . , pp. 98-102. Note also, however, that 
many of these orders have become unprofitable because of higher 
building costs. 

^NKIYT , July 2, 1974, p. 4. Mitsui Shipbuilding has 
received orders for a total of four dynamically positioned 
drilling rigs in six months. The boom comes when "the business 
of its shipbuilding division is dulling." (NKIW , July 16, 1 974> 
p. 9)» This development has been serious enough to prompt U.S. 
shipbuilders, who now lead the world in such structures, to con- 
sider legislative countermeasures. (Official of the Shipbuilders 
Association of America, interview, October 9> 1 97 4 • ) The Mitsu- 
bishi shipyard in Nagasaki also is assembling the first full-scale 
floating city (Aquapolis) for Expo 75 in Okinawa. 



333 



diet comes from the sea. The annual catch is the world's most 
valuable, and overtook Peru's in tonnage when the latter 's 
anchovy industry was devastated by over-fishing and a shift in 
the Humboldt Current. 

Pelagic (distant water and offshore) fisheries account for 
some 70 percent by weight and 50 percent by value of the Japanese 
catch. These are mostly large-scale, technologically intensive 
operations under the control of a few influential companies. 
Government regulation is maintained by licenses issued through 
the Fisheries Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
which are designed to discourage over- investment and prevent 
species over-fishing. 

Neritic (coastal) fisheries include family, cooperative or 
corporate operations and bring in about 30 percent of the total 
harvest value. Small unit fishing is tightly controlled at the 
prefectural level where it has considerable political power. 

Large coastal vessels, notably purse seiners, usually belong to 

24 
corporate interests and are regulated at the national level. 

The remainder of the fishing industry is comprised of 
aquaculture and fresh water operations. Whaling is a separate 
issue and will be considered later. 

The 1972 catch was a record, exceeding 10 million metric 



%. C. Harrington, "Operation of the Japanese Fishery 
Management System," in A. R. Tussing, T. A. Liorehouse and J. D. 
Babb, Jr., eds., Alaska Fisheries Policy (university of Alaska, 
1970), pp. 419-442. 



334 



tons for the first time. Japanese fleets range worldwide, driven 

by a population which eats more than four times as much fish as 

25 

the world average. Their technology is superb, and is sup- 
ported by extensive research efforts. Yet nearly all sectors 

of Japanese fishing- face troubled futures. 

26 

The problems are fourfold. 

(1) Domestic demand for marine products has become 
larger and more diversified than domestic sup- 
plies, thus increasing reliance on imports. 

(2) Pollution has seriously affected coastal 
fisheries and aquaculture. 

(3) The international acceptance of the 200-mile 
economic zone could affect up to 80 percent of 
the pelagic catch. 

(4) Inflation and the sharp increase in fuel prices, 
as well as a shortage of fisheries product 
material, have reduced fishermen's profit 
margins 



• • • • 



In the first case, the demand/supply imbalance is not 
readily correctable by market forces. Demand has centered on 
medium and high grade fish (such as tuna), delicacies like shell- 
fish or shrimp, and fishmeal for livestock. Largely because of 
its efforts to meet this demand, coastal fisheries diversifica- 
tion has stagnated, with some species coming close to being over- 
fished. It may be that government efforts to promote aquaculture 



25 

Food and People , XVI. 

26 

Asahi (eve), April 12, 1 974» report on FY 1973> Fisheries 

White Paper. Original in Suisancho, hen (Fisheries Agency, ed.), 

GyoKyo Hakusho Showa 48 ("Fishing Industry White Paper FY 1973") > 

T5kyo, 1974, PP. 4-5. 



335 



27 
and the world-wide need to develop new ocean resources, will 

send Japanese fishermen in search of other species which eventu- 
ally will satisfy Japanese consumers. Virtually all forecasts, 

however, show a continued increase in imports for the next few 
28 



years. 



In the "battle against pollution in Japan, some isolated 



29 
progress has been made. But the overall problem is far from 

30 
being solved, and actually may be getting worse. During fiscal 

1972, 345 claims (1.1 times those in fiscal 1971) were filed for 
damages, but the amount of the damages was 115*9 billion yen, up 
3.1 times from those of the previous year. The disastrous 1974 
oil spill in the inland sea will seriously affect mariculture in 
the area. From the standpoint of coastal fisheries, the intensi- 
fied search for oil and minerals on the continental shelf can 
only compound the problem. If previous negotiations are any 
guide, a compromise eventually will be reached which will permit 



27 

Particularly the Antarctic krill which may lead to a 

doubling of the world's catch. See also Suisancho Kenkyu bu 

(Fisheries Agency, Research and Development Section), Shinkai 

Gyo .jo Kai hat sura Suishin Hosaku Kenkyukai Hokoku ("Research 

Society Report on Promotion Plan for Deep Sea Fishery Grounds 

Development") (Tokyo, July 1974). 

Fisheries White Pape r, crp_» cit. , p. 67 • 

29 

Some fish reportedly have returned to the once- barren 

waters around Enoshiiaa, and the production of mackerel-pike and 
sardines has revived. 

30 
Note the massive oil spill which devastated inland sea 

fisheries in December 1974* 



336 



seabed exploitation in exchange for the generous compensation of 
local fishermen. But a quick resolution is unlikely. 

To date, Japanese ocean fishing has been regulated through 
a host of regional fisheries and bilateral treaties. The 
latter mostly have been spawned by extensions of coastal state 
jurisdiction. Typically, Japan either has established joint 
ventures with developing country partners, or has arranged to 
pay some sort of license fee for the privilege of fishing. Two 
factors, however, are likely to complicate these arrangements. 
The first is a proliferation of 200-mile claims, largely legiti- 
mated at Caracas whether or not a formal treaty ever becomes 
effective. The second is a general trend towards resources 
nationalism, which is likely to intensify if a food crisis 
approaches. 

Most attention with regard to 200-mile economic zones has 
focused on the developing countries. Despite their high visi- 
bility, however, only about 370,000 tons of fish a year are 

caught off the coasts of Africa, South America and Southeast 

32 
Asia. By far the largest part of the endangered catch comes 

from the North Atlantic and North Pacific, the Sea of Japan and 

33 

the East China Sea. The principal adversaries thus are not 



31 

These are listed in Suisancho, Suissn Tokei Shihy o #4 

(Fisheries Statistics Index £4) (Tokyo, June 1974) > p. 102. 

fliho n Keizai (ed.), June 3> 1 974* 

33 

On a species basis, a 200-mile limit would affect some 



337 



the developing countries (except for China and Korea). Rather, 
they are the USSR, Canada and the United States, with whom 
fisheries negotiations have been conducted almost continuously 
since the 1950s* It is here, rather than in the Third World, 
that resources nationalism poses the greatest hardship for 
Japanese fishermen. 

Fourth, the rapid rate of inflation has had a serious 

34 
impact on fishing operations at all levels. In general, fish 

culture has become increasingly profitable, while boat operators 

have been rather hard hit. In mid-1973 the number of fishermen 

35 

was 508, 200, a figure which has been declining since 1 9^4* 

Fishing in Japan is supported by an extensive scientific 
research organization; public, corporate and academic, at the 
national and perfectural levels. In fiscal 1974? excluding the 
funding for the Okinawa Ocean Expo, the Fishery Agency received 

the largest share of the Government's marine development budget — 

36 
as it has in previous years. In addition to improving ship 

and equipment design there are intensive efforts underway to 



40/S of the tuna catch, and JCF/o of that of prawns, cuttlefish and 
pollack. A total of about 4*5 million tons. Fisheries Agency 
Data. 

Suisan Keizai , January 9> 1974* 

35 

Fisheries W hite Paper, op . eft. (introduction), p. 12. 

36 

JAuiSTEC, Governm enta l M arine Development Program (by 

gener al account ) of Japan for 1974 Fisca l Year, by_ Ministerial 
Agency (hereafter IJDP 74 j, Yokosuka, April 1974 (mimeo) . 



338 



37 

promote the optimum usage of living ocean resources. 

Aquaculture, however, attracts the major share of the 
Fishery Agency marine development budget, and it is expected 
to increase. Japan already boasts a cultivated yield of over 
700,000 tons, more than any other country. Among the species 
currently grown are salmon, greenling, octopus, crab and a host 
of shellfish. In addition, the traditional harvests of pearl and 
seaweed are taken. Several studies have called for the promotion 
of fish farming, not only to provide more efficient use of the 
resource, but also to increase national self-sufficiency in food. 
Perhaps some lessons can be learned from the prototype "sea 
ranch" at the 1975 Okinawa Ocean Exposition. A joint Japan- 
Soviet symposium also recently suggested cooperative large scale 

38 

farming of aquatic products. 

Whaling 

Although whaling ha3 fallen precipitously, both in volume 
and in value, it remains a highly emotional issue in Japan. The 
primary reason has been the attempts of conservation groups, and 
lately the U.S. Government, to impose a global ban on the indus- 
try. Such pressures have intensified since the adoption of a 



37 
Kagaku Gijitsu Cho (Science and Technology Agency), 

Kaiyo Kaihatsu no Gen j o to Tembo ("Present Situation of and 

Prospects for Ocean Development"), Tokyo, November 1973> Sect. 

4.3, PP. 171-177. 

58 MM, November 23, 1974. 



339 



U.S. proposal for a 10 year moratorium on whaling at the Stock- 
holm Environment Conference in 1972. 

The opposition arguments are three-fold. (1) Whales are 
on the verge of extinction, (2) they are being taken for greed, 
rather than necessity and (3) the slaughter of such mammals is 

cruel, and the methods currently used are especially so. The 

39 
Japanese counter with data to dispute the first point and note 



that seven percent of the nation's 1973 meat intake came from 

po: 
41 



whales. They also point to the killing of animals for sport 



and furs in the West. 

Whatever the merits of each case, the ban has become a 
most sensitive issue. For one thing even if the total prohi- 
bition has not yet been accepted by the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC), it has led to Japan's near-isolation in that 

forum. For another, many Japanese feel that they simply are 

42 

being criticized for different eating habits. 



39 
For instance, some endangered species currently are 

increasing at a rate in excess of the IWC quotas. ( Mainichi 

(ed.), June 17, 1974) - 

It would take, it is said, nearly 220,000 tons of beef 
to replace this whale meat, with a consequent increase in grain 
demand. (Ninon Keizai , June 2, 1974)* 

The timing of the U.S. anti-whaling campaign was unfortu- 
nate in Japanese eyes. Beginning as it did in the late 1960s, 
at the height of the Vietnam War, it led to comments that Ameri- 
cans were more concerned about killing whales than killing 
people. See, among o thers, Japan Times, April 22, 1974* 

^ Tokyo Shimbun , June 20, 1974. 



340 



Most of the major newspapers have recognized the limited 
future of whaling, and have recommended an intensified search 
for new sources of food. Even the companies themselves have 
accepted the inevitability of stricter quotas on the valuable 
antarctic fin whales and are searching for alternatives. In the 
process, however, the United States has come in for a good deal 
of criticism. 

Ocean Development 

Aside from aquaculture, Japanese ocean development projects 
may be divided into three categories: those in adjacent waters 
or on the continental shelf, those on the deep seabed, and those 
off the coasts of other states. Volumes have been written about 
these efforts, but a brief recapitulation is in order since 
they will become an increasingly important part of Japanese sea- 
power in the future. 

(1) Adjacent Projects 

The Japanese Continental Shelf is relatively narrow, rarely 
exceeding 25 miles except in the area of the Tsushima Strait and 



^For instance, Asahi (ed.), June 30, 1974* 

Among these are: Science and Technology Agency, Marine 
Development in Japan 1972 (hereafter MDIJ 72); Japan ECCR, "Status 
Report of Sea-Bed Exploration and Exploitation Technology in 
Japan 1972" (Revised edition) (hereafter Seabed Status Report); 
Science and Technology Agency, Kai.yo Kaihatsu No Gen jo to Tembo' , 
op . cit. ; and the June 1974 edition (Vol. 5> ilA) of Kaiyo" SangyP 
Kenkyu, Shiryo (Ocean Industry Research Materials) entitled "V/aga 
Kuni Kaiyo Sangyo No Gonen" (Five Year3 of Our Country's Ocean 
Industry) . 



341 



north of HokkaidcS. Nevertheless, the shelf area is nearly 7 6 

45 
percent of the total land, area, so it has been the subject of 

intensive investigation. The adjacent waters, which once pro- 
vided most of the fish, now offer minerals as well. They also 
are used for desalinization, man in the sea projects, fish farm- 
ing and a host of scientific explorations including, unfortunately, 
pollution studies. 

(a) Marine Mineral resources include oil and natural gas, 
coal, and iron sands. Manganese nodules will be considered 
separately. Gold and other minerals have been found, but not 
commercially exploited. 

Japan's offshore oil fields are new, with prospects for expan- 
sion. However, it is doubtful that domestic production, onshore 
or off, ever will become a significant factor in her energy pic- 
ture. Such sources accounted for .3 percent of 1973 demand, and 
even a 50-fold expansion would provide less than 10 percent of 
the expected 1980 requirements. Nonetheless, every little bit 
helps, so it is being pursued vigorously. 

The political problems often have been more formidable than 

the geological ones. Notable among these have been the seabed 

46 
boundary disputes in the East China and Yellow Seas. Local 

fishermen also have opposed even seismic surveys on the grounds 



45 MDLJ 22, p. 13. 

AG 

See Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters," _op_. cit . (note 

7-39). Also pp. 251-252, above. 



342 



that they may lead to exploitation which would bring pollution 
and interfere with fishing operations. 

Major physical hurdles also must be overcome. In the Sea 
of Japan, for instance, the working season rarely is longer than 
from March to July. By August the threat of typhoons has arisen, 
and they are followed by Fall and Winter storms. 

Despite these impediments, progress is being made. There 

are plans to develop the Sakhalin continental shelf in cooperation 

48 
with the USSR, possibly with American assistance. Recent surveys 

indicate promising geological structures off the northeast coast 

- 49 
of Honshu. An ambitious three-year plan has been devised for 

oil and gas surveys on the continental slopes, which nearly will 

50 
triple the size of the offshore areas under study. In addition, 

new legislations had been proposed to promote the development of 

51 

continental shelf minerals. 

The energy crisis has renewed interest in coal, whose pro- 
duction had been allowed to decline in recent years. In 1970 
about 12,500,000 tons (one-quarter of the national output) came 
from seabed areas. Working shafts have been sunk from artificial 
islands off Western Kyushu, but research also has been done on 



4 7 lihon Keizai , April 21, 1974. 
48 Nihon Keiza i (eve.), April 27, 1974. 
4 %ihon Keizai , April 24, 1974. 
* Nikkan Kowo , July 4, 1974. 
51 Nikkan Kogvo, May 21, 1974. 



343 



exploitation from ships or offshore platforms. 

Gravel and magnetite placer sand have been recovered from 
Japanese coastal waters for years. In the past the latter have 
been less important than onshore iron sands, but may become more 
attractive in the future. Moreover, the technology developed for 
this recovery can be used for other placer deposits worldwide. 

(b) Desalinization. By 1985 Japan is expected to face a 

53 
serious fresh water shortage particularly in urban areas. In 

fact, it is estimated that nearly 22 billion tons of fresh water 

may have to be recovered from the ocean. The annual capacity of 

the three plants operating in 1972 was about 2,500,000 tons per 

5/ 
year, which obviously will need vast improvements, both in 

technology and capacity. 

(c) Unconventional Ocean Energy Sources. The theoretical 
attractiveness of harnessing waves, tides and marine currents in 
Japan is limited by several physical factors. Among these are 
the relatively low tidal ranges throughout the country and the 
fact that the position of the Gulf Stream-like Kuroshio varies 
too much to permit the use of fixed equipment. In the future, 
solar plants or other advanced systems may become attractive, 
but this will take many years. 

(d) Effective use of Coastal Areas. The rapid rise of 



52 

See above, note 2-30. 

53 

Japan Times , June 4> 1 97 3 • 

5 %DLJ, 0£. cit., p. 19. 



344 



land prices, additional food requirements, the lack of space for 
new industrial sites, the need for new port facilities, and a 
host of other factors have made utilization of the Japanese 
coastal zone more and more attractive. Coastal and brackish 
water aquaculture has been mentioned. Large portions of Japan's 
industrial areas already sit on reclaimed land. An airport in 
Osaka Bay is planned to reduce complaints of noise pollution 
which have limited operations at the present field. Superports 
have been built, and more are planned. Even arable lands have 
been recovered from the shallow seas. 

The uses of the zone bordering Japan's 27,000 kilometers of 
coastline will intensify rapidlj' - . Floating nuclear power plant 

site studies have been made, but the density of sea (and air) 

55 
traffic along the east coast poses safety hazards. The location 

56 
of industrial complexes at sea has been considered. Eventually, 

seabed oil tanks (such as Ekofisk City in the North Sea) or other 

storage facilities will be built. Man in the Sea projects one 

day may progress beyond the range of mere scientific research. 

Marine recreation facilities in the form of undersea parks and 

viewing towers already are being built. 

In sum, the use of Japan's adjacent waters will grow 

rapidly, from inshore areas out into the economic zone, however 



55 

Okamura Kenji, Japan ECOR, interview, December 8, 1 974* 

56 

J Odani Kosuke, JAMSTEC, interview, July 25, 1974. 



545 



far it may extend. 

(2) Deep Seabed Projects 

Japanese firms became interested in manganese nodules late 

57 
in the 1960s. Initially it was decided to develop their own 

system, the so-called continuous line bucket (CLB). After several 

years of testing, however, the approach was changed to investment 

in joint ventures with American, French and German companies. 

At the same time 33 corporations and 10 organizations have formed 

a Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Development Association to 

59 
coordinate domestic efforts. Geophysical surveys of the waters 

around Japan also will include prospective nodule sites. 

Another area of interest on the deep seabed has been remote- 
controlled drilling equipment. Recent technology has been 
directed towards the recovery of petroleum and gas reserves from 
the continental slopes and possibly the abyssal plain itself. 
Japanese efforts may not be in the forefront of these develop- 
ments, but her firms will be quick to make use of any break- 
throughs which occur. There also is the possibility that local 
geo thermal activity might produce mineral-rich springs such as 



57 

Seabed S tatus Report , op . cit . , p. 65. 

58 

3 Japanese firms have signed with Tenneco, four with 

International Nickel (INCO), and Mitsubishi Shoji is cooperating 
with Kennecott Copper. See Nino n Keizai , May 8, 1974? <"md 
Nikkan Kogyo, July 2 and 12, 1974* Once again, this is con- 
sistent with the philosophy of minimizing risks and maximizing 
options. 

^Nihon Keizai , April 10, 1974. 



346 



those found in the Red Sea and along the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. 
(3) Foreign Projects 

Japan has used its organization, technology and experience 
very effectively to gain entry to foreign ocean development 
markets. Foremost among these have been oil and gas, part of 
the key to her "resources diplomacy." 

In the future, such efforts will he coordinated with a 
whole range of diversified assistance programs, many of them in 
marine-related fields. These will be explored more fully in the 
section below on acquisitive seapower. 

Japan's Organization for Maritime Development 

The business- government relationship in Japan has been the 
subject of extensive inquiry. Many credit it for the nation's 
post-war economic success. In the specific field of ocean tech- 
nology, it has been argued that Japan is better organized than 
any other country in the world to exploit the future riches of 
the sea. 

The ties between government and business in Japan are 
undeniably closer than they are in most capitalist countries. 
Nevertheless, the associations are more complicated than is sug- 
gested by the term "Japan, Inc." Perhaps this is best 



John P. Craven, "Indus try /Government Relations in Off- 
shore Resource Development." Paper presented at the 5th annual 
Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, April 29-LIay 3> 1 975 - 
Pt. II, pp. 947-949. 

61 

U.S., Department of Commerce, Japan : The Government- 



347 



illustrated by an example from the deep ocean mining area. 

Businessmen coordinate policies within the zaikai (business 
leaders' clique) which includes such influential elements as 
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) and Keizai 
Doyukai (Committee for Economic Development). Mutual interests 
among bureaucrats lead to the so-called kambatsu (bureaucratic 
clique) . Barriers between occupations are broken by the closely- 
knit gakubatsu (university cliques) and innumerable informal 
associations such as those for common birthyears or zodiac signs. 
Most important of all are the keibatsu (familial ties) which per- 
vade the upper echelons of Japanese business and government. 

Decision-making is a continuous and often informal process 
designed to establish the consensus so important to most Japanese 
evolutions. Coordination is emphasized at all levels. There is 
an ongoing dialogue, usually by telephone, between company repre- 
sentatives and their contacts in the twelve ministries and five 
agencies of the Government's executive branch. Petroleum and 
seabed mining concerns work through the Ocean Division of the 
Resources and Energy Agency. The Ministry of Transport is the 
liaison for shipping companies, while fishermen approach the 
Fisheries Agency. Formal lobbying may be resorted to if legis- 
lation is pending before the Diet, but it must be paralleled by 
continued consultation with the bureaucracy. Recently, however, 



Business Relationship (Washington; U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1971), passim . 



348 



the growing importance of ocean- related projects has been empha- 
sized by the development of more complex channels. 

Aside from fisheries, probably the most important com- 
mercial forces in Japanese ocean policy are the enterprise groups 
associated with the major trading companies such as Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo and Mitsui. Functional successors to the pre-war 

zaibatsu (financial cliques), the six major groups controlled 

62 
nearly 68 percent of Japan's corporate capital in 1971 • No 

longer under family control, they still represent associations 

of diverse companies linked by a parent bank and inter-locking 

management. Much of the Japanese policy planning process can be 

illustrated by a brief description of the interwoven competition 

and cooperation of these units in search of seabed minerals. 

(See Figure 10-1.) 

63 

Between 1970 and 1973 the Sumitomo group developed a 

pilot system for seabed mining operations, The bulk of the work 
was accomplished jointly by the parent trading company (Sumitomo 
Shoji), Sumitomo Shipbuilding and Machinery, and Sumitomo Metal 
Mining. Such cooperative efforts are common, although the indi- 
vidual companies are distinct corporate entities which vie for 
funds and projects within the group. 

Among the 44 Sumitomo Companies there are some 60 organiza- 
tions which are involved in ocean- related activities. To increase 



62 F£ER, August 6, 1973, p. 37. 

63 

I am indebted to the personnel of Sumitomo Shoji America, 

Inc. for assistance in the preparation of this example. 



349 



Figure 10-1 

ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED IN SUMITOMO MANGANESE 
NODULE MINING (SUPERIMPOSED ON DIVERSE INTERPERSONAL TIES) 



Seabed Mining 
Negotiation Position 



Foreign Ministry 



Government 
Ministries and Agencies 



MITI 



DOMA 



JOIA 



Trading Company 
Groups 



Sumitomo Mitsui 



Other Interested 
Industries 



SODECO 



Sumitomo 
Shoji 



Sumitomo 
Shipbuilding 
& Machinery 



f 

Sumitomo 
Metal Mining 



Other Sumitomo Companies 



350 



the competitiveness of such ventures, their management recently 
has been coordinated within a newly-formed Ocean Development and 
Engineering Company (SODECO) . The directorate of SCDECO is 
drawn from the officers of the concerned Sumitomo companies, who 
usually will hold multiple appointments. 

Thus, future projects in seabed mining will be balanced by 
SODECO against other ocean programs. Budget requests will be 
forwarded to the Sumitomo Bank for consideration along with pro- 
posals from other companies in the group. Finally, if approved, 
the funds would be disbursed (effectively subcontracted) through 
SODECO to the appropriate firm. Although, in most cases, the 
companies which had done the work prior to the formation of 
SODECO will continue to get the contracts, this system offers 
better coordination. Equivalent mechanisms operate within the 
other trading company groups. 

However, according to SODECO President Nishimura 
Tsunesaburo: 

There is no sector in ocean development fields which 
is small enough for a single company to tackle on 
its own. All ocean development firms have to 
cooperate with one another if they really want to 
produce results. The Government, on its part, should 
select several high priority projects for the com- 
panies to pour everything in [sic]. Dispersing 
emphasis on an unwieldily [sic] large number of pro- 
jects will come to nothing. 64 

In order to facilitate this policy coordination process, 

the Deep Ocean Minerals Association (DOHA) was formed early in 



HlKIW , October 2J, 1973. 



351 



1973* Managed by representatives from five trading companies 
and including 27 firms from the mining/ smelting shipbuilding and 
steel industries, it was designed to channel communications to 
and from MITI. A year later DOMA was transformed into a legal 
entity (hs.jin ) as the Deep Seabed Minerals Resources Development 
Association. Additional consultations are conducted through the 
more broadly-based Japan Ocean Industries Association (JOIA). 

While proposals are discussed between commercial interests 
and their ministries, a similar process is underway within the 
government it3elf. An "International Conference on the Law of 
the Sea Preparations Promotion Headquarters" was set up prior to 
the Geneva Seabed Committee meeting to draw inputs from interested 
parts of the bureaucracy. In theory positions thus derived are 
presented by the Foreign Ministry for international negotiation. 
The inability to agree on a forward-looking position for Caracas, 
however, is indicative of some of the rigidities in the system. 

Although this summary has focused on ocean mining, it is 
representative of arrangements in other industries. For instance, 
there is the Japan Fisheries Association to link fishermen and 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (though it often is by- 
passed). Several zaibatsu recently have withdrawn from a 
Japanese multi-group venture, strengthened their individual oil 
development companies and immediately begun to coordinate 
negotiations for joint explorations with American firms in 



Sankei, June 25, 1973. 



352 



Southeast Asia waters. 

These organizations are, of course, superimposed on the 
myriad of previously noted inter-personal ties. It is thus 
difficult to separate a private stance from an official one. 
Rarely in these circumstances will an interest group resort to 
public pronouncements to try to bring pressure on the government. 
On the other hand, it can be certain that its point of view at 
least has been considered in some phase of the policy-making 
process. 

Dr. Craven, pointing to this cooperative approach, and the 

level of government investment in private industry, concluded 

that Japan "most closely approximates the ideal national manager 

for ocean resources." Moreover: 

There is a long range plan and goal which considers 
the total system including environmental protection 
and there are national resources of significant 
amounts to implement the resource development plan. 
The departure from the system manager idealization 
is primarily in the fact that the industry response 
to national planning is tacit rather than explicit. ° 

Although it certainly is true that Japan is closer to an 
idealized ocean system managex* than the U.S. or Great Britain, 
there are more serious weaknesses than may be apparent. 

In the first place, the government itself is by no means 



Nikkan Kogvo , June 16, 1973* 
fi'j 

Craven, cip_. cit. , p. 11-997 • 

68 Ibid., p. 11-949. 



353 



monolithic. Each of the ministries is, in many ways, a fief- 

69 
dom. Within the ministries disputes can be resolved by con- 
sensus before external positions are presented. But between the 
ministries, neither the resolution of differences nor adequate 
cooperation is by any means assured. The Caracas negotiations, 
as already noted, highlighted this, and such examples of disarray 
are likely to continue as Japan reorients its national goals from 
economic growth to social welfare. 

Another example of a lack of bureaucratic coordination is 
provided by the case of ocean surveys. Currently, these are 
conducted by the MSDF, the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, 
and the Transportation Ministry. Additional surveys involving 
petroleum development are conducted under MITI. JAMS TEC is keyed 

to man in the sea projects, but MSDF cooperation is excluded by 

70 
pressures for the separation of civil and military activities. 

A second problem is a surprising disinclination to engage 
in really innovative planning. The mistrust of long-range plan- 
ning in Japan stems in part from a view that major world move- 
ments will be largely independent of her own efforts. There is 
thus little point in setting forth extended programs in pursuit 
of fixed goals when one has so little control over the events 



69 

See, for instance, Kusayanagi Daizo, "A Kingdom of 

Bureaucrats: The Finance Ministry," Bungei Shunji, July 1 974» 

translation in Magazine Summary , July 1974> PP« 6-20. 

70 

' VADM Kitamura Kenichi, MSDF (Ret.), interview, August 14, 

1974 and Odani Kosuke, interview, December 9> 1 974- 



354 



which might prove critical. Once again, as in her diplomacy, 
this leads to strategies which maximize options at each step. 

A final point is a relatively low level of financing. 
Japan's Governmental Marine Development Program totaled approxi- 
mately $100 million in Fiscal 1974 (April 1974-March 1975). 71 
Over 66 million of this was devoted to the Okinawa Exposition, 
however. By contrast, the non-"national security" portion of 

the U.S. Federal Ocean Program for Fiscal 1975 (July 1974- June 

72 

1975) equals $641 million — nearly 19 times that which Japan is 

devoting to similar purposes. Such comparisons admittedly are 
inexact because of undetermined levels of private spending, but 
the imbalance certainly is significant. 

In point of fact, a modest level of Research and Develop- 
ment spending long has been characteristic of Japanese business 
(with the possible exception of fisheries). This is consistent 
with the joint venture approach to new technology, evidenced in 
ocean mining. By waiting for foreign firms to do the pioneering 
research and then providing capital at a later stage in the 
development process, the risk in both funds and wasted effort is 
greatly reduced, although the final cost in license fees and 
patents may be more expensive. Such an approach offers great 
flexibility, but it also may mean significant time lags before 



71 MDP 24, op_. cit. 

72 

Larry L. Booda, "Federal Ocean Program Budget Request 

Up S64 Million," Sea Technology , XV (March 1974), P- 25. 



355 



Japan can take advantage of new opportunities in the rapidly 

73 
changing ocean development field. 

Non-Military Seapower and Japan's Interests 

Protective Maritime Ventures 

One of the ways in which Japan can use her seapower is to 
insulate herself from the effects of others' actions. This will 
be termed protective seapower. The MS DP, of course, is specifi- 
cally designed for this purpose, but commercial activities also 
may contribute. 

National security has been one of the classic rationales 
for a strong merchant marine — guaranteed capacity in time of 
emergency. Such arguments still can be heard, but trends to 
multi-national crews, long-term charters, international insurance 
markets and other economies of modern shipping will make it 
harder to ensure Japan's control over large fleets even should 
they still fly her flag. In general, however, this will be less 
troublesome than it once might have been because the inter- 
nationalization of maritime commercial linkages has affected 
almost everyone. 

Still, there may be problems. The transfer of control of 
the tanker fleets to Arab states will undeniably make the indus- 
trialized world more vulnerable in future confrontations. 



73 

Admiral Nakayama Sadayoshi, MSDF (Ret.), interview, 

August 14, 1974. 



556 



Moreover, non-Japanese crews might refuse to sail in the face of 
some of the threats outlined in the previous chapter. Japan's 
encouragement of both of these trends has been dictated by her 
resources diplomacy on the one hand, and profitability on the 
other. Although the results are antithetical to her security in 
the sense of protective seapower, there is little that can be 
done to change them. The national merchant marine, insofar as 
it exists, will continue to provide her with a buffer, but this 
will play a subordinate part in future policy decisions. 

The protective role of the shipbuilding industry lies in 
its ability to replace war/ terrorist losses. 

Since resources are Japan's principal vulnerability, how- 
ever, the real protective value of her seapower will be the 
extent to which it can contribute to self-sufficiency. At 
present, there is no indication that ocean resources ever will 
be able to make Japan independent of foreign suppliers, but data 
are hard to come by. In the first place, long range forecasts 
are regarded suspiciously, as noted earlier. In the second, the 
events of late 1973 destroyed the basis of nearly all the plan- 
ning that did exist. They also introduced such uncertainties as 
to cast doubt on any studies which have tried to take them into 
account. Finally, in the case of new ocean resources, there 
simply is too little information as yet. 

Even before the extensions of national ocean claims, 
fisheries imports were expected to increase. It is possible 



357 



that new species, aquaculture and mid-ocean fishing grounds may 
offset the losses expected from the North Pacific economic zones, 
The harvesting of krill might even increase the total catch. 
But without changes in the Japanese diet, there still will he a 
demand for imports of seafood. 

The limited near-term potential of Japanese off-shore 
petroleum already has been noted. Detailed surveys of minerals 
on her continental margins are just beginning. Except for 
manganese nodules, which will be mined by foreign (U.S.) ships 
for the next few years, abyssal resources hardly have been 
studied at all. Regarding the nodules, incidently, a hypotheti- 
cal 33 percent Japanese interest in a 3 , 000 , 000 ton per year 
operation might yield results as noted in Table 10-1. 

Table 10-1 



POSSIBLE NODULE METALS PRODUCTION AS A 
PERCENT OF 1972 JAPANESE DEMAND 

Approximate 1972 Japanese (Metric Tons) 

Metal Production (A) Demand (b) A/B 

Manganese 230,000 n.a. n.a. 
(if recovered) 

Nickel 15,000 26,315 .57 

Copper 13,000 927,679 .02 



15,000 


26,315 


13,000 


927,679 


2,000 


2,558 



Cobalt 2,000 2,558 .78 



Source: (A) United Nations, Economic Implications of Sea-Bed 

Mineral Development in the International Area , p. 28. 

(B) Ninon Tckei Nenkan 1973-74 , Table 170. 



358 



It is evident that these outputs, while useful in reducing some 
imports, will not be a panacea. Indeed, this would seem to apply 
as a general statement about the protective value of all of 
Japan's seapower. Even as an oceanic state, relying on hereto- 
fore untapped wealth from the sea, it will be many decades, if 
ever, before Japan could begin to consider herself detached from 
foreign economic pressures. 

Acquisitive Maritime Ventures 

Acquisition, of course, is the usual goal of all marine 
economic activities — to win either profits, resources, or foreign 
exchange. Nonetheless, Japan's ocean-related industrial capacity 
and technological expertise (which thus are elements of her sea- 
power) have opened new ways for her to gain access to markets and 
raw materials. In turn, many of these efforts also may reduce the 
incentive to take action against Japanese operations. 

First among these are joint ventures, which have become 
especially important to fishermen. As of March 1 975> Japanese 
firms were involved in 96 such projects in 43 countries, and 
several have been established since, particularly in Africa and 
the Middle East. Foreign subsidiary and joint venture shipyards 
have been operating for years, for instance in Brazil and Singa- 
pore. However, overtures to Persian Gulf States since 1973 have 



*7 A 

Suisancho, S uisanpyo No Taisuru Taigai Shihon Kyoryoku 
Jiigyo no Genjo (Present Situation of Overseas Joint Ventures 
Facing Fishing Industries), Tokyo, July 1974* 



359 



been designed as much to improve Japan's standing in the struggle 

for oil as for profit. In the same vein, joint tanker companies 

75 
have been established with Iraq, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. 

Marine-related technological assistance is another way of 

approaching the problem. The Foreign Ministry and an industry 

source known as the Overseas Fishery Cooperation Fund have set up 

a fund for loans to developing country fisheries which could grow 

76 
as large as 15 billion yen ($50 million). The above-mentioned 

shipping agreements also include provisions for the progressive 

phase-out of direct Japanese participation as local competence 

develops. Thus they eventually also may become oriented towards 

technological assistance. This encouragement of the merchant 

marines of strategic coastal states, whatever competition it may 

generate for Japanese vessels in the short run, could well work 

to her long-run interests by increasing their stakes in minimum 

restrictions on maritime commerce. 

Finally, there are barter arrangements. Ships, for 
example, or fishing equipment, could be built in Japan with 
domestic funds and then exchanged for resources to save foreign 
currency . 

The majority of maritime commercial affairs probably will 



'^Nihon Keizai , March 19 and July 16, 1974- 

Suisan Keizai , January 9> 1974* This compares to 
Japanese investment of $30.5 million in the 96 joint ventures 
noted above. 



360 



continue to be profit-motivated. Moreover, such cooperative 
arrangements outlined above are possible in fields that have 
nothing to do with the oceans. Nonetheless, Japan is well-suited 
to take advantage of the growing global interest in marine 
industries to secure a variety of goods and services. 

77 

Suasive Measures 

Japan would seem to have few means by which to exercise 

suasion. She has renounced the "threat of force as a means of 

7fi 
settling international disputes." She also has sought to sepa- 
rate politics and economics in her international dealings. There 
are few signs that she will alter the deployments of the Self- 
Defense Forces (outside of an extended economic zone). However, 
domestic and foreign circumstances may enable her to exert more 
international pressure through non-military ocean activities. 

For one thing, Japan may be changing her policy to include 
broad connections between political, economic and social con- 
ditions, especially in relation to the Third World. Distinct 

economic issues with diverse political overtones also may be 

79 

increasingly linked in the future. 



77 

Edward Luttwak, ep_. cit. (note I~5)» has discussed the 

uses of naval forces as an exercise of "armed suasion." These 

may be latent (i.e. undirected) or active. The latter in turn 

can be broken down into deterrence and compellance. Herein, this 

typology will be extended to non-military seapower as well. 

78 

Article IX of the Constitution. 

79 

It was reported, for instance, during President Ford's 1974 

visit to Tokyo, that Japanese concessions on fisheries were offered 
in exchange for guarantees of food supplies. 



361 



For another, the manipulation of currency markets, large- 
scale investments and commodity flows have become weapons of 
great consequence. Perhaps even more importantly, they have 
become generally recognized as legitimate alternatives to mili- 
tary power under many circumstances. 

Japan's seapower, indeed most of her economic programs, can 
operate most effectively in latent or deterrent modes. For 
instance, efforts to promote interdependence through bi-lateral 
shipping or fisheries agreements could give Tokyo 1 some positive 
counter-leverage. Attractive technology transfer provisions with 
joint ventures could reduce the incentives for nationalization, 
although local political and emotional concerns might easily 
override such rationality. In the same way, long-term shipyard 
or ocean development projects would be difficult to complete by 
developing country assets alone. 

The advantages of promoting coastal state interests in 
shipping or distant-water fishing already have been noted. 

Under some conditions, merchantmen can act as "trip wires" 
almost as well as warships. Soviet freighters limited U.S. 
freedom of action in Haiphong, for instance. An American tanker 
tested the blockade of the Straits of Tiran in 1967* It may be 
argued that this influence was derived only from the military 
power of the two superpowers and the perception of a merchant 
ship as the symbol of state interests on those particular 
occasions. This may well be correct. But though Japan does not 



362 



have the military power to act on her own behalf, one of her 
ships could be persuasive if it was seen as the representative 
of most maritime powers on a given issue, i.e. the levying of 
straits tolls. Alternatively, if the domestic situation in 
Japan were unsettled, interference with her merchantmen or ocean 
development projects might be deterred on the grounds that it 
could stimulate an MSDF dispatch, with all the associated uncer- 
tainties. Finally, merchantmen capable of self-defense could be 
used to prevent the establishment of undesired precedents by 
ignoring unilateral declarations of restrictions to navigation. 

It is difficult to imagine Japan exercising much more 
active suasion, either through her military or commercial 
activities in the next several years. Were she to begin to, 
however, the signs would be visible first at the fringes of her 
ocean resources zone. 



CONCLUSIONS 

This paper has recommended several specific programs for 
the Maritime Self-Defense Force and Japan's commercial ocean 
interests. These results are based on two fundamental conclusions, 

The first is that world-wide technical, political and legal 
developments will force major adjustments in national maritime 
policies. In particular, these developments include: (1) A 
shifting image of the sea itself from a neutral medium of communi- 
cations and commerce to a territorial area with intrinsic value, 
(2) asymmetries in the acceptability of force between developed 
and developing states, (3) the current state of naval technology, 
which favors the defenders of inshore areas, (4) the increasing 
economic and political importance of near-shore ocean interests 
and (5) the erosion of the foundations of freedom of the seas. 
Whether or not such changes will offer new opportunities or fore- 
close long-standing advantages, Japan must consider them more 
carefully in her policy-planning. 

The second conclusion is that projections of a militaristic 
future for Japan, or even an expanded security role, are over- 
drawn. In the face of pollution, resources nationalism, impending 
earthquakes and other hazards, arguments can be made for the 
impossibility of maintaining Japan's present course, but there is 



363 



364 



almost no evidence that she will choose an expansionist path in 
the near future. Domestically the opposition to such a role is 
widespread and vocal. Internationally there are few states which 
would either encourage or welcome it. Moreover, though the 
economic and idealistic orientation of Japanese nationalism might 
lead to strains between Washington and TQkyS, it shows little sign 
of turning militaristic. An authoritarian government, and perhaps 
a nuclear weapons program are possible, but Japan's physical limi- 
tations and vulnerabilities would make foreign adventurism very 
risky. By the same token an increase in tensions in Northeast 
Asia would be more likely to drive Japan back towards the United 
States, rather than off on her own. The most likely course is a 
continuation of an opportunistic, low- risk foreign policy with 
expenditures on conventional weaponry remaining at about one per- 
cent of GNP while non-military security spending is increased. 
Within this framework, more specific issues of Japanese 
seapower were analyzed. For all the constraints which her 
physical situation puts on expansive or aggressive activities, 
Japan also has strengths which are less frequently recognized. 
Her island status, topography and the limits of her neighbors' 
amphibious capabilities would make direct invasion difficult. 
Surface-skimming patrol craft, anti-ship missiles and improved 
coordination between the MSDP and ASDF could further increase an 
attacker's problem. At the same time, the size of her merchant 
marine, shipbuilding capacity and other factors will reduce the 



365 



impact of a submarine campaign against the sealanes. Japan could 
strengthen her defenses in this area by the use of unconventional 
concepts, such as containerized weapon systems for merchantmen. 
Although mines may pose a serious threat to the harbors and choke 
points of the archipelago, they also can be extremely effective 
in the narrow straits which control Soviet passage to and from 
the Sea of Japan. 

In time, the demands of near-shore ocean activities probably 
will compel Japan to extend her own territorial sea and economic 
zone. This will be a major change whose impact will extend 
beyond the realm of ocean politics. In the first place, the 
expanded ocean area will be nearly ten times as large as the home 
islands themselves. In fact, under a 200-mile limit, Japan would 
acquire the seventh largest maritime zone on earth. As ocean 
development activities intensify, the psychological attractive- 
ness of the additional productive territory could become very 
important for a nation which has long been sensitive about its 
population and lack of space. 

In the second place, the extension of jurisdiction will 
bring her oceanic borders with seven states, along with several 
boundary disputes. Many of these quarrels probably will be 
settled diplomatically or officially ignored in the interests of 
larger issues. Some, however, may contain the seeds of future 
violence, particularly with Taiwan and Korea. 

Finally, the task of defending, or even monitoring such an 



366 



area will require improvements in MSDF and Maritime Safety Agency 
ships, surveillance equipment and command and control facilities. 

The concepts of protective, acquisitive and suasive sea- 
power were introduced with particular emphasis on Japan's com- 
mercial ocean activities. So long as she is vulnerable to 
countermeasures at so many points, Tokyo's options for maritime 
suasion, through military or commercial means, are limited. The 
major values of protective seapower will be to increase fisheries 
yield within the extended economic zone and to improve marine 
pollution control techniques. Ocean resources will play an 
increasingly important part in Japan's economy, but they will 
only marginally reduce her dependence on raw materials imports. 
Acquisitive ocean ventures, however, can contribute greatly to 
the uncertain future. As ocean economic activities become 
increasingly important world-wide, Japan should be well-placed 
to trade on her stores of marine-related capital and expertise. 

Japan's ocean activities could be managed more effectively. 
The model of a smoothly-coordinated, rational animal, guided by 
long-range planning has many weaknesses, at least in the area of 
ocean affairs. The nation would profit by better planning and 
intra- bureaucratic coordination at the least, and possibly by 
higher levels of research and development spending as well. One 
can understand the attractiveness of strategies which maintain 
flexibility, but the lead times involved in modem industrial 
projects, as well as their multiple side-effects dc seem to 



367 



warrant greater emphasis on forecasting. 

In sum, the next decade is likely to see Japan's seapower 
used to support opportunistic strategies in pursuit of interests 
similar to those which exist today. Near-shore activities and 
extensions of jurisdiction probably will be emphasized while 
distant-water programs fall more and more under multinational 
control. 



Appendix One 



UNITS CONVERSION TABLE 



Units of Length 



Units 



Inch 



Foot 



Meter 



Mile 



N.M. 



1 inch 


1 


.083 


.025 


- 


- 


1 foot 


12 


1 


.305 


- 


- 


1 meter 


39-37 


3.28 


1 


- 


- 


1 mile 


63,360 


5,280 


1,609 


1 


.869 


1 naut. mile 


72,913 


6,076.1 
Units of Area 


1,852 


1.151 


1 


Units 


Acre 


Hectare 


Sq .km. 


Sq .mi. 


' Sq.n.m. 


1 acre 


1 


.405 


.004 


.002 


.001 


1 hectare 


2.471 


1 


.01 


.004 


.003 


1 sq. km. 


247.11 


100 


1 


.386 


.292 


1 sq. mile 


640 


258.9 


2.589 


1 


.755 


1 sq. n.m. 


847.4 


195.5 


1.955 


1.324 


1 



Units of Mass 



Units 


Pound 


Kilogram 


Sh.Ton 


Long 
Ton 


Metric 
Ton 


1 pound 


1 


• 454 


- 


- 


- 


1 kilogram 


2205 


1 


.001 


.001 


.001 


1 short ton 


2000 


907.2 


1 


.893 


.907 


1 long ton 


2240 


1,016.0 


1.12 


1 


1.016 


1 metric ton 


2204.6 


1,000.0 


1.102 


.984 


1 



368 



369 



Units of Volume 





Units 




Liter 


Gallon 


Cubic Foot 


Cut 


dc Meter 


1 


liter 




1 


.264 


.035 




.001 


1 


gallon 




3-785 


1 


.133 




.004 


1 


cubic foot 


28.317 


7.840 


1 




.028 


1 


cubic me 


ter 


1,000 


276.9 


35.315 




1 



F = 9/5 C + 32 
C = 5/9 (F - 32) 



Temperature 



0°C = 32°F 
100°C = 212°F 



Other Measures 



Water 

1 cubic ft. 
25.96 cubic ft. 



Crude Oil 



= 62.4 lbs. 1 barrel (bbl) = 42 gallons 

= 2240 lbs. 1 metric ton = 7.35 bbls. 

1 bbl/day = 49*8 tons/year 

1 kiloliter =6.29 bbls. 



Ener,sy Conversions 



1 bbl. crude oil 
1 kwh electricity 



= 5.60 x 10 Btu 
= 5,413 Btu 



1 cu. ft. day natural gas = 1,051 Btu 

1 short ton of avg. coal = 27.7 x 10 Btu 



SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Much of the information in this paper was gathered from 
personal interviews, particularly in Parts Two and Three. Many 
of the subjects spoke excellent English. Interpreters were 
available in most cases when there was any doubt. Information 
from interviews conducted in Japanese by the author was checked 
against other sources to prevent misunderstandings. Of the 131 
interviews conducted during the Southeast Asia trip, many did not 
pertain directly to Japan, although collectively they were designed 
to give a picture of regional seapower. Accordingly, only those 
most closely related to this thesis have been cited here. Those 
names marked with an asterisk were consulted on a continuing 
basis during the author's stay in Japan. 

Some of the information presented in Part One may be con- 
sidered classified by some persons. No reference was made to 
classified materials during this research, in fact potentially 
useful background sources frequently were avoided to preclude the 
danger of inadvertent citation. When there was any doubt, data 
were not used unless they could be documented from the open 
literature. 



370 



371 



Interviews 

Abe Yuzo, Captain, JMSLF. April 9, 1974; December 11, 1974* 

Aoki Sotaro. Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Company. 
November 25, 1974* 

Armacost, Michael. American Embassy, Tokyo. March 29, 1974» 

Auer, James E., Lieutenant Commander, USN. USS Parsons (DDG-33)* * 



Baker, Roland. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake. 
October 18, 1974 (telephone). 

Blake, James. Geological Services, Ltd., Singapore. May 30, 1 974« 

Bonner, Robin, Commander, RAN. Central Studies Establishment, 
Canberra. June 19, 1974* 

Bull, Hedley. Australian National University, Canberra. 
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Burke, Arleigh A., Admiral, USN (Ret.). January 16, 1974* 

Chee, Dr. Stephen. Universiti Malaya. May 24, 1974* 

Cheng Quee Wah. Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering Company. 
June 5, 1974. 

Chihaya Masataka. Shipping and Trade News (Tokyo) . November 28, 
1974. 

Clark, Marc, Commander, RAN. Central Studies Establishment, 
Canberra. June 19, 1 974» 

Craven, John P. Director of Marine Programs, University of 
Hawaii. July 5, 1974. 

Dicks te in, Howard. Universiti Malaya. May 23, 1974, May 24, 
1974; May 27, 1974- 

Dixon, Prank W., Colonel, USA. Defense Attache, Philippines. 
May 13, 1974. 

Doba Hajime. Defense Correspondent, Yomiuri S himbun . 
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Duke, Marvin L., Captain, USN. U.S. Naval Attache, TokyS. 
August 8, 1974. 



372 



Eguchi Yujiro. Nomura Research Institute. April 2, 1 974» 

Fatasi, Mito. Southeast Asia Fisheries Research Center, Singa- 
pore. May 30> 1974* 

Fukui Shizuo, Constructor Lieutenant Commander, IJN (Ret.). * 



Fukushima Yasuto. Professor, National Defense College. 
March 20, 1974. 

Fusano Natsuaki. Assistant Director, Office of Defence 
Production Committee, Keidanren. August 6, 1974* 

Fuse Tsutomu. Graduate Student, International Law. * 



Gannon, James M., Captain, DSN. Naval Attache, Singapore. 
May 28, 1974* 

Genda Minoru. Member, House of Councillors. December 12, 1 974* 

Gorter, Wirtze. University of Hawaii. July 3> 1 974 • 

Graham, H. Edward, Captain, USN. Naval Attache, Thailand. 
May 22, 1974- 

Habanananda Kajit. Executive Officer, Kra Canal Survey 
Office, Bangkok. May 21, 1974; May 22, 1974- 

Harper, Donald. Ministry of Defence, Wellington. June 26, 1974* 

Hashim, Zain, Brigadier General. Commandant, Armed Forces Staff 
College, Malaysia. May 25, 1 974» 

Hayashi Y., Captain, ASDF. Defense Academy. April 25, 1 974» 

Heredia, Armando, Lieutenant, Philippine Navy. May 13> 1 974» 
May 14, 1974. 

Inoki Masamichi. President, Defense Academy. April 4» 1974* 

Ishida Minoru. Ishikav/ajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., 
Ltd. (Ocean Engineering Structures) . August 14, 1974* 

Ito Keiichi. Assistant Director of Defense Bureau, Japan 
Defense Agency. November 25, 1974* 

Johnson, Robert Lee. Vice President, Mobil Sekiyu Kabushiki 
Kaisha, Tokyo. July 16, 1974. 



373 



Jukes, Geoffrey. Australian National University, Canberra. 
June 18, 1974. 

Kaihara Osamu. Former Secretary General, National Defense 
Council. March 24, 1974* 

Kamura Hiroshi. Japan Center for International Exchange. 
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Kanagaki Shigeru, Rear Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.). Defense Production 
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Kato Fumihisa. Ministry of Transport. April 22, 1974* 

Kawasaki Kanji. JSP Member, House of Delegates. April 17, 1 974* 

Kitamura Kenichi, Vice Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.). Former Commander, 
Self-Defense Fleet. * 

Klass, Philip J. Aviation Week and Space Technology Magazine. 
October 8, 1974 (telephone). 

Kogan, Rudolf, Colonel, USA. Defense Attache, Singapore. 
May 29, 1974; June 3, 1974- 

Kubo Takuya. Chief, Defense Bureau, Japan Defense Agency. 
March 11, 1974; November 25, 1974. 

Kully, Sheldon D., Captain, USN. Naval Attache, Republic of 
China. May 6, 1974. 

Kunishima Kiyonori, Vice Admiral, JMSDF. President, Maritime Staff 
College. April 5, 1974« 

Kusumi Tadao. Defense Analyst. March 1, 1974; April 18, 1974; 
August 17, 1974. 

Lansangan, Jose G., Jr., Captain. Philippine Navy. May 14> 
1974; May 16, 1974- 

Lewis, Theodore, Commander, USN. Defense Liaison Group, 
Indonesia. June 7> 1974* 

MacDonald, Gerald E., Major, USMC. Assistant Naval Attache, 
Bangkok. May 17, 1974. 

Mataxis, Theodore C, Brigadier General, USA (Ret.). Ministry 
of Defence Consultant, Singapore. May 29, 1974; May 30> 
1974; June 4, 1974. 



374 



MccGwire, Michael. Dalhousie University, Halifax. October 21, 
1974; December 21, 1 974 (letter). 

Millar, T. B. Australian National University, Canberra. 
June 20, 1 974. 

Mitchell, J. T., Colonel, USMC. Naval Attache, Indonesia. 
June 9-11, 1974. 

Momoi Makoto. Professor, National Defense College. 
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Nakai Yoko. United States Information Service, Toky<3. * 



Nakamura Teiji f Vice Admiral, JMSDF. Commander, Self-Defense 
Fleet. December 3, 1974. 

Nakao Eichi. LDP Member, House of Delegates (Seirankai). 
April 19, 1974. 

Nakayama Sadayoshi, Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.). August 14, 1974* 

Nelson, Roger L. Triton Oil and Gas Co., Manila. May 15» 1974* 

Oberdorfer, Don. The Washington Post , Bureau Chief, Tcky5. 
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Oblena, Grace Carla. Chief, Shipping and Freight Study Unit, 

Department of Transportation, Republic of the Philippines. 
May 15, 1974. 

Odani Kosuke. Head, Technical Information Service, Japan Marine 
Science and Technology Center ( JAMS TEC ).* 



O'Farrell, J. A., Captain, RAN. Maritime Air Study Group. 
June 19, 1974. 

Okamura Kenji. Chairman, Japan National Committee for 
Engineering Committee on Ocean Resources (ECOR). 
December 8, 1974- 

Okuhara Toshio. Assistant Professor of International Law, 
Kokusikan University. * 



O'Neill, Robert J. Australian National University, Canberra. 
June 20, 1974. 



375 



Dshima Kenzo. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Law of the Sea 

Headquarters. April 5, 1974; April 12, 1974- 
Page, George L., Captain, USN. Naval Attache, Australia. 
June 17, 1974. 

Pee, Peter. Professor, University of Singapore. May 29, 1 974» 

Peek, Sir Peter, Vice Admiral, RAN (Ret.). Former Chief of 
Australian Naval Staff. June 19, 1974. 

Primrose, B. N. Australian National University, Canberra. 
June 17, 1974. 

Rogers, W. Haley, Rear Admiral, USN. Commander, U.S. Naval 
Forces, Japan. February 19, 1 974- 

Royama Michio. Professor, Sophia University. January 9> 1973; 
August 5, 1974. 

Rubey, E. B., Jr., Captain, USN. Naval Attache, New Zealand. 
June 25, 1974; June 26, 1974. 

Saeki Kiichi. Director, Nomura Research Institute. December 11, 
1974. 

Sakanaka Tomohisa. Political Correspondent, Asalii Shimbun . 
March 13, 1974; November 26, 1974- 

Sakurai Kiyohiko. Managing Director, Jurong Shipyard Ltd., 
Singapore. May JO, 1974. 

Samejima Iliroichi, Admiral, JMSDF. Chief of the Maritime Staff. 
March 28, 1974. 

Santos, GonzaloM., Captain. Philippine Navy. Executive Vice 
President, National Defense College, The Philippines. 
May 14, 1974. 

Sekino Hideo, Commander, IJN (Ret.). Military Analyst. * 



Seno Sadao, Commander, JMSDF. March 6, 1974; November 29, 1974; 
December 12, 1974. 

Shaw, K. E. Nanyang University, Singapore. June 5» 1974* 

Shinohara Hiroshi. Special Reporter on Defense, Political News 
Division, Asahi S him'tron . March 6, 1974; November 25, 1974* 



376 



Sitwell, D. W. Vosper Thornycroft Private, Ltd., Singapore. 
June 3, 1974. 

Spivakovsky, David. Central Studies Establishment, Canberra. 
June 19, 1974. 

Stunkel, Kenneth R. Professor, Monmouth College. December 28, 
1974. 

Taoka Shunji. Defense Correspondent, Asahi Shjmbun . * 



Thorne, E. C, Rear Admiral, RNZN. Chief of Naval Staff, 
June 28, 1974- 

Tsunoda Jun. National Diet Library. * 



Uchida Kazutomi, Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.). November 29, 1974* 

Varrell, Derek. Australian National University, Canberra. 
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Viccelio, John S., Commander, USN. Assistant Naval Attache, 
Tokyo. February 20, 1974. 

Walsh, Don, Captain, USN. October 22, 1974; January 3, 1975* 

Yamaguchi Kaiji, Captain, JMSDF. March 6, 1974; December 12, 
1974. 

Yamamoto Takashi. Ministry of Transport. December 2, 1974« 

Yamashita Tokuo. LDP Member, House of Delegates; Member, 
Dietmens League on the Ocean. April 17, 1 97 4 • 

Yamato Kunitami. Maritime Administration, American Embassy, 
Tokyo.* 

Yamazumi Akira, Captain, MSDF. Head, Foreign Liaison Section, 
Maritime Staff Office. * 



Unpublished Material and Public Statements 



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Blackwell, Robert J. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Mari- 
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Hughes, Michael Bryant. "Japan's Air Power Options: The 

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Ino Takashi. "Marine Parks in Japan." (Typewritten). 

Japan Engineering Committee on Ocean Resources. "Status Report 
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Japan Marine Science Technology Center. "Brief List of the 

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"Governmental Marine Development Program (by 



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Japan Ocean Industries Association. "JOIA." Tokyo, March JO, 
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386 



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Articles 



"Annual Drilling and Production Report." Offshore , June 20, 1974' 

Asahi Evening News. "Food and People." Asahi Evening News 
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Athay, Robert E. "The Sea and Soviet Domestic Transportation." 
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389 



Cagle, Malcolm W. "Task Force 77 in Action Off Vietnam." U.S. 
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DSba Hajime. "The Japan Sea." American Embassy, Tokyo. Summary 
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Emery, S. W. "The United States Effective Control Fleet." 

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English, Richard D. and Bolef, Dan I. "Defense Against Bomber 

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Erell, Shlomo. "Israeli Saar FPBs Pass Combat Test in Yom 
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Eto Shinkichi and Miyoshi Osamu. "What is the Axis of Japanese 

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Fraser, Angus M. "Some Thoughts on the Resurgence of Militarism 
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Frye, Richard. "The Economics of Unconventional Energy Resources." 
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Greenwood, Ted. "Reconnaissance and Arms Control." Scientific 
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Hart, B. H. Liddell. "The Objective in War." A lecture delivered 
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589 



Cagle, Malcolm W. "Task Force 77 in Action Off Vietnam." U.S. 
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Cohen, Paul. "The Erosion of Surface Naval Power." Foreign. 
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Cortada, James W. "Ships, Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War: 
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Craven, John P. "Indus try /Government Relations in Offshore 

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D5ba Hajime. "The Japan Sea." American Embassy, Tokyo. Summary 
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Emery, S. W. "The United States Effective Control Fleet." 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , XCVI (May 1970), 1 58-177. 

English, Richard D. and Bolef, Dan I. "Defense Against Bomber 

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Ere 11, Shlomo. "Israeli Saar FPBs Pass Combat Test in Yom 
Kippur War." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , C 
(September 1974), 115-118. 

Eto Shinkichi and Miyoshi Osamu. "What is the Axis of Japanese 

Diplomacy?" American Embassy, TokyS, Summary of Selected 
Japanese Magazines , April 1974* Translation from Keizai 
Orai, December 1973* 

Fraser, Angus M. "Some Thoughts on the Resurgence of Militarism 
in Japan." Pacific Community (April 1973), 437-451. 

Frye, Richard. "The Economics of Unconventional Energy Resources." 
Marine Technology Society 10th Annual Conference 
Proceedings , September 22-25, 1974, pp. 455-464* 

Greenwood, Ted. "Reconnaissance and Arms Control." Scientific 
American , 228 (February 1973), 14-25- 

Hart, B. H. Liddell. "The Objective in War." A lecture delivered 
at the U.S. Naval War College, September 24, 1952. 
Reprinted in To Use the Sea . Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1973, PP. 3-9. 



390 



Hauser, Hubert K. J. "Desalinization: The Sea as a Source of 
Fresh Water." Underwater Journal * February 1973, 9 — 1 7 • 

Hayes, John D. "The Sea 1967-72." U.S. Naval Institute Pro - 
ceedings , XCIX (May 1973), 299-J10. 

Herrington, W. C. "Operation of the Japanese Fishery Management 
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Alaska, 1970. 

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. "The Role of Navies." Brassey' s Annual 1970 . 



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Huntington, Samuel P. "After Containment: The Function of the 
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"Jieitai no Sobi to Boei Sangyo no Jittai" ("Actual Condition of 
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Ninon no Boei ( Defense of Japan) . Tokyo: Sangyo Seisaku 
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Joseph, James and Klav/e, V/itoId L. "The Living Pelagic Resources 
of the Americas." Ocean Development and International Law , 
II (Spring 1974), 37-64. " 

Kaihara Osamu. "Study on Realistic National Defense." Mainichi 
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Kasputys, Joseph. "The Evolving Role of the Merchant Marine as 
a Determinant of Seapower." Third International Seapqwcr 
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Kaul, Ravi. "The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of 
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391 



Keene, Donald. "The Short, Happy Life of Japan as a Superpower." 
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Kotani Hidejiro. "Squarely Look at the Basis of National 

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Japanese Magazines , May 1972. Translation from Jiyu , 
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Krutein, Manfred G. "Ocean Mining." U.S. Naval Institute Pro - 
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Kusayanagi Daizo. "A Kingdom of Bureaucrats: The Finance 

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Bungei Shun t ji , July 1974* 

Lelyveld, John. "The United States and South Asia." New York 
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Littman, Bruce. "How the 'Shikumisen' Deal Works." Seatrade . 
December 1973, pp. 1 37-1 38. 

Long, Jay H. "The Paracels Incident: Implications for Chinese 
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Low, Patrick. "New Dimension to the Oil Crisis." Petroleum 
News Southeast Asia. February 1974, PP» 19+* 

Luard, Evan. "V, r ho Gets What on the Seabed." Foreign Policy , 9 
(Winter 1972-73), 132-147. 

Matsueda Tsukasa and Moore, George. "Japan's Shifting Attitudes 
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McAleer, John. "Multi-Use Potential of Offshore Facilities, 

Artificial Islands and Platforms in Bays and Estuaries." 
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MccGwire, Michael. "The Submarine Threat to Western Shipping." In 
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392 



McWethy, Patricia J. "Process for Determining the Federal Role 
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Marine Technology Society 10th Annual Conference 
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"The Militarization of the Deep Ocean." SIPRI Yearbook 1969-70 . 
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Miller, George H. "Necessary for the National Defense." 
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Miwa Kimitada. "Sino-U.S. -Japan Relations Will Cause Illusion." 
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1973. 

Miyoshi Shuichi. "Japan's Resource Policy at a Turning Point." 
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Mulquin, J. J. "ARAPAQO — Emergency Helo Cover for Merchantmen." 
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. "The ARAPAHO System and Its Implications for 

Future Ship-Aviation Concept Development." Naval Engineers 
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Nagasu Kazuji. "The Super-Illusions of an Economic Superpower." 
Japan Interpreter , IX (Summer- Autumn 1974), 149-1 64. 

Namiki Nobuyoshi. "Japanese Industry's Competitive Power 
Examined." Economist (Tokyo), July 2, 1974* 

"The National Territory." Ne w Philippines (Manila), February 
1974. 

Nihon Keizai Shimbun. "Defense Industry in Japan." Japan 

Economic Journal International Weekly , July 4-December 19, 
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Niu Sien-chong. "The Resurgence of Japanese Sea Power." NATO's 
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O'Connell, D. P. "Can the Navy Plan for Peace?" New Scientist 
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. "International Law and Contemporary Naval 

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393 



Ohmura Tamotsu. "The Status of Marine Development in Japan." 
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29-33- 

Okita Saburo. "Natural Resource Dependency and Japan's Foreign 
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Okumiya Masatake. "Proposal for a Weil-Balanced National 

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Osgood, Robert E. "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law." Ocean 
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Park Choon-Ho. "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia 
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Pella, Vespasien. "la Repression de la Piraterie." Recueil des 
Cours, XV (1926-V). 

Ponte, Lowell. "Nippon Goes Nuclear." The Progressive , September 
1973, PP. 32-34. 

Reitzer, William. "Mahan on the Use of the Sea." Naval War 
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Research Institute for Ocean Economics (T3kyo) . "Waga Kuni 

Kaiyo Sangyo no Gonen'I ("Five Years of Our Country's Ocean 
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Roesnadi, 0. Sutomo. "ASEAN and the Great Powers." The Indo - 
nesian Quarterly , I (July 1973), 15-25. 

Salmon, Jack D. "Japan as a Great Power: The Military Context 
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396- 408. 

Sansone, Wallace T. "Domestic Shipping and American Maritime 

Policy." U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding s, C (May 1974), 
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Saunders, George D. "Land Bridge Comes of Age." U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings , XCIX (December 1973) ,~38-43. 



394 



Schratz, Paul. "The Nuclear Carrier and Modern War." U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings , XCVIII (August 1972), 18-25. 

Scrivener, Desmond. "Escort Ships — An Alternative Solution?" 
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"Weapons for the General Purpose Escort." Inter - 



national Defense Review , #3/1973, 331-336. 

Sekino Hideo. "Japan and Her Maritime Defense." U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings , XCVII (May 1971), 98-121. " 

Seno Sadao. "A Chess Game with No Checkmate: Admiral Inoue and 
the Pacific War." Naval War College Review , XXVI (January- 
February 1974), 26-39. 

"Shinkaitei Kobutsu Shigen Kaihatsu Kyokai ga Hassoku" ("Deep 
Seabed Mineral Resources Association is Started"). 
INS PACE , August 1974, pp. 2-6. 

Shinohara Hiroshi. "U.S. -China Rapprochement and Defense of 
Japan." American Embassy, Tokyo, Summary of Selected 
Japanese Magazines , May 1972. Translation from Chuo Koron , 
October 1971. 

Shiratori Rei. "U.S. -Japan Relations Headed Toward Dangerous and 
Unstable Period." American Embassy, Tokyo, Summary of 
Selected Japanese Magazines , June 1974* Translation from 
Economist , June 4> 1974* 

Shore, J. C. and Reeds, C. B. "Subsea Oil and Completion." 
Marine Technology Society 10th Annual Conference 
Proceedings , September 23-25, 1974, pp. 547-555. 

Simcock, B. L. "Environmental Pollution and the Citizen's Move- 
ments." Area Development in Japan, 5» Tokyo, 1972. 

Soesastro, M. Hadi. "Japan and Southeast Asia: A Regional or 

Global Question?" The Indonesian Quarterly , I (July 1973) > 
pp. 26-35- 

Stockwin, J. A. A. "Continuity and Change in Japanese Foreign 
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Suenaga Y. "Japan Wants a Voice in Pacific Naval Balance." 
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Surrey, John. "Japan's Uncertain Energy Prospects: The Problem 
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204-230. 



395 



Takane Masaaki. "Historical Structure of Japanese Bureaucracy — 
Bureaucracy and Modernization in Japan." American Embassy, 
Tokyo, Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines , October 
1 974« Translation from Chu5 Koron , September 1974* 

Thompson, Robert P. "Establishing Global Traffic Flows." 
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Tsukudo Tatsuo, Vice Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.). "Defense of Terri- 
tory." Translation in Articles from Staff College Review 
1971-1972 . Tokyo: Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff 
College, undated, pp. 51-54* 

. "Ninon no Kokubo nd Okeru Shokei Keikantei no Igi" 



("Role of Light Naval Craft in Defending Japan"). Sekai 
no Kansen , 208 (December 1974), 86-89. 

"Sea Power and Our Defense in the New Era." 



Translation in Articles from S taff College Review 1971-1972 , 
Tokyo: Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College, undated, 
PP. 65-71. 

Uchida Kazutomi. "Japan's National Defense and the Role of the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force." Pacific Community (October 
1974), PP. 38-54. 

"The Rearmament of the Japanese Maritime Forces." 



Naval War College Review , XXYl (November-December 1973) » 
41-48. 

"Verification Using Reconnaissance Satellites." SIPRI Yearbook 
1973 « Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 1973, pp. 60-101. 

Wakaizumi Kei. "Japan's Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act." 
Foreign Policy , 16 (Fall 1974), 30-47. 

"War Logistics and the Freight Container." Jane ' s Freight 

Containers 1973~74 » London: Sampson Low, Mars ton, 1 973 - 

Wechsler, L.; Brown, C. E.; and Sundaram, T. R. "Engineering 

Analysis of Systems for Extracting Useful Energy from the 
Sea." Marine Technology Society, 10th Annual Conference 
Proceedings . September 23-25, 1974, pp. 483-499. 

Weinstein, Martin E. "The Strategic Balance in East Asia," 
Current Hist pit, LXV (November 1973), 193+. 



396 



Wells, Linton II. "Japan and the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea." Ocean Development and International 
Law, II (Spring 1974), 65-91- 

Wenk, Edward, Jr. "The Physical Resources of the Oceans." 
Scientific American (September 1969), PP« 82-91. 

White, R. M. "Our Changing Ocean Priorities." Marine Technology 
Society Journal , VI (September-October 1972), 3 _ 5» 

Wilson, Desmond P. "Evolution of the Attack Carrier: A Case 

Study in Technology and Strategy." U.S. Congress, Senate 
and House Armed Services Committees, CVAN-70 Aircraft 
Carrier . 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970. 

Wohlstetter, Albert. "Japan's Security: Balancing after the 
Shocks." Foreign Policy , 9 (Winter 1972-73), 171-190. 

Yasuda M. [pseudonym]. "No Drastic About-Face in Security 
Policy." Yomiuri (English Edition), January 6, 1 971 . 

Young, Elizabeth. "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ocean." 
In Borgese, Elizabeth Mann (ed.), Pacem in I/laribus . 
New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972), 266-284. 



Periodicals 



Those magazines consulted on a regular basis included: 

Asian Survey 

A viation Week and Space Technology 

Foreign Affairs 

Foreign Policy 

International Defense Review 

Ja pan Interpreter 

Japan Quarterly 

Marine Technology Society Journal 

N aval Engineers Journal 

Naval War College Review 

Offshore 

Pacific Affairs 

Pacific Community 

Petroleum New s Southeast Asia 

Sea Power 

Sea Technology; (formerly Undersea Technology) 

Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World) 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 

Zosen 



397 



Newspapers 



The most frequently read newspapers were: 

Asahi Evening News 

Japan Times 

Mainichi Daily News 

The New York Times 

Nihon Keizai Shimbun International Weekly 

Stars and Stripes (Pacific) 

The Washington Post 

Yomiuri (English) 



Japanese newspapers and magazines mostly were reviewed 
through the publications of the Translation Section of the 
American Embassy, Tokyo, and Hiss Nakai Yoko. 



VITA 



Linton Wells II was born in Luanda, Angola, Portuguese West 
Africa, on April 7> 1946. After attending school in New York, 
Connecticut and Florida he was graduated from the Browning School 
in New York City in 1963. 

In 1967 he received a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
U.S. Naval Academy with majors in Physics and Oceanography. He 
was elected to Sigma Pi Sigma and received the Captain Charles 
N. G. Hendrix award for oceanography. 

After two years as weapons/ supply officer on a Pacific 
Fleet patrol gunboat, Lieutenant Wells served as navigator of 
the guided missile frigate U.S.S. Josephus Daniels (DLG-27) in 
the Caribbean and Gulf of Tonkin. 

Since January 1971? he has done graduate work at The Johns 
Hopkins University and completed the requirements for an M.S.E. 
degree in Mathematical Sciences in 1975* He is a member of Tan 
Beta Pi. 



<*L HVWO < 



2 U U o 



Thesis 




133528 


W4427 


Wells 






The sea 


and Japan's 




strategic 
1975-1985 


i nterests , 


->n MAY7 5 

9i HYHO 1 


DISPLAY 
2U008 






Thesis 1 L 9528 

W4427 Wells 

The sea and Japan's 

strategic interests, 

1975-1985. 



thesW4427 

The sea and Japans strateg 



ic interests, 




3 2768 001 95232 8 

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